India’s BRICS Balancing Act

In 2024, five new countries joined BRICS, and dozens of other countries have expressed interest in joining. Where does India stand on BRICS expansion and does its position differ from that of Russia and China?

Panda: Kazan marks the first BRICS summit since its expansion and will also include other Global South nations that have expressed interest in joining. While BRICS expansion has brought attention to its collective economic power, the grouping currently has very little in the way of an organizational structure or achievements. Hence, this summit may include deliberations on the challenges of integrating a larger, more diverse membership and deepening cooperation within the grouping, perhaps through a “partner country” and “observer country” model.

Discussion of subsequent expansions are premature, India will continue to be cautious and reserve judgment in this area realizing the significance that China holds in the grouping. India’s support for the recently added members to the BRICS forum was rooted more in backing members that could add economic vigor to the grouping such as the UAE, its own strategic partnerships with the newly added countries, and a desire to see greater global representation. In the future, too, India is likely to support states, including those in Southeast Asia, with similar interest-based criteria, disregarding states with a clear “anti-India” agenda such as Pakistan.

What are the key items on the agenda for the upcoming BRICS summit in Kazan, and what should observers be watching for from India?

Panda: Russia holds the presidency of BRICS this year. That Russian President Vladimir Putin is hosting the upcoming BRICS summit in Kazan — the capital of Tatarstan in the Russian heartland of the Volga region — is in itself a statement. The location showcases Russian affluence and an identity that is a blend of both East and West and hosting the summit there advances Moscow’s effort to project itself in a better light and demonstrate that it is not entirely an isolated country internationally. The crisis in the Middle East, rather than the war in Ukraine, is likely to dominate the conversation, as a large section of the Global South has strongly condemned Israel’s actions following Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attack.

India’s stance on Israel has differed somewhat from other BRICS members. In the latest vote at the U.N. General Assembly on a resolution calling for the end to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories, India and Ethiopia were the only two BRICS countries that abstained, while all others were for the resolution. While India’s position on the Middle East conflict is unlikely to play a role in the summit — divisions are not uncommon among BRICS members — it may matter for longer-term competition with China to be viewed as a leader of the Global South. China has been heavily critical of Israel over the last year, hosted rival Palestinian factions for reconciliation talks, and aligned itself with the Arab world and much of the Global South on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The development of a BRICS-centric financial system remains a top priority, particularly as two member countries (Russia and Iran) now have various sectors including the economy and military hindered by Western sanctions. This ties into broader efforts toward economic sovereignty and stability within the group, especially amid global shifts toward de-dollarization.

But the new BRICS currency seems unfeasible for now. India would be cautious of “de-dollarization” or even using local currencies for trade, depending on the viability of the partner state. While rupee-ruble trade has increased, Indian financial regulators are still wary of granting licenses to Russian banks. Earlier this year, India’s top banker, Reserve Bank of India Governor Shaktikanta Das, dismissed “de-dollarization” as a “media creation.”

The summit will, however, look to enhance the grouping’s New Development Bank as a viable alternative to Western financial institutions for financing sustainable projects in Global South economies.

Russia has outlined a broad-based agenda for the Kazan summit. But the focus is likely to be on the strategic-political agenda, in particular advancing multipolarity and multilateralism and coalescing a middle power-led opposition to the Western-led liberal order. While India does not have an anti-West agenda, this vision of a multipolar world is consistent with its interests to increase its own capabilities and influence — which necessitates some reduction in Western dominance — but is not as firmly rooted in Russia and China’s anti-West rhetoric.

The BRICS summit will bring Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi together in person. Do you expect any breakthroughs in the difficult relationship between China and India?

Panda: The BRICS summit provides a rare opportunity for direct dialogue between Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a time when mutual distrust is palpable. The two leaders could address their essential concerns over the prolonged standoff at their border and trade imbalances in a multilateral setting, where both leaders can explore cooperative avenues under the BRICS framework.

However, the meeting, if it happens, is unlikely to produce any immediate breakthroughs in their strained relationship. Although there has been some military disengagement along the disputed border between India and China following successful diplomatic and military negotiations, the lack of high-level interaction at the leadership level and India’s continued stance that the border needs to be addressed before moving forward with the bilateral relationship, makes it unlikely that the summit will produce any major breakthroughs.

Nevertheless, any diplomatic progress, even incremental, could lay the groundwork for reducing regional friction and enhancing cooperation in trade, technology and infrastructure development within BRICS. In keeping with recent trends, India’s China stance may soften temporarily due to such a type of leadership meeting, though not permanently as the issues between the two sides are complex and long drawn.

How does India’s role in BRICS, a group that includes Russia, China, and now Iran, complicate its deepening ties with the United States?

India’s relationship with anti-U.S. BRICS states like Russia and Iran adds a layer to the already complex India-U.S. dynamics, but this is nothing new. India has a long-standing policy of strategic autonomy, striving to pursue its interests in its relations with the United States and countries like Russia and China.

India’s focus within BRICS has been on showcasing multipolarity and advocating for equitable global governance, a stance in India’s foreign policy that the U.S. is well aware of. The inclusion of Iran, while complex, also offers India a chance to stabilize regional dynamics without directly antagonizing the United States — a predictable, precarious diplomatic balancing for India, especially given the escalating Iran-Israel conflict.

On another note, how the addition of new members shifts the nature of BRICS functioning is of interest to both the United States and India. Although going by past summits’ non-productive outcomes, a major achievement this time around should not be expected too.

Overall, India’s presence in BRICS can be seen as a strategic asset that adds depth to its foreign policy without obstructing the development of security ties with the United States.

Dr. Jagannath Panda is the head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Sweden. He is also a senior fellow at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies in the Netherlands and a professor at the University of Warsaw. Dr. Panda is the series editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia.

This interview/piece is first published at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington DC on October 17, 2024.