Priorities in India’s Indo-Pacific Order: Astute Realpolitik or Flexible Diplomacy?

In late October, India and China finalized a deal to pull back troops from two key Himalayan flashpoints in eastern Ladakh. This was a welcome reprieve after over 20 odd rounds of often lackluster, grim-appearing negotiations and no letup in Chinese transgressions (e.g., Tawang and Barahoti). Soon after, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met at a multilateral summit in Kazan, Russia, and signaled their evolving political intent for “peace and stability” after maintaining a cold shoulder for almost half a decade. A formal dialogue had eluded them since the much-hyped but ultimately deceptive meeting in Mamallapuram in October 2019.

These signs of an apparent thaw have sent political commentators into a tizzy. The new announcement appeared jarring to some, mainly because a month earlier, in September, Modi was hobnobbing with the outgoing US President Joe Biden in his hometown of Delaware for the all-important Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (officially, the Quad comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the US) leaders’ summit—a mainstay for the four members and other stakeholders’ Indo-Pacific visions and strategies.

For China, the Quad is a true embodiment of the US-led Indo-Pacific construct: the Quad’s perception in Beijing has evolved from being seen as easily dissipated “sea foam” to an “anti-China” bloc fostering regional divisiveness.

India’s precarious US-China balancing will get a fresh twist in the coming months with US President-elect Donald Trump, who, in his first term as president, famously got along with strongman Modi, reportedly having picked well-known “China hawks” for top diplomatic roles in his incoming administration.

India’s diplomatic prescience, or at least deftness, becomes all the more vital when viewed through the prism of global leaders (from Europe to East Asia) who have proclaimed the accelerating trends toward multipolarity – a multipolar Asia/world aim ranks high among India’s foreign policy priorities, too.

So does the India-China thaw, along with India’s redoubled participation in China-dominant non-Western forums like the newly expanded BRICS summit, indicate India’s intention to reduce its tilt to the West, particularly the US? And more importantly, what does this mean for India and its Indo-Pacific priorities? How does the Indian diplomacy view (the) Indo-Pacific order-ing?

India’s priorities for the Indo-Pacific order align with its outlook that a multipolar Asia is the best paradigm for peace and stability. In that outlook, an economically developed and strong India is critical: it is precisely this dual track of a multipolar Indo-Pacific and a strong India that the country pursues across virtually all wind directions and strategic sectors.

Read the full piece at The Diplomat published on December 6, 2024. This work is part of a Stiftung Mercator-funded project titled “Order in the Indo-Pacific: Gauging the Region’s Perspectives on EU Strategies and Constructive Involvement.” The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect those of Stiftung Mercator or the authors’ respective institutes.