China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations

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List of Abbreviations

ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CPC  Communist Party of China
CPAPFA  Chinese People's Armed Police Forces Academy
CPCTC  China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
FPU  United Nations Formed Police Unit
HNP  Haitian National Police
ICPC, Interpol  International Criminal Police Commission
IFOR  Implementation Force
INTERFET  International Force East Timor
MFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MINUSTAH  United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUC  United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPS  Ministry of Public Security
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ONUB  United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC  United Nations Operation in the Congo
ONUMOZ  United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PAP  People’s Armed Police
PLA  People’s Liberation Army
PRC  People’s Republic of China
RMB  Renminbi (People’s Republic of China’s currency in mainland China)
SCO  Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SFOR  Stabilization Force
TCC  Troop Contributing Countries
UN  United Nations
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCIVPOL United Nations Civilian Police
UNDPKO, PKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNIKOM United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
UNITAF United Task Force
UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Cote d’Ivoire
UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNOSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNPKO, PKO United Nations peacekeeping operations
UNPOL United Nations Civilian Police
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
UNSAS United Nations Standby Arrangements System
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSC P-5 Permanent Five Members of the United Nations Security Council
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
Executive Summary

Beijing currently has a relatively active policy with regards to UN peacekeeping, especially when compared to its history or the commitment of other major powers. China's active policy on UN peacekeeping may contribute to the strengthening of the UN peacekeeping regime and the promotion of peace and security through multilateral cooperation. This paper intends to explain the rationale behind this policy. The paper is divided into five parts:

1. A Historical Overview

China's inactive policy on UN peacekeeping in the 1970s was largely based on its unswerving normative concerns regarding state sovereignty and non-intervention, as well as its disagreement with what it thought to be the two superpowers' behavior internationally. China's quick adjustment of its attitude towards UN peacekeeping in the 1980s was mainly due to its improved security outlook and need for a favorable international environment which could benefit its own economic development-oriented reform and opening up strategy. However, China's traditional concerns about normative principles, such as state sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of force, and its priority on domestic affairs prevented it from becoming an active peacekeeper. From the end of the 1980s to 1998, China's further adjustment of its conservative attitude towards UN peacekeeping was mainly due to the urgent task of breaking through the international isolation following the 1989 Tiananmen event, countering the threat of "peaceful evolution" posed by the West, and restoring a favorable international environment for its development-oriented modernization strategy. However, due to several factors, such as lack of interest and enthusiasm, Beijing did not fully embrace UN peacekeeping.
2. China’s Policy on UNPKO after 1999

1999 marked the beginning of a new era for China’s participation in UNPKO. China has since viewed the normative principles such as: state sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of force more flexibly than before – having adopted a rather active policy towards UNPKO. Beijing’s increasing commitment to UNPKO can be witnessed through its deliberate efforts in improving its training capabilities, its increased participation in international cooperation and exchange activities, and its large and ever increasing contribution of both military and police units. It has also joined international efforts to improve the peacekeeping capabilities of relevant regional organizations and has given political and financial support to relevant war-torn host countries. Nevertheless, Beijing’s cooperative attitude to UNSC has not prevented it from protecting its own interests. This is reflected in its using of abstentions, threatening of vetoes or even the use of vetoes.


Based on comprehensive analyses, the reasons for China’s current policy on UNPKO fall into three categories:

Preconditions

Enhanced national strength derived from continuous success in economic, social and political development has provided China with adequate human and material resources and political currency for its active participation in UNPKO. The favorable international environment, in particular, following the September 11 incident, encouraged China to adopt a more active foreign policy. At the same time, enhanced national strength provided China with more confidence; this enables China to be selectively active in international affairs despite its long-held strategy of keeping a low profile. Besides, accumulated experience in the UN regime also promotes Beijing’s enthusiasm for UNPKO.

Strategic Reasons

As China rises, one of its urgent diplomatic tasks is to assure the world of its goodwill and intention to become a responsible power. To this end, China needs to integrate into the international community and make active contributions to international peace and security. Wearing a blue helmet
projects a good image in the eyes of both the developing and developed worlds. Beijing’s active participation can also help strengthen the UN, whose authority has been challenged by a trend of unilateralism. China’s support for the UN can yield valuable benefits, which not only serve its ‘peaceful rise’ aspirations, but can also be used as clout to balance against unilateralism and yield valuable political currency for it to promote its multilateral agenda. Moreover, Beijing is becoming increasingly aware that its peaceful rise can not be achieved without a peaceful environment. China’s embrace of globalization makes its interests interdependent with those of the rest of the world. Beijing’s increasingly active policy on UNPKO shows its willingness to join the international efforts in addressing peace and security-related matters.

Other Reasons

China’s participation in UNPKO can also yield other benefits, including improved skills and professionalism of the PLA and police personnel as well as improved force projection capabilities.

4. Barriers to China’s Participation in UNPKO after 1999

Westphalian norms remain as the major barrier to China’s active policy on UNPKO, especially when humanitarian intervention and peace enforcement are preferred to by some dominant powers as means to address conflicts. At the same time, there are internal barriers from within China as well. For example, the “China Threat” theory can discourage China and force it to keep a low profile with respect to international activities, including UNPKO, in order not to alarm others. Beijing’s more active participation in UNPKO in the future does not merely depend on its capabilities or willingness, but also on the sincere attitude and encouragement by others of its active participation rather than criticism and skepticism.

5. Prospect of China’s policy on UN peacekeeping in the 21st century

As China continues to adopt a strategy of peaceful rise, it will become increasingly integrated into the international security framework, including in UN peacekeeping. China’s attitude towards UN peacekeeping will be increasingly positive. As this continues, it will have a larger stake in
UNPKO. In the foreseeable future, China will continue to act as a defender of UN authority, advocate multilateralism and strengthen its support for the UN peacekeeping regime. It is expected to favor UN-commanded peacekeeping operations, increase its financial contributions to UNPKO and contribute more support troops, military observers and civilian police officers to UN-commanded Blue Helmet missions. However, it will not rush into sending PLA combat troops to overseas missions as it is sensitive towards how others may view such a move, leading to misunderstandings about its activities abroad.

Beijing may continue to selectively vote for UNSC resolutions that authorize the establishment of UN-commanded peacekeeping operations which adopt Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It may also selectively refrain from saying “no” to peace enforcement operations or humanitarian interventions conducted by “multinational forces,” provided there is UNSC authorization and acquiescence of the host country; but it will not participate in these missions. Significantly, Beijing will continue to oppose unilateral actions outside of the UN framework.
1. Introduction

In recent years, China has become an increasingly active participant in the UN regime, particularly with respect to its peacekeeping operations (UNPKO, PKO). On September 18, 2006, Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, announced in Beijing that China would increase its peacekeeping presence in Lebanon to 1,000 troops. As of December 31, 2006, the People's Republic of China (PRC) registered 1,666 military troops, military observers and civilian police officers in 10 of 15 ongoing UNPKO around the world – ranking China number 12 among the 114 Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), and second among the Permanent Five Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC P-5) at that time. As such, current Chinese policy on UNPKO has changed a great deal since the 1970s and 1980s, when China either rejected UNPKO and/or refrained from sending any personnel to UN peacekeeping missions.

Some observers attribute China's changing policy on UNPKO to the country's increasingly flexible interpretation of the Westphalian norms of

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state sovereignty and non-intervention. However, they overlooked the more important reasons. In fact, China’s policy towards UNPKO is largely determined by its evolving perception of the international security environment, and its own national interests and comprehensive national capabilities. China’s enhanced national strength and its improved status within the international environment provide China with the needed resources and political currency that enable it to adopt an active policy on UNPKO. The aims of such a policy are to sustain its core national interests – including the maintenance of its role as a responsible power, strengthening the UN regime and sharing common concerns regarding peace and security. While analyzing the factors that could hinder China’s active participation in UNPKO, many observers have merely focused on those factors which come from within China, thinking that China is to blame for any reluctance to shoulder its due responsibilities of maintaining international peace and security as a great power. Importantly, they overlook the fact that there exist external barriers which present obstacles to China’s adoption of a more active peacekeeping policy.

This paper examines China’s changing policy on UNPKO. China’s policy on UNPKO can be evaluated by segregating it into four phases. First, a historical review illustrates China’s different policy in three distinctive periods of time before 1999. Then the paper updates readers on China’s ongoing policy towards UNPKO, which has been gradually formulated since 1999 (Phase Four). This covers China’s participation in UNPKO, including its contributions of both personnel and resources, its efforts to set up peacekeeping capabilities and its participation in international efforts to help improve the peacekeeping capabilities of relevant regional organizations and provide both political and financial support to war-torn host countries. After this, the paper will probe the reasons which have led to China’s ongoing policy in regard to UNPKO as well as the internal and external barriers

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5 In 1684, the Treaty of Westphalia ended decades of religious wars in Europe with new rules of international law establishing the modern state system. The Westphalian norms, also known as the Westphalian principles, as incorporated in the Treaty of Westphalia, include state sovereignty and non-intervention of international affairs. See “Peace of Westphalia”, <http://en.allexperts.com/e/p/pe/peace_of_westphalia.htm> (February 20 2007)

6 The peacekeeping operations conducted by these regional organizations mentioned here are not UN peacekeeping operations, although they may be authorized by UNSC. For example, the ongoing African Union (AU)’s peacekeeping operations in Darfur of the Sudan.
which may pose as obstacles to China’s active policy. Before discussing future prospects for China’s peacekeeping policy, the author will voice his concerns in order to address some prevailing doubts regarding China’s peacekeeping capabilities and speculations regarding China’s incentives for participation. As China’s policy on UNPKO is an important part of its foreign policy, the author hopes that this paper will also shed light on China’s overall foreign policy.

It should be noted that in this paper, the term “peacekeeping” refers exclusively to the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. “Peace enforcement” in this paper refers to enforcement operations which entails the use of armed force to address international peace and security-related issues within the UN framework. “Peace-building” indicates official efforts of the UN and regional organizations to create or restore stable political, economic and social conditions for long-lasting peace. Also, the term “peacekeeper” indicates the military and police personnel in UNPKO contributed by UN member states and under the command of the UN unless otherwise stated.
2. China’s Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations – A Historical Overview

During the Second World War, China fought against imperial Japan and made significant contributions to the Allies’ victory, which led to the establishment of China’s prominent status as one of the UNSC P-5. However, as the Cold War quickly descended on the world following World War II, the communist New China, immediately after its establishment on October 1, 1949, found itself excluded from the UN. When the Korean War broke out in 1951, the People’s Republic of China and the UN multi-national forces led by the United States began to fight each other. In the following two decades or so, Beijing was absent from the UN, with China’s seat occupied by U.S.-supported Taipei as the “Republic of China.” It was not until 22 years later, on October 25, 1971, that the People’s Republic of China was admitted into the UN and assumed its seat as a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council. Since then, China’s policy on UNPKO has begun to attract international attention.

The foreign policy of a country is usually deliberated within a certain domestic and international environment with unique features reflecting a country’s national strength, security situation and other aspects aimed at promoting national interests. China’s foreign policy regarding UNPKO is no different. When examining China’s policy towards UNPKO, one should take into consideration both the domestic and international environment and the specific interests that policy serves. According to these criteria, China’s policy on UNPKO can be evaluated by breaking it down into four phases.

2.1. Phase 1: 1971 to 1980 – An Inactive Policy

During this time period, China adopted an inactive policy towards UNPKO. It condemned and opposed the creation and continuation of all UN PKO operations.
peacekeeping operations, refused to burden its annual budget with peacekeeping operations or contribute personnel to ongoing operations, and abstained from UNSC voting.

The primary reason for this was China’s ideological disagreement with the two superpowers, namely the U.S. (as well as the other Western capitalist powers) and the Soviet Union. Revolution and struggle were the banners of China’s diplomacy in those days. It was impossible for the Chinese government to adopt a cooperative policy on UNPKO, which China believed was a means by which the superpowers achieved their interests. Another reason was China’s advocacy of Westphalian norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention, which, during the 1970s, served its most important national and international interests. In addition to ideological differences and advocacy of Westphalian norms, there were other reasons for China’s inactive attitude towards UNPKO during the 1970s. These factors are examined below:

National Interests

China’s sense of humiliation following the first Opium War (1839 – 1842) through to the Resistance War against Japanese Aggression [抗日战争, kangri zhanzheng, 1937 - 1945] led to a “victim mentality” complex [受害者心态, shouhaizhe xintai]. The vivid memory of past events like the Korean War (1951) and the fact that the superpowers and other western powers supported India during the 1962 China-India Border War further deepened China’s victim mentality and reinforced its impression that UNPKO could be used by the superpowers to damage China’s state sovereignty and interfere in its domestic affairs, such as in the Taiwan Question [台湾问题, taiwan wenti]. What is more, in the 1970s China faced a grave security threat from the Soviet Union, as well as border disputes with other neighboring countries.

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8 This author recognizes the tension between China’s attempts at supporting communist ideology abroad and its own advocacy of state sovereignty. However, the examination of Chinese history from this perspective is not within the purview of this paper. The author is merely pointing out as fact the Chinese leadership’s attitude and behavior during that period of time.


such as India and Southeast Asian countries. Although U.S. President Richard Nixon paid a historic visit to China in 1972 and Sino-U.S. relations gradually improved, China’s international security outlook was perceived as being uncertain until 1979, when Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations were properly secured and the so-called “strategic triangle”\textsuperscript{11} formed. This explains why throughout the 1970s, China did not give up its position on the Westphalian principles.

\textit{International Interests}

The support of developing countries for the restoration of China’s rights in the UN during the 1960s-1970s proved that China’s long efforts in supporting the decolonization movement around the world had paid off. As the only developing country among the UNSC P-5, China was expected by some developing countries to help protect their interests in the international arena. In 1974, Mao Zedong [毛泽东] outlined the “Three-World Theory” [三个世界理论, sange shijie lilun] while meeting with visiting Zambian President Kenneth D. Kaunda.\textsuperscript{12} In his speech at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1974, the then-Chinese vice Premier Deng Xiaoping [邓小平] went further to illustrate the “Three-World Theory” and on behalf of the Chinese government, condemned the Soviet Union for violating the state sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{13} China “identified itself with the Third World”\textsuperscript{14} and wished to fulfill its international moral responsibility for other “Third World” [第三世界, disan shijie] countries by strictly adhering to the Westphalian norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention.

\textsuperscript{11} Ilpyong J. Kim (ed.), \textit{The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States & the Soviet Union}, Saint Paul: Paragon House Publisher, 1987.


Lack of Knowledge, Resources and Interests

As a newcomer, China was not familiar with the complex UN system, including its structures, procedures, customs and political environment, which might be one reason for China's non-involvement in UNPKO. With regards to resources, during the Cultural Revolution [文化大革命, wenhua dageming] China suffered from a lack of both human and material resources. At the same time, it needed to spend its limited resources on developing defensive capabilities against a possible attack from the Soviet Union as well as on providing aid to the “Third World.” As such, China did not have adequate resources to actively participate in UN affairs such as PKO.

There was also a lack of interest. Firstly, China did not think participation in UNPKO could generate much political benefit when it ideologically disagreed with both superpowers. Immediately after the restoration of China's seat at the UN, the then-UN Secretary-General U Thant invited the Chinese government to send a delegation to attend the 26th General Assembly. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that China should not go to New York due to the fact that most of the Ministry’s attention was focused on preparations for Henry Kissinger’s visit to Beijing. Secondly, during the 1970s China deliberately isolated itself from the world economy based on the principle of self-sufficiency. Even after the Cultural Revolution in 1978, China's foreign trade volume was a mere US$20 billion. China did not have much economic incentive for active participation in international institutions like the UN. In brief, the lack of political and economic interests might have partly resulted in China’s inactive policy on UNPKO.

Although China was inactive in the UNSC during this period, it did not use its veto rights at the UNSC to obstruct UNPKO. There are two fundamental reasons for this. On the one hand, it did not want to be regarded as taking sides by voting for any resolutions which might serve the interests of either superpower or compromise its normative principles of state sovereignty and
non-intervention. On the other hand, it did not want to be regarded as being an “obstructionist”\(^{17}\) or displease the relevant “Third World” countries\(^{18}\) which might have legitimate interests in the passing of such resolutions. Instead, Beijing created its own voting style termed the “fifth voting style” which namely means - to be present during the UNSC voting process but keep silent and not participate in voting.\(^{19}\) China maintained this approach throughout the 1970s for about 30 votes and only stopped doing so in the early 1980s.

2.2. Phase 2: 1981 to 1987 – A Change in Attitude

In 1981, China for the first time voted on the UNSC in favor of UNSC Resolution 495 which extended the ongoing United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).\(^{20}\) In 1982, China began to pay its dues for peacekeeping.\(^{21}\) It also voted in favor of all the other subsequent resolutions on UNPKO.\(^{22}\) However, China still did not send its personnel on UNPKO.\(^{23}\) Since the early 1980s, China had refrained from using the passive “fifth voting style” and participated in UNSC voting; although most of the time it chose to abstain altogether. Nevertheless, abstentions were arguably more “active” than the “fifth voting style.” For example, when it abstained from voting, China would always provide reasons for doing so. China’s attitude and position during this period (1981-1987) can be understood as follows:

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\(^{19}\) “The Early Days after China’s Returning to UN” [中国重返联合国之初], *China News Week* [中国新闻周刊] (online), 35/2005, 245, September 19, 2005, <www.chinanewsweek.com.cn/2005-09-25/1/6364.html> (December 2, 2006). There are usually four types of voting behaviors: (1) voting for, (2) vetoing, (3) abstention and (4) being absent and refusing to participate in voting. China created a special voting behavior in the UNSC in the early days after it returned to UN: being present in the UNSC voting process but not participating in the actual voting.


\(^{23}\) There were only five UNPKO during this period of time, all of which were established before 1980s.
Reform and Opening Up

When Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978, he decided that China should ease itself away from worrying about a world war, an issue China had been preoccupied with during the 1970s, and instead focus its attention on economic development. In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Conference of the Communist Party of China (CPC) adopted a policy of opening up and reform. This trend was further strengthened at the 12th National Congress of the CPC in September 1982 and has since become an important fundamental consideration in China’s national policy. To this end, China needed to “engage in international cooperation and multilateral diplomacy.” After re-evaluating the UN regime, the Chinese leadership began to understand that this international organization could serve as an ideal platform to broaden its global horizon and create a favorable international environment for its prioritized economic development reform policy. Accordingly, it adjusted its policy towards the UN regime, including on PKO, and began to selectively participate in various activities for the world body.

Improved Security Outlook and Growing Knowledge

In January 1979, China and the U.S. officially established diplomatic relations. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, China began to work together with Western countries to oppose the Soviet regime. For example, Beijing joined the Washington-led boycott of the 1980
Moscow Olympic Games \(^{27}\) while it “bolstered the 1984 Los Angeles Games.” \(^{28}\) By now, China’s relationship with Western countries had improved. During the 12\(^{th}\) National Congress of the CPC, the “independent foreign policy of peace” \([独立自主的和平外交政策, duli zizhu de heping waijiao zhengce]\) was formulated, which marked the fact that China had practically abandoned its ideological disagreement with the West and was determined to seek peaceful coexistence. As a China analyst noted,

“‘Peace’ means that China began to formulate its foreign policy from the viewpoint of whether it is beneficial to international and regional peace, instead of the viewpoint of pursuing military superiority, while ‘independence’ means that China began to formulate its foreign policy according to its national interests and the common interests of peoples of all the countries in the world.”

After Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981, the so-called “strategic triangle” was forged. This not only further safeguarded China’s international security environment, it also enabled China to allocate its limited recourses towards development-oriented reform and its opening up strategy; this in turn improved China’s international status and self-confidence when addressing international affairs. During this time period, China also gained more knowledge about the UN, which led to its re-evaluation of the organization. For example, it began to realize that some political benefits could be reaped by participating in the affairs of the UN decision-making bodies like the UNSC.

**Existing Normative Barriers**

Although there were some changes in China’s policy regarding UNPKO, there were some normative barriers that prevented it from becoming an active player. China was still greatly concerned with principles like state sovereignty and non-intervention. Beijing knew that although it could afford to show some degree of flexibility in these principles, it could not go too far.


China’s alliance with the U.S. and the West simply served the common task of dealing with the Soviet Union. When the common task was fulfilled, China could become the next “target” of the West. What is more, China was particularly annoyed by the U.S.’s tactics with regards to the Taiwan Question. Therefore, China could not afford to forsake its normative principles for short-term interests.

**Lack of Resources**

During this period (1981 to 1987), China’s primary focus was directed towards economic development. According to Deng Xiaoping, everything else was to be regarded as secondary to the economic development-oriented reforms and opening up policy. Most of the limited resources were therefore set aside for economic development. For example, even the military forces were downsized and expenditure on defense reduced. From 1979 to 1989, the defense expenditure registered an average annual decrease of 5.83 percent. This partly explains why China did not have resources to allocate towards UNPKO.

**Phase 2 (1981-1987) Summary**

China’s changing policy on UNPKO during the 1980s resulted from the development of a more favorable international environment which could serve its prioritized economic development-oriented reform and opening up policy. As reflected above, its improved security environment featured by its status in the *ad hoc* “strategic triangle” as well as its adjusted foreign policy, namely “independent foreign policy of peace,” encouraged it to be more active in the international arena, including institutions like the UN. What is more, China’s re-evaluation of the UN regime led to its adjustment of voting behavior in the UNSC. However, China’s concerns about normative principles like state sovereignty and non-intervention caused it to continue to

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be wary of both the West and UNPKO, while its lack of resources posed as an obstacle to more active participation in UNPKO.

2.3. Phase 3: 1988 to 1998 – A Rising Profile...and Challenges

In November 1988, China joined the UN Special Peacekeeping Committee. Five months later, Chinese Ambassador Yu Mengjia [俞孟嘉] called on the international community to give “powerful support” to United Nations peacekeeping. In 1989, twenty Chinese civilian officials were sent to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to assist with election work. In 1990, China sent five military observers to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East. It was the first time China had sent peacekeeping personnel on UNPKO. From April 1992 to September 1993, China also sent 800 PLA engineering troops in two batches to the United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC); this was the first time China sent formed military units for UNPKO and represented the only time it did so during the entire 1990s. In addition, between 1988 and 1998, 437 Chinese military observers were sent in 32 batches to five UNPKO, including the UNTSO, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), UNTAC, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and the United Nations Observation Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). In May 1997, China agreed in principle to participate in the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS).

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39 UNSAS is based on conditional commitments by UN member states of specific resources within the agreed response time for UN peacekeeping operations. The resources can be military formations, specialized personnel (civilian and military), services as well as material and equipment. UNSAS currently consists of four levels: (1) list of capabilities, (2) planning data sheet, (3) a generic memorandum of understanding, and (4) rapid development. For more information, see UNSAS homepage at: <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/rapid/sba.html> (December 20 2006). In January 2002, China formally joined the Class-A standby arrangements.
Thirty-six UNPKO were established during the period between 1988 and 1998. China voted in favor of all missions that carried out traditional peacekeeping tasks and all peace-building missions as well as the continuation of all traditional UNPKO that were established during the Cold War era.40 However, it abstained from peace enforcement missions with the exception of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).41 Beijing was very careful in dealing with matters regarding Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in particular, the use of force, which usually constitutes as its reasons for adopting abstention or threatening the use of vetoes in UNSC voting. For example, along with other P-5 members, China was accused of being inactive in promoting an international intervention during the Rwanda genocide in April 1994.42 China’s concerns about the use of force was again fully exhibited through its abstention from the UNSC resolution that authorized the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia which operated from February 1992 to March 1995,43 although it should be pointed out that Beijing’s normative principles did not lead it to veto against this mission; merely to abstain.

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41 China also voted in favor of the UNSC Resolution 794, which authorized the establishment of the Unified Task Force on Somalia (UNITAF), a U.S.-led international humanitarian intervention operation. UNTAF had the mandate to act under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and take all necessary measures to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. China insisted that these two cases were exceptions under exceptional circumstances. See, UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/794 (1992), December 3, 1992; op. cit., Staehle, “China’s Participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Regime”, p. 30.
Later on however, China voted in favor of the resolutions that allowed UNPROFOR peacekeepers to use force in specific cases.\textsuperscript{44} It also voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1031, which authorized the replacement of UNPROFOR by the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) which operated from December 1995 to December 1996.\textsuperscript{45} Afterwards, China also supported UNSC Resolution 1088, which authorized the replacement of IFOR by the Stability Force (SFOR) which ran from January 1996 until December 2005.\textsuperscript{46}

Between 1988 to 1998 (Phase 3), the heavy voting workload in the UNSC posed great challenges for Beijing’s political will as well as its long-held position on normative principles. Stefan Staehle analyzed China’s voting behavior in 14 UNSC resolutions which authorized the use of force in UNPKO during the period between 1992 and 1996: China abstained from those authorizing the use of force seven times while on another seven occasions, it voted in favor of such action.\textsuperscript{47}

In May 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing marked the full normalization of Sino-Soviet Union relations. It seemed that China’s reform and opening up policy would enjoy an even more favorable international environment and Beijing could embrace UNPKO with more enthusiasm. However, in June 1989, on the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the communist governments in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European communist nations, the Tiananmen incident occurred, leading to the U.S.-led international isolation of Beijing. At the same time, the “strategic triangle” disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. As the only remaining large communist state, China believed that it had become a Western target for “peaceful evolution” [和平演变 heping yanbian], a strategy perceived by Beijing as being initiated by the U.S. and other western countries to overthrow the communist/socialist systems by peaceful

China’s Changing Policy on UN peacekeeping Operations

In all, at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, China’s security situation deteriorated; this not only affected its international security, but also posed a threat to its social and economic development, as well as its political foundation.

After the 1989 Tiananmen incident, China quickly adjusted its strategy on foreign policy so as to break international isolation, ease the pressure of “peaceful evolution” and restore a favorable international environment for development. Its policy on UNPKO during this period of time mainly served these purposes. Facing the complicated international situation, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that China should keep a low profile [韬光养晦, tao guang yang hui] in dealing with international relations, which has since served as a guiding principle for China’s foreign policy.

China tried to avoid confrontation with the U.S. and other important Western powers and did not use its veto rights to block any UNPKO or...

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49 Op. cit., Chen Zimin, “Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy”, p. 50. According Chen, these incidents include the U.S.’s selling of advanced fighter planes to Taiwan, the U.S. search of a Chinese cargo ship on the high seas, the blocking of China’s bid to host the 2000 Olympics, the Japanese sovereignty claim on the Diaoyu Islands, the sanctions and efforts to denouncing China in the name of human rights, and the sending of aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait.

50 Keeping a low profile [韬光养晦] is a Chinese idiom which currently serves as one of the main principles of China’s foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. Its literal meaning, “to hide ones capacities and bide one’s time”, has mistakenly been attributed as a form of negative strategic behavior by some in the West. An example is the “Pentagon’s Annual Report: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China”. See “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2006”, by Office of the Secretary of Defense (U.S.A.). <www.dhl.com.sg/publish/sg/en.high.html> (January 19 2007). In actual fact, this phrase (“keeping a low profile”) simply reflects China’s intention to focus its attention on domestic development, while promoting peace and avoiding conflicts with the outside world. See “Tao Guang Yang Hui Does Not Mean Hiding Our Capacities and Biding Our Time” [韬光养晦绝非暗藏杀机], The Global Times [环球时报], September 21, 2006.

relevant resolutions in the UNSC, except in the case of Guatemala in 1997. However, it often expressed its normative concerns about the use of force. These were fully reflected in three cases: Iraq, Cambodia and Somalia.

**Iraq**

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the UNSC decided to authorize its first peace enforcement action marking a new era for UNPKO. In November 1990, China chose abstention rather than a veto during the voting of UNSC Resolution 678, which authorized member states to use “all necessary means” to restore international peace and security. Beijing was reluctant to see the U.S.-led coalition attack Iraq; however, it disagreed with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as well. Following the end of the First Gulf War, China sent 20 military observers to UNIKOM. Considering its soured relations with the West after the Tiananmen incident, Beijing’s cooperation on the issue of Iraq with the West, most notably the U.S., is believed to have yielded much needed political and diplomatic gains.

**Cambodia**

In November 1991, the Sino-Vietnamese summit set a favorable foundation for the final peaceful settlement of the problem in Cambodia. Three months later, China voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 754, which authorized the establishment of UNTAC. After UNTAC was established, China took the unprecedented step of joining the other four P-5 members in sending military troops and observers to Cambodia. China’s active engagement on the Cambodia issue in the early 1990s not only served to improve its image in the international community, but was also consistent with the trend of improved Sino-ASEAN relations.

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52 In 1997, China vetoed the UNSC draft resolution to deploy military observers to verify the implementation of cease-fire agreements in Guatemala.
53 UN Security Council resolution, S/RES/678 (1990), November 29, 1990
57 This was an unprecedented case in the UN’s history whereby all UNSC P-5 members sent personnel to a UNPKO.
58 In the early 1990s, besides normalizing relations with Vietnam, China resumed relations with Indonesia and established relations with Singapore and Brunei. Considering the
Somalia

In the early 1990s, China voted in favor of all peace operations in Somalia, including UNITAF and UNOSOM II, both of which adopted Chapter VII of the UN Charter and were authorized to use force. UNITAF was a coalition operation with the U.S. as the pivotal country and UNOSOM II was commanded by the UN. China insisted that the operations were “exceptional” measures in view of the unique situation in Somalia and should not constitute a precedence. There were many reasons for Beijing’s adoption of such a flexible policy on international intervention in Somalia. The most important one was that, considering the well-publicized humanitarian disaster in Somalia, China did not want to be perceived as obstructionist by casting vetoes on Somalia-related UNSC resolutions and hindering humanitarian assistance. This was especially true since it already had a bad image abroad, especially in the West, following the 1989 Tiananmen incident. China decided on the strategy of cooperation with the West in the UNSC as long as its own core interests would not be harmed.

Phase 3 (1988-1998) Summary

In summary, by the end of the 1990s, factors such as improved relations with the Soviet Union enabled China to take a more active approach towards multilateralism in addressing international peace and security-related issues. However, the end of the Cold War resulted in China’s decreased international strategic status as well as a deteriorated international security environment due to fears of being a target of the West’s “peaceful evolution” strategy. The 1989 Tiananmen incident prompted the U.S.-led international isolation and the threat of a Western-led challenge in the form of “peaceful evolution.” China quickly adjusted its foreign policy according to its international and domestic environment.

China’s voting behavior, as shown in the cases of Iraq, Cambodia and Somalia in the early 1990s, reflected its flexible attitude towards Westphalian norms during this period of time so as to avoid being confrontational towards the U.S. as well as other Western powers in the international arena such as the UNSC. By selectively sending military peacekeepers on UNPKO during Western-supported isolation following the Tiananmen incident, China’s breakthrough in Southeast Asia has special significance.

this time period, Beijing managed to break the post-Tiananmen international isolation and ease the threat of “peaceful evolution.”

2.4. Phase 4: China’s Policy on UNPKO after 1999 – A New Era of Participation

1999 marked the beginning of a new era for China’s active participation in UNPKO which continues until today. This is reflected in the growing number of countries China has sent its peacekeepers to.

East Timor

In August 1999, mass killing and looting took place following the announcement of the pro-independence referendum result in East Timor.60 The UNSC announced that it was to “[act] under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”61 and authorized a multinational force, the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), led by Australia, to take all necessary measures to restore peace and security in East Timor.62 China voted in favor of INTERFET.63

On October 22, 1999, China also voted for UNSC Resolution 1272, by which the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established with a mandate to provide security and maintain law and order in East Timor, establish an effective transitional administration, take various measures to ensure the running of the administration and support capacity-building for self-government.64 The UNSC authorized UNTAET

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60 East Timor was a colony of Portugal before 1975. Indonesia invaded and integrated East Timor as its 27th province in 1976. The UN never recognized this integration. On May 5, 1999, Indonesia and Portugal agreed in New York to let East Timor hold a referendum for self-determination. The pro-independence vote agitated the pro-integration militias and elements of the Indonesian security forces, which resulted in violence, looting and arson throughout the entire territory. See “East Timor – UNTAET Background”, <www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm> (December 1, 2006)
62 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
China’s Changing Policy on UN peacekeeping Operations

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to “take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate,” which made it a Chapter VII operation with peace enforcement characteristics.

In January 2002, China sent 15 civilian police in two batches to UNTAET. This was the first time that China sent civilian police on UNPKO. As UNTAET was a Chapter VII mission, Chinese police officers were authorized to carry light weapons and patrol the community of a foreign country. In other words, compared with its reluctance to compromise in the case of Somalia in the early 1990s, China for the first time signaled that an UNPKO with an enforcement-featured mandate like that of UNTAET could be politically acceptable.

In September 2000, China increased its presence in UNTAET to 55 CIVPOL personnel. At the same time, there were quite a few Chinese officials working in the UNTAET civilian administration component. Even though China did not have military troops or observers in UNTAET, it had a comparatively large police contingent, which amounted to 76 officers in early 2002, thus ranking as the largest in this particular UN mission at that time. One Chinese police officer became the deputy UN police commissioner in UNTAET, which is to date the highest position assumed by a Chinese peacekeeper in a UNPKO.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo, Liberia, Afghanistan

In January 2001, China sent five police officers to the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). Nine months later, it increased its presence in this European mission to 15 police officers. In March 2003, 218 logistics troops, including a 175-person engineering company and a 43-person medical unit, were sent to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). This was

65 Ibid.
66 The acronym of UN civilian police was CIVPOL before 2002; after 2002, UNPOL began to be widely used.
the first time China sent military (but non-combat) units to UNPKO since it sent 800 PLA logistic troops to UNTAC during 1992-1993. Since then, military (but non-combat) troops have become the main part of China’s contribution of personnel to UNPKO.

In December 2004, 558 logistics troops, including a 240-person transportation company, a 275-person engineering company and a 43-person field hospital, were sent to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The mission to Liberia is by far the largest Chinese military contingent in a peacekeeping mission to date.

On October 28, 2002, China voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1401, which authorized the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). In January 2004, it sent a police advisor to this mission.

Kosovo

In April 2004, a 12-person police contingent was dispatched to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The then-Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Kong Quan [孔泉], said in a press conference:

“China has always respected sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia and Montenegro, faithfully implemented the UNSC Resolution 1244, safeguarded equal rights of all ethnic groups and supported the United Nations' peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo. We stand ready to join the international community to make our due efforts for properly resolving the Kosovo issue.”

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72 It is a small mission, with only 12 military observers and 8 civilian police at the peak time. China had a one-person police contingent in UNAMA during the period from January 2004 to May 2006.
74 Ibid.
Back in 1999, China abstained from UNSC voting on resolution 1244, which authorized the establishment of UNMIK under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Considering its opposition to the U.S.-led NATO war in Kosovo back in 1998, and the following incident when the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was attacked by U.S. missiles in spring 1999, Beijing's non-obstructionist attitude to the establishment of UNMIK and its concrete support for the UN efforts in the war-torn Yugoslavian province are evidence of China's growing flexibility and cooperative attitude to UNPKO.

Haiti

On April 30, 2004, China voted for UNSC Resolution 1542, which authorized the establishment of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). In September 2004, it dispatched a 125-personformed police unit (FPU) as well as another five civilian police officers to MINUSTAH. This was not only the first time China dispatched a police unit to a peacekeeping mission, but also the first time China sent peacekeepers to a UN member state with which it did not have diplomatic relations.

In fact, China's participation in the Haitian mission implies a higher degree of significance. Unlike the previous police contingents China sent to East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo, which were divided into groups of one or a few and dispatched to different UN police sections and mixed with those from other countries, the FPU that China now has in Haiti is a self-contained police force. Armed with riot control equipment ranging from batons, shields, pepper sprays and water canons to sniper guns, light machine guns and armored personnel carriers (APC), the FPU has strong operational capabilities and can perform various duties that generally neither individual police officers nor military troops can/should do. For example, the FPU can

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77 During his official visit to China in October 2004, the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan went to the newly built China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center (CPCTC) and inspected China's first FPU before it left for Haiti. “Annan Applauds China's Role in United Nations”, China Daily, October 12, 2004.  
provide operational backup to individual police officers, or perform public control duties, which are usually regarded as being sensitive for military troops as well as too difficult for ordinary police officers.

China’s contribution of a FPU reflects flexibility in its long-held position on the use of force by peacekeepers, which has long constituted its reason for refusing to send military combat troops on UNPKO.

**Lebanon and Sudan**

In March 2006, China sent 182 military logistics troops to UNFIL, including one mine clearance company, one engineering company, one support company and one field hospital. Two months later, another 435 military logistic troops, including a 275-person engineering company, a 100-person transportation company and a field hospital of sixty members, were sent to the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which has a six-and a half year mandate and is “the longest ever peacekeeping mission for [the] Chinese.”

**Statistics on Chinese Peacekeepers and Financial Contribution**

As of November 2006, China had 1,666 peacekeepers, including 1,411 military troops, 75 military observers and 180 civilian police personnel, in 11 of the 15 ongoing UNPKO, which represented 2.07 percent out of a total of 80,368 peacekeepers in all the peace operations supported by DPKO. China ranked number 12 among the 114 TCCs and number two among the UNSC P-5 members in terms of the contribution of personnel. As Table 1 shows, of the 1,666 Chinese peacekeepers, 1,322 were deployed to all seven ongoing UN

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81 The 80,368 UN peacekeepers include those in 15 ongoing UNPKO, two political missions and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).
83 At the end of December 2006, France had 1988 peacekeepers in UNPKO, ranking 10th among the 114 TCCs. China had 1666 and ranked 12th, Britain had 358 and ranked 40th, the U.S. had 324 and ranked 43rd, while the last one, Russia, had 291 and ranked 45th. During the period from March 2004 to August 2006, China had been the largest TCC among the UNSC P-5. Since September 2006, France overtook China to become the largest TCC among the UNSC P-5 due to its drastic increase of presence in UNFIL. See: op. cit., “Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Civilian Police Personnel”, by Ranking, 2000-2006.
African missions, where it has a much larger presence than any other UNSC P-5 member.84

Table 1: China’s Contribution of Personnel to UNPKO
(As of 31 December 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Host Country</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Military Observers</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFIL</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>The Sudan</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1411</strong></td>
<td><strong>75</strong></td>
<td><strong>180</strong></td>
<td><strong>1666</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations85

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84 As to December 31, 2006, France has 232 peacekeepers in African missions, which is followed by Russia with 213. The US has a presence of 18, while the last one, Britain has only 12. Op. cit., “Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Civilian Police Personnel”, by Ranking, December 2006.

By the end of 2006, China had contributed 6,600 peacekeepers to 21 UNPKO, ranking number one in terms of the number of active peacekeepers among the UNSC P-5 members.86

China’s assessment rate in contributions towards UN peacekeeping had increased from 0.995 percent for 2000 to 1.540 percent for 2001-2003, 2.053 percent for 2004-2006 and 2.667 percent for 2007-2009, which represents a 168 percent increase in the short span of seven years.87 In 2006 China ranked the ninth largest financial contributor among all 191 UN member states and the largest one among all developing member states of the UN.88 Nevertheless, it still contributed less to PKO financially compared to the other P-5 members except for Russia.89

International Cooperation

China is an increasingly active contributor to UNPKO, sending more peacekeepers and paying more dues for peacekeeping. It is also an active participant as well as a growing organizer of various international peacekeeping training courses and exchange activities, as well as a generous aid donor to peacekeeping and peace-building.

A Participant: Since the 1990s, China has actively participated in peacekeeping training courses and exchange activities organized by the DPKO as well as foreign countries and organizations around the world.90 For

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89 The assessment rate for the period of 2007-2009 for UNSC P-5 are: the U.S. 22.00 percent, Britain 6.64 percent, France 6.30 percent, China 2.67 percent and Russia 1.20 percent. From January 2001, China began to have more scale of responsibility than Russia. See “China’s Assessment Rate Has Increased” [中国承担的联合国会费比额增加], Xinhuanet, December 24, 2006, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2006-12/24/content_5525945.htm> (February 18 2007); op. cit., UN Secretariat Report, ST/ADM/SER.B/537.
example, in July 2004, ten Chinese UN civilian police (UNPOL) candidates attended the international peacekeeping exercises held in Mongolia. Four UNSC P-5 members\(^9\) and the host country Mongolia participated in these exercises. China also received training assistance from other countries.\(^9\) In addition, China sends its peacekeeping trainers to UNPKO so that they can gain first-hand peacekeeping experience and improve their training skills. China also sent inspection delegations and fact-finding teams to peacekeeping mission areas. After the trainees fulfill their missions, some are invited to assist with training work. All these efforts have greatly improved China’s peacekeeping capabilities.

**An Organizer:** In recent years, as China gradually gained experience as a peacekeeper and a peacekeeping trainer, it is no longer purely a “participant” of various peacekeeping-related international activities, but also an active “organizer.” In June 2000 and March 2003 respectively, China hosted two of the four China-Britain joint peacekeeping doctrinal seminars, which “aimed at increasing cooperation between the two permanent UN Security Council members.”\(^9\) China and Britain also jointly held two “train the trainers’ courses.”\(^9\) In September 2001, under the advocacy of Beijing, the heads of the UNSC P-5 members, during their attendance to the UN Millennium Summit, held a special meeting to discuss strengthening the roles of the UN and UNSC in maintaining world peace and security.\(^9\)

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\(^9\) Russia canceled its attendance at the last minute.

\(^9\) CPCTC has received training assistance from foreign countries including Australia, Brazil, Britain, France, Malaysia, Norway and Portugal as well as from UN peacekeeping missions like UNMIS, etc. PLA has sent officers to foreign countries such as Australia, Bangladesh, Britain and Holland, etc.


\(^9\) The first “Train the Trainers’ Course” was held in Beijing in October 2001 and attended by 16 police officers and peacekeeping trainers from China and other East Asian countries and Southeast Asian countries. The second course was held in CPCTC in March 2006 and attended by Chinese and Pakistani participants. The author attended the second course.

In November 2004, China and Sweden jointly held the Beijing International Seminar on Challenges of Peace Operations into the 21st Century, which were attended by high-ranking military officers and officials from China and the UN as well as participants from 13 other countries.\(^9\) In September 2006, China and the UN’s DPKO jointly held a seminar in CPCTC to develop training modules for peacekeeping FPU training. Two months later, China held an international peacekeeping training course, which was attended by 28 police officers from 18 foreign countries.\(^7\) China’s participation in organizing peacekeeping-related international activities reflects its growing enthusiasm as well as its improving capabilities for peacekeeping.

**An Aid Donor:** Although still a developing country, China has been generous as an aid donor, providing financial or material aid to relevant regional organizations to strengthen their peacekeeping capabilities as well as war-torn host countries and regions for their peace-building efforts. Since 1999, China has pledged US$25.2 million in aid and grants to East Timor.\(^8\) In 2002, China pledged an aid package worth US$150 million to Afghanistan over a five year period.\(^9\) In September 2004, China provided aid material worth RMB1 million (about US$125,000) to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for its peacekeeping purposes.\(^10\)

China has showed its support for the peace process in Somalia by giving huge financial aid to the Somali transitional government, which was established in 2000.\(^1\) On June 19 2006, visiting Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao

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\(^7\) The 18 foreign countries include 15 countries from Africa and four from Asia.


\(^1\) In 2005, China provided RMB50 million (about US$6.3 million) in economic aid to Somalia plus US$100,000 in cash to the Somali transitional government. After the 2004 Tsunami hit Somalia, China donated US$250,000 to the Somali government as emergency assistance for disaster relief. See “China Provides Six Million US Dollars’ Economic Aid to Somalia”,
announced in the Republic of the Congo that China would offer US$1 million to the African Union’s (AU) peacekeeping efforts in Sudan’s Darfur region and provide another RMB20 million (US$2.5 million) of emergency humanitarian aid to the region.\textsuperscript{102} In addition, during the China-Africa Summit, Beijing also announced an ambitious aid program to Africa amounting up to US$5 billion.\textsuperscript{103} Outside Africa, in September 2006 Premier Wen Jiabao announced that his government would increase its presence in Lebanon to 1,000 troops and that China would also provide Lebanon with aid materials worth RMB40 million (US$5 million).\textsuperscript{104}

**Voting Behavior**

There have been significant changes in China’s voting behavior since 1999. China has voted in favor of the establishment of all the new UNPKO and the continuation of all the existing UNPKO with merely one exception concerning Macedonia.\textsuperscript{105} Many of the UNPKO that China has voted in favor of, or directly participated in, such as UNTAET, UNMSIL, UNOIC and MONUC, were mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and with the authorization to use “all necessary means” to fulfill their mandates.\textsuperscript{106} China has recently demonstrated a degree of flexibility on the issue of Darfur in Sudan, a country where it is a key player in the oil industry.\textsuperscript{107} In

\textsuperscript{102} "Wen Jiabao Holds Talks with President of the Republic of Congo Sassou-Nguesso", the Web of the Foreign Ministry of PRC, June 20 2006, \texttt{<www.fmprc.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/fzs/xwb/1250149.htm> (February 18 2007)}.

\textsuperscript{103} During the 2006 China-Africa Summit China announced that it would cancel more debt owned by the poor African countries and pledged to provide US$5 billion in loans and credit over the next three years. See “China to Cancel More Debt Owned by Poor African Countries”, \textit{Xinhua News Agency}, November 4, 2006; “China to Double Its Aid to Africa”, \textit{BBC News}, November 4, 2006.

\textsuperscript{104} Op. cit., “China to Increase Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon to 1000”.

\textsuperscript{105} In February 1999, China vetoed the UNSC draft resolution S/1999/201[S/PV.3982] on extending the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia.


contrast to its previously firm opposition to any sanctions or intervention in the Darfur issue, Beijing has now promised to persuade Khartoum to be more flexible and supported the replacement of the AU by the UN in conducting peacekeeping in Darfur “if the Sudanese government accepts it”\(^\text{108}\). In January, during his visit to Khartoum, President Hu Jintao reportedly urged the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir to boost the UN’s constructive role in realizing peace in Darfur along with the AU.\(^\text{109}\) A few reasons have led to Beijing’s changed approach on the Darfur issue: (1) the conflict in Darfur has attracted world-wide attention, so has Beijing’s attitude to the Darfur issue because Beijing does not want to see its international image being damaged as a result of inflexibility on the Darfur issue, (2) the AU is concerned about the Darfur issue and wants to see international efforts involved in Darfur; China has no reason for ignoring the request of Africa, (3) it seems that the Sudanese government cannot control the situation in oil-rich Darfur; Beijing’s interests in Sudan, including its energy-related interests, are likely to be damaged due to the instability there.

Nevertheless, Beijing’s cooperative attitude in the UNSC has not prevented it from occasionally showing its different views through the use of abstentions and vetoes or threats of vetoes. In February 1999, China vetoed the UNSC draft resolution S/1999/201[S/PV.3982] on extending United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia. China said that as the situation in Macedonia had improved, there was no need to further extend the mandate of the mission and that the limited UN peacekeeping resources should be used in other places.\(^\text{110}\)


\(^{110}\) UNSC Press Release SC/6648, February 25, 1999; “February 27 MFA Spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue Press Conference on Issues like UNSC Discussion of the Extension of UNPREDEP” [2月27日发言人章启月就联合国安理会正在讨论联预部队延期问题答记者问], the Web of
In addition, along with other powers like France, Russia and Germany, China stood against the American attempt to apply for UNSC authorization of peace enforcement actions in Iraq in 2003 and called for solving the Iraqi issue through peaceful means. It keeps a cautious eye on the threat of sanctions against Sudan and Myanmar, and advocates addressing the relevant issues through “peaceful means.” Regarding the issue of Myanmar, China even resorted to a rarely-used veto in the UNSC. Beijing believes sanctions cannot help solve the problems in Myanmar. More importantly, international intervention in Myanmar may lead to a deterioration of conditions in this poverty-stricken country, and endanger China’s geopolitical and economic interests.

Phase 4 (1999-Present) Summary

To wrap up, 1999 marked the beginning of a new era for China’s participation in UNPKO. China has since then viewed the Westphalian norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention with more flexibility than before and adopted a rather active policy towards UNPKO. Since 1999, it began to send civilian police on UNPKO. China’s increasing commitment to UNPKO is exemplified by its deliberate efforts to improve its training capabilities, its increased participation in international cooperation and exchange activities, and its large and ever increasing contribution of both military (non-combat) and police units. It has also joined international efforts to improve the peacekeeping capabilities of relevant regional organizations and give political and financial support for relevant war-torn host countries. Thus, it has begun
to play a more active role regarding matters of international peace and security.

Nevertheless, Beijing’s cooperative attitude in the UNSC has not prevented it from protecting its interests by showing where it stands. This is reflected in its use of abstentions, threats of vetoes or even use of vetoes, say, recently in the case of Myanmar.\footnote{Op. cit., “China, Russia Bar Sudan Sanctions”.} In addition, it is occasionally bothered by the challenges posed to peacekeeping by peace enforcement actions, such as the “coalition of the willing” in the case of Iraq, or humanitarian intervention in the case of the former Yugoslavia.
3. China’s Policy towards UNPKO after 1999 – An Analysis

While examining China’s reasons for its changing policy on UNPKO, many observers tend to focus on factors such as the Taiwan Question\(^{115}\) or China’s quest for natural resources such as oil.\(^ {116}\) One cannot deny that China’s support for UNPKO in some war-torn countries such as Sudan and Congo may yield favorable access to raw materials or improved diplomatic relations to counter Taiwan’s diplomatic efforts to gain international recognition. However, such case-by-case analyses cannot explain the reasons for China’s policy on UNPKO. A thorough study of China’s policy on UNPKO needs a comprehensive review of China’s diplomatic strategy in the context of globalization, China’s growing international profile, as well as its changing internal and external environment. For example, Beijing’s active participation in African UNPKO should be partly attributed to its comprehensive policy towards this war-torn and poverty-stricken continent. Also, its increased support for UN peacekeeping in Africa is in part due to the comparative indifference of the West with regards to peacekeeping operations there.

As the author would like to point out, China’s support for MINUSTAH (in Haiti) is also thought by many to have to do with the Taiwan Question. China wishes for Haiti to shift its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. However, considering Haiti’s pro-Taiwan policy, including its consistent support for Taiwan to become a member state in the UN,\(^ {117}\) China

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could have responded to Haiti by recalling its FPU and terminating MINUSTAH by vetoing the UNSC resolution on the extension of the Haiti mission, just like it did to Macedonia in early 1999. However, as a reflection of China’s growing diplomatic sophistication compared to a few years ago, it no longer uses this heavy-handed approach in its dealings with Haiti. China has decided to prioritize its grand diplomatic strategy regarding UNPKO, which has been formulated starting in 1999.

3.1. China’s Growing Capabilities

There are many reasons for China’s changing policy on UNPKO. While China’s policy on UNPKO is formulated to serve its national interests, this only reflects one side of the coin. China’s behavior is not only determined by the goals/interests that it expects to achieve; equally important, it has been made possible by China’s ability to effectively adopt and execute such a strategy.

Enhanced National Strength

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of China has continued to maintain an annual growth of 9.6 percent on average since 1979.\textsuperscript{118} In 1998, China’s GDP registered RMB7.9553 trillion (US$961 billion), while it reached RMB20 trillion (US$2.55 trillion)\textsuperscript{119} in 2006, making it the fourth largest economy in the world.\textsuperscript{120} During this time period, China also enjoyed a generally stable social and political environment. All these contribute to the enhancement of national strength and provide China with more resources to increase participation in international affairs, including UNPKO. In 2003, China invested US$20 million in setting up a civilian police peacekeeping training center called the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center (CPCTC).


\textsuperscript{119} This is calculated according to the exchange rate of each year. In 1999, the exchange rate for USD to RMB is 1 : 8.28 and by December 31, 2006, it is 1 : 7.80. The figure RMB20 trillion was estimated by the National Development and Reform Commission [国家发改委] in January 2007. See “China’s GDP Tops 20 Trillion yuan Last Year”, People’s Daily Online, January 14, 2007, <http://english.people.com.cn/200701/14/eng20070114_341079.htm> (January 15 2006)

Besides its huge investment in training facilities and equipment, huge sums were also spent on personnel selection, training and deployment. What is more, China’s high economic growth has led to an increase in its financial contributions based on the scale of assessment for UN peacekeeping. During the eight years from 2000 to 2007, its scale of assessment increased by more than 150 percent from 0.999 percent to 2.667 percent. Although compared with the top peacekeeping fund contributors such as the U.S., Japan and Germany, China’s scale of assessment remains small, the fact that it is picking up significant momentum should not be ignored. Without successful economic development, all these initiatives could not have been possible.

Favorable International Environment

Following the September 11 2001 attack on U.S. soil, China managed to secure what can perhaps be described as a more favorable international environment. Before the September 11 incident, there was rising tension in Sino-U.S. relations. First, there was the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in the spring of 1999 and this was followed by the air collision of Chinese and U.S. military planes off Hainan Island in the spring of 2001, which reminded many Chinese of U.S. hostility towards China. However, the September 11 incident quickly drew much of the U.S.’s attention towards a global counter-terrorism war and it is believed that as a result, China escaped from becoming a target of the Bush Administration, at least temporarily. The American preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as its preoccupation with the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues, further contributed to securing and extending China’s

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121 In China, a peacekeeping training course usually lasts for three months. TTCs’ expenditure on both personnel training and the building of training facilities cannot be reimbursed by the UN.
“strategic opportunities”[战略机遇期, zhanlue jiyuqi], thus enabling Beijing to be more active in international affairs like UNPKO.

In September 2005, the U.S. Deputy-Secretary of State, Robert B. Zoellick, proposed the idea of the Chinese being a “stakeholder”. China found that at present, the U.S. does not oppose Chinese attempts to strengthen its role in the international system. Other major powers such as Britain and France are also keen on China’s participation in international operations as well. During his visit to Beijing in 2004, the British Defense Secretary, Geoff Hoon, said that it would be very welcome if China played a larger role in UNPKO. China and Britain have had much interaction ranging from training assistance to joint seminars, while France is also willing to reach consensus with China regarding long-term cooperation on peacekeeping training. In addition, China’s international image has improved. For example, more countries like those in Southeast Asia seem to have become less suspicious of China’s growing power due to Beijing’s friendly foreign policy. This also generated a favorable environment for China’s active participation in UNPKO.

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128 In November 2006, some high-ranking Chinese police officers were invited to attend peacekeeping training course held in France. One month later, France sent a training assistance team to CPCTC to assist Chinese with FPU training.

Increased Confidence

In 1999, the former Premier Zhu Rongji [朱镕基] coined the phrase “responsible power” [负责任大国, fuzeren daguo], which means that China cannot only be a responsible economic player but also a political one in maintaining peace and security. Zheng Bijian’s [郑必坚] “peaceful rise” [和平崛起, heping jueqi] concept goes further to reveal China’s growing confidence based on its achievements in both domestic and international fields. All these pronouncements indicate the belief among the Chinese leadership that China can be selectively active and do something worthwhile [有所作为 you suo zuo wei] while continuing to keep a low profile. Such a belief is reflected in China’s growing concerns for the peace and security of the world.

The return of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999, Beijing’s much-praised role in not revaluing the Chinese Renminbi following the 1997-1998 East Asian Financial Crisis, and its further integration into the global economy marked by its membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of 2001 also contributed towards China’s growing confidence. This enabled Beijing to be more active in international affairs, such as UNPKO.

Accumulated Experience

After more than two decades, China has accumulated sufficient experience in UNPKO as well as more knowledge about the UN system, which enhances its enthusiasm for UNPKO. Notably, China has become more and more skillful in peacekeeping personnel training and deployment:

- It has taken deliberate measures to build up its training capabilities. Both the police and military have established their own training mechanisms

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131 Zheng Bijián, China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2005, from: www.irchina.org. (December 6 2006). Zheng Bijian was executive vice-president of the Party school of the CPC Central Committee and currently Chair of the China Reform Forum, a nongovernmental and nonprofit academic organization that provides research on and analysis of domestic, international, and development issues related to China. The term "peaceful rise" was firstly introduced at 2003’s Boao Forum [博鳌亚洲论坛] by Zheng Bijian.
133 During the financial crisis China decided not to devalue its currency in an effort to save some of the afflicted economies of the region, although the fixed exchange rate policy reduced China’s exports sharply in 1998.
which meet strict UN requirements.

- The civilian police have a comprehensive training center.
- All military observers receive training in the PLA Nanjing International Relations Academy, while military (but non-combat) troops are trained in the training bases in the military regions.\textsuperscript{134}
- China has also accumulated more knowledge about logistic supply, troop projection and contingent management.

In May 2004, China agreed to send a FPU to Haiti; five months later, the 125-strong police unit and all its equipment arrived at Port au Prince with 27 giant shipping containers. This shows Beijing’s impressive speed in deployment to crisis areas.\textsuperscript{135}

3.2. Strategic Reasons

Since 1999, China has deliberately formulated its policy on UNPKO in strategic terms to serve its strategic interests in the context of China’s peaceful rise. These strategic interests are powerful motivating factors accounting for China’s commitment towards UNPKO. In all, this author believes there are three core reasons for China’s ongoing policy on UNPKO: being a responsible power, strengthening the UN and sharing common concerns for peace and security.

A Responsible Power

As a UNSC P-5 member, China has the responsibility to play a significant role in maintaining international peace and security. However, due to many reasons which have been analyzed in the first half of this paper, China’s previously inactive policy on UNPKO had caused disappointment in the international community.\textsuperscript{136} Some accused China of “exploiting” the UN

\textsuperscript{134} In China, the PLA has seven military regions. Peacekeeping tasks of different PKO are assigned to different military regions. It is impossible to give training to a large number of military troops in one specific peacekeeping training center. Therefore, the peacekeeping training department in the PLA Nanjing International Relations Academy sends its trainers to the military regions to help with training work.

\textsuperscript{135} Before May 2004, China and UN did not have any memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding China’s UNSAS responsibilities of placing any FPU ready for PKO, the task of sending a FPU to Haiti was quite urgent and unfamiliar for China.

regime while fulfilling fewer responsibilities. 137 While its successful
development has yielded enhanced national strength, China has been
increasingly aware of the international expectations for its active
participation in international affairs. 138 China’s increasing participation in
UNPKO is to meet these demands and “[s]trengthen [its] commitment to
international peace and stability in a more globalized world”139 and maintain
the international moral responsibility that it always claims. 140

China’s continuous economic success and social development in the context
of globalization have attracted appreciation but also unease from the outside
world, as reflected in the heated “China Threat” debate.141 On the one hand,
the international community including the UN expects a rising China to
shoulder more responsibilities and do more for international peace and
security. On the other hand, a rising China has caused fears in the
international community that China will pursue a hegemonic path and
threaten international peace and security, as most rising powers have done in
history.

One of the urgent diplomatic tasks of a rising China is to assure the world of
its goodwill and intention to become a responsible power. To this end, China
needs to integrate further into the international community and make active
contributions to international peace and security. 142 As the largest
international institution, the UN is the most suitable for such an endeavor.
Wearing a blue helmet and actively participating in high profile UN
peacekeeping activities “furthers China’s image as a status quo nation that

China to Play Bigger Role in World”, Xinhuanet, October 11, 2006; “Annan Urges Greater
Peacekeeping Role for China”, Agence France-Presse, October 12, 2004; op. cit., “Britain Keen on
Chinese Peacekeepers”;
Beijing”, p. 41.
20, 2006; Herbert Yee and Ian Storey (eds.), The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,
London Routledge Curzon, 2002; William A. Callahan, “How to Understand China: the
Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power”, Review of International Studies (2005), 31,
pp. 701-714.
142 David Lague, “News Analysis: An Increasingly Confident China Lends Clout to UN”,
International Herald Tribune, September 19, 2006. Quoted words of Allen Behm, a security
analyst in the Australian Defense Department.
seeks to contribute to international stability through diplomatic and security measures," thus portraying a good image in eyes of the international community and serving to dispel the “China Threat” theory.

**Strengthening the UN**

In recent years, the UN’s authority has repeatedly been challenged by a series of international events like the 1999 U.S.-led NATO’s war in Kosovo as well as the 2003 U.S.-led “coalition of the willing” war in Iraq. Certain UN member states such as the U.S. as well as regional organizations have adopted unilateral action to address international peace and security-related issues without the authorization of the UNSC. Moreover, the past few years have witnessed a decline in the troop contribution of developed states to UNPKO, especially in Africa. According to a recent report by the Stimson Center, developed industrial states contribute only six percent of the Blue Helmets deployed in Africa. The UN peacekeeping regime has encountered great difficulties.

As a paper by Yong Deng and Thomas G. Moore notes: “Since the 1999 NATO war in Kosovo, China has been more determined to defend the relevance and authority of the UN.” When UN authority is challenged, China is willing to act as a “defender” of the UN system. In June 2005, the Chinese government issued its first comprehensive position paper on UN reform, in which it insisted:

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144 According to the statistics released by DPKO, in November 2006, the number of UN peacekeepers had reached a record of more than 80,000. All the top 9 TCCs, who contributed more than 57 percent of personnel, were developing countries. See “UN Has more than 80,000 Peacekeepers, Breaking a Record” [联合国在全球维和兵力已超8万达历史最高水平], People’s Daily Online, November 12, 2006, <http://world.people.com.cn/GB/1029/5027427.html> (January 16 2006); op. cit., “Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Civilian Police Personnel”, by Ranking, December 2006; Bruce Jones, “Evolving Models of Peacekeeping Policy Implications & Responses”, <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/Bruce%20Jones%20paper%20with%20logo.pdf> (January 8 2007); op. cit., Lynch, “China Filling Void Left by West in UN Peacekeeping”; Mark Doyle, “China Peacekeepers in Liberia”, BBC News, January 20, 2004.
“The United Nations plays an indispensable role in international affairs. As the most universal, representative, authoritative inter-governmental international organization, the UN is the best venue to practice multilateralism, and an effective platform for collective actions to cope with various threats and challenges. It should continue to be a messenger for the maintenance of peace, and a forerunner for the promotion of development.”

In contrast to the Western countries’ declining contributions to UNPKO in Africa, China’s increasing presence reflects its strong support for the UN. Considering its current national strength, China’s increasing participation can “add an important new dimension” to UNPKO, if not significantly change the situation.

China has also given strong support to UN reform on peacekeeping. It welcomes the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) and gives support to the United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS):

“China supports the enhancement of the UN’s peacekeeping capacity and welcomes the Secretary-General’s proposal on the establishment of strategic reserves and civilian police standby capacity. China hopes that the Secretariat will specify and clarify the many aspects of the proposal as required by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping of the General Assembly.”

China’s support for the UN is also reflected in its flexibility in the use of force, as shown in its increasing support for the adoption of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter in peacekeeping mandates. Besides, it has selectively agreed to peace enforcement operations when UNSC authority can be secured. These two points will be illustrated in detail later.

China today has a larger role in the UN regime. It actively participates in the decision-making process regarding UNPKO. For example, China has raised

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149 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said this during his visit to China in October 2004. See “Annan Urges China to Play Bigger Role in International Peacekeeping Operations”, Xinhua New Agency, October 12, 2004.
quite a few suggestions regarding the issue of reform on DPKO and the administration of PKO. It has complained “about the lack of officials from developing countries, including from its own country, who occupy high posts in the DPKO.” It has also expressed concern that “UN missions have been dominated by some Western powers and military alliance such as NATO.”

On UNSC reform, China insists that:

“Increasing the representation of developing countries should be given priority ... More countries, the small and medium-sized ones in particular, should be given more opportunities to enter the Council on a rotating basis to participate in its decision making process ... The principle of geographic balance should be adhered to, with representation of different cultures and civilizations taken into consideration.”

Beijing’s support for the UN also includes significant increases in contributions through peacekeeping dues. As mentioned above, China’s dues increased by 168 percent in a time span of five years since 2000. During the same period of time, dues for other countries, including the major UN financiers such as the US, Japan and German, declined.

It should also be noted that on many occasions, China’s support for the UN could not be achieved without a degree of confrontation with the U.S., since certain American unilateral policies are perceived by Beijing to endanger the authority of the UN. Under normal circumstances, China would be willing to cooperate with the U.S., even though sometimes flexibility in normative principles or concessions need to be traded off. For example, after constructive negotiations with the U.S., China abandoned its idea of extending the Haiti mission by another six months and voted for the U.S.’s eight month proposal in spite of Beijing’s unhappiness over the Haitian government’s provocative stance regarding the Taiwan Question. However,

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153 Op. cit., Yan Wei, “A Heftier Price Tag”. From 2000 to 2007, the U.S.’s scale of assessment for peacekeeping has dropped from 25.00 (percent) to 22.00, Japan from 20.57 to 16.60, Germany from 9.86 to 8.57.
when it comes to the issue of Myanmar, Beijing vetoed Washington and London’s UNSC draft resolution against Myanmar without any hesitation in January 2007. This is because, in the latter case, Beijing’s core interests were at stake and, equally important, China does not believe that such a move would genuinely improve the situation in Myanmar.

Sharing Common Concerns for Peace and Security

China’s expanded economic interests in the context of globalization have “forc[ed] Chinese policymakers to take a broader and more globalized view of China’s national interests.” In 2002, the former President Jiang Zemin said that,

“As countries increase their interdependency and common ground on security, it has become difficult for any single country to realize its security objective by itself alone. Only by strengthening international cooperation can we effectively deal with the security challenge worldwide and realize universal and sustained security.”

Unlike the time when China was closed to the outside world, Chinese interests today are linked to events abroad. Instability abroad may not only affect the export of Chinese goods to the conflicting countries and the neighboring regions which suffer from the spillover effect of conflicts, it also affects Chinese access to raw materials in some places. As an observer notes: “Instability in [...] energy producing parts of Africa and the Middle East, is clearly not in China’s interests.” In recent years, Chinese companies, citizens and compatriots have been repeatedly harassed, attacked or kidnapped by terrorists and criminals in foreign countries, to the alarm of

<http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070214/wl_afp/haitiviolenceun_070214230039> (February 21 2007)

China’s GDP of 1978 was $147.3 billion, foreign trade 20.6 billion; in 2006, China’s GDP was estimated to be RMB1.8 trillion (US$2.55 trillion), while its trade volume (both export and import) was 1.76 trillion. China’s foreign trade dependence had risen from 14 percent in 1978 to about 70 percent in 2006.


the Chinese government as well as the public. In view of such developments, the Chinese government is determined to “protect overseas Chinese enterprises and agencies” through both diplomatic channels and help with the improvement of security situation in relevant countries and regions.

In 2005, the PRC Foreign Ministry put forward the banner for China’s diplomacy, advocating “peace, development and cooperation” [和平、发展与合作, heping, fazhan yu hezuo]. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry:

“The security of one nation is closely related with that of the region and the world as a whole. Only through international co-operation can we effectively address the common security problem ... The thesis of peace, development and cooperation is an enrichment and development of China’s independent foreign policy of peace.”

In September 2005, while addressing an audience of state leaders from more than 170 countries at the UN headquarters in New York, Chinese President Hu Jintao called for a “harmonious world” [和谐世界, hexie shijie]. From then on, China began to implement its “harmonious world-oriented” diplomacy with the understanding that a peaceful and harmonious world serves as the precondition for China’s peaceful development and rise. Such thinking serves as a guideline for China’s active participation in international efforts and contribution to international peace and security and this is partly expressed through its active participation in UNPKO.
3.3. Other Reasons

There are also other notable reasons for China’s increasing enthusiasm for UNPKO, although they are not the primary determining factors. One is that comprehensive training and field practices can improve the skills and professionalism of personnel. Through international exchange activities in training and mission areas, PLA and police peacekeepers can gain exposure to the operational practices and methods of foreign counterparts. Such enrichment of their international experience can contribute to the modernization of Chinese military and police forces, and further improve China’s capabilities for future international activities. For example, many police officers with peacekeeping experience have been dispatched to overseas Chinese embassies as well international institutions such as the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC, Interpol) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to work as police liaison officers. Some believe that the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games will enjoy the Chinese police’s improved professionalism, which they have gained from their valued international experience as peacekeepers.

China’s participation also helps to improve its crisis management response effectiveness, especially in humanitarian operations. The PLA participated in the rescue work of the 2004 Tsunami and 2005 South Asian earthquake. Although small in size, consisting of one or two teams, it shows that with the enhancement of its national strength, coupled with increased the willingness to “do something worthwhile,” China can play a more important role in international humanitarian assistance operations. Domestically, it would also be able to better manage the humanitarian disasters that frequently occur inside the country.

4. Barriers to China’s Participation in UNPKO after 1999

Although there are adequate reasons for China to adopt an active policy on UNPKO, the barriers China faces should not be ignored. However, while analyzing China’s reluctance to be more active in UNPKO, many observers simply looked at China’s internal factors; few observers have noticed that there exist external influences that affect Chinese UNPKO participation. This section will discuss both internal and external barriers that hinder China’s participation in UNPKO.

4.1. Internal Barriers

Normative Concerns

As China’s interests in UNPKO increases, it will adopt an increasingly flexible attitude towards what are considered acceptable international norms especially if it contributes to international peace and security. In July 2001, in his speech on the 80th anniversary of the founding of the CPC, the former General Secretary of CPC Central Committee and President of PRC, Jiang Zemin, asked the Party (CPC) to promote the spirit of keeping pace with time [与时俱进, yu shi ju jin] and to adhere to the principles of bringing forth new ideas in theories. Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao [胡锦涛], said in a speech on the 86th anniversary of founding of CPC:

“[T]he CPC always attaches great importance to maintaining and developing the progressive nature as a Marxist party [...] Past experience proved that in order to maintain the progressive nature, the Party must keep in pace with time, setting goals and implementing strategies in accordance with reality of the country and the will of the people.”168

Ideological breakthroughs such as the spirit of “keeping in pace with the times” derive from the new generation of Chinese leaders’ re-evaluation of

China's strategic interests according to the new context of the domestic and international situation in the new millennium. Such breakthroughs have injected new vitality into China, which have led to China's adjustment towards a more flexible foreign policy.

Although China can be flexible in normative principles like state sovereignty and non-intervention, its flexibility is not without limits. China is aware that its flexibility regarding these norms may be a “double-edged sword.” On the one hand, when properly used, flexibility can provide Beijing with more diplomatic options for dealing with international affairs, prevent unnecessary conflicts with other powers and yield a favorable environment for its development strategy. On the other hand, when over-exploited, it will not only jeopardize China's strategic interests regarding state sovereignty (especially the Taiwan Question), but also damage its image as a peace-loving power, especially in the eyes of the developing world.

As mentioned above, globalization makes China's interests increasingly dependent on those of the developing world as well as the developed world. Beijing cannot afford to deepen cooperation with the developed countries at the expense of abandoning its heritage of special relations with the other developing countries. As one Chinese observer points out: “For developing countries, including China, adherence to state sovereignty and non-interference still matters, and they will resist any attempts to destroy this commitment.” Beijing knows that traditional security is still the priority of its national security concerns. For example, in the cases of the two UN humanitarian intervention missions in Somalia in the early 1990s, China insisted they were exceptions. When voting in favor of the international intervention in East Timor in 1999, China said the Australia-led intervention was invited by the concerned parties including Indonesia and the host country, East Timor. Although China recently agreed to the deployment of UN peacekeepers in Darfur, it insists on the consent of the Sudanese government as a condition.

Use of Force in UNPKO

After the end of the Cold War, the frequent use of force to solve conflicts has alerted China to the point that peace enforcement and other forms of forceful intervention – such as the U.S.-led “coalition of the willing” – are likely to dominate peacekeeping. Such actions threaten the UN’s authority as the only international institution with the legitimacy to authorize the use of force and threaten Beijing’s own national interests as well. China has never abandoned its principle of non-use of force in peacekeeping. It insists:

“Peaceful settlement of international disputes and non-use of force in international relations is an important principle of the UN Charter and a basic norm of international law. China [...] opposes the threat or use of force in international relations.”\(^\text{172}\)

China’s conservative attitude towards peace enforcement will continue to constitute a reason for its reluctance to agree to peace enforcement-related international activities, or to directly participate in this kind of peace operations by contributing troops.

Nevertheless, China believes that there may be special occasions whereby force could be used in peacekeeping. However, it should only be conducted with the authorization of the UNSC:\(^\text{173}\)

“[U]se of force shall not be resorted to without the authorization of the Security Council with the exception of self-defense under armed attack [...]. Whether to use force or not should be decided by the Security Council in light of the reality of conflicts on a case-by-case basis.”\(^\text{174}\)

Therefore, as long as the host nation acquiesces, UNSC authority is secured and China’s core interests are not endangered, China will not block peace enforcement operations in the UNSC.

Up to now, China still refuses to send combat troops on UNPKO as it is reluctant to be involved in possible armed conflicts with parties in the mission areas. Nevertheless, it has shown its flexibility by deploying to Haiti a Formed Police Unit (FPU), which often uses force and conducts combat duties in various law enforcement operations. The main objective of this


The FPU unit is to give support to the Haitian National Police (HNP) and to protect the MINUSTAH personnel as well as the mission mandate.

The Taiwan Factor

The Taiwan Question affects China’s policy on UNPKO. Beijing’s worries about international intervention in the Taiwan Question makes it cautious towards the use of force in peacekeeping as well as the growing popularity of peace enforcement. The Taiwan factor also affects China’s policy on specific UNPKO, as well as relations with relevant countries. Two of China’s six vetoes in the UNSC are related to nations which have diplomatic relations with Taiwan.\(^\text{175}\) One occurred in 1997, when China vetoed the UNSC draft resolution to deploy military observers to verify the implementation of ceasefire agreements in Guatemala, which has diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Later on, China lifted its veto when Guatemala agreed to stop pushing for Taiwan’s membership in the UN. Another was on February 25, 1999, when China vetoed the UNSC draft resolution to extend UNPREDEP in Macedonia.

Many, including some Chinese observers, have been critical of China’s above-mentioned vetoes and accused Beijing of taking advantage of its privileged seat in the UNSC.\(^\text{176}\) However, Beijing believes that every country’s foreign policy, including that on UNPKO, is directed towards serving its national interests; China is no exception. For example, while vetoing the UN peacekeeping mission in Guatemala in 1997, China said that “no country’s peace should be at expense of another’s sovereignty.”\(^\text{177}\) Beijing insists that Taiwan is a part of China, this is a position that has been accepted by more than 160 out of the 191 UN member states, including all the large and medium-sized ones. It is extremely unfortunate that Beijing used its veto power in the cases of Guatemala and Macedonia. However, from a Chinese perspective, Guatemala and Macedonia should bear some responsibilities for their provocative behavior. Guatemala had been active in pushing for Taiwan’s membership in the UN in the 1990s and the

\(^{175}\) As to January 2007, China as a UNSC P-5 member has used vetoes five times, one of which was cast by Taiwan in 1955. See “China Threatens to Use Veto Power” [中国直言要动用否决权], The Global Times, July 1, 2007: 1; op. cit., “China and Russia Veto US/UK Backed Security Council Draft Resolution on Myanmar”.


Macedonian government shifted its recognition from Beijing to Taipei 17 days before the UNSC intended to deliberate upon the extension of UNPREDEP because Taipei promised to provide aid.\textsuperscript{178}

In 2004, China extended a hand of goodwill to Haiti by voting for the establishment of MINUSTAH, despite the latter's diplomatic links with Taiwan. In June 2005, Beijing even actively pushed for the extension of MINUSTAH.\textsuperscript{179} Unfortunately, with Taipei’s “money diplomacy” [金元外交, jinyuan waijiao], Haiti remained unmoved by Beijing’s overtures. Thus ironically, while Chinese FPU risked their lives in launching one operation after another to fight the anti-government armed rebels in Cité Soleil\textsuperscript{180} in support of the Haitian National Police, the interim Haitian President, Alexandra Boniface, was planning an official visit to Taiwan in July 2005.\textsuperscript{181} In addition, his government continued to push for Taiwan’s membership in the UN.\textsuperscript{182} Haiti is aware of the potential consequences from its continuing relations with Taiwan. Nevertheless, the newly elected Haitian President, Rene Préval, insisted that his government would continue to adopt a pro-Taiwan policy. He said: “If they [Beijing] are upset with us all the way up to prevent [UN] peacekeepers from renewing their mandate, then it is unfortunate.”\textsuperscript{183}

Due to Beijing’s growing economic influence, Macedonia shifted from Taipei to Beijing in 2001, and Liberia did the same in 2003. The impact of Taiwan’s diplomatic ties abroad is in fact becoming less of a problem for China in relation to UNPKO. Beijing’s recent support for the extension of MINUSTAH\textsuperscript{184} shows that certain UNPKO host nations’ intimate relations


\textsuperscript{180} Cité Soleil, an urban area in Port au Prince, the Capital of Haiti, is believed to be one of the places with the most active rebel activities in Haiti.


\textsuperscript{182} Op. cit., “Rift with China Puts UN Aid to Haiti at Risk”.

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.

China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations

with Taiwan is no longer necessarily a reason for it to resort to the use of its UNSC veto as “punishment”, as it did previously to Guatemala in 1997 and Macedonia in 1999. As a rising power, China has more important goals to realize through its policy on UNPKO.

4.2. External Influences

The “China Threat” Theory

China’s increasingly active policy on UNPKO has aroused speculation and even obstacles from the outside. The biggest external obstacle is the “China Threat” theory.\(^{185}\) In 2004, when China sent a FPU to Haiti as part of the UNPKO, the 125-person Chinese civilian police unit aroused some unease in the United States. While the U.S. State Department essentially regarded the case as normal peacekeeping business, with U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, quoted as saying: “[It] is a good thing to have them [Chinese police] there [in Haiti] because we need the police.”\(^{186}\) The U.S. mass media used some politically loaded terms like “western hemisphere” and “American backyard” to describe China’s presence in America’s traditional sphere of influence.\(^{187}\) Some observers even said that the People’s Armed Police (PAP) had arrived in the Caribbean area.\(^{188}\) China’s comparatively large presence in Africa also attracts various speculations.\(^{189}\)

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For example, some think that the purpose of China’s active participation in UNPKO in Africa, such as in Sudan, is solely for oil.190

As a rising power concerned about its international image, China cannot afford to remain indifferent to the voices from the outside about its participation in international affairs. The “China Threat” theory has a negative impact on Beijing’s policy on UNPKO and presents the Chinese leaders with a dilemma. Although China is willing to further shoulder the responsibilities of a big power for international peace and security, it also wishes to avoid being regarded as too “assertive.” In other words, although China has become increasingly willing to “be selectively active” in the international arena and do something worthwhile, in the foreseeable future, it will not abandon the fundamental principles of “keeping a low profile” and “never taking the lead”[绝不出头 jue bu chu tou].

Significance of Outside Encouragement

Some observers, most notably Bates Gill and James Reilly, 191 have observed the significance of outside encouragement for China’s participation in UNPKO:

“Encouraging China to take on a greater peacekeeping role could lead to significant benefit for the international community. These include China’s greater integration into the international society, its greater acceptance of international norms, establishing a new multilateral confidence-building measure to gain greater Chinese military transparency while reducing regional distrust of China, and spreading the burden of and strengthening international support for UN peacekeeping... To foster greater Chinese participation in UNPKO could generate long-term benefits for both regional and global security.”192

China has recently been actively participating in the peace process in war-torn Somalia,193 where the UN and major powers like the U.S. suffered

192 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
setbacks in the early 1990s. China has acted as UNSC coordinator on the Somalia issue since 2003.\textsuperscript{194} Beijing is even reported to be actively advocating the establishment of a UNPKO in the country.\textsuperscript{195} Despite the obstinate Haitian support for Taiwan, Beijing’s support for the extension of MINUSTAH in February 2007 was a relief to many who feared that Beijing would use a veto to terminate this far-from-accomplished UN mission.\textsuperscript{196}

China’s engagement in the Middle East peace process in recent years, including its nomination of a special envoy for Middle East affairs\textsuperscript{197} and the recent announcement of increasing its peacekeeping presence in UNIFIL, shows that it can be a serious and responsible peacekeeper.

China’s active participation in international affairs regarding peace and security needs to be welcomed and encouraged. The opinions of the outside world, especially those of the relevant powers and individuals in influential positions of power can have great impact on China’s UNPKO policy. If China’s policy on UNPKO encourages the “China Threat” theory, Beijing will, in response, prefer to adopt a rather conservative and restrained policy on UNPKO. This reservation is in fact evident right now, as reflected in its reluctance to send combat troops, which could largely constrain its contribution of peacekeepers. China is very sensitive and mindful towards how the world would react if it agreed to deploy 10,000 troops on UNPKO around the world, like what India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are doing now.

In all, encouragement is of great importance for China. Its participation in the peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon implies that it has both the capabilities and political will to dispatch large numbers of troops to UNIFIL. However, it must be emphasized that without the request of the EU and acquiescence of the U.S., no matter how hard both UN and the Lebanese government

\textsuperscript{194} Ibid.


appealed to the Chinese government, and no matter how many interests it has in the Middle East, China would not have sent its 182 troops to Lebanon, let alone announce in 2007 an increase to an unprecedented 1,000 Chinese peacekeepers to be sent to the country.

Encouragement will lead to China’s further participation in international institutions like the UN, and China would be “increasingly socialized to the norms those institutions were designed to advance.”\textsuperscript{198} What is more, as Gill and Reilly rightly note, “Encouragement of responsible Chinese engagement with international organizations offers a patently preferable policy to either antagonistic containment or shortsighted disregard of China.”\textsuperscript{199}

\section*{4.3. Comment on Misinformation}

\textit{Equipment and Personnel Issues}

There is serious misinformation regarding China’s reasons and limitations for its policy on UNPKO in the current literature on Chinese PKO. Some observers\textsuperscript{200} are worried that China lacks the resources and qualified personnel for its increasing participation in UNPKO. This is incorrect. In the case of resources, peacekeeping is not a very high-tech business and usually does not rely on advanced equipment;\textsuperscript{201} China, as the so-called “world factory,” can by itself produce many of, if not all, the equipment used in UNPKO. Most of the equipment of the Chinese FPU in Haiti was purchased in China. In fact, many peacekeepers from other countries use “made-in-China” equipment ranging from weapons to footwear.

As far as human resources are concerned, besides a large number of military and police cadets prepared by their own training and education systems, both PLA and the Chinese police forces annually enroll thousands of undergraduates or graduates from more than 1,000 non-military colleges and universities in China. Therefore, both the 2.3 million-strong PLA and 1.7

\textsuperscript{198} Michael J. Green, “Democracy and the Balance of Power in Asia”, \textit{The American Interest}, Volume II, No.1, September/October 2006, 100.


\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., p. 53; op. cit., Pang, “China’s Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping”, p. 87.

\textsuperscript{201} UNIFIL is an exception, which now has heavy weapons ranging from fighter planes to warships. Before UNIFIL, ONUC has been deployed with a few attacker helicopters. In other PKO, the heaviest weapons are tanks and APC.
China's Changing Policy on UN peacekeeping Operations

million-strong Chinese police forces have no problem in preparing a few thousand personnel who are qualified for UN missions, including their abilities in mission languages.\textsuperscript{202} Up to now, China has not received any complaints from the UN or the PKO missions accusing its peacekeepers of operational incompetence due to poor performance. On the contrary, Chinese peacekeepers seem to be highly appreciated by the UN, as well as host nations. During his visit to Beijing in 2004, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, told President Hu Jintao: “It is clear that China has the capacity to provide many of the resources needed in peace operations. Your military is well-equipped and well-trained.”\textsuperscript{203} David Harland, the former head of the evaluation division of the DPKO, published an article entitled "The Reason Why the UN Welcomes Chinese Peacekeeping Personnel," in which he cited the medical and engineering detachments of the Chinese peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as examples and praised them for their excellent job.\textsuperscript{204} Liberian President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, also spoke highly of Chinese peacekeepers, calling them “well trained and disciplined.”\textsuperscript{205}

Question of Fatalities

Some observers suppose that China has an aversion towards fatalities.\textsuperscript{206} This claim is also incorrect. Although at the end of 2006, eight Chinese peacekeepers lost their lives and several dozens had been wounded since China sent its peacekeepers to PKO starting in 1990,\textsuperscript{207} there is little negative reaction from either the Chinese authority or the general public. In 2006, within less than one month, China suffered one death and three injuries in Lebanon. Nevertheless, two months later, Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, announced the deployment of 1,000 Chinese peacekeepers to Lebanon.

The public also has a positive attitude towards peacekeeping. China recruits peacekeeping candidates on a voluntary basis and has no difficulty in

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\textsuperscript{202} Till now, the UNPKO mission languages are either English or French. \\
\textsuperscript{203} Op. cit., “Annan Urges Greater Peacekeeping Role for China”; \\
\textsuperscript{204} “Chinese Blue Helmets Play Active Role in Africa”, Xinhua News Agency, October 28, 2006. \\
\textsuperscript{206} Op. cit., Gill and Reilly, “Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing”. \\
\end{flushright}
preparing a big pool. Many peacekeepers have been awarded by their work units or local governments, and all those who died in PKO have been buried as heroes, their funerals attended by top officials and officers. Chinese peacekeepers’ stories are widely covered by the national and local mass media. In 2005, RMB 5 million (US$1.25 million) was invested in a 20-episode television series, “China's Peacekeeping Police,” telling Chinese peacekeepers’ stories. Most military and police personnel regard participation in UNPKO as an honor. In all, one can conclude that Chinese casualties as a result of peacekeeping operations have not posed any serious problems for China at this point in time.

Some explain China’s reluctance to contribute combat troops to UNPKO or deploy Chinese troops close to conflicting areas to the Chinese fear of fatalities. This is also incorrect. As of the end of 2006, China has contributed 6,600 peacekeepers to 15 UNPKO and suffered eight fatalities, which means 12 fatalities per 10,000 peacekeepers. Bangladesh and Indian are two of the largest contributors to peacekeeping. By February 2005, Bangladesh had contributed a cumulative total of 49,000 peacekeepers to UNPKO and suffered 63 fatalities. The fatality rate for Bangladesh is 12.9 per 10,000. By June 2006, India had contributed 85,000 peacekeepers to UNOPKO

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211 Some background: In order to assess such speculations, one should understand the life-threatening dangers in peacekeeping areas. In fact, UN peacekeeping is not as hostility-intensive as many think. According to the statistics provided by DPKO, as of February 12, 2007, 2,331 peacekeepers and the UN civilian employees have died in all types of DPKO-supported peace operations. Among all these fatalities, 906 were attributed to various types of accidents, 590 from illness, 146 from other non-malicious incidents and only 689 from malicious acts. Thus, one can note that malicious acts merely account for 30 percent of the total fatalities while non-malicious incidents such as accidents and illness account for 70 percent. Apparently, malicious acts do not constitute the biggest security threat in UNPKO. China has no reason to be particularly adverse towards activities in hostile areas since other factors like accidents and diseases pose more of a threat to its peacekeepers in treacherous UN peacekeeping environments.
and suffered 116 fatalities. The fatality rate for India is 13.6 persons per 10,000.213 Both Pakistan and India’s fatality rates are not significantly higher than that of China. It should be pointed out that both Bangladesh and India contribute large numbers of combat troops and do not have preference for the location of deployment, while China has only deployed non-combat troops, military observers and civilian police.

Of the eight Chinese fatalities, four came from malicious acts. Therefore, it seems that the preference of location of deployment, as well as contribution of non-combat peacekeepers, has no correlation with the number of fatalities. To reiterate, China’s refraining from sending combat troops on UNPKO is mainly because of (1) its conservative attitude regarding Westphalian norms; (2) its caution on the use of force in UNPKO; and finally (3) its interests in grooming its reputation as a responsible rising power.

Financial Motivations

Some observers hold that China’s increasing participation in UNPKO makes financial sense because of significant peacekeeping reimbursement from the UN coffers.214 This claim does not reflect reality. When Chinese peacekeepers are deployed to UNPKO, they not only enjoy an allowance from the UN but also get to keep their salary in their work units.215 Therefore, for the individual peacekeepers, participation in UNPKO may make some financial sense, although not as significant as some expect. However, the Chinese government does not enjoy financial gains from its participation in UNPKO. The Chinese government or the work units of individual Chinese peacekeepers do not share in any of the allowance or other kinds of payments that the UN gives to its peacekeepers.

UNPKO are not a source for generating revenue for the country. China receives reimbursement from UN coffers by wet lease for the equipment it has bought for its military troops and police units (FPU) to use in PKO,

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215 For civilian police officers other than those in a FPU, they receive Mission Supplementary Allowance (MAS), which varies according to the different conditions of PKO. MSA is usually US$100 a day. Both military and police units members receive an allowance of about US$1,100 per month plus about 12 US dollars for hygiene necessities.
through which no significant profits can be generated. On the contrary, the Chinese government has to invest a lot of money in peacekeeping. China’s huge expenditure on building training facilities and equipment as well as maintaining its UNSAS commitments and running money-consuming training courses can never be compensated by the UN. Therefore, China’s participation in UNPKO is not based on reaping any financial benefits and is not a reason for China’s increasingly active policy on UNPKO.
5. Conclusion

A comprehensive review of China’s policy on UNPKO reveals that compared with the past, in particular before 1999, Beijing is now an active peacekeeper. There are many factors that encourage or discourage China’s participation in UNPKO. In general, China’s policy on UNPKO is usually determined by its international security environment, national interests and comprehensive national strength at certain periods of time. It also wants to assume the role of a responsible power, give support to the UN regime and contribute to global security. To this end, China has been increasingly flexible towards the Westphalian norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention as well as other normative principles.

China’s position on Westphalian norms, its concern about the use of force and preference for peacekeeping over peace enforcement pose barriers to an active policy on UNPKO. The Taiwan Question is also an important factor affecting China’s policy on UNPKO, especially when the issue becomes even more complicated due to the current pro-independence administration on the island. Nevertheless, as China rises, the Taiwan factor has less impact on China’s policy on UNPKO, as is shown in the case of Haiti.

While analyzing the barriers that may hinder China’s active participation in UNPKO, many observers merely focus on those coming from within China, thinking that Beijing should take all the responsibility for not playing a much bigger role commensurate with its status as a permanent member of the UNSC. They overlook the fact that there exist external factors which may hinder China’s otherwise more active attitude towards UNPKO. Factors like the “China Threat” debate remind the Chinese leadership of the negative impact of sending too many PLA troops abroad, albeit for peacekeeping purposes. Such talk poses a significant discouragement for China’s policy on UNPKO. However, Beijing’s recent announcement to increase the presence of Chinese peacekeepers in Lebanon shows that, with encouragement from the outside, in particular, from major powers such as the U.S. and the EU,
China’s enthusiasm for UNPKO can positively surprise the international community and dispels incorrect assumptions about China’s purposes/reasons and limitations for its policy regarding UNPKO.

Comparatively speaking, China is rarely an obstructionist in the UNSC. It possesses many of the resources as well as political will for peacekeeping. As China continues to develop, it will adopt an increasingly active policy on UNPKO. However, it is unlikely to totally abandon its position on Westphalian norms as well as the non-use of force. In the future, China may pay higher dues for UN peacekeeping and send more civilian police officers and units, military observers and logistic troops to UNPKO. However, China is likely to continue to remain reluctant to deploy combat troops to UNPKO and this will in turn constrain China’s scale of peacekeeping personnel contribution. Nevertheless, from a long-term perspective, if there is adequate encouragement from other major powers as well as from its neighboring countries, China may one day consider the contribution of combat troops to UNPKO. However, it must be added that while China has not always hindered peace enforcement operations in the UNSC, China will probably not participate in such operations, at least in the foreseeable future.

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