Japan’s Foreign Policy in Transition

The Way Forward for Japan as an International Actor in a World in Flux

Edited by Bert Edström
Contents

Foreword ..................................................................................................................................................5

The Yoshida Doctrine in Unchartered Waters ..................................................................................6
Bert Edström

China and the United States as “Alternatives” in the Diplomacy of the Democratic Party of Japan .................................................................21
Guibourg Delamotte

Japan and China: The Complexities of Interdependence .................................................................32
Reinhard Drifte

Japanese ODA and Initiatives for Peace Building .............................................................................42
Marie Söderberg

Japan’s Paradigm Lost? ......................................................................................................................58
Kazuki Iwanaga

About the Authors ............................................................................................................................73
Foreword

This report is based on the workshop “Japan’s Foreign Policy in Transition: The Way Forward for Japan as an International Actor in a World in Flux,” organized by the Institute for Security and Development Policy on February 11, 2011. Japan’s present-day foreign policy was founded in the early post-war years. It was a child of the Cold War and when the Cold War ended its underpinnings seemed gone. A cautious process of change began to evolve as a result of the setback for Japan’s foreign policy during the 1991 Gulf War, and, subsequently, foreign policy has been gradually modified and altered in a step by step process. Domestic developments in 2009 made it reasonable to expect that more far-reaching changes would be introduced into Japan’s foreign policy. After the landslide victory for the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the general elections in August 2009, the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had to hand over the reins of power to the former opposition party. The new coalition government headed by the DPJ declared that the “bloodless Heisei revolution” had taken place and a process of reforms involving also foreign policy was initiated. Eventually, however, the DPJ has seen its support among voters slip. The political situation in Japan is volatile and outcome of the on-going political processes is far from clear. ISDP is grateful to the contributors who willingly shared their views on the foreign policy of Japan that is evolving.

Bert Edström
Senior Research Fellow, ISDP
The Yoshida Doctrine in Unchartered Waters

Bert Edström

The Historical Background to Japan’s Present-day Foreign Policy

The Up and Down of Japan as a Great Power (1868–1945)

For Japan, 1945 was a calamitous year. It was the year that ended Japan’s ambitions to be a traditional great power alongside those of the West. It meant the end of the saga that had been luring the Japanese ever since 1868 when the Tokugawa feudal system collapsed and Japan’s modern era began. The Meiji Restoration of that year was an event of truly world historic proportions, initiating the modernization of the country that would impact the world. Craving for power and glory, Japan’s political and military leaders during the Meiji era (1868–1912) embarked on a course that soon turned the country into a great power. The milestones of Japan’s rise to national grandeur were when it defeated China in the first Sino–Japanese War (1894–95) and the victory over Tsarist Russia in the Russo–Japanese War (1904–05). The final proof that Japan counted among the Powers was when it annexed Korea in 1910.

By then, Japan’s status as a great power was recognized not least by leading European commentators. One of them was the famous Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, the father of geopolitics, who looked upon the Korean fate under the Japanese and rejoiced: “Japan is a great and chivalrous state, so it must be an honor, even a pleasure to be killed by it.”\(^1\) Geopolitical theory that taught that strong and mighty countries had the right to suppress and exploit weaker countries had become an inspiration to the leaders of continental European countries, and was practiced by the great powers. Having excelled in being able students of the West ever since many of the Meiji leaders toured the world with the Iwakura Mission for almost two years at the beginning of the 1870s to study and learn from more

advanced countries, the Japanese excelled in their characteristic habit of not only learning from more advanced countries but also surpassing their teachers. Emerging in 1895 after its victory over China as a great power-to-be and having its status as a power on a par with Western ones sealed and safe after the victory over the Russians in 1905, Japan continued in subsequent decades to practice what it had learnt, entering a path of expansionism and aggression as a way to solve the pressing problem of feeding the population on the islands of Japan and building up industries in a country not blessed with natural resources and energy. For a country like Japan, considered severely overpopulated, industrious application of the teachings à la Kjellén and his followers seemed tailor made when the Japanese leaders wanted to solidify Japan’s place and position among the great powers.2

Japan’s unconditional surrender on August 15, 1945 made the national endeavor initiated by its leaders no more than writing in water. What the Meiji fathers and their ardent disciples had thought was an avenue to power and glory and international recognition, turned out a path to death and ruinous disaster. The outcome of World War II showed that what had seemed a solution to pressing social and economic problems was but a cul-de-sac. The Japanese nation had been led into misery and affliction by the militarists raving about extending the eight corners of the Emperor’s roof to all of the world, hakkō ichiu.3

From Defeat to Regained Great Power Status (1945–1990)

One who raged against Japan’s leaders of the 1930s and the war was Japan’s prime minister-to-be Yoshida Shigeru. He despised what he saw as a gang of extremists who had usurped power and pursued policies distorting the legacy of the Meiji founders of modern Japan.4 He was not alone in expressing disgust but was one of the most vocal. In an irony of history, he would have been among the Japanese who would have been prosecuted when the war was over but did not have to stand trial. As one of Japan’s top diplomats,

---

2 In many studies of Japan’s foreign policy published before World War II, the decisive factor behind foreign policy is population pressure. See, e.g., Albert E. Hindmarsh, The Basis of Japanese Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936).
he was deeply involved in the policies that had resulted in national disaster. What saved him were his activities at the end of the war. He withdrew from active service in 1939 and sat out the war but took part in clandestine peace discussions in the spring of 1945, an activity for which he was arrested by the Kempeitai, Japan’s feared military policy. His weeks in the hands of the military policy seem to have washed him clean of his previous record, and made him – in the words of a contemporary commentator – “eminently acceptable to SCAP [the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers] despite his previous career.”5 On his personal file kept by the Occupation authorities was written “unpurgable.”6

Yoshida entered the government as foreign minister in September 1945, and kept this post also when he became prime minister in May 1946, a post he kept until December 1954 (with an eighteen months break 1947–48). When he became prime minister, he was an unlikely choice for the post. Born in 1878 into an upper class family, he was the son in law to one of the most influential statesmen in Japan’s modern history, Makino Nobuaki, and entered diplomatic service in 1906 after graduating from Tokyo Imperial University. Subsequently, he served as a diplomat both in Asian and Western countries and reached the upper echelons of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the 1930s, he was ambassador to Italy and Great Britain and was on the verge of becoming vice-minister but withdrew from public life at the end of the 1930s and, like Winston Churchill, became an outsider to national politics.

Japan was an occupied country for most of Yoshida’s period in power and his powers as prime minister were circumscribed. All important decisions were taken by the Occupation authorities. A steady flow of reforms was put in place by them. The reforms introduced were sweeping, almost verging on being revolutionary like the adoption of a pacifist constitution, the land reform, the education reform, and the reorganization of the political and economic systems. In a clever move, the Occupation kept the Japanese government and its henchmen, the central bureaucracy, as its instruments for implementing reforms. The role played by the Japanese government was minuscule, as Yoshida recollects in his memoirs. As prime minister, “he saw

---

his task as being to do his best in a situation in which he had no power to object to policies and acts that he deeply resented. [...] Despite the fact that he was prime minister, Yoshida had often no say in the making of decisions. As the changes instituted by SCAP were intended to reshape Japanese society completely, it is no wonder that they clashed with the wishes of well-established centers of powers in Japan. Consequently, Yoshida had no choice but to clash with those interests himself if he wanted to remain in office.”7 In a stroke of irony, the stubbornly conservative Yoshida who despised many of the reforms put in place by the Occupation authorities became the very symbol for these reforms.8

In many senses, Yoshida was a man of the Meiji era who became Japan’s first modern politician. He had been centrally placed for decades and observed at close range the great power play both in the aftermath of World War I and before World War II. His many years as a top diplomat and keen observations of great power politics in the interwar period had sharpened his understanding of international relations and the forces at play in international affairs. The insights he gained were crucial for his thinking and became decisive for the formation of Japan’s foreign policy and the international role that Japan has played in the postwar period. While arrogant and stubborn as a person, he had a keen sense of the values that Japanese nationalists treasured and was an ardent Imperial loyalist. His profoundly realist understanding of what shaped the international situation, the forces influencing actions and activities of countries and the way outcomes of the encounters of powers materialized, enabled him to modify policies devised in Washington so that they became advantageous and of lasting benefit to Japan. In the words of a high-ranking Japanese official, “Yoshida was the right man for those hard times. He was decisive, strong, stubborn and secretive. Of course, these same qualities would make him less suitable for a normal peacetime democracy. [...] But back then, the times were tough and Yoshida was the sort of leader that the country needed.”9

In his memoirs Yoshida writes, “Japan is an island-nation in which a population in excess of ninety-one million must be provided with a civilised

standard of life. This can only be accomplished through an expanding volume of overseas trade.” Simply put, the problem of national survival could not be solved in the samurai way that the Meiji fathers had attempted, marching under the banner of *fukoku kyōhei*, “rich country, strong military.” That pursuit had ended in national catastrophe. As an island country and with its topography, meager resources, and large population Japan was destined to be a trading nation. To Yoshida, it was axiomatic that economic matters took precedence over politics in Japanese foreign policy. Japan’s modern history showed that securing national survival as a samurai nation in the way that prewar Japan had tried was illusory. However, at the same time, the paradox was that samurai philosophy was perfectly applicable. In the situation prevailing after World War II, with the world organized in blocs around the victorious United States and the Soviet Union, however failed Japan’s attempt to become a great power in the samurai way may have been, samurai philosophy told Yoshida that defeated Japan should seek refuge with a strong country, in the same way as a clever samurai would work for a strong lord, while a stupid samurai worked for a weak lord and would be killed; captured in the samurai principle *nagai mono ni makareyō* (“move with the powerful”). This stance had a solid tradition in Japanese history; Japan has systematically aligned itself with the power perceived to the most powerful. Thus, what guided Yoshida was thus the absolute negation of the European balance of power thinking; for him, it was not for Japan to be party to a balancing act but to side with the preponderant power.

For Yoshida, it was not hard to pick against whom Japan should lean to in the post-war situation. As a trading nation, with sea lanes controlled by the United States constituting life-and-death shipping routes for Japan, the power occupying Japan was also the power that Japan should try to lure: the U.S. was “Japan’s most dangerous enemy and most desirable ally.” The

choice was not made harder by Yoshida’s vitriolic anti-communism. Yoshida and other Japanese leaders had no sympathy with communism and had few difficulties in accepting, and adjusting policies to the Cold War World.\footnote{Reinhard Drifte, *Japan’s Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 6.} In his memoirs, he wrote “it has always been my firm belief that Japan should associate and co-operate closely with the free nations in planning her future course. […] There can be no question to which of the two world camps—free or Communist—we are committed.”\footnote{Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, pp. 274, 286.}

In the international situation prevailing after World War II, U.S. officials saw Japan not only as a defeated enemy but also a priceless asset that would tip the balance in favor of whichever power block could control it.\footnote{Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), pp. 221f.} After the onset of the Cold War, Japan was as important to the U.S. as the U.S. was to Japan. It played into Yoshida’s hands. In his negotiations with the Americans, he ingeniously played the card that the weaker party can have in negotiations.

*The Founding of Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Early Postwar Period*

In 1952 when the Occupation period was over and the dust had settled, the parameters of Japan’s postwar foreign policy had been set. It was the outcome of two treaties signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, the peace treaty signed by Japan and 47 other countries and the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty signed by Yoshida on behalf of Japan. The fact that 52 countries took part in the peace negotiations shows the scale on which Japan had come to be at odds with the world.

The security treaty settled the framework and direction of Japan’s postwar foreign and security policies. In accordance with this treaty, Japan handed over the responsibility for Japan’s defense against external enemies to the United States. Yoshida’s key interest in this arrangement was to secure Japan’s national defense in a situation where the country was demilitarized. Handing over the responsibility for national defense to an outside power was common in the era of colonialism, but it was unusual for a country that recently had been a military great power. This arrangement was the result of the war and the mood in the U.S. in the aftermath of World War II, where
the predominant interest had been to defoliate Japanese militarism, but this stance did not last long. Already by the time the Korean War broke out, the U.S. government had embarked on making Japan an industrial workshop in the Far East and a bulwark against Communism. The U.S. tried to persuade the Japanese government to start rearming, but this was an idea that the economically-minded Yoshida did not find in Japan’s interest. To appease the Americans, he began what became in reality a slowly unfolding rearmament process. When ordered, he conceded to establish a national police force in 1951 that was expanded in 1954 and became what was in reality a military force for all that it carried a euphemistic misnomer, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Subsequently, the SDF was built up to a sizeable military force.

The foreign policy line put in place with Yoshida at the rudder was built on two rails: on one hand, the security treaty signed with the U.S. in 1951 (renewed and modified in 1960); on the other, the pacifistic Constitution by which Japan abandoned its right to build up “war potential” as well as forswore its right to use violence or the threat of using violence to solve international conflicts. Declaring itself to be a pacifist country made Japan be a, if not unique, then certainly unusual country.

In accordance with the postwar settlement codified in the security alliance with the United States, issues of “high politics” were handled by the U.S. Japan’s role was to play its part in the U.S. global strategy as a loyal supporter. This did not mean that postwar Japan abandoned the ambition of reaching a position of power and glory that had guided its leadership since the Meiji era, but the craving for power and prestige was relayed into areas of “low politics,” in Japan’s case the economy, as a result of Yoshida’s “economics first” philosophy.

In hindsight, the foreign policy founded during Yoshida’s years in power has been baptized “the Yoshida Doctrine.” This doctrine is a diffident creature but, while the descriptions of Japanese and U.S. analysts differ, they agree that there was such a doctrine, the tenets of which were – to chose one description among many – (1) Japan’s economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal; political-economic co-operation with the United States was necessary for this purpose; (2) Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues; (3) To gain a
long-term guarantee of its own security, Japan would provide bases for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force.\textsuperscript{18}

The security treaty with the United States confirmed the close relationship between Japan and the U.S. In practice, the security treaty and the sovereignty granted made Japan enjoy semi-autonomy only. Yoshida’s opponents argued that he had consented to making Japan a military satellite of the United States, with the U.S. being given the right to have bases on Japanese territory. This was advantageous to the U.S. since it opened the possibility of projecting power and stationing forces close to conflict areas in East Asia like China and Taiwan as well as Korea and Indochina. As compensation, Japan received assurances for its defense against external enemies. The right for the U.S. to have bases in Japan was an offer from Yoshida, who realized that “Japan acquires security while the U.S. acquires control,” as succinctly pointed out by Iokibe Makoto.\textsuperscript{19} U.S. military bases on Japanese territory served also as a “cork in the bottle” hindering any moves from Japanese militarism. This was a key U.S. consideration in the immediate postwar years and during the discussion of how to resolve the legacy of Japan in World War II, and is still popping up on and off in statements made by both U.S. military and Japanese commentators.

Yoshida’s successor as premier, Hatoyama Ichirō, and other conservatives and nationalists objected to the security treaty and described it as a modern variant of the unequal treaties that had been forced on Japan by Western imperialist countries after the opening of the country. They found the concessions that Yoshida had consented to absolutely intolerable, but he saw the price Japan had to pay as acceptable. To him, the only viable option for Japan after its defeat was to behave as “a good loser.”\textsuperscript{20} He prided himself on being a “realist,” and did not understand those Japanese politicians who acted as if their country had not lost the war. After all Japan had attacked the United States in 1940 and this was a fact not taken lightly by U.S. decision-makers. Yoshida had a keen sense of this and understood the


\textsuperscript{20} Yoshida, \textit{The Yoshida Memoirs}, p. 58.
importance for Japan of securing tight relations with the United States, and consented on behalf of Japan to the subordination of Japanese policy to the Cold War strategy of the United States. In a situation where Japan had been demilitarized and had no military defense, he saw no other option than asking the U.S. to take responsibility for Japan’s defense against external enemies.21

The policies that Yoshida adopted made Japan an international actor of a new kind. Its foreign policy system was bifurcated. On the one hand, the security treaty with the United States provided security against external threats, and, on the other, the Constitution severely restricted what Japan could do in international affairs. The foreign policy volte face was so drastic that post-war Japan as an international actor became virtually the antithesis of what it had been before and during the war. Had Japan been an aggressive war-monger before the war, it was now a country that took pride in its pacifist constitution; had it been an expansionist power harassing and trampling on the sovereignty of other countries, it was now a country solidly inward-looking, obsessed as a nation with economic pursuits.

The Moment of Truth for Japan’s Post-War Foreign Policy

In retrospect, the policies put in place when Yoshida was prime minister became a success. After a decade, the period for economic reconstruction was over, and, by 1955, Japan had regained its prewar top industrial production level. Based on its impressive economic and industrial growth, Japan began to be described in terms of being a great power, albeit an economic one, at the end of the 1960s, and it had secured a position as an economic superpower by the 1980s. In the foreign-policy line devised in the aftermath of the war, the “high politics” aspects of Japan’s international policy, defense and security policies had been handed over to the United States, in accordance with the security treaty. The revision of that treaty that was agreed upon in 1960 did not change this arrangement, and subsequent decades saw no changes either. While allocations to defense were rather modest – eventually it settled at one percent of GNP, far less than other Western countries – it enabled Japan to build up sizeable military forces. Nevertheless, Japan’s

“exclusively defensive defense” made it adamant for Japan to rely on U.S. military power to stop “fires across the sea,” defending Japanese national interests.

When the Cold War began the U.S. government took the decision to build up Japan as a bulwark against Communism and incorporate Japan into the U.S. bloc in world politics. This meant that Japan’s subsequent rapid economic growth was nurtured by the U.S. That Japan grew to economic power opened up the avenue to pursue an assertive policy in areas of “low politics.” Japan used its swelling economic resources as a foreign-policy tool. The most notable was its ODA program. In 1990, Japan became the world’s largest ODA donor and continued to be so throughout the decade, at one time allocating ODA to 165 countries. It helped Japan regain its good name and reputation, but on a deeper level, Japan avoided having to face squarely its misdeeds in the years leading up to defeat in 1945, and the problems of “history” have continued to smear Japan’s image and pester its relations with some of its neighbors.

Foreign Policy in Disarray

While Japan was seen as a “great power” and even a “superpower,” it was lacking the prerequisites ordinarily ascribed to great powers, military power, making the leading IR scholar Kōsaka Masataka describe Japan as an “unbalanced great power,” since its great power, or superpower status, was based solely on its economic might. That Japan was an “unbalanced” power pursuing an assertive, at times even an aggressive economic diplomacy [keizai gaikō], at the same times as its involvement in high politics was

---

22 The buzz word that eventually was used to capture the nature and role of Japan’s military was that Japan had an “exclusively defensive defense.” See, e.g., Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1993 (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1993), p. 64; the commitment is reiterated as late as 2010, see “Summary of National Defense Program Outline, FY 2011-,” approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreignkakugikettei/2010/summary_ndpg_e.pdf

23 At the end of the 1990s, cuts in Japan’s ODA budget began, and, by now, cuts have continued for thirteen years and hollowed out Japan’s role as an ODA donor. In 2008, Japan’s ODA was only double that of a small country like Sweden. See Development Committee (DAC), Japan: Peer Review, 2010 (Paris: OECD, 2010), p. 92.

next to nil, was premised on the Cold War world order. When the Cold War was declared over at the Malta Summit meeting of George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev on December 2–3, 1989, it signaled the breakdown of the Cold War world order, and, with the dissolution of the USSR, the gap in power between the United States and its adversaries and allies was immense. In such a situation, Yoshida’s *nagai mono ni makareyō* thinking seemed to have paid off. Being a long-time ally with the only remaining superpower, Japan’s security situation could be seen as better than ever. What could be seen as the arrival of happy days for Japan, turned out to be illusory, however.

The Gulf War against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq that broke out on February 6, 1991 triggered a process of change of Japan’s foreign policy. Citing constitutional inhibitions Japan refused to “put boots on the ground,” which angered the U.S., from the president down to shrill public opinion. High-ranking U.S. officials made no attempt to hide their displeasure over Japan’s lack of will to show its flag on the battlefield. After much agonizing, and after having endured much pressure, Japan employed the trump card in its foreign policy toolbox, “checkbook diplomacy,” and wrote out checks totaling US$13 billion that made Japan one of the key economic backers of the war against Iraq. In consideration of its pacifist constitution, Japan made it clear that this money should not be used for weapons. Eventually, however, it became clear that Japanese funding went straight into the war chest, which was a national humiliation for Japan. Insult was added to injury when the government of Kuwait after the war expressed its gratitude in large U.S. newspapers to countries that had helped Kuwait and Japan’s name was not on the list.25 Japanese policymakers and officials were flabbergasted. Had other international events and incidents in the postwar period been “shocks” to the Japanese, the reactions to Japan’s actions during the Gulf War became the Godzilla of all shocks to jolt Japan. In the 1970s and 80s, Japan’s checkbook diplomacy had seemed to make Japan enter the club of great powers, entitled it to sit at the round table when the fate of the world was discussed and decisions taken, but now, in the twinkling of an eye and to the consternation of Japanese politicians and officials, it turned out to be just an illusion. For Japan, the reactions to its inactivity in the Gulf

---

War constituted an “absolute humiliation” resulting in a “trauma.” Japan’s foreign policy was thrown into disarray.

Cautious Changes

The “shock” that Japanese decision-makers and officials felt at the reactions to Japanese actions during the Gulf War became the impetus of a process of change. Japanese politicians and foreign policy officials realized that Japan had to find a new way forward in the post-Gulf War world. Gradually, step by step, changes were introduced. Some milestones in this process of change are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Milestones in Japan’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>International Peace Cooperation Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>National Defense Program Outline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Indian Ocean refueling mission for U.S.-led Afghanistan operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>First visit to North Korea of acting Japanese prime minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Dispatch of SDF to Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>New National Defense Program Outline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Dispatch of MSDF for anti-piracy activities outside Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A key aspect of a majority of these “milestones” is that they involve and/or are linked to Japan’s relationship to the U.S. These milestones testify to the resilience of the Yoshida Doctrine, the axis around which Japan’s foreign policy had revolved since 1951. Despite the fact that it was a child of the Cold War, and its parameters were set to meet conditions prevailing during that period, it could be surmised to have been in for change once the Cold War had ended. This did not turn out to be the case. While this outcome might be seen as paradoxical, the outcome of the process of change that was triggered by the Gulf War was consonant with foreign policy thinking à la Yoshida.

Actions taken and policies introduced by Japan in the aftermath of the 1991

---

Gulf War “shock” demonstrate the ingenuity of the Yoshida solution to the perennial problem of national leaders, national security.

With the Soviet threat gone the very *raison d’être* of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty was lost. But, instead of abolishing the treaty, Japan redefined the link to its security subscriber, the United States, to be even more solid, as can be spotted in the above list of post-1990 foreign policy milestones. Yoshida’s *nagai mono ni makareyō* thinking lingered in the background and made it even more compelling for Japan to uphold the security treaty relationship with the United States in the post-Cold War world, when the gap in power between the United States and other countries was so unprecedented that the world order was described as unipolar. In an intriguing twist of history, Japan’s behavior in the post-Cold War period has been strikingly opposite to policies pursued when the foundation of its postwar foreign policy was laid in the early years of the 1950s. Then, a key concern of the Japanese was the so-called *makikomare ron*, that Japan risked becoming a pawn in the U.S. global strategy treaty and dragged into a conflict because of its ties with the United States. In the early post-Cold War days, what loomed large in Japan was the possibility of abandonment by the United States.

**Challenges Ahead**

World trends and developments may or may not augur well for Japan. “The lost decade” of the 1990s has by now stretched one more decade. The way Japan handles and manages the challenges it encounters will be decisive. The 1991 Gulf War “shock” made Japanese foreign policy-makers reassess the foreign policy inherited from Yoshida. While changes and alternations were introduced, the very foundation of the policy established during the Yoshida years remained. In the prevailing situation with the U.S. towering presence, instead of scrapping the Yoshida line with its focus on the U.S., Japanese policymakers endeavored to build up an even closer relationship

---

with the U.S. This was in line with the nagai mono ni makareyō philosophy as practiced by Yoshida. The foreign policy that was a heritage from the Yoshida years was marked by the fact that it was formed during a period when Japan was an occupied country. The Occupation was one by the Allied Powers but the preponderant position of the United States was so marked that the occupation is often seen as American.\textsuperscript{30} The overwhelming preoccupation with great powers that is so easily discerned in Japan’s modern foreign policy continued in the postwar period as a result of the fact that Japan was geographically situated between two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. The U.S. lies beyond the seas but its power projection was such that Japan was de facto squeezed in between the two superpowers. When the Soviet Union collapsed another neighbor to Japan, China, began eventually to take on the looks of a great power and, after some years, even a superpower. Thus, throughout the postwar period, regardless of the demise of the Soviet Union, Japan has found itself squeezed between preponderant powers for most of the period. Leaning itself towards the U.S., relations with other countries became of secondary importance.\textsuperscript{31} In many ways, Japan’s security relationship with the United States during the Cold War period not only insulated Japan from the rough going of world politics but also put a lid on the need to reconcile with its neighbors for atrocities before and during World War II.

Important changes are taking place now, which will test the tenacity of Japan’s recalibrated foreign policy. The most important and a cause for much alarm on the part of Japan are the declining power position of the United States and the rise of China, which is increasingly taking on the shape of a global power. In the 1980s, Japan was seen as a rising power that had the potential to overtake the U.S. in the long run, but concurrent with the great change that took place around 1990, an economic stalemate began for Japan that has continued and eventually taken its toll – the deeper Japan has fallen into economic morass, the foggier became the contours of “unbalanced great power” that Kōsaka discerned. Current trends will inevitably force Japan’s political leadership take a renewed look at how present-day

\textsuperscript{30} The classic work is Kazuo Kawai, \textit{Japan’s American Interlude} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

Japan can solve the perennial problem of statesmen, national security. Is Yoshida’s elegant solution that has endured for so long also the solution to this problem also for the future? The upheaval of world politics that took place when the Cold War ended put the Yoshida Doctrine to a test. At that moment of history when the very *raison d’être* of this doctrine was seen to have gone down the drain, Yoshida’s latter-day successors came up with an adaptation of the doctrine that made it turn out to be still going strong. But for how long?
China and the United States as “Alternatives” in the Diplomacy of the Democratic Party of Japan

Guibourg Delamotte

The August 2009 elections in Japan brought a new administration to power. After nearly 60 years, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was ousted from power, having ruled uninterrupted since 1955, with the exception of 11 months from August 1993 to June 1994. In the West, some media claimed that a center–left party had come to power. In Japan, too, many claimed that it was a victory for a Left-wing party, with a program akin to that of the Communists. Why this vision or portrayal of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), and what were its consequences as far diplomacy goes?

The DPJ was depicted as being pro-Chinese and anti-American and some feared that its victory would have repercussions on the Japan–U.S. security alliance. This was an erroneous view of the party’s position. During the 2009 campaign, the LDP/DPJ alternative had been turned into a U.S. vs. China one in a distortion of both LDP and DPJ views. In fact, the LDP had sought to establish good relations with China in a number of fields after 2006. The DPJ aimed to continue in the same vein; its policy had anti-American side effects but the U.S. Alliance was re-established as central to Japan’s diplomacy. A closer look at the DPJ’s structure and program and the political context helps understand how its intentions could be misrepresented, what it intended to do in the diplomatic field, and why it could not do more.

Good Japan–U.S. relations and good relations with China are seen as mutually exclusive by those who emphasize that China is a threat and the Alliance the way to face it. Putting emphasis on U.S. deterrence after North Korean aggression towards South Korea (the March sinking of the Cheonan) or towards the Alliance after a crisis in China–Japan relations (following the


2 Interviews, Tokyo, May–August 2010.
September collision), as Hatoyama and Kan did respectively,\(^3\) gave weight to this view. But for either of those relations to be allowed to improve or evolve, they should be distinguished from one another.

1. The LDP/DPJ Alternative Turned into a United States/China Alternative

A Right-wing Party with a Left-wing Image

A Center-right Party

The DPJ is in fact more of a center-right than a center-left party, judged by the political color of its more charismatic members: a majority of them stem from the LDP after the party split in 1992. The DPJ was a gathering of the small parties with center-left MPs (the Democratic Socialist Party, DSP, won only 15 seats in the 1993 general elections).

The notions of right and left are relative from one country to another and one period to the next. In Japan, the LDP (which itself contains a broad range of opinions, from center-left to conservative) put emphasis on welfare from the 1970s and its ability to redistribute wealth was one of the factors that enabled it to retain power for many decades. The main dividing line between left and right in Japanese politics is the defense policy; a narrow definition of the DPJ’s left includes some 40 MPs. In April 2009, its various “working groups” (akin to LDP factions, but more fluid as memberships in several groups is allowed) displayed the following approximate memberships: 50 for Ozawa Ichirō, 30 for Hatoyama Yukio, 30 for Maehara Seiji, 15 for Hiraoka Hideo’s Riberaru no kai, 30 for Kan Naoto, 20 for Noda Yoshihiko, 20 for Kawasaki Tatsuo (former DSP), 20 for Yokomichi Takahiro (former Japan Socialist Party, JSP). Though Ozawa, Hatoyama or Maehara have personal and diverging views of what Japan’s defense policy should be, the “right” of the party constitutes its majority and its left (former DSP and JSP) a minority.

The left-right divide is blurred beyond defense issues. Ozawa favors to some extent a development of Japan’s defense policy – essentially within the UN framework – and is also known as a friend of China, which makes him a center-right figure. Maehara favors good relations with the United

\(^3\) Hatoyama Yukio (September 2010–June 2010), Kan Naoto (June 2010 to present).
States, increased strategic autonomy for Japan, and has brought up China’s “threat” in the past, which puts him to the right of the political arena.

Nonetheless, the median opinion of DPJ’s MPs leans to the right and the party is most accurately described as center-right rather than as center–left. However, the electoral context explains why it was placed or positioned itself further to the left than it really was in 2009.

A Center–left Image

Aiming at victory in August 2009, the DPJ put a strong emphasis on its social program, offering to abolish highway tolls and high-school fees and to establish a child allowance.

The DPJ was further drawn to the left by its alliance with the Social Democrats. The DPJ’s platform was not anti-American but it ended up being perceived as such as Hatoyama struggled to settle the Futenma issue. The Social Democrats insisted they would not remain in the coalition if Hatoyama did not keep his promise to relocate this base outside of Okinawa, or preferably outside of Japan, and did when he failed to deliver.

Further Background Elements

Hatoyama’s Voice Article

Further elements misled observers to believe that Hatoyama was anti-American. In an article published in the September issue of the monthly Voice and in an op-ed published in the New York Times, Hatoyama dwelt on the financial crisis that to many had suggested “that the era of U.S. unilateralism may come to an end.” It had also raised doubts “about the permanence of the dollar as the key global currency.” He further felt that “as a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financial crisis, the era of U.S.-led globalism [was] coming to an end and that we [were] moving toward an era of multipolarity.”

This, along with subsequent paragraphs, was taken to mean that an East Asian Community inspired by the European experience should establish its own currency and rise as U.S. influence decreased.

---

Hatoyama’s Family History

Hatoyama’s grandfather, Ichirō, was also a leading politician and his ideas were seen as proof that his grandson, who in many ways followed in the steps of his grandfather (invoking the concept of yūai, fraternity or solidarity, quoting Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, …) was as opposed to the Japan–U.S. Alliance as his grandfather had been. Though Hatoyama did, like his grandfather, wish to see the U.S. bases on Japanese territory withdrawn and Japan’s Constitution revised, he did not wish to end the security alliance with the United States (not right away, anyway).

Distrust from the Elites

Hatoyama’s unawareness of what might be inferred from his writings and his family history were additional factors that misled observers. Issues on the DPJ’s program – a cut in useless spending in particular in relation with the amakudai, bureaucrats’ “second careers” in agencies often related to ministries; and stance – Kan’s record as Minister of Health and Welfare – also drew criticism from elites whose fears seemed likely to materialize: the Japan–U.S. Alliance would incur severe damage, Japan’s public deficit would rise, bureaucrats would be considered enemies… Intellectual, bureaucratic and business elites were therefore largely opposed to DPJ, which won the general election in August 2009 thanks to the swing votes of urban classes, and lost the election in July 2010 because of their disappointment.

2. The DPJ’s Lack of Will to Deeply Alter Japan’s Diplomacy

The DPJ’s Diplomacy with Respect to the United States and China

The DPJ Manifestos

In fact, the DPJ had no pretense to reassess the pillars of Japanese diplomacy. The 2008 Policy Index claimed that the party would establish the Japan Alliance of a new era, based on equal relations and trust. To this end, it would launch an autonomous diplomatic strategy that would clearly state Japan’s claims. While playing a role different to that of the United States, Japan would actively assume its share of responsibilities. What is implied is that Japan was going to strengthen its capabilities in order to be less dependent upon the United States and to have the means to be more responsive
in international crisis situations. This would require an increased budget for defense, foreign aid, intelligence, and foreign ministry, which – given Japan’s current financial situation – means spending less elsewhere. Therefore, the Policy Index indicated that Japan’s contribution to the costs of the U.S. bases would be regularly reexamined with a view to limiting costs in consideration of the U.S. budget situation, the position of U.S. forces in Japan and their activities in Asia, so as to ensure that the Japan–U.S. Alliance, a pillar of Japan’s security, could genuinely contribute to Asia’s peace and that civilian control functioned effectively.

As for relations with China, the Policy Index emphasized the importance of bilateral ties and China’s relevance for regional peace and prosperity. In view of the challenges to come – food safety, environment, lack of transparency of China’s defense budget, etc. – relations of trust should be built between the heads of states of the two countries and constructive discussions should take place.

With respect to the Japan–U.S. Alliance, the DPJ’s 2009 Manifesto stated that to establish a close and equal Alliance, the party, while respecting the burden sharing pertaining to the Alliance, would seek to establish a diplomatic strategy and to develop Japan’s commitments accordingly. This implied a will to preserve the Alliance and to be more active within its framework, with a clearer view of Japan’s national interest. The New Special Measures Agreement\(^5\) and relocation plans, in the context of the transformation of the U.S. armed forces, would be reviewed.

As for relations with Asia, the DPJ wished to strengthen them and put a genuine effort into building a trust relationship with neighboring countries, in particular China and South Korea. An Asia-Pacific Community should be built extending to trade, finance, energy, the environment, assistance in case of natural disasters and pollution.

The DPJ’s 2010 Manifesto put more emphasis on diplomacy than the previous one (moving from the seventh to the third point of the Manifesto). After the March sinking of a South Korean patrol boat (the Cheonan) by a North Korean torpedo and following Hatoyama’s mishandling of the

\(^5\) The Agreement between Japan and the USA concerning new special measures relating to Art 24 of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (also referred to as “the Status of Forces Agreement,” SOFA) will expire in March 2011.
Futenma issue, the Manifesto stated that relations with the United States should be strengthened; the burden of the bases on Okinawa would be reduced “in accordance with the agreement signed with the United States” (the May 28, 2010 agreement affirming the 2006 solution of a relocation of Futenma to Henoko, though some activities will be relocated outside Okinawa and the DPJ’s objective remains to shut down Futenma). Defense cooperation with Australia, South Korea and India would be developed. Relations of trust should be established with China and defense cooperation should be developed. Most of this program meant achieving what the LDP had dreamt and failed to complete. The 2010 Manifesto clearly took on LDP ideas.

Things did not go according to plan.

Relations with the United States

The DPJ’s avowed intention in the summer of 2009 was to establish a stronger, more balanced Alliance with the United States based on a greater (though asymmetric) contribution from Japan. Inspired by Terashima Jitsurō, who advocated “bases in emergency only,” Hatoyama concentrated on the base issue, which appealed to most in the coalition and the party. By May 2010, debates over Futenma had brought no discussion on the future shape of the Alliance: Futenma had been addressed as an internal issue. Only in May 2010 did its international dimension emerge, when Hatoyama declared that he had come to understand the meaning of deterrence in general and Futenma’s role in U.S. deterrence in particular. May 2010 marked a return to square one (the 2006 plan with the aforementioned qualifications), notwithstanding the frustration felt in U.S. political and diplomatic circles.

The crisis in China–Japan relations, in the fall of 2010, provided an opportunity for Japan and the United States to restate for the former its appreciation of the Alliance, and for the latter its commitment to Japan’s security and the stability of the Far East. This gave weight to the argument that Japan could not seek to maintain good relations with China and the United States concurrently.

---

6 Terashima Jitsurō, “Jōshiki ni kaeru isō to kōsō: Nichibei dōmei no saikōchiku ni mukete” [The will and imagination to return to common sense: Toward a restructuring of the U.S.–Japan alliance], Sekai, February 2010, pp. 118–25.
Relations with China

Relations with China under Hatoyama started on the erroneous expectation in Japan that the DPJ would incur some change compared to when the LDP was in power. It was an assumption based on a misunderstanding of the balance of opinions inside the DPJ, of its resulting program and intent, and of the LDP’s past goals and, occasionally, achievements (after Prime Ministers Koizumi, Abe, Fukuda, Asō and their respective defense ministers had attempted to improve conditions).

In December 2009 DPJ Secretary-General Ozawa Ichirō made a spectacular four-day visit to China as the head of a delegation of 600 decision-makers. Beyond Ozawa’s initiatives, continuity prevailed, with its ups and downs. When Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Tokyo at the end of May 2010, an agreement on food safety was signed and the idea of a hotline between heads of states was voiced again; in April 2010, Chinese vessels transited through Japanese straits without prior notice and helicopters flew by the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) destroyers.

A greater-than-usual crisis followed the September 2010 collision of a fishing vessel in a Japan Coast Guard (JCG) vessel. The reason why this incident developed into a crisis in Japan–China relations lasting two months was that since the issue involved the JCG and not the SDF, the Japanese judiciary dealt with it and it was kept out of the diplomatic channels. The harder right of the DPJ might have sought to show China that it was being treated according to applicable procedures. Possibly preoccupied by the anti-Japanese demonstrations across the country or eager to reverse the situation, the Chinese government reacted irrationally (relentlessly summoning the Japan ambassador to Beijing, slowing down exports of “rare earth minerals” to Japan). Therefore, like Japan–U.S. relations, Japan–China relations, if anything, deteriorated under the DPJ.

In any event, to achieve substantial change in diplomacy, the party faced many obstacles.

---

Hatoyama’s first trips as prime minister were to the United States for the UN General Assembly, then to South Korea.
Change of Diplomacy

Why Diplomacy Knows Little Change in Spite of Changes of Governments

Diplomacy is usually subject to little interest on the part of voters, hence its limited dependence on majorities. France’s 1981 change of administration and the subsequent 14 years of Socialist rule led to little change from the previous Gaullist (under de Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard d’Estaing) period.

Japan was long an exception. Until the 1995 general elections, the JSP was the main opposition party. Its main terrain of opposition with the LDP was defense policy or more broadly, relations with the United States, China and the Soviet Union. The reason why it never appealed to enough voters to overtake the LDP and why a social, center–right party like Kōmeitō found a political space was that a majority of voters felt it best for Japan to be part of the West (in the geostrategic meaning of the word during the Cold War).

Since the end of the Cold War was met in Japan with the demise of the “1955 system,” Japan is no longer an exception in this respect. In the 2005 general election campaign, Prime Minister Koizumi had declared that he would support the United States should there be a war in Iraq. Public opinion was against Japanese military participation in such a war. Nonetheless, Koizumi was re-elected by a very large majority. Diplomacy no longer is tied to politics in voting behavior.

Further reasons explain why a new administration did not bring about profound diplomatic changes.

Why Japan’s Diplomacy has Changed Little with the DPJ

Three sets of reasons, of a legal, political and social nature, account for the lack of substantial change in Japan’s diplomacy after the DPJ’s victory in the 2009 general elections. First, the normative constraints on Japanese defense have prevented Japanese governments making radical changes in this field.8 Such change has been incremental due to the necessity to alter the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution and the defense principles drawn from

---

it; to gather a majority in the political arena; not to go against public opinion (as stated above, defense issues are hardly relevant in electoral outcomes, but they can cause governments to collapse); to take Japan’s security environment into account and provide for Japan’s effective security. Changes have often occurred undercover rather than publicly; measures widely publicized for international purposes are often accompanied by cautious restrictions for domestic ones.

Second, the organization of political life and the structure of the political scene do not encourage long-term vision and strategic thinking. This favors step-by-step decisions, which are more easily reversed and easier to pass. The frequency of elections means alliance politics with their short-term electoral goals, and domestic issues prevail over long-term agendas and a future leader’s opinions on international matters. Furthermore, all opinions are represented in large parties in order to allow them to broaden their reach, and also because they are considered as electoral machines rather than as gatherings of like-minded representatives.

Third, a lack of consensus on history, a lack of will to impose the majority view of history on the minority (revisionist) view and to re-examine a long-gone past prevents Japan from taking the steps that Chinese leaders (or for that matter Korean ones) would expect and which would compel them in turn to admit that Japan is now a peaceful nation.

How can those obstacles subside?

3. Learning from the LDP, or How Continuity Could Lead to Change

The Difficulty of Moving Forward in Relations with China...

A substantial move forward in Japan–China relations would require China’s goodwill. At present, there is a lack of will on the part of China to change its official view of Japan or that of the Chinese people, and a lack of interest in doing so. The “history card,” which China can draw at any moment, is all too convenient. All opposition in Japan would not vanish if China became

---

9 The Futenma relocation issue did contribute to Minshutō’s poor performance in the July 2010 Upper House elections, but it bears a major domestic (political and economic) dimension.

10 Kishi Nobusuke (July 1960), Hatoyama Yukio (June 2010).

more open to dialogue on history, but it would make it difficult for the status quo to subsist.

... or in Relations with the United States

Some of the weaknesses of Japan’s defense policy are also its strengths. The reluctance of Japanese leaders to deploy troops overseas not only stems from normative considerations, but from the fact that they thereby are “compelled” to contribute to international operations at a lower human and material cost.

In theory, Japan could gain more autonomy from the United States by improving the ability to defend itself, while preserving the constitutional interpretation on overseas deployments. In practice, to the right at least,\textsuperscript{12} gaining autonomy means gaining influence over the United States, i.e. being able to voice concern on a planned international operation and to refrain from taking part in it without imperiling its security. Therefore, cooperation within the framework of the Japan–U.S. Alliance, defense of the Japanese territory and international cooperation of a military nature all have a meeting point in the bilateral relationship.

Therefore, ultimately, if Japanese leaders want more autonomy from the United States, they will have to review Japan’s overall defense doctrine. However, at present, the Diet members who want more autonomy are not a majority, nor indeed does a majority agree on what autonomy might mean.

Hints from the LDP

Given the current state of Japan’s defense doctrine, the United States plays an irreplaceable part in Japan’s defense. Therefore, relations with China must improve \textit{in spite of} the Alliance. The only way for this to happen is to ensure that the Alliance is not perceived as anti-Chinese – though all elements of Japan’s security environment (including China’s military rise) fall under the scope of the Alliance.

Japan’s elites should distinguish both sets of relations to allow each one to develop positively. This was in fact what the LDP tried. Koizumi’s successors would not mention China as a threat to Japan and aimed at

\textsuperscript{12} To the left, the way to autonomy is the dissolution of the Security Alliance and the signature of a treaty of amity with the United States.
strengthening relations with the United States while improving cooperation with China. Their unstated goal was to increase Japan’s autonomy from the United States and to re-establish a balance of power favorable to Japan in its dealings with China.

The DPJ wanted much the same but achieved opposite results. By reaffirming the importance of the Japan–U.S. Alliance after the autumn crisis in Japan–China relations, it gave weight to the view that good relations with China and the United States were mutually exclusive as if the three countries were engaged in a zero-sum game. It thereby reversed the trend which the LDP had started after Koizumi of rebalancing U.S. and China relations in Japan’s diplomacy. The LDP sought confidence-building measures with China, in particular improvements in cooperation and communication on food safety, pollution or defense – efforts which the DPJ kept up upon Wen Jiabao’s May 2010 visit. With the September 2010 collision, this trend was reversed.

The political repercussions of the problem of relocating Futenma and the diplomatic confusion that followed the September 2010 vessel collision incident may not have happened had the DPJ had a long-term vision of the goals it aims to achieve. The LDP launched a reflection on the creation of a National Security Council. Pursuing LDP goals may be the best way in some instances for the DPJ to achieve reforms. Some MPs also call for a reorganization of the political scene, which would provide the Japanese leadership with increased stability. Those are the paths to follow.
Japan and China: The Complexities of Interdependence

Reinhard Drifte

Introduction

Despite the ups and down of the Japanese–Chinese relationship, the economies of both countries have become more interwoven and more interdependent. However, while Japan was in the past clearly the stronger economic partner which was less dependent on economic interactions with China, this has changed since the 1990s. Major turning points were Japan’s need of trade with China since the beginning of the new millennium to overcome its economic slump, the year 2007 when China overtook the United States as Japan’s biggest trading partner, and 2010 when China overtook Japan as the second biggest GNP power.

This contribution will therefore look first at some statistical data to document the economic interdependence of the two countries while trying to document the shift from Japan – being, at least in relative terms, the less dependent partner – to China achieving this position. The second part will analyze how Japan is politically aggregating this growing dependence and vulnerability and what economic counter-measures it has chosen. Finally I will evaluate what factors are complicating Japan’s ability to cope with this new trend and what are the implications for the overall relationship. At the end I offer five scenarios for where Japan’s relationship with China may go, and conclude that it seems most likely that Japan will reinforce at first its political-strategic relationship with the U.S., but finally – particularly in view of its growing dependence on the Chinese economy – be forced to opt to “jump on the bandwagon” with China at the expense of the Japan–U.S. relationship.
Shifting Trade Patterns and Dependency Ratios

Japan’s exports to China in 2010 amounted to US$149 billion, which was an increase of 36 percent over the previous year, and imports from China were valued at US$153 billion, an increase of 24 percent. First of all, the increase in Japan’s exports to China is very significant and has been like this for the last few years, which has been extremely important for Japan as it copes with its economic crisis. Japan has no other trading partner of that scale with such increases. Secondly, Japan’s exports to China in 2010 counted for 19.4 percent of Japan’s total exports, while China’s share of Japan’s total imports was 22.1 percent. Compared with Japan’s shares of exports to and imports from the United States (15.4 percent and 9.7 percent, respectively), China’s share in Japan’s overall trade is ahead of the United States, which had been for a long time Japan’s top trading partner. Japan’s exports to the United States were US$118 billion (still an increase of 26.3 percent!) and imports US$67 billion (an increase of 13.7 percent). Finally, in 2010 Japan achieved a small trade surplus with China for the first time since 1988 as a result of China’s booming economy, which relies to a considerable extent on Japanese technology and parts.

At the same time, the importance of Japan for China is decreasing despite the growing overall trade volume and annual increases. Japan’s share in Chinese exports fell from 13 percent in 2003 to 8 percent in 2010 (Japan is now No. 3 after U.S. and Hong Kong). Japan’s share in Chinese imports fell in the same period from 18 percent to 13 percent in 2010 (Japan is now No 1 before South Korea and Taiwan).

- However, the share of China in Japan’s worldwide foreign direct investments (FDI) stock was only 8 percent compared with 11 percent for ASEAN, 27 percent for Europe and 32 percent for the United States. This is explained by Japan’s relative late start of heavy FDI in China (i.e. the 1990s), and by the greater number of FDI by small and medium enterprises (SME), in contrast to the size of FDI having gone to the

---

2 “Chūgoku risuku” [The China risk], Shūkan Daiyamondo, October 30, 2010, p. 28.
United States and the EU. But this again has to be qualified in terms of Japan’s growing dependence on China. The figures as of 2009 are: 29.1% of Japanese overseas companies are in China (5130 companies)

- 33.2% of workers in Japanese companies overseas are Chinese
- 14.6% of Japan’s equipment FDI (setsubi tōshigaku) are in China
- 16.1% of the turnover of Japanese overseas companies is made in China

For individual industrial sectors, the dependence on China is particularly significant. The share of China in overseas sales for Toyota (a late comer to FDI in China!) is 8 percent, for Nissan it is 17 percent and for Honda 18 percent. Other sectors with significant dependency ratios are electronics, apparel and food. However, it is the dependence on rare earth minerals which was highlighted in 2010 when the general public realized that over 90 percent of Japanese imports of these vital metals comes from China. This fact surfaced after China first curtailed the export of rare earth minerals, and then, in September, temporarily suspended their export to Japan in the wake of the latest incident around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. However, Japan also depends on imports from China for other vital metals: Antimony (94 percent), Tungsten (87 percent) and Indium (71 percent).

Other economic sectors are also gaining prominence in the bilateral economic relationship. For the last few years, the Japanese government has gradually been lowering the visa requirements for Chinese tourists to Japan because of their growing importance for tourism in Japan in general and for regional economies in particular. In the first five months of 2010, the number of Chinese tourists to Japan increased by 36 percent to 600,000 after the total for 2009 had reached 1.1 million. Data of the Japan National Tourist Organization (JNTO) show that Chinese tourists spend ¥230,000 on average per trip to Japan, half of that on souvenirs such as cosmetics, pharmaceutical products, clothes, brand bags, watches, electric products and cigarettes.

---

4 Shūkan Daiyamondo, October 30, 2010, p. 46-47.
5 Shūkan Daiyamondo, October 30, 2010, p. 54.
6 Shūkan Daiyamondo, October 30, 2010, p. 37, 41.
When this number temporarily dropped after the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands incident, the general public became aware of the importance of this market. All the time new areas of actual or future dependence on China are becoming apparent. China is increasingly becoming a capital exporter thanks to its outward going companies, as well as its state-run sovereign funds. While most Chinese FDI is still directed to the energy and raw materials sectors, an increasing amount is flowing into ailing companies in Western developed countries like Japan, where Chinese companies are aiming at the acquisition of technology, brands and management know-how. On an annual basis, Chinese FDI to Japan increased from US$12 million in 2006 to US$15 million in 2007, reaching US$37 million in 2008. According to Thomson Reuters data, Chinese companies completed 11 investments in Japanese firms in 2009 for a total value of US$118 million, up from seven deals for a combined US$2 million in 2008 and two for US$309 million in 2007. By the middle of 2010, the tally of Chinese investment in Japan had already jumped to 14 cases for US$95 million.

What is impressive at this point are not the absolute figures, which are still very small and directed towards mostly smaller companies, but the speed and purposefulness of these FDI and mergers and acquisitions (M&A), as well as their growing importance for salvaging ailing companies with significant technologies and/or brands.

One can conclude in general that up to the 1990s Japan was the less dependent one (Japanese imports of raw materials/energy from China, Japanese outsourcing to China), whereas China was the more dependent one (Japanese FDI and Official Development Assistance (ODA), export of technology to China in form of equipment/components, access to the Japanese market). However, this changed from around the middle of the 1990s with Japan’s economic slowdown and demographic crisis, when Japan became more dependent on China to overcome its recession through exports to China, the two-sided sword of relocation and outsourcing to China and

---

the high dependence for certain raw materials and food. At the same time China became less dependent on Japan as a result of its economic success, which brought with it opportunities to diversify FDI, ODA, to develop competitive strengths as producer, exporter, and acquirer of raw materials/energy/M&A and to absorb foreign technologies from foreign companies in China. A Japan-relevant example is the technology to produce its own high-speed trains, which has been acquired through China’s own efforts, through cleverly playing producers in Japan, France and Germany against each other as well as through Intellectual Property Rights violations.

Political Aggregation and Countermeasures

These shifts in economic strengths have to be considered in their political context. How does the political discourse in Japan react to it, and what kind of economic and political countermeasures – if at all – are undertaken? Are there any political consequences, and by what other factors are these influenced?

From a perspective of market liberalism, the shift may be considered “value free.” Japan may lose its international economic ranking and has to submit to certain market forces (e.g. paying more for rare earth minerals and other internationally traded raw materials and energy resources), but China provides Japan with an ever expanding market to “export itself out” of the recession, salvages ailing companies (thus maintaining employment in Japan), and even supports regional economies through its tourism. Mainstream opinion in Japan widely recognizes these positive effects. When the government conceded in February this year that China had overtaken Japan as the second largest economy in terms of GNP, the reactions were positive, albeit wistful, and the development was taken as an incentive for Japan to address more forcefully its own structural and political problems.11

At the same time, the move from being the stronger one in an interdependent economic relationship to becoming the weaker one, or even the more vulnerable one – if only in relative terms – has been recognized.

At the economic level, the mainstream media has pointed this out, although in the end they agree that not much can be done about it. There

---

11 “Japan as No. 3,” *The Japan Times*, February 18, 2011; “China unseats Japan as world No. 2 economy / Late-year downturn was tipping point,” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, February 15, 2011.
is talk about the “China risk.” From around 2004, Chinese acquisitions of some Japanese medium-sized companies have been given prominent coverage by Japan’s media. This led the business journal *Economisuto* to have on the cover of its September 14, 2004 issue the title “Chinese companies buy Japan!” although the contents did not bear this out at all. In 2009 the movie “Vulture” dealt with the issue, featuring a Japanese fund manager who was brought in to rescue a fictional car maker from the grips of the Chinese government-backed fund out to dismantle it.

One economic counter-argument is to point out how much China still needs Japan for the continuity of its economic development (apart from drawing attention to the huge gap between the two economies in terms of per capita income, wealth, technological base, etc.). China is facing now, and perhaps even more in the future, huge economic and environmental problems and will need all the help it can get, particularly from a country with top environmental technology and other tangible and intangible assets. Japan’s experience of moving from a developmental state to a post-industrial society is extremely useful for China. However, the notion of “need” (let alone “dependence” or “interdependence”) is political: China’s authoritarian regime can shape this notion in order to protect its legitimacy as a successful regime vis-à-vis the Chinese public, or to cope with the public’s animosity towards Japan.

Japan is taking several economic countermeasures. Specialist media offer plenty of advice on how to deal with the “China Risk.” The expression “China Risk” has apparently been coined by JETRO, which suggests that Japanese companies should not only consider investing in China, but should also invest in another country like Vietnam or India – the so-called “China +1” strategy. In 2010, India became for the first time the No. 1 country for planned FDI by Japanese companies. In order to deal with the dependence on China for rare earth minerals Japanese companies, supported by the government, concluded agreements for extracting and processing rare earth minerals with the United States, Canada, Australia, Mongolia, Vietnam and Bolivia. However, the implementation of these agreements will last longer than inventories in Japan, and, at least in the short term, Japanese

companies will have to provide funding and technology to Chinese companies in order to secure continued supply, thus effectively cementing their dependence on China.15

However, the main difficulty for Japan (and for China, albeit for different reasons) to cope positively with this paradigm shift of economic dependence or even vulnerability lies in the political arena. One has to question the Liberalist notion that growing economic interactions reduce political frictions. Closer economic links and interdependence can lead – at least temporarily – to economic frictions, as the tense Japan–U.S. economic relationship until 1995 proved. However, these tensions were contained because both countries could balance these tensions with a positive political-strategic relationship. It was therefore not enough when Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji stated that “Japan and China are in a relationship of mutual dependence, particularly when it comes to economic matters. […] It’s extraordinarily important for the world’s second- and third-largest economies to cooperate dependably with one another. Right now we’ve got to make this recognition the foundation for our efforts to improve bilateral relations.”16

The political problems between Japan and China are considerable and there is a clear negative potential for an escalation between the political and economic relationships. The main issues are the historical legacy, the disputes in the East China Sea and the Taiwan issue.17 At the very least, economic disputes may make the solution of political conflicts more difficult. The combination of extraordinary political and economic measures taken by China during the latest East China Sea incident to force Japan to capitulate have been a warning sign for most Japanese. Not only in this incident but also in other cases it became clear that China’s leadership has gained self-confidence, encouraged by the overcoming of the world economic crisis after the Lehman Shock and by demands from public opinion.

There are several structural factors that complicate the management of these political-economic problems. The different political systems diminish the legitimacy of the other side and delay the recognition of common interests. One case where China brings together the historical legacy and Japan’s legitimacy is the latter’s quest for a permanent UN Security Council seat: China declares that Japan lacks the legitimacy for such a seat because of its failure to come to terms with its past in a way considered appropriate by China. The difference in the political systems and political culture means that Japan has weak political leadership that is highly bureaucratized and often deficient in analysis. The Chinese political system is highly centralized and generates a mix of rigidity and adaptability. China’s increasing pluralism of political actors and the growing spoiler role of the public (e.g. internet) makes, however, decision-making sometimes very difficult.

Both sides have very different negotiation styles, which does not help with the resolution of disputes. Japan’s negotiators have a tendency towards initial total denial of a dispute and attempts to avoid it, then to minimize it, reiterate positions and take a very legalistic approach. One example of this kind of sequence is Japan’s approach to the territorial dispute around the Senkaku Islands, where Japan at different times has either implicitly agreed to “shelve” or to deny the very existence of a territorial problem. Moreover, Japanese negotiators are often – particularly at the current moment – handicapped by slow decision-making, need for consensus across many political actors and weak political leadership. Particularly weak governments have a tendency to insist on traditional positions. This can result in misjudgment of changing power relationships, the missing of a window of opportunity and the risk of total capitulation.

Chinese negotiation tactics are more flexible and skillful. Chinese negotiators like to commit the other side to a “motherhood” principle (e.g. “peaceful coexistence”; “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests”), but over time try to extend the reach of the principle through reinterpretations or blaming the other side for not doing enough to achieve it. In the case of the East China Sea both sides agreed to change it from a “Sea of Confrontation” to a “Sea of Peace, Cooperation, and Friendship.” Since the agreement in June 2008 to negotiate a treaty on sharing the hydrocarbon resources in the East China Sea, the Chinese side – probably for domestic reasons – has been stalling with the resumption of negotiations,
accusing the Japanese side of not creating the appropriate atmosphere for such negotiations.

The other side’s “silence” may be interpreted as acceptance and commitment (e.g. “shelving” the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue during treaty negotiations in 1972 and 1978). They skillfully use levers and back channels to the other side (“divide and rule”). The Japanese side’s tactics, which may result in delays, is used by China to improve its negotiation position.¹⁸

Concluding Remarks

This contribution is meant to argue that Japan’s position vis-à-vis China is weakened by many factors, but focusing here on the impact of the shift from Japan being the less vulnerable economic partner to China achieving this position now. Coping with this shift is complicated by the difficult political relationship between the two countries. Making a case for higher or lower vulnerability is, however, difficult because so much depends on political aggregation by both sides, which in turn is strongly influenced by political leadership, political system and political culture. While there are signs in Japan of economic accommodation with China’s economic rise (because of its benefits, its perceived inevitability and Japan’s lack of means to reverse the situation), the political implications (e.g. China’s ability to increase its military force and challenge U.S. preponderance in Asia) and political disputes make accommodation on the political level more difficult.

I suggest therefore the following scenarios, which, like all scenarios, suffer from the simplistic extrapolation of present trends (e.g. China’s economic rise or political stability):

1. Japan skillfully equilibrates the diverse elements of its policy of engagement with China (i.e. the mixture of political and economic enticements, hedged by its military forces and the Japan–U.S. security arrangements).

2. Japan accepts China’s political, economic and military pre-
dominance in Asia and makes itself accepted by scaling
down the military alliance with the United States (jumping
on the bandwagon). This may be more acceptable to Japan if
China becomes more democratic.

2a Facilitating circumstances for 2: Marginalization of Japan
(as a result of Japanese decline/abdication – for economic,
demographic or even tectonic (i.e. an earthquake in Tokyo)
reasons). Other circumstances may be that neither the United
States nor China needs Japan anymore that much because of
its political and economic weakening. Finally, Japan’s grow-
ing dependence on China may lead to inescapable political
consequences.

3. Japan further integrates itself into the Japan–U.S. military
alliance and strengthens its political and military power to
balance against China’s rising power.

4. Japan develops its own autonomous military power and tries
to assume a posture of neutrality and a role as a mediator
among the powers in Northeast Asia.

5. Japan becomes an active and imaginative promoter of Asian
integration that includes China in such a way that it does not
become a spoiler of peace and stability in the region.

Scenarios 1, 4 and 5 do not seem likely because of Japan’s weak political
system, passive political culture and declining competitiveness or because of
resistance from China and other countries. Even the United States would not
accept Japan as a mediator of its relationship with China, let alone China.
This author would argue that Japan is now already pursuing Scenario 3
(which is even pursued by the now ruling Democratic Party of Japan, DPJ),
but for political, economic and military reasons will have to change to the
third scenario.
Japanese ODA and Initiatives for Peace Building

Marie Söderberg

“Development assistance in the last year has moved from the fringe to the center of national policy in such countries as Japan and the United States.” Sadako Ogata, President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency, December 27, 2010.1

Many observers of Japanese foreign policy who touch upon Japanese foreign aid have recently tended to downplay the importance of ODA (Official Development Assistance).2 According to OECD and DAC3 calculations, the amount of aid has been decreasing over the years, and Japan no longer holds the position of number one donor, as it used to do during the 1990s, interest in the topic has waned. With a huge deficit in the Japanese state budget, no radical increases are to be expected. Since the financial crises in 2008, the overall picture of ODA in general is quite gloomy and the Japanese one maybe more so than any of the others.

So how can Madame Ogata, a professor and one of Japan’s most prominent and famous decision-makers claim that development assistance has moved from the fringe to the center of national policy in Japan?

With globalization there are great changes taking place in our world. The whole field of development and security is becoming more complex, intertwined and difficult to understand. Are we missing something here? Is Sadako Ogata right? And how about Japanese development assistance:

2 ODA is defined as grants, technical assistance and loans to countries or territories on the DAC list of ODA recipients. It includes both bilateral assistance and that from multilateral agencies. It is aid provided by the official sector on concessional terms (i.e. with a grant element of at least 25 percent) and that has the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its goal. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded.
3 DAC members are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Commission of the European Communities.
is it really decreasing? Could it be the case that the weight of development assistance as a policy tool is actually increasing for Japan?

To bring some clarity to this issue, I will start with a short historic account of Japanese ODA and the many different ways in which it has been used and purposes it has fulfilled over the years. Second, there will be a short account of some characteristics of Japanese ODA, as well as how aid organization in Japan has been changing. Third, I will touch upon trends within DAC in general and more specifically about the securitization of aid, as well as the widening of the concept of security and the implications of this for Japan. Fourth, I will try to say something on Japanese foreign aid in the future, where it is heading and which roles it will fulfill as a foreign-policy tool.

**Historical Context**

The origin of Japan’s aid program is seen as being its contribution of US$50,000 to the Colombo Plan in 1954, together with the war reparations agreements with Burma in 1954, the Philippines in 1956 and Indonesia in 1958. The war reparations were given to build up what had been damaged during World War II. It was tied to procurement from Japanese companies, and in that way it also served the purpose of promoting exports from Japan.4 In 1957, the yen loans from the Export–Import Bank started. They went mainly to Asia, and besides meeting certain needs in the developing countries, they also served the purpose of establishing Japanese industry in the area. Aid in the 1960s was almost exclusively directed towards Asia and overwhelmingly served Japan’s commercial purposes.

This pattern changed with the oil crisis of 1973, when a huge aid package began for the Arab world in order to secure the supply of oil. As a consequence of this crisis, a stable supply of natural resources became another ingredient of Japanese aid policy.5 Trade was a prerequisite for obtaining resources and Japan, as a resource-poor country, recognized its interdependence with developing countries. To conduct trade a certain amount of infrastructure was needed. This was one of the reasons for the huge amount of

---

Japanese aid money that was spent on infrastructure development in Asia. It was seen as a necessary cost for achieving a secure and peaceful world, as well as Japan’s own economic development. Humanitarian considerations, as a reason for aid, did not appear with any weight until the late 1970s.6

In 1977, the first of a number of aid-doubling plans was announced. The wish to be respected in the international community was another motive for these plans, which eventually turned Japan into a leading donor. It was also a way of improving Japan’s image in Asia, where Japanese businessmen had left far from favorable impressions of their country. This was the start of the gift-giving diplomacy (omiage gaikō) that Japanese prime ministers touring Asia have used extensively.

The End of the Cold War

In 1989, Japan became the world’s biggest donor of ODA in absolute terms and remained so until the end of the 1990s. Domestically, the Japanese ODA program was the subject of intense debate. There was a substantial group of researchers who were critical of the heavy emphasis on economic infrastructure, which they asserted only profited people in the developing countries who were already well off. Alternatively, these projects were regarded as being of most benefit to Japanese companies. The infrastructure projects were regarded as being detrimental to the environment and the government was criticized for giving aid without face.7 This, combined with the end of the Cold War and the requests for aid from a number of new countries, led to the formulation of the first ODA Charter, adopted in 1992. The Charter called for environmental considerations and development to be pursued in tandem, for ODA not to be used for military purposes, for attention to be given to recipients’ military expenditure as well as any production of weapons of mass destruction, and for the promotion of democracy and the introduction of the principles of a market economy. With the Charter came not only a commitment to certain values and goals in Japanese aid giving but also a turn away from a “request-based” model of aid, with no intervention in internal affairs, to a “consultative” one where the Japanese government

started formulating country strategies. In the 1990s, Japanese ODA, at least verbally, became more politicized and more environmentally conscious.

9/11 and the Fight Against Terrorism

In 2003, it was time for another revision of the ODA Charter by the Japanese government. The motivation for the revision this time was that “the world has changed dramatically since the Charter was first approved, and today there is an urgent need for the international community, including Japan, to address new development challenges such as peace-building.”

The securitization of aid that has occurred since 9/11 and the “war on terror” that followed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the invasion of Iraq in a trial run of forcible disarmament of weapons of mass destruction poses special problems for Japan that, through its so-called “Peace Constitution,” has clear limitations to what the country can do in the field of peacekeeping with its Self-Defense Forces. To cover up for that, ODA is getting an enhanced role.

The UN Millennium Declaration (MDG) has as its first development goal that “Extreme poverty and the proportion of people suffering from hunger shall be halved by 2015.” Although Japan signed this declaration, the revised Japanese ODA Charter of 2003 does not note the MDG of poverty reduction up front but states that “the objectives of Japan’s ODA are to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity.”

The Structure of Japanese ODA and Its Distribution

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Japan’s ODA program has been its huge size; for roughly a decade from the late 1980s, Japan was the world’s number one aid donor. Yet although large in absolute terms, at over US$9.6 billion in 2008, in terms of percentage of gross national income (GNI) Japan’s ODA is less impressive. In 2008, it amounted to 0.19 percent of GNI as compared to the 0.31 average for the DAC countries (Table 1). Another

---

10 *Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter*, p. i.
distinctive characteristic of Japanese bilateral ODA as compared with the ODA of many West European countries concerns its quality. During the 1980s and 1990s, Japan’s ODA consisted largely of bilateral loans, so that although quantitatively Japan’s ODA was large, its quality (by share of grants, which are not re-paid, rather than loans, which are) was rather low. Here, the stated justification was moral/ideological – help those who help themselves – with the stated rationale that when recipients know they must repay the money, they will use it more carefully. There were, however, other reasons as well for providing loans rather than grants. Japan did not want to increase ODA within the national budget while simultaneously cutting domestic expenditure items such as education, which would certainly not have been popular with domestic public opinion.

Furthermore, the focus of Japanese aid was in Asia. In 1970, Japan gave 98 percent of its ODA to Asian nations, in 1980 70 percent, and in 2008 58 percent. The Asian share has decreased with the rise in living standards of some Asian recipient nations to the extent that, no longer eligible to receive, they have “graduated” from the ODA program. Japan’s ODA to East Asian countries between 1970 and 2004 was approximately US$71.6 billion (in terms of net disbursement), which was 54.4 percent of the total ODA to these nations from DAC members. The number one recipient on a cumulative basis is Indonesia. China has a much shorter history of receiving Japanese aid (since 1979) but was the largest recipient during much of the 1990s. The Chinese share is much smaller today, since Japan stopped loan aid to China to coincide with the 2008 Olympics, explaining that China was itself experiencing strong economic growth and had its own resources to pursue economic development. The emphasis on Asia during the 1990s gave rise to another feature of Japan’s ODA program: its largest share was to low middle-income countries rather than to the poorest countries.

A final characteristic concerns the nature of Japan’s ODA program: what the ODA is spent on and through what channels. More than other DAC donors, Japan’s ODA program has always heavily emphasized economic

---

11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Official Development Assistance (Tokyo, 2008), p. 172, and Figure 2 (OECD, DAC).
infrastructure: roads, railways, harbors, airports, power plants and other infrastructure necessary for economic development (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Bilateral ODA by Major Purposes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allocable bilateral ODA by major purposes, 2007-08</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social infrastructure &amp; services</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic infrastructure &amp; services</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production sectors</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multisector</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodity and programme aid</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action relating to debt</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As for spending channels, the major part is distributed bilaterally, but 28.8 percent goes through multilateral channels. This is equivalent of DAC average (Table 1).

During the 1970s and the early 1980s Japanese aid policymaking was usually fairly uncontroversial. There were few politicians who were knowledgeable about ODA and few private citizens or groups with a special interest in the area. Aid was mainly handled by the bureaucrats and the ODA budget was dealt with by the Diet every year without any political debate or deliberation on its content. Japan did not have one single ministry or bureau responsible for aid but about 20 different government bodies were involved depending on the subject matter.14

---

At the implementation level, there were also several organizations in charge of ODA. In the 1950s, the Export–Import Bank began to be criticized for being too commercially oriented and too restrictive for many development projects. A new organization called the Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) was set up. In 1999, the OECF was merged with the old Export–Import Bank to form the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC), an institution that dealt with both aid loans and other official flows\footnote{These are a different kind of subsidized official flows that are on terms below market rate but the conditions of which are not concessional enough for them to qualify as ODA.} to developing countries. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was set up in 1974 to handle grant aid and technical cooperation. It came under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). There was constant
fighting between JICA and the OECF (or later the JBIC), which sometimes had different ideas about best practice for aid. In all the main recipient countries, both institutions had their own separate offices. In 2008, the loan aid part of the JBIC was merged with JICA into what is called the “New JICA” which is now responsible for the implementation of all three types of Japanese aid, that is loans, grants and technical cooperation.
In 2006, an Overseas Economic Cooperation Council under the prime minister was formed and although Japan’s development cooperation set up still involves 13 ministries or agencies, today it is MOFA that has the main responsibility for aid policy formulation and coordination. About two-thirds of all aid is now channeled through them and the “New JICA”, which has become the biggest bilateral aid agency in the world.16

MOFA’s International Cooperation Bureau was restructured in 2009 – it is now divided by region rather than by loans, grants and technical cooperation. This gives a more holistic view on aid to each country. Japan is in this sense moving away from an instrument-based towards a country-based approach.

The Nexus of Security and Development

Recently ODA and aid in general is becoming more and more entangled with issues of peace and security, not only in Japan but among most of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members in general. The DAC recommends its members promote peace and security as fundamental pillars of development, both on a personal and on the state level and to push for security system reform, implying increased transparency, good governance, the protection of human rights and institutional change in the developing countries. The traditional concept of security is being redefined to include not only state stability and the security of nations but also the safety and well-being of people. There is currently huge pressure to make security the key foreign policy objective of donor countries. This is happening on a worldwide basis, and not only in Japan.

From a development point of view, the importance of security for all people also became evident during the 1990s. Security was seen as a prerequisite for poverty reduction. Again and again it had been proven that years of development could quickly be wiped out by internal fighting as well as war with neighboring states. In the mid-1990s, the Development Assistance Committee formed the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation. In 1998, it published the first guidelines for donors on conflict, peace and development cooperation. A second report entitled Helping to Prevent Violent Conflict in 2001; the Security System Reform (SSR) was endorsed

by ministers and agency heads at a high-level meeting in 2004. The DAC Guidelines specify a number of recommendations for action in order to promote peace and security as fundamental pillars of development on both a personal and the state level. These include supporting country-owned and country-led reform efforts and making necessary institutional changes to promote people’s security in their daily lives.

It should be noted that conflict prevention, peace building or peace preservation are complex areas that to a large extent are not issues of ODA but also incorporate PKO (peacekeeping operations) and other issues. There is a mixture of civil and military dimensions to missions such as the Japanese reconstruction efforts in Iraq, where the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) worked side by side with aid workers. ODA and SDF are thus being launched as “two wheels of the same cart.” This makes things all the more complex in Japan from a legal point of view, where we have Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, the so-called peace clause, which forbids Japan from making military contributions to solving conflicts abroad. 17

It also makes it clear that what is happening in the field of peace building also should be seen in the broader perspective of the U.S.–Japanese security alliance. This is nothing new, but has been the case since the end of the 1970s when Japan announced a number of plans that doubled the amount of ODA. This was seen as one way for Japan to fulfill its obligation to international society18 and was partly explained in terms of “burden sharing” (yakuwari buntan) according to which Japan should take greater responsibility in the field of aid in order to compensate for the United States’ expenditure on the global security umbrella.19

The announcement in November 2009 that Japan will provide ODA assistance to the amount of US$5 billion to Afghanistan during the coming five years should clearly be seen both in the context of the U.S.–Japan security alliance as well as the security system reform within the DAC.

---

Article 9 of the Japanese constitution actually led Japan to be early out with a broader concept of security than the strictly military one. Already in 1979, Japan’s Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira appointed a study group that came to launch the concept of comprehensive security, which, besides military security, enhanced all forms of security, including those of natural resources, food and economic security.

In a speech in London in 1988, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita explained Japan’s international cooperation initiatives:

As you may know, Japan is firmly committed to the furtherance of world peace, and its Constitution does not permit it to extend any military cooperation. This does not mean, however, that Japan should stand idly by with regard to international peace. I believe that Japan, from a political and moral viewpoint, should extend cooperation to the utmost of its ability. I will pursue “Cooperation for Peace” as a new approach toward enhancing Japan’s contributions to the maintenance and reinforcement of international peace. This will include positive participation in diplomatic efforts, the dispatch of necessary personnel and the provision of financial cooperation, aiming at the resolution of regional conflicts.20

According to Takeshita, ODA was the most valued aspect of Japan’s international contribution and he would continue to improve both its quality and its quantity.21

In the present ODA Charter (adopted 2003) Japan’s policy regarding peace building with ODA is “to support the response to humanitarian emergencies and to provide counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance, as well as address projects that contribute to consolidation of peace and post-conflict nation building, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former soldiers, the collection of small arms, demining and related activities and improving governance.”22

21 Ibid.
22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2007,
To work effectively on SSR, “whole of government” approaches are needed both in donor and developing countries. This implies that a range of policy and funding instruments, such as development cooperation, diplomacy, trade, finance and investment, as well as defense, should be coordinated to increase effectiveness. Japan does not have a strategy and policy framework guiding its engagement in fragile situations; it has not yet explicitly addressed the challenge of taking a whole of government approach in such contexts.

Japanese Foreign Aid: Where is it Heading?

Japan has endorsed both the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. A new Medium Term Policy on Official Development Assistance should have been announced in 2010, but has been delayed for several reasons. One is the general turmoil in Japanese politics that makes it difficult for any decisions to be taken. Another one is the severe restrictions on the Japanese general account budget. A third one is that ODA has become increasingly politicized and there are nowadays a number of stakeholders pushing in different directions.

Let us first take a look at the budget as such. DAC statistics show that Japan has fallen from providing nearly 20 percent of all DAC aid in 1999/2000 to providing only 7.7 percent in 2007/08. The overall ODA budget from the general account has shrunk in nominal terms by 42.5 percent since its peak in 1997. How can anyone then claim that Japanese development assistance is moving from the fringe to center of Japanese national policy?

The figures above are partly a result of the DAC way of calculating ODA. This is a way that put Japanese ODA in a very favorable light during the 1980–90s, but today puts Japan in an unfavorable position when it has to deduct the repayment of all the ODA loans distributed at that time. The figures do not give the same picture as the foreign ministry, besides the general account budget is also using the supplementary budget on top of that. Although there was a cut of 40 percent of the general account budget, there was a large increase in the gross operational (project ODA) budget with 5.8 percent in FY2008 and another one with 14.1 percent in FY2009. In


The present one does not make references to the aid effectiveness agenda or policy coherence for development.
December 2009, the Japanese government announced another 7.9 percent cut in this year’s budget (FY2010), but the overall project ODA budget is expected to increase two percent in gross terms. With the high value of the Japanese yen the budget can be expected to increase even more in dollar terms.

Table 2. Japanese Gross Bilateral ODA, 2004–08

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Constant 2007 USD million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gross Bilateral ODA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>6 351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project and programme aid</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical co-operation</td>
<td>1 703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental food aid</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action relating to debt</td>
<td>2 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative costs</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other grants</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-grant bilateral ODA</strong></td>
<td>5 380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New development lending</td>
<td>5 283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt rescheduling</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition of equity and other</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gross Multilateral ODA</strong></td>
<td>2 677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN agencies</td>
<td>1 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU institutions</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank group</td>
<td>922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional development banks (a)</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other multilateral</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total gross ODA</strong></td>
<td>14 407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repayments and debt cancellation</td>
<td>-6 460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total net ODA</strong></td>
<td>7 947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For reference:
- Associated financing (b)
- Net debt relief
- Imputed student cost
- Refugees in donor countries

a. Excluding EBRD.

Source: OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), PEER REVIEW of Japan, p. 88 (reproduced with permission).

DAC Peer Review of Japan (2010), p. 44.
These figures show that the amounts of gross Japanese ODA are still substantial.

One of the suggestions from the group thinking about Japanese ODA (Nihon no ODA o kangaeru kai) at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in connection with their studies for the new Midterm Defense Program outline is that Japan should actually move away from the concept of ODA and instead use the term development cooperation, which would also incorporate civil and NGO activities and not only government to government aid.

What can be included in the concept of ODA is also debated among other DAC members. Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation Gunilla Carlsson has suggested that money for peace-promoting activities of the African Union should be counted as ODA and so should some of the Swedish activities in Afghanistan. Sweden has also promoted the idea that some military expenses like minesweeping and the education of soldiers in human rights should be included in the ODA-budget.25

Another factor of importance is that private and other official flows actually are becoming much more important in the relationship between the OECD countries and other countries in a more globalized world. It is these kinds of flows that are the once dominating and the aid portion is steadily decreasing. Another change is that development assistance from non-DAC and non-OECD members is growing. In 2007, Chile, Estonia, Israel, Russia and Slovenia were invited to open discussions on membership of the DAC. Discussions on “enhanced engagement” with Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa were also initiated. What they calculate as aid is often very unclear. When it comes to East Asia, South Korea now joined DAC, but any aid given to North Korea, which in general has been roughly as much as that to all other countries, is not calculated as ODA. The People’s Republic of China has, besides still being a recipient of foreign aid, now also become a major donor. Both South Korea and China’s development cooperation policies are mediated by their own experience with foreign aid. Japan has been their main donor and they are heavily influenced by Japanese policy where ODA always has been seen as part of the wider concept of economic

cooperation (keizai kyōryoku), which besides aid also encompasses two other components – other official flows (OOF) and private investments. Economic cooperation encompasses almost all activities considered helpful to economic development, without distinguishing between official and private, commercial and non-commercial funds. This conceptualization can be traced to the concept of “mutually beneficial economic assistance.”

Besides, there is the competition that Japan is now facing with Chinese aid. There is no doubt that Japan feels quite comfortable with some parts of Chinese aid and that this is an area where we will see more cooperation in the future. As Sadako Ogata puts it: “We have opened up some windows of cooperation with China.”

Another change in the field of development assistance is that besides new non traditional country donors we have also a number of new private foundations that make contributions of considerable size, such as those founded by Bill Gates or Warren Buffet. Their budgets equal some of the development assistance budgets of the DAC member states. In general, economic flows have been changing in a world that is becoming more and more globalized. Commercial flows and remittances overall have risen faster than aid.

In Japan, as well as in many other countries (including Sweden), there is also a push for more private – official cooperation in the field of aid. The Japanese government is for example trying to promote further private – official cooperation in Africa. At the fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV) held in Yokohama 2008, the Japanese government announced that it aimed to double Japanese FDI into Africa by 2012. Part of this was by establishing a US$2.5 billion Facility for African Investment and dispatching joint public-private missions.

PCD (Policy Coherence for Development) has generally been considered weak in Japan. The exception is Development Initiative for Trade

---

28 “JICA President Reviews the Year 2010.”
(DIT). For the 2009–11 period, Japan has committed US$12 billion to help partner countries build their capacity to expand trade and there is a Policy Framework for Investment (PFI). Japan generally scores higher than any other country in the so-called “Aid for Trade” index. This is in strong contrast to the nexus of aid and security.

At the same time as Japan identifies “peace building” as a priority in its ODA Charter and Mid-Term Policy, its gross bilateral disbursement to peace, conflict and security has remained low (less than 1–2 percent of total ODA 1997–2008) and figures for humanitarian assistance is an equally small portion.\textsuperscript{30} To a certain extent, this is also a matter of how aid is classified. Iraq has for many years been the top recipient of Japanese ODA, although a large part of the reconstruction work there is classified as economic infrastructure. The recent commitments of US$5 billion to Afghanistan must also be considered as efforts to promote peace-building, although it might not all be classified as such.

Can we say that Sadako Ogata was wrong in her statement that development assistance has moved from the fringe to the center of national policy? I do not think so. The securitization of aid makes it reach the center stage. With the present government in Japan the process of constitutional change has slowed down and Article 9 is likely to remain, at least for a few more years. In this situation, Japan does not have all that many tools to turn to when it comes to peace-building. The wider concept of security, as well as the securitization of development assistance, might have enhanced the power of development assistance as a foreign-policy tool.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 47.
Japan’s Paradigm Lost?

Kazuki Iwanaga

Foreign Policy In Question

More than twenty years have passed since the end of the East–West confrontation, with a sea change in the international distribution of power, and it seems worthwhile to examine how Japanese foreign and security policies have actually developed since then. It would enable us to assess whether continuity has prevailed in Japanese foreign policy or whether a profound change has occurred.

The radical changes brought about by the termination of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat recast the foreign and security policy issues facing Japan. Changed conditions stimulated a lively debate over future foreign policy directions amongst politicians, officials and scholars. There was widespread agreement at that time that Japan was in the throes of far-reaching change in its foreign policy and that the nation had come to a critical juncture that demanded that cardinal choices be made. An array of observers agreed that the end of East–West conflict had opened up new opportunities to break with the foreign policy traditions based on the Yoshida Doctrine, the foundation of the Japanese foreign policy orientation during the Cold War, and to pursue a more assertive foreign policy independent of the United States.

Glancing back rapidly over Japan’s foreign and security policy behavior in the past two decades, we can see that Japan has been far from passive, as its demand for a UN Security Council seat and its proposals to reform the UN show. The most profound change since the end of the Cold War is Japan’s deployment of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) abroad. Japan’s first “military” operation ever was the dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War in 1991. Since then it has participated in a number of U.N.-sanctioned peacekeeping, reconstruction and humanitarian missions. Within the framework of its security relationship with the United States, Japan has taken certain measures to assume a larger international role. It expanded its role with the revision of the Japan–U.S. Defense Guidelines
1997 and the Surrounding Areas Emergency Measures Law in 1999. The Diet also passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2001 to allow the dispatch of SDF outside of the region, and this so-called antiterrorism law was used to enable them to be deployed and to permit providing fuel and supplies to U.S. forces and those of other countries operating in the Indian Ocean.

These were all very limited operations, however, and were undertaken as a way of giving Japan some kind of a “military” role in international politics. Japan’s foreign policy record does not show a fundamental break with the basic premises guiding the Japanese approach to international affairs. It should be seen as an adjustment process to the changes in Japan’s internal and external environment. These changes did not amount to a paradigm shift. None of the post-Cold War Japanese governments has successfully articulated a coherent foreign policy doctrine. Japanese foreign policy behavior since the early 1990s has been characterized by a “modified continuity,” to borrow the term used to describe the development of German foreign policy behavior.1 While Germany had by the 1990s, against the background of the conflicts in the Balkans and the crisis in Kosovo, shed its inhibitions about the use of military force and become a “normal” country, Japan has not yet overcome the constitutional and political constraints on the use of force in the international realm. Germany has taken significantly larger steps than Japan in the direction of deploying military forces in combat missions.

Having moved from pursuing checkbook diplomacy, as in the Gulf War, to participating in non-combat missions in Asia and elsewhere is far from Japan being normalized. It has yet to resolve the relationship between force and diplomacy. The country still has a long way to go on a normalization trajectory. The challenge to Japan today is how to harmonize its nonmilitary identity with its greater international responsibilities and with the security threats of the twenty-first century, reconciling its ambition to shoulder larger international responsibilities with deep-seated anti-militarist sentiments.

I would argue in this paper that if one looks at the scope and magnitude of the change since the early 1990s, a genuine reorientation of Japan’s foreign and security policies has not occurred and does not seem to be forthcoming.

1 Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull, Germany as a Civilian Power: the Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).
in the near future. Japan has not been able to, or has not even been willing to play a major regional and global role commensurate with its potential. Japan has been something of an underperformer in international politics. Japanese foreign policy has not yet reached a point where Japan is prepared to become a pillar of the international order. In fact, one distinct feature of Japanese foreign policy is the inability on the part of all post-Cold War governments to formulate and implement clearly a coherent, overall policy to replace the Yoshida Doctrine. Contrary to the rhetoric of Japanese political leaders and officials, Japan will continue to be the subordinate alliance partner of the United States and a relatively minor actor in global diplomatic and security affairs, incapable of dealing effectively with major political and security crises even in its own backyard. This situation is not likely to change radically, even over the longer term.

Whether or not Japan is able to develop into a major foreign and security actor is significant for the Japanese, who wish to see their country as an influential actor in diplomatic and political affairs in the regional and global context. Many Japanese resent their country’s heavy dependence on the United States for security and consequently regret its limited ability to influence events in world politics. Whereas Japanese political leaders have long advocated a more independent foreign policy, they have in practice resisted doing anything that might seem to threaten close relations with the United States. As a result, the creation of a truly autonomous Japanese foreign policy, capable of backing its diplomacy with force, or even to significantly influence global and regional security affairs, has remained an elusive goal. Creating such a policy would mean endowing Japan with the military capability to back up its political and diplomatic initiatives.

Japan is facing a plethora of political and security challenges to its interests regionally and globally. In addition to nontraditional global security issues such as environmental degradation, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational crimes, breakdowns in the world’s financial and economic system, and human trafficking, there are some potential disputes and conflicts, such as China’s increasing assertiveness and military buildup in the Asia-Pacific region, the growing tension on the Korean Peninsula, territorial disputes in the North China Sea and the South China Sea, as well as disputes between Japan and Russia over four
northern islands. All these potential crises may pose serious threats to the security of the region and of Japan.

Some of these trends and developments have made the old paradigm, the Yoshida Doctrine, obsolete. With the rapid changes unfolding in the Asia-Pacific region and the world, Japan needs a grand strategy that can provide a compass by which to set policy priorities and shape appropriate policies. The long-standing Yoshida Doctrine seems to have outlived its usefulness and relevance. New realities require the articulation of a new doctrine or grand strategy. The case-by-caseism that has characterized the foreign and security policies of the Japanese governments is not adequate to deal with the complex problems of the twenty-first century. One recent example of this case-by-caseism was the way the Japanese government, led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), reacted towards China’s pressure over the incident involving a violation of territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands by a Chinese trawler, and especially, after the boat’s captain was arrested.

The Japanese government’s inept handling of the Senkaku Islands issue in September 2010 and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s later visit to one of the four Russia-held islands off Hokkaido in November are symptomatic of the state of the government and Japan’s diplomatic weakness today. It is possible that neither would have happened if the government had been able to possess the sort of credibility and military power necessary to be an influential diplomatic actor in international affairs. Some believe that Japan’s diplomatic weakness invited challenges by its giant neighbors. For example, Hitoshi Tanaka, a former deputy minister for foreign affairs and a top foreign policy advisor to former Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō, claimed that China and Russia “seized the opportunity to take a jab at Japan’s diplomatically weakening state” and that “Japan, now more than ever, needs a strategic vision.” On another occasion, Tanaka wrote that

the Kan administration’s handling of the issue is indicative of a lack of strategic thinking on how to deal with the Senkaku issue specifically, a dearth of crisis management mechanisms to deal with such serious incidents as they unfold, and a lack

---

of vision regarding the formulation of an overarching foreign policy strategy more generally. The government must make a more realistic assessment of the international environment and formulate a foreign policy grand strategy that recognizes the reality that East Asia is a region in transition.³

Framework for Analysis

Change is an important concept in the study of foreign policy. This paper mainly deals with a specific type of foreign policy change, namely restructuring, “the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations.”⁴ This differs from “normal foreign policy change, which is usually slow, incremental and typified by low linkages between [geographic and functional] sectors.”⁵ Instead, restructuring “usually takes place more quickly, expresses an intent for fundamental change, is non-incremental and usually involves the conscious linking of different sectors.”⁶

In this paper, the parameters of the Yoshida Doctrine are used to define the “normal” Japanese foreign policy, and fluctuations from this “normal” foreign policy result from both short-term and long-term forces that become important in specific foreign policies. The parameters of the Yoshida Doctrine include dominant bilateralism, minimalism, economism and multinationalism.⁷ Dominant bilateralism refers to Japan’s relations with the United States. The U.S. was the predominant foreign policy actor relevant to the formulation and conduct of Japanese foreign policy during the Cold War. Japan’s relations with the outside world were seen through the prism of the U.S.–Japan relationship – the dominant-bilateral lens, through which Japanese leaders viewed reality and made decisions regarding the priorities of their country. Minimalist preference is indicated by a low level of involvement in political and strategic issues of the world, and unwillingness to commit military forces to outside states. Economism is marked by

---

⁵ Ibid., p. 2.
⁶ Ibid.
Japan’s predominant focus on economic as opposed to political or military power. Japanese foreign policy emphasized multilateral actions as opposed to nationalism and unilateralism.

Depending on whether the movement of foreign policy results in the change of some specific areas, and on whether this movement is associated with a basic shift in long-term restructuring, change can be classified as maintaining, reforming or restructuring. In a maintaining foreign policy, the pattern of foreign policy prevailing in the preceding period persists. It involves no or only minor changes. In a reforming foreign policy, the basic orientation is not affected, but the influence of long- and short-term forces on foreign policy is such that there are moderate changes in some aspects of policies. Restructuring foreign policy is characterized by the appearance of a durable restructuring of foreign policy orientation.

In order to assess whether continuity or change prevailed in Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy and the prospects for the creation of Japan’s new foreign policy orientation, Kjell Goldmann’s concept of “stabilizers,” factors for making stability in foreign policy, can be used as a point of reference in understanding foreign policy change in Japan. He argues that stabilizers determine whether or not inputs from sources of foreign policy change actually set a process of policy change in motion. Stabilizers reduce the sensitivity by blocking foreign policy change, reducing the scope of change, or delaying change. Moreover, he argues that nation-states “have a tendency to stick to their previous policies.”

Domestic Stabilizers

A large measure of Japan’s lack of foreign policy restructuring can be found in its political dysfunctionality. For example, Kent Calder, among others, argued that the domestic political structure imposes serious constraints.

---

10 Ibid., p. xv.
on the Japanese government’s ability to adopt independent and proactive foreign policy, even when it has strong incentives to do so. Specifically, he contended that the absence of a strong political leadership, marked sectionalism in bureaucracy, and the factionalism of the former ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), inhibit the Japanese government from undertaking decisive, independent international initiatives. Without external pressures, Calder argued, Japanese politics would be virtually immobile. Domestic sources of Japan’s inability to influence world events and its failure to restructure foreign policy can also be found in excessive and destructive partisanship, economic stagnation and Article 9 of the Constitution. Domestic stabilizers have made it difficult to move away from the “old” policy, to articulate a new grand strategy, and to set new priorities by restructuring the country’s foreign policy.

**Political Leadership Deficit**

It has been argued that Japan suffers from a “political leadership deficit.” In the past 20 years there have been no fewer than 14 prime ministers and since 2006 a succession of five weak prime ministers. If Japanese governments have a tenure that has averaged a year and a half, it is no wonder that they have not been able to formulate a coherent foreign policy and act decisively on various pressing issues. Chinese President Hu Jintao (since March 2003) had to deal with six Japanese prime ministers and his predecessor, Jiang Zemin (March 1993–March 2003), had to deal with eight. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton met with seven Japanese prime ministers during his presidency and his successor, George W. Bush, had to deal with five. Under the Obama administration, we have already seen three Japanese prime ministers. Such high turnover poses a serious problem. Without a strong, stable political leadership, Japan will be unable to create a strategic vision. Every new Japanese prime minister declares that the time for reform has come. But the reform proposals usually get drowned in Japan’s dysfunctional politics.

With Japan’s leadership in flux, policymakers lacked any central cohesion. As a result, those policymakers were less focused on developing more
assertive policies, much less articulating, anything that could be likened to a new doctrine or grand strategy. There have been no decisive responses to various important challenges confronting Japan. Japan is clearly in a situation where it suffers from dysfunctionality at the highest level. A decision to shift foreign policy away from the country’s predominant focus on the U.S. might be difficult to make without the support of major parties, business, and other organized interests, as well as public opinion.

It should be noted here that Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō was an exception to a succession of weak prime ministers in recent years. He was able to exercise a strong executive leadership during his term (2001–06). Because of his extraordinary popularity, Koizumi was able to overcome factional politics within the ruling LDP and the influence of powerful bureaucrats.

**Partisan Dysfunctionality**

Japanese conduct over the past two decades does not show the emergence of a new distinct foreign policy pattern that the country’s major political parties all share. Japan appears to have been trapped in a cycle of partisan dysfunctionality. The same party was in power almost without a break from 1955 until 2009, but it proved incapable of dealing effectively with various pressing issues, including the problems that have been dragging the economy downwards for several decades. The LDP’s policymaking was often so paralyzed by factional infighting that it was virtually impossible to develop a new, coherent grand strategy. Since the emergence of the DPJ-led coalition government in 2009, it seems to have been reverting to the “old” policies of the LDP of the past. Instead of pulling together, the two major parties are unable to formulate a common strategic vision for the country’s foreign policy. Partisan dysfunctionality tends to perpetuate previous choices or, at most, allows incremental departure from previous choices. It is unlikely to provide greater opportunities for a fundamental change in foreign policy. The major parties would have to forge a broadly based consensus on developing a road map for the future.

**Economic Stabilizer**

The availability or lack of economic resources for the implementation of foreign and security policies can act as an effective stabilizer. The current
weak state of Japan’s economy limits its foreign and security policy options in that Japan cannot afford to increase its military capability significantly in order to secure its position in the international community through military means. After three decades of spectacular growth, China quite recently passed Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy, after the United States. Japan has now gone through two decades of economic stagnation and the key question is whether Japan can and will put into place the policies that will allow it to have an economic revival. If not, it might have serious consequences for Japan’s long-term capacity to be a regional and global power. According to Thomas Berger,

the idea that Japan’s emphasis on economic power and behind-the-scenes diplomacy would allow Japan to assume the role of a de facto regional or even global hegemon[y] seems faintly ridiculous today in light of Japan’s diminished economic fortunes, the continued weakness of Asian regional institutions, and the relative decline of Japanese influence inside of Asia.13

Japan’s defense budget has been falling for more than seven years and is likely to be cut even further in the near future, whereas China’s military budget has been rapidly increasing. Successive Japanese governments have been stymied in finding effective solutions to a cycle of sluggishness.

Bureaucratic Stabilizer

The bureaucratic organization may function as a stabilizer of foreign policy in the sense that it can block international initiatives made by political leaders. David Skidmore has noted that “past choices may become so embedded in bureaucratic organizations, vested interest groups, as well as intellectual outlooks and understandings that they place severe constraints on the choices realistically available to present policy makers.”14

erful, but fragmented bureaucracy may be less likely to see the need for a major change in foreign policy. Deficiencies of a highly compartmentalized bureaucracy may be overcome with the existence of strong political leadership.

The Japanese foreign ministry during the era of LDP rule acted as an effective stabilizer of Japan’s traditional foreign and security policies. Foreign policy realignment was rendered extremely difficult because the U.S.-centered foreign policy became enmeshed in bureaucratic interests, which had a stake in its continuation. The foreign ministry was keen to keep relations between Tokyo and Washington cordial. It was often, therefore, from the ministry that the U.S. government receives assurances that Japan’s key security relationship with the U.S. will not be changed.

The removal of the LDP as a ruling party and the emergence of Hatoyama Yukio as the new prime minister 2009 offered the DPJ-led government a chance to reorient Japanese foreign policy. Prime Minister Hatoyama spoke of the need for a new direction in Japanese foreign policy and stressed shaping an “East Asian fraternity,” improving relations with China, and putting the bilateral relationship with the United States on a more “equal” footing. Policy input from the powerful bureaucracy, one of the key domestic stabilizers of Japanese foreign policy, seemed to have decreased dramatically as the new government was anxious to increase the policy making power of the cabinet by reducing influence from the foreign ministry’s bureaucrats. One keen observer wrote, “as part of the DPJ’s campaign promise to reduce excessive dependence on the bureaucracy, the lines of communication for bureaucrats to make policy recommendations to the political leadership were almost entirely cut off, and bureaucrats were, on the whole, routinely ignored.”

Hatoyama resigned after less than nine months and was replaced by Kan Naoto, another leader in a succession of weak prime ministers. Kan, like his predecessors, has been incapable of crafting a coherent and sustained set of foreign policy strategies.

---


15 Hitoshi Tanaka, “Hatoyama’s Resignation and Japan’s Foreign Policy,” East Asia Insights, June 2010, p. 2.
Public Opinion

The room for maneuver for foreign policy decision-makers in Japan is shaped by public opinion. The key question is whether Japanese political leaders will be able to create a domestic consensus that would allow Japan to reorient its foreign policy and play a major regional and global role commensurate with its potential. Domestic public opinion has been slow to accept a more active foreign policy independent of the United States. The Japanese public, with a deep-rooted skepticism of military power, has prevented the country from developing independent foreign and security policies consonant with its economic power. A public that has expressed strong opposition to international action that is not sanctioned by a United Nations mandate and resisted even modest expansions of Japan’s military capability is not likely to support a rapid military buildup and an expanded role for the SDF in the Asia-Pacific region.

The restraining effect of public sentiments on foreign and security policies is particularly evident with respect to military power and the use of force in the international realm. The Japanese political culture of antimilitarism, also known as the “culture of restraint” that has evolved after World War II still has a strong impact on Japan’s readiness to deal with the issue of force in foreign policy and security policy and to take part in military interventions abroad. Given its militarist history, it has been difficult for Japan to overcome a deep-seated reluctance to confront the issue of force. The current foreign and security policy discourse and public attitudes in Japan are such that it would be difficult to raise the scope of Japanese military deployments by moving beyond the established domestic consensus. Japan has to be able to reconcile its ambition to shoulder larger international responsibilities with reconciling international responsibility to deeply entrenched national convictions.

Dominant Relations

Among the external stabilizers, Japan’s dominant relations with the United States have acted as a powerful stabilizer and clearly militated against Japanese foreign policy restructuring. The SDF have not yet acquired sufficient military capability to alone defend the national territory against external attacks. Japan, as a non-nuclear power, continues to be highly dependent on the United States with respect to security. Its overwhelming security
dependence on the United States has prevented Japan from developing a more independent foreign policy and from taking a more significant role in the region’s strategic and security affairs.

The term dependence “refers to a distinctly asymmetrical situation in which one country is significantly on another even as the second country no more than slightly depends on the first.”16 Japanese foreign and security policies are necessarily the product of the dependent relationship. Japan as a dependent state has developed and pursued its foreign policy within the context of its asymmetrical security relationship with the United States.

There is no sign that Japanese political leaders are prepared to do very much about their strategic and military dependence on its alliance partner, the United States. There is no evidence of Japan stepping out on its own. Having developed security policies on the basis of the alliance relationship with the United States for sixty years, the Japanese have developed a “culture of security dependence.” The prospects for a more autonomous security policy seem uncertain. A number of Japanese leaders resent their nation’s military dependence on the United States and regret its relatively limited ability to influence developments in global affairs. Japanese do not, however, seem to be willing to endow their country with a sufficient military capability of its own. Until it is willing to change this reality, Japan is unlikely to become a significant foreign policy actor capable of backing its diplomacy with military means, or influencing global and regional security developments.

Around Japan, the security environment remains uncertain and unclear as Chinese power continues to rise and North–South tension on the Korean peninsula continues. Under these circumstances, Japan’s need for a stable and solid relationship with the United States remains undiminished, but its character needs to change from security dependence to something much more strategic and broad. Japan needs to develop a different sort of security relationship with the United States. It cannot simply be the continuation of a traditional alliance relationship. There is an urgent need to adjust the Japanese–U.S. alliance to the changing global and regional environment. Leaders of both countries recognize the need to transform the

U.S.–Japan relationship into a true, reciprocal partnership. Some observers even suggested that Japan’s relations with the United States should be like those between the United States and Britain. Japan has a long way to go to become an equal partner of the United States, and it faces many obstacles to its development. In order to make the partnership more balanced and even equal, it is necessary for Japan to increase its military capabilities to the extent where it can take full responsibility for the conventional defense of its home islands. Barry Buzan once argued that “[taking] that responsibility is a necessary step in Japan’s normalization and internationalization. It would allow Japan to behave as a great power, while still remaining dependent on the American nuclear umbrella.”

Constitutional Stabilizer

The greatest limiting factor for Japan’s foreign policy restructuring is Article 9 of the Constitution. Changing the peace clause is also the most effective way to put Japanese–U.S. security relations on an equal footing. Although all nations have the right to collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the current Japanese interpretation of Article 9 forbids Japan from exercising this right. Some argue that the country’s foreign and security policies no long reflect a strict interpretation of the peace clause. They believe that the time has now come for Japan to update its interpretation in order to bring it into line with reality. Others call for constitutional revision, especially the “renunciation of war” clause, which bans Japan from maintaining “land, sea and air forces” and forbids the use of force to “settle international disputes.”

The Referendum Law for revising the Constitution, which was initiated by the LDP-led coalition government of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and enacted by both houses of the Diet in May 2007, came into effect in May 2010. The Law, which stipulates formal procedures for constitutional revision, was criticized by opposition groups within Japan as well as by neighboring countries, especially China and the two Koreas, which viewed the law as aimed at turning Japan into a militarist state. It should be noted that despite periodic debate and discussion in the past, no law has previously been passed.

Although the law is one further step in a movement towards constitutional revision, Japan still has not reached a point where the current DPJ government under Prime Minister Kan is prepared to undertake constitutional revision. While the main opposition party, the LDP, has long supported a constitutional amendment, the ruling DPJ is divided with regard to this issue. When it replaced the LDP as the ruling party, one of its partners in the coalition government, the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDP), was strongly opposed to changing the Constitution, and, as a result, the government was taking a cautious approach. At the moment, the issue appears to have lost political momentum and it is unlikely that a revision of the Constitution will take place under a DPJ government.\(^{18}\)

**Regional Stabilizer**

The regional stabilizer in the form of Japan’s East Asian neighbors’ apprehension about a larger Japanese military role seriously restrained the country’s foreign and security policies. The legacy of militarism has proven to be a handicap in playing a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region. Some Asian countries still fear and resent the prospects of Japan’s gaining a greater say in strategic affairs. This is especially true of China and the two Koreas, suspicious of any bid by Japan to play a larger political and military role. As some of its Asian neighbors are still very wary of any signs of Japanese remilitarization, any attempt at taking on more responsibility for its own security by increasing Japanese military power through constitutional revision is likely to meet with fierce opposition from China and South Korea. Although this regional stabilizer has been losing some of its strength in recent years, it will take some time before Japan can convince its Asian neighbors that it can be trusted to wield military power responsibly. One keen observer notes, “a newly determined Japan will not be deterred from revision by its neighbors’ negative reactions.”\(^{19}\)

---


Concluding Remarks

Japanese foreign and security policies in recent years show how far the country is from possessing the sort of credibility and military power necessary to be an influential actor in regional and global political and security affairs. For decades, and in particular since the Gulf War in 1991, Japan has been trying to enhance its ability to act politically abroad. Contrary to the rhetoric of political leaders and the analyses of some scholars, the prospects for Japanese foreign policy restructuring are rather poor, and likely to remain so. Unless some overwhelming external challenges and crises were to emerge and Japan is willing to take on more responsibility for its own security by increasing its military power, and so long as the United States is committed to the security of Japan and of the Asia-Pacific region, Japan is likely to remain an insignificant diplomatic actor, dependent on the United States for military protection and leadership.

Japan is an example of a country that has been committed to foreign policy reorientation at the rhetorical level, but which over the past twenty years following the momentum created by the end of the Cold War has failed to achieve fundamental change, making only limited progress in its attempts to redefine its role in world politics. In this respect, Japan today does not look very different from the way it did twenty years ago. A paradigm shift has not taken place in Japanese foreign policy. The Japanese approach to international affairs should be regarded as a modified continuation of the Yoshida Doctrine with regard to the question of whether Japan's foreign policy is thoroughly changing or rather following a path of continuity. Japan has to overcome the plethora of stabilizers inhibiting the development of a new grand strategy to succeed the Yoshida Doctrine.
About the Authors

**Guibourg Delamotte** is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Japanese Studies, French Institute of Oriental Studies, and Research Fellow, CEJ, Adjunct Fellow, CRCAO and Asia Centre. Her latest book on *Japan’s defence policy* (2010) received the Shibusawa-Claudel award.

**Reinhard Drifte** is Emeritus Professor at Newcastle University (UK) and Visiting Professor at Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto and at Pau University (France). He is the author of numerous books on Japanese foreign policy, among them *Japan’s foreign policy in the 1990s: From economic superpower to what power?* (1998), *Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: A matter of pride or justice?* (1999), and *Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989* (2002).

