

Reinventing Human Security: Lessons from Chinggis Khan's Biography

Robert Bedeski

STOCKHOLM PAPER
August 2013



Institute for Security &
Development Policy

Reinventing Human Security: Lessons from Chinggis Khan's Biography

Robert Bedeski

Reinventing Human Security: Lessons from Chinggis Khan's Biography is a *Stockholm Paper* published by the Institute for Security and Development Policy. The *Stockholm Papers Series* is an Occasional Paper series addressing topical and timely issues in international affairs. The Institute is based in Stockholm, Sweden, and cooperates closely with research centers worldwide. The Institute is firmly established as a leading research and policy center, serving a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders, and journalists. It is at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security, and development. Through its applied research, publications, research cooperation, public lectures, and seminars, it functions as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion.

The opinions and conclusions expressed are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for Security and Development Policy or its sponsors.

© Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2013

ISBN: 978-91-86635-64-0

Printed in Singapore

Distributed in Europe by:

Institute for Security and Development Policy
Västra Finnbodavägen 2, 131 30 Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden
Tel. +46-841056953; Fax. +46-86403370
Email: info@isdpeu

Distributed in North America by:

The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Tel. +1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785
E-mail: caci2@jhuadig.admin.jhu.edu

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to Alec Forss at: forss@isdpeu

Contents

Executive Summary	5
Introduction	6
Human Security and its Limitations	9
Reinventing Human Security.....	11
A Biography of Chinggis Khan.....	15
The Political life of Chinggis Khan – an Anthrocentric Perspective	19
Applying the Theory of Anthrocentric Security	22
Formulizing Anthrocentric Security Theory -	
How Human Life is Prolonged.....	29
Appendix I: Figures 1-7.....	32
Appendix II: Selected Readings.....	36
About the Author.....	40

Executive Summary

The concept of human security has enjoyed some prominence in development and security studies/policy, especially within several Asian nations. While criticized as too broad for policy application, human security can also be faulted as excessively dependent on direct or indirect state (state-centric) action. An alternative approach is to re-formulate human security as human-centered, or 'anthrocentric.' From this perspective, human security's core concern of 'safety of individuals' is refined as 'Prolong Life, Postpone Death,' with the individual mortality event as the ultimate and inevitable security failure. By examining the historical biography of Chinggis Khan a full array of security inputs can be identified, and a working (and quantifiable) theory of human life security can be derived.¹

飲水思源 **'When drinking water, remember its source'**

Chinese proverb

'The first law for every creature is that of self-preservation, of life'

Machiavelli (Quoted in Stendahl, *The Red and the Black*)

'What doesn't kill us makes us stronger'

Friedrich Nietzsche

¹The author is indebted to the Institute of Security and Development Policy in Stockholm and its director, Niklas Swanström, for the opportunity to present an earlier version of this paper at a seminar held at ISDP on April 23, 2013.

Introduction

The concept of human security has held traction in political discourse and development studies since its introduction in the 1990s. The UNDP introduced the new concept of human security in its Human Development Report of 1994, *New Dimensions of Human Security*. The report equated security with people rather than territories, with development rather than arms. It examined both the national and the global concerns of human security. The report sought to deal with these concerns through a new paradigm of sustainable human development, capturing the potential peace dividend, a new form of development co-operation and a restructured system of global institutions.² Various Asian research bodies and governments have maintained interest in the concept and continue to apply it to contemporary problems. Middle powers such as Japan, Canada and Norway have pursued a human security approach in framing aid policy, and prefer it to traditional state security criteria. Peng Er Lam examines how Japan has incorporated human security into its aid programs:

Japan, however, given its tradition as one of the largest donors of foreign aid in the world and the already mentioned legacy of history (suspicious neighbours, constitutional restrictions, and residual pacifism among its public), adopts a broader and more development-oriented notion of human security. Simply put, Tokyo cannot embrace a more muscular form of human security such as military intervention or peace enforcement even for humanitarian purposes against the consent of a target state because it runs counter to the norms of Japanese pacifism.³

Mongolia, owing to its small population, large area, and vulnerability between China and Russia, has sought to preserve sovereignty and identity through active foreign policy and human security. The government,

² <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/>

³ Lam, P. E. (April 2006). 'Japan's Human Security Role in Southeast Asia,' *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 28:1: 141-159, 146.

reorienting the state after decades of Soviet domination and establishing a new democratic constitution in 1992, adopted the 'National Security Concept' which contained and elaborated its domestic human security interests with key areas of 'economic security; scientific and technological security; security of information; security of Mongolian culture and way of life; security of the population and its gene pool; and ecological security.'⁴

Human security encompasses seven key areas to increase human freedom from fear and want. Thailand incorporated human security as a component of government, establishing the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (MSOHS) as part of a major ministerial reorganization. In 2008, the Ministry used nationwide seminars and networking to develop a human security strategy, framing the approach as a way to survey the spectrum of human development. The seven threats identified in the UNDP human security framework were:

- Economic security: an assured basic income and minimum job security, while the threats to economic security are rampant uncontrolled inflation, economic depression and financial crises.
- Food security: questions of access often are in fact more important than simply 'having enough to go around,' the threats come therefore from unequal distribution, while obviously famine and starvation due to real food shortages are the worst-case threats.
- Health security: death and illness linked to poverty, unsafe and unclean environments, access to healthcare, and the problem of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS and infectious diseases.
- Environment security: degradations of local and global ecosystems, one of the major challenges being access and cleanliness of water.
- Personal security: against threats of sudden physical violence

⁴ Nelles, W., *Reconciling Human and National Security in Mongolia: A Canadian Perspective* (Vancouver: Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, North Pacific Policy Papers No. 6, 2000), 9.

exercised by the state, by other states in war, or from other individuals from other groups due to ethnic tensions, also encompassing specific personal security of women against violence and exploitation, or of children against all forms of child abuse.

- Community security: to tackle threats such as intra-community strife, tensions, or hurtful practices directed against certain members of the community, such as women.
- Political security: against torture, political repression, ill treatments and disappearances.⁵

Using these criteria, the Report evaluated Thailand's progress in development using economic and other measures. However, an absent element was change in longevity, or life expectancy, which would seem to be a logical measurement of human security policy effectiveness.

⁵ *Thailand Humanitarian Development Report* (2009), <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/thailand/docs/NHDR2010.pdf>.

Human Security and its Limitations

Critics of human security's limitations have summarized it as too broad and having little utility to policy-makers, although the Japanese, Mongolians and Thais have disproven this latter criticism.⁶ One problem is that human security theorists and practitioners assume the state and its agencies as a near-exclusive delivery agent, thus deflating the *human* half of the concept's full meaning. Even when 'civil society' organizations such as NGOs are designated as delivery agents, their viability depends upon collaboration⁷ with a state or states, and thus cannot escape their state-centric character. Why is this a problem? Because by implication, human security remains largely the domain of the state. While the state has proven to be a highly efficient mechanism for establishing and enlarging the seven goals of reducing threats to human security, it has also repeatedly proven to be incompetent and even toxic to those same goals – the USSR or the Chinese Cultural Revolution being cases in point.

How to resolve this dilemma of state-centrism? A more precise fix on the concept will help – 'human security' is really about 'human life security.' That is, the focus of 'human life security' is individual life as a phenomenon or process to be prolonged as long as possible, in contrast to human security-based policy and activities to improve quality of life. No doubt freedom from fear and anxiety will add to the general happiness of mankind, and will indirectly extend longevity, but as a concept behind state policy, human security suffers from at least two defects. First, its outputs are generally difficult to measure accurately, and second it largely ignores two major inputs of human security – the individual human himself, and pre-state (organic) society. Both sources of security inputs remain powerful factors in prolonging life.

Whether a change from 'human security' to 'human life security'⁸ would

⁶ Paris, R. (2001). 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?' *International Security* 26:2: 87-102.

⁷ Collaboration in the sense of benefitting from laws, finances, formal and informal government support, and protection.

⁸ The author is grateful to Dr Bert Edström for pointing out this distinction.

make a difference requires further investigation. Human security sought to create a space for inclusion of individual humans and broaden the concerns of national and transnational institutions beyond protection of the state,⁹ but it did not liberate its approach from the state structures and values which have assigned hegemony to the state. The dominant approach of political science in general and human security in particular can be described as *statecentric* – a quality that obscures non-state contributors to human life protection.

The first step in moving beyond the state is to define ‘security.’ Usage of the term has been largely appropriated by states, as in ‘national security’ and ‘state security.’ Human security can be seen as the latest manifestation of modern states’ ambition to manage their populations through benefits, guidance and soft coercion. However, while ‘security’ has been semantically confiscated by the state, there has been considerable leakage to non-state agencies, as in ‘home security’ or ‘internet security.’ Almost imperceptibly, human security discourse has abetted the blending of individual and state, with the former as beneficiary and the latter as benefactor.

From a humanist standpoint, preceding ‘security’ with ‘human’ directs attention to the essence of human existence – life and its termination, that is, death. Seeing and thinking like a state obviates this fundamental concern of the mortal individual, and seeks to mitigate or remove the causes of deprivation, repression, and subordination for the sake of relief, happiness, and empowerment. The state-centric approach is efficient, but has hidden costs.

States ‘see’ people as numbers, just as James Scott portrayed states as seeing trees as forests through the lens of resource harvesting – collections of individual trees.¹⁰ An antidote to this useful yet self-imposed restriction is to think like the human being who fears death and seeks its postponement, taking every possible precaution to postpone his or her inevitable demise, and entering agreements of cooperation for collective action.

⁹ Seng, T. S., *Human Security: Discourse, Statecraft, Emancipation* (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001).

¹⁰ Scott, J. C., *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

Reinventing Human Security

The proposal here is to reinvent human security in recognition that the individual living person, not the state and not any government, is the primary source and beneficiary of all security activities. This approach can be termed 'anthrocentric' and protection of individual life is 'anthrocentric security' – a formal statement of 'human life security.' Operationally, this shifts the realm of state-centric human security beyond 'public policy.' 'Anthrocentric security' proceeds from the claim that individual humans are the starting point for protection.

Addressing the seven points of UNDP human security to people as individual persons transforms the identified threats into potential mandates:

- Economics is material adequacy as a buffer to poverty, that condition which makes life more fragile;
- Food and water is vital to sustaining human life;
- Health is a prerequisite to autonomous and productive life;
- Environment is the non-human domain to be sustainably exploited and protected for the sustenance of human life;
- Personhood is recognition of individual dignity and sovereignty, so that men and women can independently or collectively strive to prolong life as they see fit;
- Community is that portion of society which forms individual identity and provides informal protections; and
- Politics is the state exercising benevolent power to guard individuals from danger, including from its own potential to do harm.

Based on these requirements for human life protection, and returning the source of security to individual humans, the core principle of anthrocentric security is defined as Prolong Life, Postpone Death (PLPD). Life is binary,

or a toggle switch with only two mutually exclusive settings – on or off. The ultimate security failure is inevitable termination. Merging these two facts, we establish that anthropocentric security success equals human life, and failure is human death. Whether that life is happy or healthy or free or prosperous is not relevant to the security of the individual, although those qualities usually contribute to longevity. Individual longevity can be measured precisely, starting from the moment of birth to the minute of death, and is thus a suitable ratio for anthropocentric security. In this fashion, a year of life is 365 days of successful protection (PLPD) of one person's living and breathing body – and thus making possible other thoughts, actions, enjoyments, and enterprises as well as sufferings and deprivations.

All life forms develop strategies for PLPD. Birds and animals, for example, practice vigilance and pursue physical sustenance although they usually lack inter-generational accumulation and communication of survival knowledge and skills. Plants are self-healing, and emulate mobility of descendants to other areas by 'bribing' insects with nectar to distribute pollen. Only humans are able to devise or discover techniques of survival and comfort, and pass them along to others through language and culture, inviting further refinement as the skills pass through hands and minds.

The state is not the exclusive instrument of security, and other agents of life protection can be identified. First is the individual *person*, who is both instrument and beneficiary of all security inputs. A 'security input' is defined as a set of actions and characteristic behavior which protects the life of autonomous individuals. An input source may be the individual or others whose actions affect life preservation. Every living organism, from the lowest insect to humans, demonstrates what Schopenhauer termed the 'Will-to-live' – the fundamental motivation to preserve one's life. Humans are desperately vulnerable during the first years of life, and few could survive without parental and family protection. A further input to security is knowledge, gained through observation, instruction, practice and reason, which enables humans to acquire and utilize the vital resources of life and to avoid or deal with environmental and human hazards and threats.

The second level of security inputs builds upon spontaneous and unorganized behavior of individuals in pre-state societies, such as clans and tribes, which we will call *organic society*. Behaviors can include warfare, herding, hunting, gathering, trading and other forms of human or material

resource acquisition. Religion, language, myth, and custom further bind members of this form of pre-state society into a collective entity providing mutual protection and sustenance, based on accumulation of practical knowledge, loyalty/obligation, common customs, religion and dialect, and experience. Individuals must surrender some of their natural liberty to enjoy the benefits of membership in any organic society.

The *state* is the third level providing security to individuals, and while always constructed on the foundation of previously existing organic societies, invariably demands that *raison d'état* take precedence over (organic) social structures. Law, organization of coercive institutions, and sovereignty weaken or replace social spontaneity and custom with political discipline. Autonomous organic society is transformed into state-dependent or state-dominated civil society. The test of security arrangements – the matrix of protections – for any individual is postponement of death, and can be measured in human life years. Longevity is a precise measure of anthropocentric security, a term reflecting the autonomous living human being as alpha and omega of protection. (A less accurate proxy is statistical life expectancy). The term also includes the three levels of security input referenced above – individual, organic society, and state. Civil society, empires, and regional or global governance can also play a role but their existence and efficacy is a consequence of state success in establishing order.

We can summarize anthropocentric security thus far as follows:

- Security is generated by humans, for humans – and often, against other humans;
- Life is lived by one person at a time and ends the same way;
- Security is defined as freedom from danger. Why avoid danger? Because it is life-threatening;
- It is more accurate to specify human security as 'human *life* security' – a term which must focus on individual human life, rather than aggregate human lives as a collective concept.
- Greater security does not translate into invulnerability nor bestow immortality.
- Security can be measured and quantified as longevity, which

expresses success of security as prolonging life, postponing death.

Figure 1 (all figures are to be found in Appendix I) suggests that anthrocentric security preceded evolution of the state, and emergence of the modern state accompanied acceleration of global aggregate life years. Over the past dozen millennia, humans have been successful in prolonging the lives of the species and in establishing conditions under which numbers have also increased – phenomenally effective in the last century, and even wars, natural disasters, famines, epidemics and genocides have not halted this long-term growth. Conventional human security addresses life quality, dignity, and conditions of happiness. Anthrocentric security, on the other hand, measures human opportunity (measured as longevity) to seek and create desired circumstances, while not divining what individual humans will do or would want to do with extended life-long prospects, except to prolong it. In addition, by humanizing security we can trace the ‘chain’ of incremental improvement in the human condition, reflecting Edmund Burke’s vision of society as ‘a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.’

A Biography of Chinggis Khan

Examining a single life through the lens of anthropocentric security illustrates how the tripartite approach can be applied. In contrast to most transformative individuals in world history, Chinggis Khan had relatively few state or civil society institutions to provide a platform for his endeavors. The fluidity of tribal life and the absence of permanent settlements in much of the Mongolian plateau testified to a relatively primeval level of survival. Metaphorical fragments of state-building materials and tools were a skeleton of scattered bones that Chinggis gathered and assembled as a foundation of military and political power.

Sui generis does not disqualify his biography from providing a template for anthropocentric security. In fact, his perilous life, his vanquishing of life-threats (except the final one) and his growth from clan-exiled adolescent to ruler of empire, render him a suitable, if not ideal, subject as a study of human life security. Chinggis Khan is unique among historical state-founders insofar as his early life had a 'state of nature' circumstance, with few of the ameliorating conditions normally available to agrarian or urban dwellers. Living on the steppes of Central Asia, he survived, fought and flourished during much of his life in tribal society, not only creating a Mongol nation-state, but a global empire under 'Pax Mongolica.'

Security Inputs for Chinggis Khan's Life

Distilling the security inputs of his life narrative – the human and material resources that kept him alive and those that threatened to kill him – provide a template which could be applicable to any human being. Figure 3 shows that his life-span was considerably longer than the average for his contemporaries, a remarkable fact considering his life of frequent war and exposure to danger. This anomaly renders his longevity worthy of further investigation. By understanding life-threats and the elements that enhanced his survival we can gather a few clues pertaining to life security in general.

While Chinggis Khan was ahead of his time in longevity, the broad trend of humanity's life-span has been increasing. In terms of sheer physical mass and numbers, humankind has increased over the past twelve millennia

(Figure 1), indicating either a positive natural environment or improved techniques for mutual protection – or both. Figure 4 represents human progress in achieving higher levels of life security – more people living longer. The graph is the product of population multiplied by life expectancy, a rough proxy for aggregate average number of years lived. It should not be unreasonable to assume that many individuals produce a surplus of security inputs which enhance survival chances and reduce mortality risk. In addition, this operation (population times longevity) further identifies the unit of human life security as one year of one individual's living, due to the fact that postponement of death for that one year validates the proposition that adequate security inputs are functioning to prolong that single life. We can stipulate that unit as a 'humlear' (short for 'human life year').

The steppes and forests of Central Asia were dominated by nomadic tribes, who had adapted to a harsh environment through herding and horsemanship. Absent a central power, tribal war and vendetta were common means of settling disputes – justice was realized through vengeance. Chinggis Khan justified his attack on the Jin Empire as revenge for the humiliating execution of his ancestor. Security against enemies was sought through fierceness and alliance, unlike the more sedentary agro-urban civilizations in the more densely populated southern regions. The rapacious Tatars and warlike Merkits often plundered the tribes of eastern Mongolia. In addition, fragmented heirs of China's Tang Empire manipulated tribes to prevent any one becoming a threat to the Xixia or Jin – pursuing the traditional policy of *Yi yi zhi yi*: 'Use barbarians to control barbarians.'

Mongol chief Yesugei kidnapped the young wife of a Merkit, Ho'elun, and made her his own, fathering Temujin (the future Chinggis Khan) who was born around 1165. Yesugei's ancestry and tribal position placed him and his lineage among the steppe aristocracy. His defeat of Tatars and wife-napping from the Merkit marked him and his line for future revenge. Steppe males were taught the skills and knowledge needed for survival – including horsemanship, hunting, archery, animal husbandry, wrestling and some tribal history. Yesugei took a second wife, and had a total of six sons and one daughter. When Temujin was around ten, his father took him to the Onggirat tribe to seek a bride. Betrothal to Börte was a further benefit by establishing an alliance cemented by a dowry of a fine sable coat. Temujin was left with his fiancé's tribe to learn their ways, and on the road back,

Yesugei was poisoned by a band of Tatars and soon died at home. Temujin returned to his birth clan, where a new leader emerged, and the widows and children of Yesugei were abandoned to survive as best they could. During this tenuous existence in exile, Temujin, aided by brother Kasar, killed his half-brother, Bechter. During his youth, he also acquired blood brothers (*anda*), including Jamukha, who became his ally in war, and later his rival in a fight to the death for supremacy over the Mongols.

His bride Börte was captured and held by the Merkit until rescued by a joint attack by Temujin, Toghrul (his patron and his father's *anda*), and Jamukha. In battle after battle over the next twenty years, Chinggis Khan was exposed to danger; sometimes he was victorious, sometimes he was defeated, as well as being seriously wounded at least twice. Several of the wars were fought to right old wrongs or in revenge for past insults, or to acquire herds, slaves, and horses due to depletion by war and worsening climatic conditions.

In 1201, Jamukha was elected Khan of a tribal confederation and led an attack against Temujin and Toghrul. Temujin's victories over the Naiman and the Tayichi'ut had stimulated formation of a coalition against him. Toghrul, later called Wang-khan, sought to rid himself of his ambitious vassal. In 1202 Temujin exterminated the Tatars near the Khalkha River, then broke with Toghrul, who defeated Temujin at the battle of Kalakalzhit. Nonetheless, he linked up again with Toghrul to exterminate the Karait tribe, and then the Naiman.

Ruler of the Steppes: 1206-1227

He gave rewards to supporting tribes and individuals, and delivered destruction or enslavement to those who resisted. From 1202 through 1204, he fought major battles and won victories against the tribes allied with and led by Toghrul and Jamukha. He was crowned by election as Great Khan at the Quriltai of 1206, and then set out to create a new Mongol state with two main organizational principles – reduction of tribal chieftain power and creation of a core military unit to carry out his policies. This military reorganization changed the social structure of the Mongol nation. Men were assigned to particular units, breaking up clans in the process, and could not leave under pain of death and punishment for their commanders. Families

were responsible for providing military equipment, and were subordinate to the unit's military commander.¹¹ The Mongols were united into a centrally commanded, militarized society and state, ruled by a new military aristocracy created by Chinggis Khan out of meritorious blood relatives, advisors, bodyguards, warriors and generals.

His bodyguard became an instrument of power from which the administrative cadres of the empire were later selected. The time (1204-1209) between his victory over the Naimans and the war against the Tanguts was a period when he devoted himself to organizational matters – creating the framework of the Mongol empire and consolidating the power of the ruling family. In the same year, the Uighurs became the first people outside the Mongol nation to acknowledge Chinggis Khan's suzerainty. His armies also attacked the Jin Empire in north China and captured Zhongdu (present-day Beijing). Chinggis died in 1227 while his armies were conquering the Western Xia Dynasty. His burial site was located in secrecy, unlike most imperial figures in history who proclaimed once grandiose lives with pyramids or elaborate tombs and sarcophagi.

¹¹ Ratchnevsky, P., *Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992), 55.

The Political Life of Chinggis Khan – an Anthrocentric Perspective

Globalization of modern history has been dominated by maritime empires from the sixteenth century onward, eclipsing continental exclusivism of previous periods. Chinggis Khan was pivotal in demarcating the ancient world from the modern. Spanning most of Asia and much of Russia, the retreating empire of his descendants left a power vacuum to be occupied by Ottomans, Romanovs, Ming and Qing. The bubonic plague, Central Asian fragmentation and discovery of the New World demoted much of Eurasian inner space from a terrorizing heart of darkness into the relatively exotic obscurity it enjoys today.

Chinggis Khan initiated and expanded the Mongol empire:

In twenty-five years, the Mongol army subjugated more lands and people than the Romans had conquered in four hundred years. Genghis Khan, together with his sons and grandsons, conquered the most densely populated civilizations of the thirteenth century. Whether measured by the total number of people defeated, the sum of the countries annexed, or by the total area occupied, Genghis Khan conquered more than twice as much as any other man in history.¹²

His career was highly improbable, given the hazards of survival to old age on the steppes and the animosity facing any rival to power. To the extent that scholars have reconstructed his narrative, evidence demonstrates that he was an individual who endured the unforgiving challenges of harsh climate, bleak landscape, untrustworthy relatives, enemies and competitors who preferred him dead, and a dearth of resources to supply his ambitions and forces. Reviewing the above-identified three levels of life protection, the primary guardian of any person is the individual himself as ego, and secondly, organic society, consisting of family, clan, tribe, and

¹² Weatherford, J., *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World* (New York, 2003), xviii.

other realms of activity which reinforce life security – including religion, markets, culture, and customs. These realms and associated behavior have been, since prehistoric times, largely spontaneous in the sense of lacking imposed or agreed organization. The third level of protection comes from states, which are human constructs for the purpose of establishing order and safety – organized and imposed by military elite in most cases, and often based on tribe and clan hegemony. A fourth construction has been empire, or contemporaneously, transnational governance, to bring peace and prosperity to conflicting and fragmented states.

Chinggis Khan lived longer than the highest global average, and so it is useful to investigate those security elements which reinforced his longevity and the negative forces which threatened it. In Figure 5, light shaded arrow boxes represent his security resources, and counter-security forces as solid arrows. The 'aggregate of individual security' is shown by a diagonal line increasing annually and is ideally the sum of all security inputs, positive and negative. The natural environment (at the left vertical axis) can be life-sustaining and is also potentially fatal. His age in years (the exact year of his birth is unknown and 1165 AD is a best-guess) is demarcated on the bottom axis, and the vertical axis represents the relative improvement of his security status.

Figure 6 roughly correlates the life-threats in his biography with a preliminary estimate of death-probability during each year of his life.¹³ Battles fought produced high mortality risks, with lost battles at maximum 80 percent, since personal life risk was in a high danger zone. Early loss of his father and subsequent exile of his nuclear family from the clan also produced a high mortality risk. Marriage and other alliances served to reduce mortality risks. Mortality risk is always greater than zero since 0 percent mortality risk = immortality. An inevitable 100 percent (physiological shut-down) defines life-termination risk during any single humlear.

Figure 7 illustrates the major security resources which sustained the life of Chinggis Khan. During any year of his life, indicated on the vertical axis, there were persons within structures acting to protect him from harm and death. The cross-section of these human resources, at any year, theoretically has a measurable magnitude, and exhibits growth in most years, indicating

¹³ Dates and assessed events from Ratchnevsky, P., *Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy* (Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1992).

cumulative security to benefit Chinggis Khan as 'prolonging life, postponing death.' Formation of the Mongol state in 1206 introduced a major new security resource for him, his family, and the Mongol nation, as he used his sovereign position to reorganize the military, the economy, and society. But no amount of security for him could exclude final termination, although those security inputs (excepting 'Self') continued to securitize members of the Mongol nation.

Applying the Theory of Anthrocentric Security

The life and security narrative of Chinggis Khan provides empirical referents for a theory of anthrocentric security (summarized below). The theory inverts state-centric human security in that security begins with an individual's spontaneous or instinctive (PLPD) motivation and mutates into action which can be amplified by clan and tribe. The atypical longevity of Chinggis Khan began with a powerful will-to-live, nurtured by family and reinforced by increasing knowledge of survival skills – thousands of trivialities which may save a life – that are vital when daily confronting raw nature and untrammelled enemies. The main elements (with Mongol illustrations) of the theory of anthrocentric security are listed below, followed by formulae to identify input relationships. Each level of security input (individual, organic society, state) provides characteristic elements to reduce mortality risk.

Individual Level

1. ***Will and physical capacity to survive [W]. Remaining alive is the first law of nature, affirming Schopenhauer's 'Will-to-Live.'***

A strong constitution characterized Chinggis Khan's physical condition and despite setbacks, captures, defeats, and near-fatal wounds he persisted to survive through ultimate victory over his foes.

2. ***Family [F]. The nuclear family is the reproductive, nurturing and protective structure of individuals, and pre-adolescent children have virtually no physical defenses in an adult or natural environment.***

A birthing and nurturing mother (Ho'elun) and a protective father (Yesugei) provided safety for the infant Temujin. After the death of Yesugei, Ho'elun and her children cooperatively survived as a cooperative nuclear family unit during exile from the clan. Temujin's fratricide of Bechter was not a particularly exceptional event in the annals of dynastic and pre-modern history, and removed his strongest rival for primacy in the nuclear family.

3. **Knowledge [K_i].** Innate instinct and acquired knowledge enable individuals and families to obtain food, water and shelter to sustain life.

Centuries of survival on the steppe and forests, with horses and herds of domesticated animals, supplemented by hunting, gathering, fishing, and raiding settlements or other tribes created a pattern of survival adaptation for Mongols and Asian nomads. Knowledge, expressed in spoken language, was accumulated and passed on by parents, relations, and acquaintances without formal institutions specializing in education or dissemination. Only after the tribal confederation became the Mongol nation-state was a written language created to unify laws and disseminate knowledge.

4. **Natural environment [E_i].** Geography determines the territories, materials and environment for survival while adaptive strategies expand the possibilities for life protection.

Sparse resources required that steppe nomadic life maintain mobility. The *ger*, grasslands, dependence on animals for transport, food and other materials, seasonal changes, extreme climate, and absence of agriculture framed the environmental parameters of steppe survival.

Organic Society Level

5. **Liberty [L_o].** The individual acquires new (and surrenders some old) personal freedom of action with membership (personhood) in society.

The autonomous individual has extensive freedom of volitional action in his natural condition, subject to the limits of mortality, as Thomas Hobbes wrote in *The Leviathan* or as Daniel Defoe described in *Robinson Crusoe*. Upon initiation into social obligations, he surrenders much natural liberty and takes on responsibilities which may reduce his survival chances. Temujin gave up the dowry sable coat to Toghrul (Wang Khan) to renew his late father's *anda* (blood brotherhood) relationship in order to gain support from a powerful chieftain. Also Yesugei arranged the marriage of Temujin to Börte – a useful alliance but a deprivation of liberty of choice for the adolescent

son. Complete liberty and total security are mutually exclusive.

6. ***Cultural and technical (social) knowledge [K_o].*** Access to socially-generated knowledge, social interaction and material surplus facilitate specialization and innovation, which enhance a wide variety of human endeavors, including medicine, war, hunting, agriculture, crafts and trade which all benefit the life chances from social membership.

The development of spoken languages, writing, and printing have been major media for spreading knowledge and securing cooperation in more recent ages of human development. For the nomadic Mongols, survival skills of archery, horse-riding, wrestling, hunting, herding and *ger* construction were vital skills, facilitated by language, religion, protocols of deference, rituals, myths and history.

7. ***Social obligation/loyalty [O_o].*** Loyalty creates obligation and maintains a basis for predictable and cooperative action.

Yesugei imparted the importance of social bonding to his son in word and deed. Temujin swore blood brotherhood with Jamukha, whose support was vital in his younger years and who became his major rival for power later in life. Another bond facilitating his rise to power was the subordinate relationship with his father's *anda* (Toghrul), although this alliance also collapsed when Temujin became too powerful. Support by a band of warrior 'brothers' (*comitatus*), pledged to fight to the death, formed the core of his general staff. Loyalty was the highest virtue for Chinggis, and betrayal, even of his enemies, was often punished with death.

8. ***Social economy [E_o].*** Mining, handicrafts, trade, agriculture and animals herding created networks, and provide incentives to acquire life necessities through exchange and occasionally predatory practices of raids and war.

Herders and forest people of the Mongolian high plateau were primarily self-sufficient, with rudimentary craft production, trade in animal and forest products, as well as theft and raids to augment needs and wants.

9. ***Social concord coefficient [C_o].*** During every year of human history,

for every person, there is a distinctive and potentially measurable range of conflict intensity that affects an individual's mortality risk. This range, which will be termed 'social concord coefficient,' can be averaged and aggregated for particular groups. A low C_o indicates a high propensity to conflict or war, and a high magnitude signals social harmony.

Temujin lived in a social setting of low concord, and resolved tribal conflicts through alliance, diplomacy, conquest and occasionally full destruction of his enemies through execution and enslavement. Social concord was achieved by exterminating those individuals, groups or tribes who had demonstrated hostility, by incorporating supporters, as well as reducing clan and tribal loyalties by making his dicta supreme law. Military discipline and punishment reinforced voluntary obligation as Mongol organic society was subjected to the unified Mongol state.

State

As individuals valued life protection and struggled to achieve longevity, with organic society providing security to individuals, the state built upon social foundations to create order and domestic peace.

10. *Political Obligations to the State [O_s].* The state is a set of structures created and constructed to organize power of one group over a population. It imposes laws, extracts resources, and protects its inhabitants and territory. The state encourages, draws upon and takes advantage of a generally parallel growth of ethnic unity or nationalism – the personal identification of individuals within an organic society with the symbols and ideals of an existing or potential state.

Consciousness of nationhood is most efficient and long-lasting when based on the array of spontaneous behaviors embedded in the cultures of an organic society. Re-direction of social loyalty to state loyalty is critical, and requires reduction of the former for the benefit of the latter. The French revolution, for example, sought to end feudal and church allegiances in favor of the state. One goal of the people's commune system in Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward was to weaken traditional family solidarity which had

been the core of dynasties and society. A primary policy of Chinggis was to replace clan loyalty with Mongol identity and loyalty by mixing various clans, tribes and ethnicities within units of his army, and reducing the power of local chiefs.

11. *The political economy [E_s].* The state can enhance security by imposing order and stability through clarification, standardization and enforcement of rules and laws. Political order expands a market economy by safeguarding profit, reducing risk, and improving transportation and communication infrastructure. Protection of property under law further contributes to wealth which can add to prolonged life.

A flourishing economy benefits the state by providing resources for financing the government and its activities, improving livelihoods of subjects/citizens, deflecting ambitious individuals from dissent or sedition into trade and comfort, and binding social units into a common and interdependent fabric to reinforce nationalism.

12. *Political knowledge [K_s].* Specialized, and often esoteric, political knowledge is based on experience and history, and is available for the establishment, preservation and expansion of state power. This specialized knowledge enables governing elites to identify and deploy human and material resources for the purpose of extending the lives of citizens.

Chinggis Khan and his heirs employed and consulted non-Mongol advisors to administer their territories and subjects. But the rulers of the empire were also determined to retain the Mongol character of the army which had brought them such success. Sources of knowledge to govern vast territories and diverse peoples were Mongol experience, as well as Chinese, Moslem and other traditions.

13. *Coercive institutions of the State [M_s].* The military and other enforcers of state control and law comprise organizations established to defend against external enemies and domestic disorder. A standing military claims exclusive legitimacy as wielder of force within state territory.

Temujin climbed a ladder of status from fatherless exile to vassal of Toghrul to independent tribal leader with his own military force led by his band of warrior brothers. Through defeats and victory they eventually vanquished their opponents, incorporating some and executing others, and created the Mongol state with a tough and battle-tested army as its core. Mongol law (the *yasa*) was extended throughout the realm, enforced with often ruthless severity.

14. ***The coefficient of (domestic) political concord [C_s]. Analogous to the social concord coefficient [C_o], its political equivalent [C_s] is generated within the state, and between a state and its component organic society. Contained within this element and lowering its magnitude is the phenomenon of parts which seek to secede from the state, such as rebellions against constituted authority, and rivals to the throne.***

As with the social concord coefficient, the degree of conflict is proportional to the political concord coefficient. The Mongol state expanded to include other religions and ethnic groups, with Chinggis Khan favoring toleration towards the former, and either assimilation when surrendered or destruction when resisting for the latter. The degree and duration of [C_s] determined issues of tribal peace and war during the period preceding formation of the Mongol state.

15. ***External relations [E_s]. Since a state has formed most likely as a response to perceived actions and threats from other states, it must deal with those either as equals, superiors, or inferiors, or as allies or enemies or neutrals. Depending on the magnitudes of social and political concord, management of external relations requires actions such as diplomacy, war, negotiations, tribute, and espionage.***

The experiences of Temujin in surviving and eventually dominating the tribal complex of the Mongol plateau gave him insights and tools to deal with non-Mongol states. War was a primary instrument, as he destroyed the Merkit, Naiman, and Tatars. The Uigurs submitted on the basis of the Mongol winning record, while the Jin resisted and were annihilated. The Khan of Kwarazm wavered, declared war, and was also destroyed. Alliances were cemented with gifts and marriage. By the end of his life, Chinggis Khan

saw his Mongol state transformed into an empire, having no limits until his successors were defeated in battle or decided they had conquered enough.

Formulizing Anthrocentric Security Theory – How Human Life is Prolonged

To review, these three groupings of fifteen security elements have a sequential quality in that the individual is ontologically prior to organic society, which in turn precedes establishment of the state. Within each structure there are four, five or six security inputs which can be sub-totaled as the security contribution to the individual by that structure. The first four elements combine directly to affect individual longevity. Note that security inputs can also be negative. An absent parent or malevolent family member might negatively affect longevity of an infant or child, for example. Similarly, the sub-totals of organic society and state security inputs are diminished by lesser or negative magnitudes. The second and third structures (organic society and the state) are cumulative in that they include the sums of the preceding level. Organic society includes the particular security inputs generated by this structure plus the sub-total from the individual; likewise the state contains its inputs plus those of organic society. Although the life of Chinggis Khan has been reviewed as an illustration of anthrocentric security theory, this analytical matrix can be applied to any human person, living or dead, to outline a unique security profile.

The following three formulae provide a summary of anthrocentric security theory, with outputs on the left and inputs to the right of the equal sign:

- Formula One: Anthrocentric security of one individual in pre-society equals the sum of individual level inputs:

$$AS_i = W_i + F_i + K_i + E_i$$

- Formula Two: Anthrocentric security of one person in organic society equals the sum of individual level inputs (Formula One) plus the organic society inputs:

$$AS_o = AS_i + L_o + K_o + O_o + E_o + C_o$$

- Formula Three: Anthrocentric security of one citizen/subject in a state, representing the total security (expressed in years) available to an individual/person/citizen in a state, equals the sum of organic society inputs plus state inputs. AS_s is expressed as a number equal to the number of life years enjoyed by a particular person:

$$AS_s = AS_o + O_s + E_s + K_s + M_s + C_s + E_s$$

Anthrocentrism analyzes social and political institutions from the standpoint of human life as lived and protected within mortal limits. It accepts the human security attention on individual 'safety' as the point of departure, but shifts the focus from 'persons' as passive beneficiaries and 'institutions' as agents, to the individual as primary actor and institutions as supplementary and ensuing to his actions. Anthrocentrism also differs from state-centrism in emphasizing the chronological and ontological priority of individual achievement over state and state-policy inputs. UNDP-based human security discourse may carry too much burden of 'thinking like a state.'

Anthrocentric security theory presents a re-design of human security, one based on identification of a range of protections historically available to the human individual rather than a limited state-centric template which is more attuned to outputs of the welfare state or state-led developmentalism. Second, the introduction of human life years (humlears) offers a precise measurement of aggregate security output (life protection) at the individual level, and a proxy sum of inputs, based on the three above formulae. Actuarial technique could sharpen the calculus of mortality risk. A third potential advantage of an anthrocentric approach is that it offers an antidote, or at least a possible modification, of a dominant imperative in the political sciences, 'thinking like a state,' which depreciates or overlooks the contributions to human security from non-state structures. Finally, in reassessing historical persons such as Chinggis Khan, and utilizing the rich biographical literature available to scholars, a more human-centric focus

will reduce the ahistorical quality of contemporary political discourse and broaden understanding of non-state inputs to security.

Appendix I: Figures 1-7

Figure 1: Human population expansion, 10,000 BC- 2000 AD. Based on data from M. Livi-Bacci, *A concise history of world population* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007).




Figure 2: Security dynamics among humans




Figure 3: Chinggis Khan's lifespan and global averages



Figure 4: Growth in security of human life, 10,000 BC to 2000 AD (Population x life expectancy) Environment and early life




Figure 5: How Chinggis Khan lived to the ripe old age of 62(+/-)




Figure 6: The perilous life of Chinggis Khan – an actuarial estimation/risk analysis.





Figure 7: Security inputs to the life of Chinggis Khan: Parents, self, organic society, and state.



Appendix II: Selected Readings

- Atwood, C. P. 'Comparison of Political Forms.' *Imperial Statecraft*. D. Sneath, ed. (Bellingham, WA, Western Washington University, 2006).
- Axworthy, L. 'Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First.' *Global Governance* 7 (2001), 19-23.
- Beckwith, C. I., *Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009).
- Biran, M., *Chinggis Khan*. (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007).
- Boyd, R. and T.-W. Ngo, Eds. *State Making in Asia*. (New York, Routledge, 2006).
- Cave, S., *Immortality: The Quest to Live Forever and How It Drives Civilization*. (New York: Crown, 2011).
- Charleux, I., G. Delaplace, et al., Eds. *Representing Power in Ancient Inner Asia : Legitimacy, Transmission and the Sacred*. (Bellingham, WA, Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University, 2010).
- Cohen, J. L. and A. Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992).
- Creveld, M. V., *The Rise and Decline of the State*. (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1999).
- Dalrymple, T., *The Worldwide Evolution of Life Expectancy*. <http://pjmedia.com/lifestyle/2012/12/29/the-worldwide-evolution-of-life-expectancy/?singlepage=true>, 2013).
- De Hartog, L., *Genghis Khan: Conqueror of the World*. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1989).
- Durkheim, É. *The Division of Labor in Society/ De La Division Du Travail Social. With an Introduction by Lewis Coser*. (London: Macmillan, 1984).
- Edman, I., Ed. *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer*. (New York, Modern Library, 1928).

- Edström, B., *Japan and Human Security: The Derailing of a Foreign Policy Vision* (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2011).
- Eisenstadt, S. N., *The Political System of Empires: The Rise and Fall of Historical Bureaucratic Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1969).
- Evans, P. B., D. Rueschemeyer, et al., Eds. (*Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1985).
- Fukuyama, F., *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011).
- Golden, P. B. 'The Qipcaqs of Medieval Eurasia: An Example of Stateless Adaptation in the Steppes.' *Rulers from the Steppe*. In G. Seaman and D. Marks. (Los Angeles, Ethnographics Press, Center for Visual Anthropology, University of Southern California, 1991).
- Greenblatt, M., *Genghis Khan and the Mongol Empire*. (New York: Benchmark Books, 2002).
- Grousset, R., *Conqueror of the World: The Life of Chingis-Khan* (New York: Viking, 1966).
- Hampson, F. O., J. Daudelin, et al., *Madness in the Multitude*. (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2002).
- Huntington, S. P., *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
- Jackson, P., *The Mongols and the West, 1221-1410*. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005).
- Jagchid, S., *Essays in Mongolian Studies*. (Provo, Utah: David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, Brigham Young University, 1988).
- John Bagot Glubb, S., *The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival*. (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1978).
- Juvayni, A. a.-D. A. a. M., *Genghis Khan: The History of the World Conqueror*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997).
- Kley, R., *Hayek's Social and Political Thought*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
- Krader, L., *Formation of the State*. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,

1968).

- Lai, D. C., *Land of Genghis Khan: The Rise and Fall of Nation-States in China's Northern Frontiers*. (Victoria, BC: Dept. of Geography, University of Victoria, 1995).
- Lam, P. E.. 'Japan's Human Security Role in Southeast Asia.' *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* (April 2006) 28:1: 141-159
- Lane, G., *Genghis Khan and Mongol Rule*. (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2004).
- Larner, J., *Marco Polo and the Discovery of the World*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
- Lattimore, O., *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*. (Boston: Beacon, 1962).
- Lieven, D., *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000).
- Livi-Bacci, M., *A Concise History of World Population*. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007).
- MacFarlane, S. N. and Y. F. Khong., *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006).
- Mazower, M., *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (New York: Penguin Books, 2012).
- Moses, L. W. and S. A. H. Jr., *Introduction to Mongolian History and Culture*. (Bloomington, Ind.: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, 1985).
- Mote, F. W., *Imperial China, 900-1800*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).
- Oppenheimer, M., *The State in Modern Society*. (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 1914).
- Ostrowski, D., *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304-1589*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,, 1998).
- Pan, Y., *Son of Heaven and Heavenly Qaghan: Sui-Tang China and Its Neighbors*

(Bellingham, WA: Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington University, 1997).

Paris, R. (2001). 'Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?' *International Security* 26:2: 87-102

Rachewiltz, I. d., *The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2004).

Ratchnevsky, P., *Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy* (Cambridge, USA: Blackwell, 1992).

Rossabi, M., *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).

Ruffin, M. H. and D. C. Waugh, Eds. *Civil Society in Central Asia*. (Seattle, University of Washington Press 1999).

Sabloff, P. L. W., Ed. *Mapping Mongolia: Situating Mongolia in the World from Geologic Time to the Present*. (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2011).

Saunders, J. J., *The History of the Mongol Conquests*. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1971).

Schlichte, K., Ed. *The Dynamics of States: The Formation and Crises of State Domination*, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005).

Scott, J. C., *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

Seaman, G. and D. Marks, Eds. *Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the Eurasian Periphery*. (Los Angeles, Ethnographics Press 1991).

Seng, T. S., *Human Security: Discourse, Statecraft, Emancipation*. (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001).

Weatherford, J., *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World*. (New York, 2003).

Weiner, M. S., *The Rule of the Clan: What an Ancient Form of Social Organization Reveals About the Future of Individual Freedom* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013).

About the Author

Dr. Robert E. Bedeski is currently Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria. He is also Honorary Professor at the University of British Columbia's Institute of Asian Research. In 2008-2009, he was appointed Aung San Suu Kyi Endowed Chair in Asian Democracy at the University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky. He is also Associate Fellow at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm, Sweden, where he has authored two papers on Mongolia. Dr. Bedeski received his MA in Asian Studies and his PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. He was the first non-Japanese research fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo in 1980-81.