Fostering Order In The Indo-Pacific: What the EU Can Learn From and Do With Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam

Executive Summary

One of the most critical challenges of this century is fostering order in the Indo-Pacific. (Dis)order in this space will significantly affect the international order. Not only do many Indo-Pacific residents lead efforts to probe and reform international order and concepts of order, but the superpower competition between the United States (US) and China primarily unfolds here. The EU is already cognizant of this. Yet, it is not just about what the EU and its members seek to accomplish in the region but just as much the interpretations of and preferences for order of key Indo-Pacific resident actors. What are their views on EU strategies and contributions to order? Indeed, major and middle powers from the primary maritime regions—Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam (abbreviated as the “five powers”)—are proactive and have much agency in Indo-Pacific affairs. In their ways, they attempt to do what is best for them and what they perceive as fostering order in the Indo-Pacific. What can the EU learn from and do with these five powers?

Order in the Indo-Pacific is characterized by forces that simultaneously sustain, strengthen, erode, expand, and reform it. The predominant force is the reemergence of Asia at large as an economic, (geo)political, and technological force, particularly China, India, ASEAN, and actors in the Islamic world. As power balances shift in favor of Asia, and in particular China, the Indo-Pacific is in an ordering dynamic in which new institutions are founded, rules and principles such as sovereignty and non-interference are simultaneously violated and emphasized, and new principles and norms regarding cooperation and security are promoted.

Amidst this backdrop, the interpretation of order fostering in the Indo-Pacific of all five powers essentially converges. While geographic focus varies from the international, i.e., Japan, the Indo-Pacific, i.e., Australia, the Indian Ocean, i.e., India, to the regional, i.e., South Korea and Vietnam, a stable, free, and open rules-based Indo-Pacific that enables economic integration,  open sea lanes, and unimpeded trade flows, and that excludes anyone’s unilateral actions are essentially their shared understanding of order.

Nevertheless, rather stark differences exist in their preferences for fostering order in the Indo-Pacific. Australia, Japan, and, to a lesser degree, South Korea, bonded by a volatile Korean Peninsula, perceive the balance of power vis-à-vis China as the most critical and effective way to sustain order in the Indo-Pacific. They see the US as a critical security balancer with whom they, as active agents, can help foster order. To them, there was a stable and economically facilitating order in the Indo-Pacific that a stronger China is uprooting due to its maritime and territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. From their perspective—and among other approaches—it is critical to sustain a balance of power so that China does not trespass on order parameters.

Time will tell the efficacy of this approach, as the inherent mistrust and instability of power balancing, generally an exercise of friction, does not necessarily guarantee sustained peace, stability, cooperation, or order. Yet, it may indeed discourage China from any unilateral actions. In turn, China considers this US-led power balancing as destabilizing, the Hub-and-Spokes alliance system as an exclusive hegemonic military configuration, and neither as part of the international or Indo-Pacific order. As an extension of that stance, India and Vietnam, while still pursuing hard security and an Asia that includes the US, favor a more balanced approach to order fostering that prioritizes inclusive dialogue, genuine multilateralism, multi-aligned networks, and cooperative rather than collective solutions to security. India, South Korea, and Vietnam also strongly prioritize economic development. These differences highlight how geographic distance, domestic political and economic priorities, material capabilities, strategic culture, historical relationships and legacies shape each power’s interpretations of and preferences for order in the Indo-Pacific. These five powers cannot be considered a grouping that thinks and acts in unison or has identical views on order fostering in the Indo-Pacific.

The five powers’ views on the EU’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific thus far and how the EU could help foster regional order also vary. These hover over an amalgam of realism, disillusion, and optimism. The Australian, Japanese, and South Korean aspirations for greater coordination with the EU lie in the hope that it can move closer to the US-led Indo-Pacific military alliances, informally or formally, directly or indirectly. India and Vietnam place a much stronger emphasis on diversifying external relations and on a more plural or multipolar Indo-Pacific where firm security reliance through collective security on the US, or anybody for that matter, is largely discouraged. This represents the overall Indo-Pacific barometer for order, stability, and cooperation more than the Australian, Japanese, and South Korean approaches.

This report does not claim to know which of these five powers’ individual or shared preferences for order fostering is the most effective way. Each interpretation and preference have a degree of rationale and merit. What is clear is that if stability and cooperation are the highest goals of order— and these should be—then order in the Indo-Pacific should be characterized by genuine multilateralism and based on international law. This automatically equates order in the Indo-Pacific with the international order. While order in the Indo-Pacific has unique characteristics and regional institutions, it falls under its aegis of international order—particularly international law.

Therefore, the best way for the EU to contribute to fostering order might be a two-pronged approach. The realities of China’s territorial and maritime claims and power balancing cannot be wished away. The preferred modus operandi of some of the area’s most notable middle and major powers, Australia, Japan, and South Korea, to power balance and rely heavily on the US is firm—this needs to be respected. If the EU believes in this approach, it may expand on current support to these regional countries’ endeavors (in)directly.

Yet, most of the Indo-Pacific, India, and Vietnam included, do not see power balancing as the remedy for order fostering. Therefore, the EU’s order fostering opportunity lies in 1). diplomatic engagement by facilitating (or joining) genuine multilateralist track I and track II dialogues with international law as the point of departure and that considers all stakeholders’ core concerns; and 2). through non-traditional security cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally with the five powers, and other powers, in maritime, economic, and cyber security—these are elaborated on in the Recommended Policies section (4.1). Importantly, the EU should consider working with all like-interested states, not just like-valued ones. The like-valued states are limited to the IP4 and a few others, which will not cut it in a region as large and diverse as the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the desire for stability, cooperation and order fostering is not exclusive to democratic states.

These ways forward do not require a new EU Indo-Pacific strategy but rather a recalibration of approaches more closely with all regional actors. This will include reconciling different interpretations of and preferences to foster order. Importantly, if international law is the cornerstone of international order, those fostering stability in the Indo-Pacific must champion it—equally for all, by all, and with all.