

Assessing the Development of Taiwanese Identity

Edited by
Bo-jiun Jing & Torbjörn Lodén

SPECIAL PAPER
August 2023



Institute for Security &
Development Policy

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V. Finnbodavägen 2, Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden

www.isdp.eu

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Printed in Lithuania

ISBN: 978-91-88551-44-3

Distributed in Europe by:

Institute for Security and Development Policy

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Abbreviations

ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
INDSR	Institute of National Defense and Security Research
ISDP	Institute for Security and Development Policy
KMT	Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCCU	National Chengchi University
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NTU	National Taiwan University
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
TPOF	Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation

List of Contributors

Chung-Chih Hong, also known as Ayah Demaladas, is an indigenous female scholar from the Kasavakan community of the Pinuyumayang tribe in Taiwan. Ayah is a PhD candidate at the School of Religious Studies at McGill University, focusing on Gender and Women's Studies. Her research interests lie in exploring the connections between Christianity, Indigenous traditional practices, and the lives and spirituality of Indigenous women.

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Yi-Chen Huang completed his undergraduate studies at the University of Taipei's Department of History and Geography in 2019, and he is currently a master's student at the National Taiwan Normal University's Department of History. Through his role as an assistant for Man-houng Lin's Academia Sinica Core Humanities Course, "The Rise of the US and Japan on the East Asian Seas and Taiwan in Modern Times," and related research projects, Huang has actively participated in creating the essay included in this volume. Huang's ongoing research is focused on the discourse surrounding family reform and the changes in Chinese family law during 1911-1949.

Bo-jiun Jing is a Research Fellow and the Head of the Taiwan Studies Project within the Asia Program at ISDP. He is also a member of the Chatham

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Man-houng Lin became an Adjunct Research Fellow upon retiring in 2021 at the Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, where she has held a position for more than four decades. Man-houng pursued her doctoral studies at Harvard University under the guidance of Philip A. Kuhn, leading her to focus on the dialogue between social facts and social thoughts. For instance, she examined: (1) the coincidence of the rising influence of the concept of limited monarchical power in China with the surge of silver prices in the international market initiated by the Latin American Independence Movement; and (2) the post-1945 intellectual emphasis on the China factor for Taiwan's present and the neglect of its Pacific background beginning in 1853, which has been blurring the national identity of the Republic of China in Taiwan.

Torbjörn Lodén is the Head of the Stockholm China Center at ISDP, an Emeritus Professor of Chinese Language and Culture at Stockholm University, and a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities. He served as the Director of the Center for Pacific Asia Studies at Stockholm University from 1998 to 2001 and also held the position of Director at the Stockholm Confucius Center from 2005 to 2014. From 1973 to 1976, he served as the Swedish Cultural Attaché to China. He has been a Visiting Professor in Hong Kong and Beijing and has delivered lectures at universities across different parts of the world. His main research interest lies in Chinese intellectual history, both ancient and modern, and he has published numerous works on Chinese thought, history, literature, and politics.

Wasiq Silan is a Tayal woman from the Mstaranan, known as the Nanshi River valley in the northern region of Taiwan. She has also published under her Mandarin name, I-An Gao. Currently, she serves as a Core Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies. Wasiq Silan has been a member of the delegation to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Her research interests and experience revolve around developing sustainable quality-of-life care systems, decolonizing state-Indigenous relationships, and employing collaborative and community-based approaches. She has contributed to publications in *Facets*, *AlterNative*, *Dutkansearovi diedžalaš áigečála*, *Gerontologia*, *Global Qualitative Nursing Research*, and *Journal of Gerontological Social Work*.

Tsung-Han Wu is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) in Taiwan. His research interests encompass Chinese politics, cross-strait relations, nationalism, cognitive warfare, and cybersecurity. Since the initiation of the Russian-Ukrainian war, he has directed his attention toward understanding the war's unfolding and extracting insights that hold relevance for Taiwan's defense strategies. Tsung-Han earned his Ph.D. from the Lau China Institute at King's College London, an M.A. from the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University, and a B.A. from the Department of Chinese Literature at National Chengchi University.

Introduction

Bo-jiun Jing and Torbjörn Lodén

The subject of contemporary Taiwan inevitably evokes controversy concerning its political, national, and cultural identity, especially the fervent dispute regarding its sovereignty and global recognition. Should Taiwan be recognized as a sovereign and independent state under the name of the Republic of China (ROC), or should it be seen as an “inseparable part of one China,” as claimed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? Should the people in Taiwan be considered culturally Chinese, or should they be seen as a separate cultural entity?

A compelling underpinning of Taiwan’s assertion of separate nationhood and statehood derives from its emphasis on a distinct historical narrative that diverges from that of the PRC. Furthermore, its political democratization has undeniably contributed to the rise of Taiwanese identity. At the same time, it is hard to deny that Taiwan shares much of the Chinese cultural legacy with mainland China and other parts of the Chinese-speaking world. Therefore, it appears that the discussion of these issues would benefit from consistently differentiating between the notions of statehood and cultural identity.

Within the pages of this meticulously curated volume, our exploration surpasses mere comprehension of the context surrounding the contested statehood of the ROC or Taiwan. The quartet of articles delves deeply into the unique facets of Taiwan’s identity politics, adopting historical, indigenous, and international relations perspectives. Our esteemed contributors offer invaluable insights into the essence of Taiwanese identity, its evolutionary trajectory, and potential directions for the future.

In the first essay, titled “Has Taiwan Been China’s Since Ancient Times? ‘Yizhou’ and ‘Liuqiu’ in Historical Records,” Professor Man-houng Lin from Academia Sinica and Mr. Yi-Chen Huang from National Taiwan Normal University respond to Beijing’s assertion that Taiwan has

been a part of China since ancient times, referred to as Yizhou or Liuqiu in antiquity. Despite a plethora of academic works spanning various languages since the late 19th century that have wrestled with the enigma of Yizhou and Liuqiu, the debate remains inconclusive. Through an in-depth analysis of primary historical sources, Professor Lin and Mr. Huang propose a counterargument that challenges the conventional narrative. They contend that both Yizhou and Liuqiu maintained their autonomy in relation to China during the time frame outlined in Chinese historical texts. To substantiate their position, they shed light on various critical factors. Notably, they highlight how an international academic misconception led to the association of Liuqiu with Taiwan. As a culmination of their study, they argue that the historical juncture signifying Taiwan's incorporation into China's territorial ambit should be dated to the year 1683.

The second essay, titled "'Taiwanese Ethos' in Transformation: From the 17th to the 21st Century" by Professor Chun-chieh Huang of National Taiwan University, investigates the concept of "Taiwanese ethos" or "Taiwanese consciousness." Professor Huang defines this as the guiding beliefs, sentiments, ideals, and values that permeate Taiwanese society as it seeks self-identity and positioning in the global context. He thoroughly examines the evolution of the "Taiwanese ethos" from the 17th century onward, encompassing key periods such as the Dutch era (1624-1662), Koxinga's rule (1661-1683), the Manchu era (1683-1895), Japanese colonization (1895-1945), and the Republic of China government's influence (1945-). Looking ahead from a historical perspective, Professor Huang suggests that Taiwan in the 21st century must shed the "egocentrism" and "narcissism" that have been ingrained in the longstanding "Taiwanese ethos." Instead, he advocates embracing a new philosophy of inter-subjectivity. By doing so, he believes that Taiwan can cultivate healthier relationships and interactions not only with mainland China but also with the wider global community.

In the third essay, titled "When Indigenous Peoples Meet the State: Reflecting Indigenous Identities through the Politics of Name in Taiwan," Ms. Chung-Chih Hong (Ayah Demaladas) from McGill University and Dr. Wasiq Silan (I-An Gao) from Helsinki Collegium for Advanced

Studies examine the reclamation of Indigenous identity within a context of mixed Han Chinese and indigenous heritage. Their analysis explores the intricacies of indigeneity, weighing its advantages and disadvantages in the broader tapestry of Taiwanese society. In particular, Ms. Hong and Dr. Wasiq critically evaluate the current naming practices of indigenous peoples and dissect their implications within the contemporary state-indigenous relationship. Through the analysis of three specific cases, they offer a more refined and nuanced comprehension of indigeneity in Taiwan. This understanding is rooted in the dynamic interplay between political acknowledgment and cultural identification, captured within a fluid consultation process. Their work underscores the necessity for ongoing research into how indigenous peoples navigate the recognition systems that shape the parameters of transitional justice and reconciliation while reclaiming their identities.

The fourth essay, titled “Formation of a Firm and Stable Taiwanese National Identity after the Russian-Ukrainian War” by Dr. Tsung-Han Wu from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, assesses the current status of Taiwanese national identity in the wake of the Russian-Ukrainian War. Dr. Wu also explores the origins of Taiwanese national identity through the lenses of history, democratization, and the offensive activities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Additionally, he examines the evolution of Taiwanese national identity since 1992. He argues that, although variations in Taiwanese identity exist across different political affiliations, the majority of Taiwanese people view themselves as a distinct political entity separate from China. This sense of identity has strengthened over recent years, particularly in response to the Russian-Ukrainian War. The conflict underscored the significance of determination in repelling aggressors and highlighted the necessity for robust defense capabilities.

The Institute for Security and Development Studies (ISDP) in Stockholm, Sweden, is engaged in a Taiwan Studies Project, and this Special Paper stands as one of its outcomes. We extend our sincere gratitude to the six authors whose unwavering dedication brought this volume to fruition. We also appreciate the support provided by the Taipei

Mission in Sweden as we transformed this project from a concept into reality. Our aspiration is for this undertaking to serve as an ongoing platform, amplifying the voices of scholars dedicated to Taiwan and cultivating fresh ideas and perspectives that resonate throughout both the policy and academic spheres.

1. Has Taiwan Been China's Since Ancient Times? "Yizhou" and "Liuqiu" in Historical Records

Man-houng Lin and Yi-Chen Huang

Nancy Pelosi, the then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, visited Taiwan on August 10, 2022. In response to her visit, the People's Republic of China (PRC) State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office released its third white paper on Taiwan, titled "The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era," expressing opposition to the visit.

The first White Paper on the "Taiwan Question" issued by the PRC in 1993 declared, "Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times. It was known as Yizhou (夷州) or Liuqiu (流求) in antiquities (*sic*) [...] Several expeditions, each numbering over ten thousand men, had been sent to Taiwan by the State of Wu (third century A.D.) and the Sui Dynasty (seventh century A.D.) respectively. [...] Chinese governments of different periods set up administrative bodies to exercise jurisdiction over Taiwan. As early as in the mid-12th century, the Song dynasty set up a garrison in Penghu..."¹

The 2022 White Paper further states, "Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times. This statement has a sound basis in history and jurisprudence. [...] The royal court of the Sui Dynasty had on three occasions sent troops to Taiwan, called Liuqiu at that time. Starting from the Song (宋, 960-1279) and Yuan (元, 1279-1368) dynasties, the imperial central governments of China all set up administrative bodies to exercise jurisdiction over Penghu and Taiwan."²

1 "The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era," Taiwan Affairs Office & Information of the State Council, the People's Republic of China, August 2022, Beijing, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/zylszl/baipishu/202208/t20220810_12459866.htm (accessed April 18, 2023).

2 Chinese characters were added by the authors. "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China," Taiwan Affairs Office & Information of the State Council, the People's Republic of China,

The identity of Yizhou and Liuqiu has been a topic of academic contention in numerous written works published in various languages since 1874. With the increasing comprehensiveness of electronic databases, this article employs these tools alongside primary sources to further investigate this issue.³

Previous research often presented accounts of Yizhou and Liuqiu customs and production as supporting evidence. Customs have been described, including topics such as tattoos and raw fish consumption. Research on production has centered on copper, iron, and horse breeding.⁴ However, since these descriptions have little relevance to the dominion of Yizhou and Liuqiu, this article analyzes their categorization in Chinese literature as “barbarian,” as well as their political and military organizations. The aim is to demonstrate that both regions upheld their independence from China during the period covered by Chinese historical texts. This study also underscores that the inclusion of Penghu in the aforementioned White Papers, indicating Chinese administration from the Song and Yuan dynasties onward, has contributed to the mistaken academic notion of linking Liuqiu with Taiwan.

August 1993, Beijing, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zt/zylszl/baipishu/201101/t20110118_1700018.htm (accessed January 18, 2023).

- 3 Databases we have used include “Scripta Sinica,” Scripta Sinica Research Group, Academia Sinica, <https://hanchi.ihp.sinica.edu.tw/ihp/hanji.htm> (Some documents may require authorization or may only be viewed from collaborating institutions); “Taiwan wenxian congkan ciliaoku,” 臺灣文獻叢刊資料庫, Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, <https://tcss.ith.sinica.edu.tw/>; “Chinese Text Project,” Donald Sturgeon, <https://ctext.org/>. Our research also relied on the Japanese National Diet Library Digital Collections (国立国会図書館デジタルコレクション, <https://dl.ndl.go.jp/ja/>) and the ROC National Central Library Chinese Rare Books Catalog (古籍與特藏文獻資源, <https://rbook.ncl.edu.tw/>).
- 4 For reviews of these academic debates, see Akiyama Kenzō 秋山謙藏, *Nisshi kōshō shiwa* 日支交渉史話 (Tokyo: Naigaishoseki, 1935); Liang Jiabing 梁嘉彬, *Liuqiu ji Dongnan zhudao yu Zhongguo* 琉球及東南諸島與中國 (*The Ryukyus and islands in the East and South China Seas as well as China*) (Taichung: Tunghai University, 1965); Lai Fu-Shun 賴福順, “Liu-Zhong hangxian yanjiu (shang)” 流中航線研究 (上), *Taiwan wenxian jikan* 臺灣文獻季刊 54, no. 1 (March, 2003): 1-46; Kuwata Rokurō 桑田六郎, “Jōdai no Taiwan” 上代の台湾 *Kikan minzokugaku kenkyū* 季刊民族學研究 18, nos. 1-2 (March 1954): 108-112; Tu Cheng-sheng 杜正勝, “Liuqiu yu Liuqiulun” 流求與流求論. *Taiwanshi yanjiu* 臺灣史研究, 29, no. 4 (December 2022): 1-69.

Classification as “barbarian”

The earliest description of Yizhou comes from a section from the *Seaboard Geographic Gazetteer* (*Linhai Shuitu zhi*, 臨海水土志), a work authored by Shen Ying (沈瑩), who was the commander of Linhai Commandery (臨海郡) in the eastern part of the Wu Empire. This work was published in 275, although the original text has been lost. However, the relevant passage for our research was copied in the “Collective Biographies of the Eastern Barbarians” (*Dongyi liezhuan*, 東夷列傳) section of the *Book of the Later Han* (*Hou Han shu*, 後漢書) and Eastern Barbarian 1 (*Dongyi yi*, 東夷一) within “The Four Barbarians Section” (*Siyi bu*, 四夷部) of the *Taiping Imperial Encyclopedia* (*Taiping Yulan*, 太平御覽).⁵ Similarly, the *Records of the Three Kingdoms* (*Sanguo zhi*, 三國志) by Chen Shou (陳壽) of Western Jin (西晉, 266-316) contains a similar entry regarding Yizhou.⁶ As for Liuqiu, the earliest and most comprehensive description of the State of Liuqiu (*Liuqiu Guo*, 流求國) can be found in the “Collective Biographies of the Eastern Barbarians” section of the *Book of Sui* (*Shui shu*, 隋書), which was compiled during the early Tang (唐, 618-907) dynasty.⁷

Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Wu and Sui armies immediately left after attacking and capturing prisoners from Yizhou and Liuqiu.⁸ Based on this evidence, it becomes apparent that regardless of the specific location of Yizhou and Liuqiu, they were not considered part of “Chinese” territory at that time.

Political and military organization

According to the passage from the *Seaboard Geographic Gazetteer* recorded

5 Fan Ye 范曄, Li Xian 李賢, Sima Biao 司馬彪 auth., and Yang Jialuo 楊家駱 ed., *Hou Han shu* (Taipei: Dingwen Shuju, 1981), 2822; Li Fang 李昉 et al., *Taiping Yulan*, in Zhang Yuanji 張元濟 et al. (eds), *Sibu congkan sanbian* 四部叢刊三編 (*Collected Classics, Histories, Philosophy and Literature, Series III*), juan 342 (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan [The Commercial Press], 1935), 3586b, 3587a.

6 Chen Shou 陳壽, Pei Songzhi 裴松之 auth., and Yang Jia-luo 楊家駱 ed., *Sanguo zhi* (Taipei: Dingwen Shuju, 1980), 1136, 1350, 1383.

7 Wei Zheng 魏徵 et al. and Yang Jia-luo ed., *Sui shu* (Taipei: Dingwen Shuju, 1980), 67, 74, 687, 1519, 1822-1825.

8 Chen Shou et al., *Sanguo zhi*, 1136; Wei Zheng et al., *Sui shu*, 1825.

in the *Taiiping Imperial Encyclopedia*, it states that in Yizhou, the heads of the barbarians each claimed themselves as kings and divided the land, with the people belonging to different kings.⁹ Similarly, the *Book of Sui* describes “Liuqiu” (流求) as a “state” (*guo*, 國) with a king. Under the king, there were “four or five generals (*shuai*, 帥) commanding the caves (*dong*, 洞), and the caves had princes (*xiaowang*, 小王). It further states that the villages had subordinate generals (*niaoliaoshuai*, 鳥了帥) who were skilled in battle and capable of establishing themselves. These subordinate generals managed the village affairs. In the state of Liuqiu, the subordinate generals were responsible for deciding upon all crimes, and those who dissented could appeal to the king. The king would then send ministers to deliberate and make a decision. Additionally, the State of Liuqiu had defensive installations that caused the Sui army to engage in fierce battles without respite.¹⁰

The Record of Drifting to the State of Ryukyu (*Hyōtō Ryūkyūkoku ki*, 漂到流球國記), written in 1244, regarded Liuqiu as a separate state (see Figure 1.1). The scroll was recorded by the Japanese Tiantai (天臺) monk, Keisei (慶政), and it depicted the experience of a group of seamen and passengers who drifted to Liuqiu in 1243 while intending to sail to Song China from Kyushu, Japan, but were carried off course by a gust of wind. Initially, they believed they had ended up on some islands south of Kyushu, but later they realized they had arrived in the State of Liuqiu, which did not belong to Japan or China (see Figures 1.1 and 1.3).

During their exploration of Liuqiu, the drifters encountered a lone scout wearing red and carrying a spear. The following day, they came across a naval force consisting of over ten boats, more than one hundred people, and a commander referred to as a “general” (*shogun*, 將軍).

According to the accounts given by the seamen and monks who were interviewed by Keisei, it is believed that the Liuquiens initially perceived the Japanese travelers as invaders, leading them to send out a force to attack. However, once both sides realized that they did not harbor hostile


9 Li Fang et al., *Taiiping yulan*, 3586b, 3587a.

10 Wei Zheng et al., *Sui shu*, 1519, 1823.


intentions, the Japanese offered the Liuquians dark blue clothing and some food known as “yagi”. In return, the Liuquians provided the travelers with boiled taro and purple seaweed and extended an invitation to their village. Despite these gestures of hospitality, the Japanese travelers still harbored a sense of fear towards the perceived wild behaviors of the Liuquians. Eventually, they were able to catch a favorable wind and escape from the state of Liuquiu (see Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.5).

Indeed, the account provided by Keisei in depicting the State of Liuquiu aligns with the descriptions recorded in the *Book of Sui*. Both sources highlight the ability of Liuquiu to mobilize and deploy significant forces for defense. These descriptions further support the notion that Liuquiu was an independent political entity, distinct from China.


Figure 1. Record of Drifting to the State of Liuquiu written in 1243



1.3



1.2




同廿二日，々中，緩弦棄鉞，舉手示和平之思。日本人亦納弓箭、解甲冑。爾時彼船漸近來。倩看之，其人長高於本朝人，面色甚黑……言語異兩國，亦無知文字。又乞衣服，即與紺衫等，面々悅之。又乞飲食，與[八木]等，各々興之。又從流球船。送煮芋并紫苔、其味同本朝。

At noon on the 22nd day (of the 9th month), the Liuquian put down their bows and shields and raised their hands to express their intention to be friendly with us. (We) Japanese also put away bows, taking off the armor as a response. The Liuquian boats then got close gradually. With precise observation, (we noticed that) they were taller than our Japanese and had dark skin. ... The Liuquians asked us for clothes and food and felt happy since we gifted them dark blue clothing and some food like [yagi]. Then, we followed Liuquian ships. They provided us with boiled taro and purple seaweed, which tasted the same as our homeland's.

同廿一日未明，見海上船兩三浮來。其船不似兩國船。其中有將軍，着赤色衣服、以赤巾纏頭。暫時之間，船十餘艘競來。一船列十餘人許成，各々持鉞楯、帶弓箭。同時，放矢猶如雨脚，其箭急飛遠走健中。又持楯浮水猶如水鳥。〈其矢小々拾取持來，其羽六筋，其尻如鉞〉

On the dawning of the 21st day (of the 9th month), we saw some vessels coming which were not similar to both countries' ships (Song China and Japan). A General wore red clothes, and his head was tied with a red scarf. Tens of vessels approached one after another instantly. About a dozen people held spears and shields, carrying bows and arrows on every boat. Simultaneously, they fired arrows that flew far and rapidly like raindrops. They used their shields to buoy the water, just like (the swimming) water birds. (The arrows we picked up had six feathers, and their bottom were shield-like shapes)

1.4



E. Fuzhou

E. Fuzhou

The text in the red box reads “Fuzhou, Lingnan Circuit of the Tang” (*Da Tang Lingnan Dao Fuzhou*, 大唐嶺南道福州). Fuzhou was actually part of the Fujian Circuit in the Song Dynasty. In his writing during the late Southern Song, Keisei still employed the early Tang name for this administrative division.

1.5



Note: *The Record of Drifting to the State of Ryukyu* is a scroll so it should be read from right to left. The images above have been arranged accordingly.

Source: Keisei, *Hyōtō Ryūkyūkoku ki* (Tokyo: Kunaichō shoryōbu, 1962), no pagination.

Penghu, Taiwan, and the Taiwan Theory of Liuqiu

During the early 12th century, Penghu, an island group located west of present-day Taiwan, was added as a destination on the trade route from Quanzhou (泉州) to Liuqiu.¹¹ Due to a possible attack by Taiwan’s

¹¹ Zheng Zao 鄭藻, *Qianchun jishi* 乾淳紀事, in Zheng Ruozeng 鄭若曾, *Zheng Kaiyang zazhu* 鄭開陽雜著, Chinese Text Project, photocopied from Wenyuange Siku Quanshu held by Zhejiang University, juan 7, 17b.

indigenous inhabitants, a garrison was established on Penghu, which was subordinated to the Jingjiang (晉江) district of Fujian province's Quanzhou prefecture during the Song and Yuan dynasties since the 12th century,¹² as mentioned in the PRC White Paper. Chinese authorities still considered Penghu as their territory in the early Ming dynasty, even though the government removed the garrison and mandated evacuation.¹³ The Ming regularly dispatched naval patrols to Penghu and sometimes traveled to the island to expel pirates.¹⁴

As for Taiwan, it was referred to as "Jilong" (雞籠) and "Jilong Shan" (雞籠山), and listed alongside Ryukyu in the "Biographies of Foreign Countries" (*Waiguo liezhuan*, 外國列傳) rather than in the "Records of Administrative Geography" (*Dilizhi*, 地理志) with the provinces of the Ming Empire in the Ming history compiled by the Qing. The name "Taiwan" did not appear until the 1630s in official reports.¹⁵

During the 1620s, several trade centers emerged along Taiwan's northern and western coasts. These included Jilong (雞籠), Beigang (北港), and Dayuan (大員), which grew in importance over others. Taiwan became a thriving trade hub during this time, attracting Chinese, Japanese, and European merchants who frequently visited the island. In official and private records of China's Ming dynasty, Taiwan proper was often referred to as "Dongfan" (Eastern Savages, 東番).¹⁶ Immigrants from southern China who arrived in Taiwan in the late sixteenth century used the term

12 Tu Cheng-sheng, "Liuqiu yu Liuqiu lun," 39.

13 Lou Yao 樓鑰, *Gongkuiji 攻媿集*, vol. 88, 15b-16a; Zhao Rugua, *Zhufan zhi, juan shang*, 39a; Wang Dayuan auth., and Su Jiqing eds., *Daoyi zhilüe Jiaoshi*, 13
Huang Zhongzhao 黃仲昭, "Guji" 古蹟 (Historic places), in *Bamin Tongzhi* 八閩通誌 (Comprehensive records of the whole of Fujian), vol. 80 (Fuzhou: published by Chen Dao 陳道, Garrison Eunuch of Fujian 福建鎮守中官, 1490), 12; Zhou Ying 周瑛 ed., *Daming Zhanzhoufu zhi* 大明漳州府志 (Ming Zhangzhou Prefecture Gazetteer), vol. 30 (Zhangzhou: published by Chen Hongmo 陳洪謨, Prefect of Zhanzhou 漳州知府, 1513), 1a.

14 Academia Sinica Institute of History and Philology ed., *Ming shilu Shenzong shilu* 明實錄神宗實錄, vol. 30, 731-732; vol. 127, 2638; vol. 312, 5842.

15 Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 et al., *Ming shi* 明史, vol. 323, "Waiguo liezhuan 4," (Beijing: Wuying palace edition, 1739), 17b-18a.

16 Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi 臺灣銀行經濟研究室 ed., *Ming Shilu Minghaikuansi Shiliao* 明實錄閩海關係史料 (Taipei: the editor, 1971), 1-3 preface.

“Mai Yuan” (埋冤), which means “bury unjust,” to describe the distant land where many had met an early death due to disasters. Without an official name, various written forms of the island’s name emerged based on the spoken word in the early seventeenth century. Chen Di’s (陳第) *Records on the Eastern Savages* (*Dongfan ji*, 東番記) from 1603 mentioned that “the place where the eastern savages live is called Dayuan (大員).” Both “Mai Yuan” and “Dayuan” are pronounced as “Dai Wan” in the Southern Fujian dialect. When the Dutch arrived in Tainan in the 1620s, they heard the locals pronouncing “Dai Wan,” which they translated as Da Wan (大灣) or “great bay,” while the name “Formosa” was used for the entire island. It is not until Taiwan came under Qing dynasty rule that “Taiwan” (臺灣) became the fixed name for the whole island.¹⁷

When the Yongzheng Emperor of the Qing dynasty ascended the throne in 1723, he made a statement in remembrance of the former Kangxi emperor, saying, “The place that is Taiwan did not belong to China in ancient times. My father, the emperor, through his mighty spirit, brought it into the territory.”¹⁸ Hence, it was not until 1683 that Taiwan became a part of China.

Since the early 17th century, Taiwan experienced rule by various powers including the Dutch, Spanish, Zheng regime, Qing dynasty, and Japanese. Throughout these periods, trade in Taiwan was predominately maintained and flourished, and the island’s strategic significance in East Asia grew more prominent. Following World War II, when the government of the Republic of China (ROC) relocated to Taiwan and concluded the 1952 Taipei Peace Treaty (also known as the Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan, UN treaty series, no.1858), Taiwan gained representation as a “country” through the ROC.¹⁹

17 Macabe Keliher, *Out of China, or Yu Yonghe's Tales of Formosa: A History of Seventeenth-Century Taiwan* (Taipei: Nantian chubanshe (SMC Publishing), 2003), 191-193.

18 Zhonghua shuju 中華書局 ed., *Qing shilu Shizong Xianhuangdi shilu* 清實錄世宗憲皇帝實錄 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), *juan* 10, 189.

19 Man-houng Lin, “Ryukyu and Taiwan on the East Asian Seas,” Lin Man-hong 林滿紅 *Liewu, jiaohun yu Taiwan dingwei: Jianlun Diaoyutai, Nantai guishu wenti* 獵巫、叫魂與臺灣定位：兼論釣魚臺、南海歸屬問題 (Taipei: Liming wenhua, 2017), 288-305.

The statement made by the PRC that “Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times. It was known as Yizhou or Liuqiu in antiquities (*sic*)” differs from the descriptions found in historical records and seems to be influenced by the writings of French sinologist Léon d’Hervey Saint-Denys (1822-1892).²⁰ In 1874, the Botan Tribe Incident, which resulted in the inclusion of Ryukyu (now Okinawa) into Japan’s territory, raised concerns in France about potential Japanese occupation of Taiwan and its impact on French interests in the Far East. Based on a translation of the 14th-century work “Examination of the Four Barbarians” (*Siyi kao*, 四裔考) from Ma Duanlin’s (馬端臨) *Comprehensive Examination of Literature* (*Wenxian tongkao*, 文獻通考),²¹ Léon d’Hervey de Saint-Denys wrote an article in the same year arguing that the Liuqiu mentioned in the Sui dynasty referred to Taiwan and that Taiwan had close relations with China since antiquity.²² However, it is important to note that Ma Duanlin’s statement, “The State of Liuqiu is on an ocean island east of Quanzhou, and one of the islands is called Penghu,” is not an original text from the Sui dynasty. Instead, it is a synthesis of knowledge from the Song dynasty about maritime routes between China and Liuqiu that passed through Penghu. Saint-Denys, however, took this as a primary source, and as Penghu was part of Taiwan in the late 19th century, he concluded that Gaohua Islet and Goubi Islet in the original text from the Sui were part of Penghu, and Liuqiu, reached in one or two days from these islands, was Taiwan.²³

This Taiwan theory was first introduced to Japan in 1895 by the Dutch Gustaaf Schlegel,²⁴ but it did not draw wide attention until 1897. In that

20 French Wikipedia (https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%A9on_d%27Hervey_de_Saint-Denys); French National Library, [https://gallica.bnf.fr/services/engine/search/sru?operation=searchRetrieve&version=1.2&maximumRecords=50&collapsing=true&exactSearch=true&query=\(dc.creator%20adj%20%22Hervey%20de%20Saint%20Denys%20%20L%C3%A9on%20d%27%22%20or%20dc.contributor%20adj%20%22Hervey%20de%20Saint%20Denys%20%20L%C3%A9on%20d%27%22/](https://gallica.bnf.fr/services/engine/search/sru?operation=searchRetrieve&version=1.2&maximumRecords=50&collapsing=true&exactSearch=true&query=(dc.creator%20adj%20%22Hervey%20de%20Saint%20Denys%20%20L%C3%A9on%20d%27%22%20or%20dc.contributor%20adj%20%22Hervey%20de%20Saint%20Denys%20%20L%C3%A9on%20d%27%22/) (accessed February 2, 2023).

21 Ma Duanlin, *Wenxian tongkao* (Unknown: Baoxutang, 1524), vol. 327, 3b, 4a-b, 5a-b, 6a-b.

22 Akiyama Kenzō, *Nisshi kōshō shiwa*, pp. 337-339; Macabe Keliher, “Contested Sovereignties: The Liuqiu-Taiwan Thesis as National Historiography (1874-1920),” unpublished manuscript, 2023, 6-11.

23 Liang Jiabing, *Liuqiu ji dongnan zhudao yu Zhongguo*, 107-109, 221-227.

24 Liang Jiabing, *Liuqiu ji dongnan zhudao yu Zhongguo*, 107-109, 221-227.

year, Ludwig Reiss, a German historian and professor at Tokyo Imperial University, published his monograph *Geschichte der Insel Formosa*. In the book, Reiss explained that Taiwan was called “Liuqiu” because of Ryukyuan who migrated to Langqiao, i.e. Lonc-kjauw, around the 6th century, after which they were encountered by the Sui army. The Taiwan-as-Liuqiu theory was gradually accepted among Japanese academics due to the scholarly influence of Reiss.²⁵ Japanese scholars, such as Ino Kanori (伊能嘉矩), Ichimura Sanjiro (市村瓊次郎), and Shiratori Kurakichi (白鳥庫吉), worked in an academic structure profoundly shaped by continental European sinology and adopted this position. Their academic achievements and status made the idea that Liuqiu is Taiwan mainstream in pre-1945 Japan.²⁶ The *Corrected and Annotated Brief Account of Island Barbarians* (*Daoyi zhilue jiaozhu*, 島夷志略校注) published by Fujita Toyohachi (藤田豊八) when he was teaching in China also promulgated this theory, influencing China and Japanese-ruled Taiwan. Ke Shaomin’s (柯劭忞) *New History of Yuan* (*Xin Yuan shi* 新元史) and Lien Heng’s (連橫) *General History of Taiwan* (*Taiwan tongshi*, 臺灣通史) are representative works bearing the influence of this theory. The argument of the latter work that Malay colonized Taiwan in the 7th century could have originated in another work of Reiss, “Geschichte der Insel Formosa.”²⁷ Following the publication of these works, Feng Cheng-chun (馮承鈞) and Lü Ssu-mien (呂思勉) also both expressed support for the Taiwan theory.²⁸

However, it is important to note that this Taiwan theory of Liuqiu differs from the actions of Ming China in 1383 when the term Liuqiu (流求) was changed to Ryukyu (琉球),²⁹ which is a Chinese term used during

25 Gustave Schlegel auth., and Feng Chengjun 馮承鈞 trans., *Zhongguo shisheng zhong weixiang zhuguo kaozheng* 中國史乘中未詳諸國考證 (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1928), 164-167, 185-888.

26 Akiyama Kenzō, *Nisshi kōshō shiwa*, 411-412.

27 Lien Heng 連橫, *Taiwan tongshi* 臺灣通史 (Taipei: Liming wenhua, 2001), 41-42, 45-46; Ludwig Reiss, Yoshikuni Tōkichi 吉國藤吉 trans., *Taiwantō shi* 臺灣島史 (*Geschichte der Insel Formosa*) (Tokyo: Fuzanbō, 1898), 1-40; Macabe Kelihier, “Contested Sovereignties,” 20-22.

28 Lai Fu-Shun, “Liu-Zhong hangxian yanjiu (shang),” 26-28.

29 Tu Cheng-sheng, “Liuqiu yu Liuqiu lun,” 1, note 1 citing a Ryukyu scholar’s work published in 1650.

the Ming-Qing period to refer to present-day Okinawa.

By pointing out the following factors: (1) Yizhou and Liuqiu's classification as "barbarian" in Chinese historical records; (2) the existence of various kings in Yizhou and a king or a general with state-level political and military organization in Liuqiu, as documented in both Chinese and Japanese records; (3) the assertion by Qing China that Taiwan only became part of China after the conquest by the Kangxi emperor; and (4) the emergence of the theory identifying Liuqiu with Taiwan due to an international academic fallacy,³⁰ we propose that the historical period for Taiwan's incorporation into China's territory should be 1683 of the 17th century. Contrary to the assertions made in the PRC White Papers, neither the invasions of Yizhou and Liuqiu by the Wu and Sui dynasties, nor the control exerted by the Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties over Penghu, lend support to the notion that China exercised rule over Taiwan prior to the Qing dynasty.

30 A more comprehensive paper discussing the possibility of Yizhou and Liuqiu being identified as today's Okinawa is expected to be published by ISDP later.

2. “Taiwanese Ethos” in Transformation: From the 17th to the 21st Century

Chun-chieh Huang

The leitmotif running through Taiwanese history since the 17th century, when Han Chinese people immigrated to this island, has been the formation, growth, transformation, and manipulation of the “Taiwanese ethos.” By “Taiwanese ethos,” I mean the guiding beliefs, sentiments, ideals, and values that pervade and permeate Taiwanese society in its striving for self-identity and self-positioning in the world. After the lifting of martial law in July 1987, this “ethos” has frequently been expressed by the term “Taiwanese consciousness” (*Taiwan yishi*, 臺灣意識) in the everyday language of civil society.¹

The formation and transformation of the “Taiwanese ethos” are closely intertwined with the vicissitudes of history. Taiwan has witnessed successive changes in ruling authorities, including the Dutch (1624-1662), Koxinga (1661-1683), the Manchu (1683-1895), the Japanese (1895-1945), and the Republic of China (ROC) government (1945-). As a result, Taiwan’s history can be best characterized by two metaphors. First, Taiwan is like a polyphonic symphony, filled with diverse sounds. At times, these different voices and melodies come together to create a harmonious piece of music, while at other times, they are mutually distracting and create discordant noise. Second, Taiwan can be metaphorically described as a palimpsest that carries the footprints of previous ruling authorities. It is against the backdrop of these two metaphors that the “Taiwanese ethos” has evolved over the past three hundred years or more.

1 For a fuller account of the “Taiwanese consciousness,” see my *Taiwan in Transformation: Retrospect and Prospect* (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2014, 2nd edition), chapter 6, 111-127.

This article will first discuss the developmental stages of the “Taiwanese ethos” since the 17th century. Next, it will analyze the substance and function of the “Taiwanese ethos” throughout history. Finally, this research will envision a possible path forward for the “Taiwanese ethos” in the 21st century and beyond.

Periodization

From a historical perspective, five stages in the development of the “Taiwanese ethos” can readily be observed: (1) the embryonic period from the 17th century until 1895; (2) the formative period, 1895-1945; (3) the transformative period, 1945-1987; (4) the period of consolidation, 1987-2016; and (5) the period of manipulation, from 2016 to the present.

In the first stage, which spanned almost three hundred years, the “Taiwanese ethos” was in an embryonic state. Those who immigrated from Fujian (福建) and Guangdong (廣東) in late imperial China to the island of Taiwan were primarily conscious of their own local identities in mainland China, from where they originated. The prevailing identities in the local society of Taiwan during the 17th century were the “Zhangzhou (漳州) ethos,” “Quanzhou (泉州) ethos,” “Minnan (閩南) ethos,” and “Hakka (客家) ethos.” These local identities often manifested in conflicts between these groups. Throughout the 19th century, internecine fighting erupted among groups of different local identities. Moreover, the immigrants’ religious beliefs further intensified their respective local identities. The deities worshipped by Minnan immigrants from Fujian and Hakka people from Guangdong differed. At this first stage, the “Taiwanese ethos” as an organic whole had not yet emerged.

In the second stage, during Japanese colonization (1895-1945), the “Taiwanese ethos” emerged as a collective consciousness shared by all immigrant groups from mainland China. In this particular period, the “Taiwanese ethos” primarily represented an awareness of ethnicity and socio-political status. Under Japanese occupation, the Japanese were the colonizers, while the Taiwanese were the ruled class. Ethnically, the Japanese were the Yamato (大和) people, while the Taiwanese were Han

Chinese. Colonial Taiwan witnessed a “dual contradiction” of sorts.² During Japanese colonization, the “Taiwanese ethos” rapidly evolved into a holistic ethnic and class awareness.

The third stage began with the postwar retrocession of Taiwan to the ROC government in 1945. During the period of China’s civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) from 1945 to 1949, the Taiwanese were keenly aware of themselves as a people in “this province,” which was immune from the bloody internecine civil wars in mainland China. This sense of “provincial ethos” was heightened by the bloody slaughter of the 228 Incident in 1947, when the Taiwanese protested against the incoming rule of the Mainland Chinese KMT government. The “Taiwanese ethos” as a provincial awareness was shared by the Taiwanese vis-à-vis the mainlanders (*Waishengren*, 外省人)³ who arrived in Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石, 1887-1975) in 1949.

The fourth stage commenced with the abrogation of martial law in 1987, when Taiwan embarked on the road to democracy. It was during this time that the slogan “New Taiwanese,” coined by Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九, 1950-) during the presidential election campaign, emerged as a new mode of thinking. Since 1987, a sense of self-consciousness among the people began to manifest as a form of protest against mainland China, particularly as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) authorities exerted pressure on Taiwan through various means. In 2000, Taiwan experienced its first change of administration since 1945 when Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁, 1950-) was elected as president of the ROC and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the ruling party.⁴ Once again, the “Taiwanese ethos” was consolidated as a collective identity in the face of pressure from the PRC.

2 Yanaihara Tadao (矢内原忠雄, 1893-1961), tr. by Zhou Xienwen (周憲文), *Riben diguozhuyi xia de Taiwan* 日本帝國主義下的台灣 [*Taiwan under Japanese Imperialism*] (Taipei: Pamir shudian, 1985).

3 For an excellent treatment of the collective memory, trauma and identity of the mainlanders in Taiwan after 1949, see Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang, *The Great Exodus from China: Trauma, Memory, and Identity in Modern Taiwan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

4 For a discussion of many aspects of Chen’s administration, cf. Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, and Kharis Templeman eds., *Taiwan’s Democracy Challenged: the Chen Shui-bian Years* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016).

The fifth stage began with the presidential election in 2016 when the DPP returned to power. Over the subsequent seven years, the “Taiwanese ethos” has evolved in response to drastic changes in the global geopolitical order and cross-Strait relations. If we characterize the third and fourth stages of the “Taiwanese ethos” as periods of consolidation, it can be argued that they have been manipulated and betrayed since 2016. The “Taiwanese ethos” has been twisted and monopolized under the guise of “Taiwanese value” by the ruling party’s power elite, forming what is known as “Team Taiwan.” Therefore, “Taiwanese value” has been turned into an ideological weapon used to target perceived political adversaries of the DPP’s ruling elite, both domestically and internationally.

In recent years, scholars worldwide have coined terms like “democratic recession,” “electoral autocracy,” “illiberal democracy,” “hate politics,” “cyber warriors,” and “media manipulation” to describe recent developments in democratic countries. These terms are, to varying degrees, applicable to Taiwan since 2016. Corruption has been justified through mind-bending and eyebrow-raising political slogans, twisting the hard-fought democracy that Taiwan has attained. In the changing geopolitical order, Taiwan has become a retinue or chess piece of world power, while the notion of “Taiwan subjectivity” (*Taiwan zhutixing*, 台灣主體性) has gone with the wind. In sync with this new development, the fierce “de-sinicization” policies in the educational and cultural arenas have contributed to identity crises, including nihilism and schizophrenia, within civil society. The pivotal juncture in Taiwan’s history became evident in the first week of April 2023, as former President Ma Ying-jeou paid his first visit to mainland China, coinciding with President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文, 1956-) visit to the United States.

In the developmental stages of the “Taiwanese ethos,” various “significant others” played important roles in its formation. During the second stage, when Taiwan was colonized by the Japanese empire, it was the Japanese who served as the important “significant other” in shaping the “Taiwanese ethos.” In the postwar period of transformation, the ruling party KMT was the “significant other” in the eyes of the local Taiwanese population. As Taiwan entered the third stage and embarked on the path

to democratization, the CCP replaced the KMT as the primary “significant other” influencing the “Taiwanese ethos.” Since 2016, when the ruling party, namely the DPP, twisted and monopolized the “Taiwanese ethos,” the United States and the PRC have become influential “significant others in absentia,” impacting the monopolization of that ethos in different ways.

One might wonder why the emotionally powerful “Taiwanese ethos” can be manipulated and betrayed so rapidly. Admittedly, several factors contributed to this significant decline since 2016. Among these, a crucial reason lies in the control of the state apparatus by those in power, granting them the power to interpret the meaning of the “Taiwanese ethos.” As they interpret and represent this ethos, the holders of power simultaneously exploit it for their own political advantage. In this context, the acts of “interpretation” and “use” become intertwined.

However, the explanatory power of the aforementioned theory is insufficient as it primarily focuses upon the *external* factor of powerholders manipulating the “Taiwanese ethos.” In order to offer a fuller account of this sad story of the “Taiwanese ethos,” it becomes necessary to shed light on the *internal* factors, specifically, the very essence of the “Taiwanese ethos” itself.

When considering the *essence* of the “Taiwanese ethos” from a historical perspective, two important things should be noted. First, the discourses on the “Taiwanese ethos” since Japanese colonization began in 1895 have often considered Taiwan *qua* Taiwan, without placing it within the broader context of Chinese culture and human civilization. Unsurprisingly, this perspective has contributed to social, political, and cultural *involution*. Such a “me-only” mentality can lead to egocentrism, tribalism, and narcissism. These three afflictions were evident in the words “Taiwan can help” printed on containers carrying masks donated by the Taiwanese government to European countries in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, when Europe was experiencing a shortage of masks.

Second, due to the “inward-looking” nature ingrained within the “Taiwanese ethos,” it often focuses solely on values specific to Taiwan rather than embracing the values of humankind. As a result, the theorization of the “Taiwanese ethos” tends to be a kind of particularism

rather than universalism. Therefore, the “Taiwanese ethos” is nothing but a Taiwanese version of nationalism, influenced by the nationalistic sentiment deeply embedded in Taiwanese society as a result of its tortuous history. Therefore, it becomes crucial to delve into a discussion on the substance and function of the “Taiwanese ethos.”

Substance and function

To put it in the context of Taiwanese history, the “Taiwanese ethos” evolved primarily as a discourse of *protest*. Protest sentiment has been prevalent throughout each stage of the development of the “Taiwanese ethos.” During the Japanese colonial occupation, the “Taiwanese ethos” developed an ethnic aspect as Chinese self-awareness grew to counter the oppressive Yamato (Japanese) imperial race. Under the KMT regime, especially in the aftermath of the 228 Incident in 1947, the “Taiwanese ethos” became a provincial self-awareness, standing in opposition to “outsider” mainlanders who had assumed the role of the ruling class since Taiwan’s retrocession to the ROC in 1945. After the repeal of martial law in August 1987, a “New-Taiwanese ethos” finally emerged, uniting all residents of Taiwan, irrespective of their provincial origins, in protest against the oppressive Communist regime in mainland China. Since 2016, the “Taiwanese ethos” as a protest discourse has been vividly expressed through the DPP’s political slogan “against China, protect Taiwan” (*kang zhong bao tai*, 抗中保台) during election campaigns.

In the course of the history of Taiwan, the “Taiwanese ethos” has served three primary functions, namely: (1) judgment; (2) evaluation; and (3) orientation.

The “judgmental function” of the “Taiwanese ethos” refers to its role as a yardstick for distinguishing those who belong to the “we group” from those who do not. During the 50 years of Japanese colonization (1895-1945), the “Taiwanese ethos,” expressed through the term “Taiwanese” (*Tâi-uân-lâng*, 台灣人), served as an expression of group identity in opposition to the Japanese colonizers. From 1945 to 1987, when Taiwan was under the one-party rule of the KMT, the term “Taiwanese ethos” drew a clear demarcation between long-time residents of Taiwan and the

“mainlanders” who arrived after 1949. Since 2016, the term “Taiwanese ethos,” embodied in the notion of “Team Taiwan,” has been used to refer to those who support the DPP and its syndicate.

In addition to its judgmental function, the “Taiwanese ethos” is also simultaneously an “evaluative” term. Those with strong Taiwanese sentiments use the term “Taiwanese” in a way that carries a moral sense of superiority. In the colonial era, the “Taiwanese” were considered morally superior to the Japanese colonizers because of their love for Taiwan, contrasting with the colonizers’ lack thereof. During the period of KMT domination, the “Taiwanese” saw themselves as morally superior to mainlanders due to their love for Taiwan, in contrast to mainlanders who were viewed as temporary residents with intentions to return to the mainland. In the present stage, the notion of “loving Taiwan” is interpreted as the exclusive privilege of the “Team Taiwan” who support the ruling party. Therefore, within the evolving discourse of the “Taiwanese ethos,” not only “factual judgments” are made but also “moral judgments” prevail.

Moreover, in the argumentation of the “Taiwanese ethos,” “fact” and “value” have been intertwined to pinpoint the future direction of Taiwan. This is what I term the “orientative function.” Many politicians exploit the “Taiwanese ethos” to advance their own political agendas, whether it be independence or unification. However, the real problem lies in the fact that the so-called “Taiwanese ethos” has often been transformed into a manipulative and distorted tool, akin to a “Procrustean bed,” by those who seize power during different periods.

To sum up, the “Taiwanese ethos” has exercised these “judgmental,” “evaluative,” and “orientative” functions throughout the history of Taiwan. The interweaving of the three functions has made the “Taiwanese ethos” a *double-edged sword*. On the one hand, the “Taiwanese ethos” is a very powerful cluster of ideas that unites the people of Taiwan in their fight against external invasions. After the lifting of martial law in 1987, the expression “we the courageous Taiwanese” (*lán ióng-kám ê Tâi-uân-lâng*, 咱勇敢的台灣人) became a powerful inner élan, promoting the democratization of Taiwan. On the other hand, the vivacity of the “Taiwanese ethos” can easily be manipulated as an ideological weapon

to draw a demarcation between “us” and “them.” The problem lies in the fact that “we” may be further narrowed down to denote solely the very person who seizes power. Thus, a form of involution becomes inevitable. On the road to involution, the three functions of the “Taiwanese ethos” have become blind ones and have paved the way to “hate politics.”

Before concluding this article, a note on the indigenous people may be in order. With a population of approximately 586,000 people spread across 16 tribes, they constitute 2.5 percent of Taiwan’s total population. The indigenous people are ethnically Austronesian, distinct from the Han Chinese. They possess their own cultural and political identities, which diverge from the formulated and defined “Taiwanese ethos” of the Han Chinese.

Conclusion

Looking towards the future from the perspective of history, I am inclined to suggest that Taiwan in the 21st century must shed the “egocentrism” and “narcissism” embedded in the time-honored “Taiwanese ethos” and subscribe to the new philosophy of *inter-subjectivity*. By doing so, Taiwan can develop healthier relations and interactions with mainland China and the world at large. Taiwan should not perceive itself as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in international politics today, nor should its people be willing to fight a proxy war for global powers. In the context of the 21st century, the *raison d’être* of the “Taiwanese ethos” in the future lies in carrying forward the torch of the pristine Chinese culture and putting true democracy into practice on this blessed island, which is the Chinese community *par excellence*.

What I refer to as “inter-subjectivity,” which should serve as the core value of the new “Taiwanese ethos” in the 21st century, is particularly pertinent to the future cross-Strait relations. Before Taiwan can embrace this “inter-subjectivity,” it must firmly hold onto its own subjectivity. Taiwan should not be a chess piece being played by others in international affairs. The history of ancient Greece in the sixth century BCE may be analogous to present-day cross-Strait relations. In 359 BCE, King Philip of Macedon (382-336 BCE) assumed leadership and later invaded central Greece in 353 BCE. At that time, politicians in Athens were divided into

two factions. Demosthenes (384-322 BCE), the politician-orator, denounced Philip and proposed that Athenians rise up to stop Macedon. On the contrary, Isocrates (439-338 BCE) beseeched Philip to lead the expedition.

In Taiwan's contemporary political landscape, politicians can be categorized as "Sinophile" vis-à-vis "Sino-phobic." A public intellectual even indicated that there are "Sino-pondering," "Sino-amiable," "Sino-neutral," "Sino-sceptic," "Sino-critical," "Sino-hostile," and "Sino-antagonistic" between the two extremes of the spectrum.⁵ The consensus on Taiwan's relationship with mainland China must be formed before the construction of Taiwan's subjectivity. The Taiwanese people should not be lured by warmongers, who work in the interests of the military-industrial complex, towards self-destruction. What is disheartening in both Taiwan and mainland China is the growing number of politicians and individuals willing to raise their metaphorical "Alexander's sword" to cut off the very complex and challenging "Gordian Knot" of the Taiwan-mainland China relationship. In these difficult days, the leaders of Taiwan and mainland China should turn to the teachings of *Mencius* (1B:3):⁶

King Hsüan of Ch'i asked, "Is there a way of promoting good relations with neighboring states?" "There is," answered Mencius. "Only a benevolent man can submit to a state smaller than his own. [...] Only a wise man can submit to a state bigger than his own."

齊宣王問曰：「交鄰國有道乎？」孟子對曰：「有。惟仁者為能以大事小，[...] 惟智者為能以小事大。」（《孟子·梁惠王下·3》）

An international media outlet has warned America, China, and Taiwan to consider the issue of "how to avoid a third war."⁷ Scholars and policy analysts have started pondering the post-Taiwan fall scenario, which may lead to the advent of a *Pax Sinica*.⁸ The deteriorating cross-Strait relations,

5 Chen-shen Yen (嚴震生), "Wei he taiwan you chou zhong he qin zhong, mei yi zhong?" 為何台灣有仇中和親中，沒疑中？ [Why Taiwan has "Sino-phobia" and "Sinophile" but not "Sino-sceptic"?] *United Daily News*, October 20, 2022, A 10.

6 *Mencius*, translated with an introduction by D. C. Lau (Penguin Books, 1970), 1B:3, 62.

7 *The Economist*, March 11, 2023, 8.

8 *Issues & Insights*, vol. 23, SR 2 (February 27, 2023), "The World After Taiwan's Fall," edited by David Santoro and Ralph Cossa.

at the heart of these concerns, should not devolve into a David versus Goliath war. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait must make every effort to prevent 2023 from becoming “the beginning of the end.”⁹ To achieve this, the wisdom and benevolence of Mencius are needed to shift the current relationship model from an “I-It” model to a future “I-Thou” model.¹⁰ Such a shift would enable heartfelt dialogue and the adoption of a maternal thinking that emphasizes sharing, caring, and acting responsibly towards one another. The pressing issue in the cross-Strait relationship cannot be resolved through quick-fix solution of unification or independence. Since 1895, when Taiwan was ceded to the Japanese empire, there has been a “rupture of history” between the island and mainland China. What is urgently required on both sides of the Taiwan Strait is what I called “mutual historical understanding.”¹¹ Through such understanding, both sides of the Taiwan Strait may achieve a heart-to-heart understanding between the people. This soul communication should occur at the grassroots level rather than solely at the governmental level. Individuals on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have experienced the sufferings of invasion, colonization, and abuse by imperial powers during the 20th century, whether by Western Powers or the Japanese empire. The Chinese people in Taiwan and mainland China must lend each other a hand to wipe off their tears.

In summary, for the cross-Strait relationship and the “Taiwanese ethos” in the 21st century, the wisdom and benevolence of Mencius, rooted in a deep sense of compassion, should prevail. These values are universal and inherent to all of humanity. Mencius “was convinced that compassion is innate and considered compassion to be the foundation of morality.”¹² We have to return to the spontaneity of Mencius’ innate compassion so as to pave the path toward peace and prosperity for Taiwan, mainland China, and the global community.

9 William Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, 5:1.

10 Martin Buber, trans. by Ronald G. Smith, *I and Thou* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937).

11 Chun-chieh Huang, *Taiwan in Transformation: Retrospect and Prospect*, chapter 8, 153–174.

12 Torbjörn Lodén, “Chinese and Western Resources for a Global Ethic,” in Gunner B. Mikkelsen and Ken Parry eds., *Byzantium to China: Religion, History and Culture on the Silk Roads: Studies in Honour of Samuel N. C. Lieu* (Leiden & Boston, Brill, 2022), 280-305.

3. When Indigenous Peoples Meet the State: Reflecting Indigenous Identities through the Politics of Name in Taiwan

Chung-Chih Hong (Ayah Demaladas) and Wasiq Silan (I-An Gao)

“Children of intermarriages between indigenous peoples and non-indigenous peoples taking the surname of the indigenous father or mother, or using the indigenous peoples traditional name shall acquire indigenous peoples status.”

- Article 4, Paragraph 2, The Status Act for Indigenous Peoples¹

The reclamation of indigenous identity from a mixed Han Chinese and Indigenous background has become increasingly relevant in contemporary Taiwan. This nuanced and fluid indigeneity is inextricably linked to the state’s political recognition and Indigenous cultural identification. In this essay, we aim to explore the advantages and disadvantages of Indigeneity in relation to being part of Taiwanese society. Our paper begins with a reflection piece by Wasiq.² It is then followed by two recent cases that further the discussion. We then analyze the current naming practices of Indigenous peoples and their implications for the contemporary state-Indigenous relationship. Last but not least, this essay sheds light on future research and what the process of indigenous identity formation tells us about the current state of social justice and reconciliation in Taiwan.

1 The Status Act for Indigenous Peoples (原住民身份法), Article 4, Paragraph 2. Full Act can be accessed at <https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=D0130001>.

2 I-An Gao, *Social Policies and Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan: Elderly Care Among the Tayal* (Helsinki: Unigrafia, 2021), <https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/329277>.

Prologue: Wasiq's story

When I was born, my parents gave me the name Chen I-An. Chen is the surname, a family kinship marker that was obligatory to be taken from the father's side. I-An means "easygoing and safe." I was born in the year the Martial Law was lifted, and it was unthinkable to have an Indigenous name at that time. Ten years later, I was given the Western name "Grace" in an English language afterschool. I did not use it in official documents, but I used it regularly at the language school twice a week. Using an English name was like adopting a new identity. It is a widespread phenomenon for children from middle-class families in Taiwan. It creates a shared understanding and identity among people who want to be international.

When I entered university, I witnessed a vibrant consciousness of the citizenry awakening in Taiwanese society, and the trend of recognizing difference was in full swing. I started to consider changing back my name as an acknowledgement of my Indigenous heritage. I felt safe to do so in the university, I thought: nobody could sneer at me anymore. I reclaimed my Indigenous status after my father reclaimed his by updating our family name from Chen to Gao in the national registration system. Gao is my grandmother's last name, which she got through a randomized lottery system from the Chinese district registration office when she was a child. Like many people in her generation, she used to have a Japanese-sounding name and not a typical Tayal tribal name. People in the community call her Huzi.

Huzi has been a proud Tayal entrepreneur who used to operate a small retail souvenir store on the high street in the community. She has good social networks and can get good revenue for her merchandise. She reminded me that she gave me a Tayal name, Wasiq. It refers to a delicious, common, and important plant in the community. There is no "family name" in the Tayal system. Instead, my grandmother told me we use our father's or mother's name attached to our own names to distinguish whose sons or daughters we are. In my case, my father's indigenous name is Silan, so I should refer to myself as Wasiq Silan.

However, I did not use Wasiq Silan after grandmother gave it to me. For the most

part, I thought that I was not Tayal enough. I have been constantly asked how “pure” I was (meaning how much Indigenous blood I have) and told that I did not look “Indigenous” (meaning often that I am too pale). Most importantly, I felt fake to claim that I am Tayal without being able to speak the language, tell a proper joke with the proper accents, or without living in the community on an everyday basis.

But then it hit me that it is not about those things—blood quantum, familiarity with the culture, language proficiency, or appearance—that qualify whether I am Tayal or not. It is more about negotiating an Indigenous identity for myself and staying committed. In other words, being indigenous is an active process of becoming.

Indigeneity as self-identification or political status?

Two cases echo Wasiq’s struggle with her ethnic identity, which is shaped by her blood, culture, language, and name. In 2020, a public petition was sent to the President’s office, calling for Kolas Yotaka, the first Indigenous presidential spokeswoman, to use her Chinese name Yeh Kuan-ling instead of her Indigenous name. The office released a written letter in response, stating that the Name Act allows Indigenous people’s names to be written in Roman alphabet. Therefore, the spelling of Kolas’ name is correct.³ In Kolas’ case, the use of her Indigenous name is not a personal decision, but a negotiation for political recognition and/or cultural identification.

Arguments about the Indigenous names and ethnic identity also involve appeals to obtain Indigenous status. In 2022, an Indigenous mother applied for a constitutional interpretation of her daughter’s ethnic status. Mrs. Cheng Chuan-ju, an Indigenous mother from the Truku tribe, married her Han-Taiwanese husband, Wu, the only son in his family. In most Han-Taiwanese families, the son is responsible for passing on the family heritage, so children typically take their father’s surname. Cheng’s daughter is not entitled to her mother’s Indigenous status because she

3 See the post of Presidential office on Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/presidentialoffice.tw/posts/2667444856812567?ref=embed_post

has her father's surname. Cheng argues that the Status Act of Indigenous Peoples prohibits children of intermarriage from acquiring Indigenous status if they have their father's Han surname.⁴ She further contends that this provision discriminates against women and violates the right to gender equality. The Justice later ruled that Article 4.2 and part of Article 8 of the Status Act of Indigenous Peoples violate the rights of Indigenous identity and equality.⁵

Kolas's insistence on using Roman spelling for her name and Cheng's argument for her daughter's indigenous status provoked public disputes about the identification and performance of indigenous status. These contentions are closely related to the political and cultural recognition negotiations between the State government and the Indigenous communities. Indigenous naming cultures are diverse and differ from the dominant Han-paternal surname custom. Cheng asserted that Indigenous people do not have surnames in the same way that Han-Taiwanese people do. Yang Shen-Chen classifies Taiwanese Indigenous naming customs into four categories: parent-child joint names, given names followed by clan names or house names, and parent titled with specific terms and followed by their first child's name.⁶ Both Kolas' and Cheng's tribes, the Pangcah and the Truku, use parent-child joint names. Therefore, Kolas' name, which includes her father's name, indicates that she is the daughter of Yotaka. Cheng also points out that colonial policies banned Indigenous naming traditions. This challenge resulted in her inheriting the Chinese

4 Status Act for Indigenous Peoples, Article 4.2: 'Children of intermarriages between indigenous peoples and non- indigenous peoples taking the surname of the indigenous father or mother, or using the indigenous peoples traditional name shall acquire indigenous peoples status.'

5 X.-H. Li, *Jin 10 wàn yuán mín yǔ fēi yuán mín tōnghūn zǐnǚ shòu yǐngxiǎng, dà fāguān `cóng hàn xìng shì xiàn àn `xīqīng rèntóng quán yǔ píngděng quán* [Nearly 100,000 aboriginal and non-indigenous intermarried children were affected. The justice clarified the right to identity and the right to equality "from the Han surname interpretation case"]. Right Plus, April 22, 2022, <https://rightplus.org/2022/04/22/name/>.

6 Sheng-chen Yang, *The Study of Taiwan Aborigine's Traditional Name*. (臺灣原住民族傳統姓名之研究) Master Thesis. Graduate Institute of Taiwan Culture, National Tainan University. 2004, 26-39. Particularly in Tao tribe, when a couple give birth to the first child, they will drop their own names and replace by a specific title such as 'Sinan (the mother) or Syaman (the father)' and followed by their first child's name. For example, Mavivo's mother will be called Sinan Mavivo and the original name won't be used in the community anymore.

surname Cheng, which was given to her family by the colonist instead of an Indigenous name.⁷

In her second appeal, Cheng criticizes the way Indigenous status is recognized by surname. At the constitutional court, Wu (Cheng's husband) argued that in Truku culture, a child is recognized as Truku if one of their parents is a Truku. Cheng continued to question why her daughter cannot obtain her father's surname and her mother's Indigenous status simultaneously, even though the surname inheritance custom does not make sense to her Truku culture and her Truku culture embraces all children born with at least one Truku parent.

Discussion

The experiences and identities of Indigenous peoples in Taiwan are diverse and multifaceted.⁸ On the one hand, the case of Kolas shows how contemporary Taiwan can accommodate and respect Indigenous people's names. Indigenous names are a part of their distinctive cultural heritage. The case of Kolas supports the argument that Taiwan should reform to reflect Indigenous people's cultural identity. On the other hand, the case of Cheng raises a more nuanced and controversial issue of recognition. Cheng highlights that she was not given a Truku name because of discrimination against Indigenous peoples. She was given a Chinese surname, which she says is meaningless to her Truku heritage. In this

7 Huang A., 'Hàn xìng shì guómíndǎng yìng sǎi wǒmen de': Tàì lǚ gé zú māmā shēnqǐng shì xiàn, bāng xiàohái zhāo huì yuán zhùmín shēnfèn ["The Chinese surname was forced on us by the Kuomintang": Truku mother applied for constitutional interpretation to help her child regain her aboriginal identity], The News Lens 關鍵評論網, January 18, 2022, <https://www.thenewslens.com/article/161647>.

8 The multifaceted nature of Indigenous identities in Taiwan has been discussed in the field of non-status Indigenous peoples, see Jolan Hsieh, *Collective Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Identity-Based Movement of Plain Indigenous in Taiwan* (New York: Routledge, 2006). In addition, many recent publications from early career Indigenous researchers also touched upon this issue, see Nikal Kaban'an, "An Insider or Outsider? Lessons from the Recognition of Mixed-Background Indigenous and the Pingpu Peoples in Taiwan," *Taiwan Insight* (blog), December 22, 2022, <https://taiwaninsight.org/2022/12/22/an-insider-or-outsider-lessons-from-the-recognition-of-mixed-background-indigenous-and-the-pingpu-peoples-in-taiwan/>; Ta-Chung Wang, "When 'yes/no' is no longer an answer: The self-narrative of an indigenous 'descendant' searching for Pangcah identity," (Taipei, Taiwan: National Chengchi University, 2021), <https://hdl.handle.net/11296/dwe3ph>.

sense, it was discriminatory to deny her daughter Truku status because she did not have her surname. The process may seem puzzling, but it is a reflection of the essence of indigeneity in Taiwan today.

The key to understanding the puzzle is to unpack the link between the State's naming legislation and people's self-identification. In Wasiq's story, the State's legislation gave her the opportunity to reclaim her Indigenous name and familiarize the Tayal culture.⁹ In Cheng's case, she may identify with the Truku people, but she does not seem to see Truku names as an essential part of their identity. We understand Cheng's case, but we disagree with her argument. No matter what Indigenous naming custom is, names are crucial to define who we are as Pangcah, Tayal, and Pinuyumayan people. Indeed, names help us connect with our kin, families, and ancestors. Due to Taiwan's layered colonialism, it would be problematic if we disregard names in Japanese and Chinese languages simply because they are "colonialist impositions."

On the contrary, we can still retain our indigeneity even though we were forced to adopt colonial names. The Status Act for Indigenous Peoples may be flawed, but its aim is to establish a link between Indigenous identity and Indigenous names. Cheng's challenge in the constitutional case may make sense from a gender and settler colonial perspective, but her self-identification and the Status Act for Indigenous Peoples are different issues with different contexts. More Indigenous people's voices are needed to make the Status Act for Indigenous Peoples inclusive, and more consultation is needed for the truth and reconciliation process. Indigenous self-determination is broader than the state-centric definition,¹⁰ and we must be careful not to be trapped in a limited legalistic

9 Wasiq Silan, "Social Policies for Older Indigenous People in Taiwan," *Gerontologia* 35, no. 3 (2021): 310-13. <https://doi.org/10.23989/gerontologia.109370>.

10 This is a challenge faced by many Indigenous communities in Taiwan and beyond. For the cases in Taiwan, see Jolan Hsieh, *Collective Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Identity-Based Movement of Plain Indigenous in Taiwan* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Yabung Haning, "From being me to becoming us - Exploring ways of social working for Truku People" (Taipei, Taiwan: National Chengchi University, 2022), <https://hdl.handle.net/11296/xs49rg>. For cases beyond Taiwan, see Eva Garroutte, *Real Indians: Identity and the Survival of Native America* (University of California Press, 2003); Michelle Harris, Bronwyn Carlson, and Evan Poata-Smith, "Indigenous Identities and the Politics

and state-centered conception.¹¹

Cheng challenged the Status Act for Indigenous Peoples in the Constitutional Court, arguing that it should not deny her daughter Indigenous status just because her daughter did not have her surname. We are concerned that the Indigenous concept of self-determination may be lost in the legalistic and bureaucratic process. The fact that Taiwan's constitutional court invalidated our definition of indigeneity raises substantial concerns, especially given the extensive discussions surrounding Indigenous peoples' autonomy and self-determination. It seems counterintuitive that the state, rather than Indigenous peoples themselves, ultimately determines the legal interpretation and significance of indigenous autonomy and self-determination.

This inquiry exposes the prevailing power imbalance between Indigenous peoples and the State. The Indigenous Peoples' Basic Law, although passed in 2005, was void and never genuinely implemented. Despite President Tsai Ing-wen's official apology in 2016 and the establishment of the historical justice and transitional justice committee, there is still much to be done to truly accommodate and recognize Indigenous peoples as distinctive peoples.

Conclusion

This essay has examined the complexity of Indigenous identities through their names. Our discussion allows for a more subtle and nuanced understanding of indigeneity in Taiwan, which is embedded in a fluid consultation process between political recognition and cultural identification. The cases of Kolas, Wasiq, and Cheng illustrate the varied decolonial approaches under the current Indigenous policy that set the terms of ongoing colonialism.

of Authenticity," *Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers (Archive)*, January 2013, 1-9.

11 The dilemma between state-centric definitions as forms of coloniality and sites of resistance is an integral part of Indigenous peoples' struggle today. See Audra Simpson, "The Ruse of Consent and the Anatomy of 'Refusal': Cases from Indigenous North America and Australia," *Postcolonial Studies* 20, no. 1 (2017): 18-33, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2017.1334283>.

Kolas firmly holds on to the Roman letter spelling of her name to disrupt the monolingual Mandarin Chinese norms, amplifying the cultural significance of the unique Indigenous naming practice. Wasiq, coming from a mixed-race family, resolves the tension and embarks on the transition of reclaiming her indigeneity through her research.¹² Cheng, affected by harsh discrimination, refrains from reclaiming her name in the Truku language; however, she goes to the Constitutional court to ensure that her daughter, while having her paternal surname, should have the right to register as a Truku.

To conclude, our paper points to the need for future research on how Indigenous peoples reclaim their identities while navigating the recognition systems that set the terms for transitional justice and reconciliation. Future research that examines Indigenous identities and the politics of names should include to what extent the concept of a surname exists in Indigenous cultures and the implications of demolishing the link between the surname and Indigenous culture. Moreover, more Indigenous peoples, including Indigenous women, young people, and elders, should have the right to participate in reconfiguring what indigeneity means to them.¹³

Indigenous identities are tied to our histories, cultures, knowledge systems, and healing from colonial oppression. We, the Indigenous peoples, should be the ones to define what it means to be Indigenous in our terms. Indigeneity is integral to the dynamic consultation process embedded in the state. Only by playing an active part in it can we forge a new future where Indigenous and non-Indigenous people can both thrive.

12 Wasiq Silan, and Mai Camilla Munkejord, "Pinhkngyan: Paths Taken to Recognizing, Doing and Developing Indigenous Methodologies," *AlterNative: An International Journal of Indigenous Peoples*, April 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1177/11771801231167727>.

13 For exploring Tayal Elders' identities, see Wasiq Silan, and Mai Camilla Munkejord, "Hmali', Rgrgyax and Gaga: A Study of Tayal Elders Reclaiming Their Indigenous Identities in Taiwan," *AlterNative: An International Journal of Indigenous Peoples* 18 no. 3 (2022): 354-74, <https://doi.org/10.1177/11771801221119214>.

4. A Formation of Firm and Stable Taiwanese National Identity after the Russian-Ukrainian War

Tsung-Han Wu

Nation, as an “imaged community,”¹ has been a critical and sensitive issue in Taiwan’s politics. Given the island’s geopolitical location, the question of “who we are” for the “Taiwanese people” is not only an academic puzzle,² but also a question that carries strategic and practical implications in the Post-Cold War era.³

Over the past three decades, Taiwanese national identity has consistently increased, while Chinese identity has sharply declined. This shift can be attributed, in part, to the process of political democratization and a significant change in the balance of power in the cross-strait region. In addition, the military aggression posed by China under Xi Jinping’s leadership has reinforced a sense of “otherness” in the minds of many Taiwanese people.

The outbreak of the Russian-Ukraine War on February 24, 2022, has had an additional complex impact on Taiwan. Since then, numerous polls and investigations have revealed that Taiwanese national identity, attitudes towards pro-independence, and willingness to defend themselves have all increased. On the other hand, Chinese identity and attitudes towards

1 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2016).

2 Yitan Li and Enyu Zhang, “Changing Taiwanese identity and cross-strait relations: A post 2016 Taiwan presidential election analysis,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 22 (2017): 17-35; Timothy Ka-ying Wong, “From ethnic to civic nationalism: the formation and changing nature of Taiwanese identity,” *Asian Perspective* (2001): 175-206; Yun-han Chu, “Taiwan’s national identity politics and the prospect of cross-strait relations,” *Asian Survey* 44, no. 4 (2004): 484-512.

3 Mercy A. Kuo, “Cross-strait Crisis and Taiwan’s National Identity,” *The Diplomat*, September 12, 2022, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/cross-strait-crisis-and-taiwans-national-identity/>.

unification with China have declined. Examining this development, the possibility of war has given new impetus to the ongoing debate over these issues, bringing them to the forefront of public consciousness.

This essay is mainly divided into four parts. First, it discusses the three origins of Taiwanese national identity from the perspective of history, democratization, and the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) offensive activities. Second, it examines the evolution of Taiwanese identities mainly based on reports from the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University (NCCU) in Taiwan. Third, it analyzes the current state of Taiwanese national identity in the aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian War. Finally, the essay concludes with a summary of its main findings.

Three origins of national identity in Taiwan

Historical Aspect

To explore the question of why Taiwanese national identity has been dynamic and constantly evolving, two key aspects of historical backgrounds are considered. The first one pertains to Taiwan's colonial history. In 1895, following the Qing Dynasty's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan was ceded to Japan. Local Taiwanese people vehemently opposed this agreement and called for independence, although their resistance was ultimately unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the event marked a milestone in Taiwan's history, as it brought about the recognition of the entire population as a distinct political community.

During the Japanese rule, which lasted from the late 19th century until 1945, Japan's discriminatory policies towards Taiwanese people fueled a new wave of anti-colonial sentiment and Taiwanese nationalism in the 1920s. Moreover, national identity education through history and geography lessons taught in schools was framed within the context of the Japanese Empire, which included Taiwan as a local unit. Meanwhile, early modernization and educational efforts also contributed to the formation of an identity with Taiwan as its boundary. Despite colonial rule ending in 1945, the legacy remains and has contributed to the basis of Taiwanese

identity.⁴

The second historical background is related to the modern history and politics of the Republic of China (ROC). In 1949, during the Cold War and the midst of a civil war in China, the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) regime was defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Subsequently, the central government of the ROC was transferred to Taipei. The Chinese state became divided into two regions administered under different political systems and bearing different names, namely the ROC and the PRC. At the constitutional level, however, both sides still claim sovereignty over each other, without any essential amendment or adaptation thus far. Consequently, the issue of sovereignty has remained a sensitive dispute.

Under this framework, identity education in Taiwan has long been centered around a narrative of Greater China and the concept of the Chinese Nation (*Zhonghua minzu*, 中華民族),⁵ along with an anti-Communist ideology. In relation to this, the content concerning cross-Strait relations written in the textbooks was primarily grounded in three ideas. First, China comprises both the mainland and Taiwan. Second, both sides belong to the same state. Third, unification is the ultimate goal for the future of cross-Strait relations. Although these ideas have been modified in the education system following the democratization process, they still form the basis of Chinese identity in Taiwan to some extent.

Together, the colonial experience and the China-centric curriculum imposed by the KMT were two distinct sources that contributed to the initial formation of Taiwanese and Chinese identities. However, these identities were also influenced by various domestic and international events and factors, resulting in the development of modern Taiwanese identities.

4 Hua-Yuan Hsueh, taiwan ren tong di li shi fa zhan yu wen ti: cong taiwan shen fen ren tong dao zheng chang hua guo jia ren tong [台灣認同的歷史發展與問題：從台灣身分認同到正常化國家認同], *xin shi ji zhi ku lun tan*, Vol. 74 (June 2016): 62-66; Wan-Yao Chou, cong taiwan li shi kan taiwan ren zi wo ren tong de xing cheng、cuo bai, ji qi dang qian kun jing [從台灣歷史看台灣人自我認同的形成、挫敗，及其當前困境], *xin shi ji zhi ku lun tan*, Vol. 99-100 (October 2022): 106-109.

5 Malcolm Cook, "Taiwan's Identity Challenge," *The SAIS Review of International Affairs* 25, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2005): 83-92.

Political Aspect

Political democratization has been regarded as another key factor influencing the shift in national identity in Taiwan. The literature on identity studies has found that the relationship between identity changes and elections is intertwined and can mutually reinforce each other.

First, before and during the early stages of the lifting of martial law in 1987, many individuals who identified themselves as Taiwanese and supported Taiwan independence actively participated in the democratization movement. This group of campaigners formed the backbone of the so-called *Tangwai* (outside the party, 黨外) movement, and some of them established the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. After years of development, the DPP won the presidential election for the first time in 2000 and again in 2016, becoming one of the two major parties in Taiwan.

Second, the implementation of democratic practices has also played a significant role in shaping and strengthening Taiwanese identity. While it is true that some election studies have noted that the mobilization of ethnic groups can lead to political polarization and, in certain cases, compromises the quality of politics in Taiwan,⁶ a number of studies have demonstrated that the democratization process over the past decades has fostered a newfound sense of shared identity among Taiwanese citizens, promoting inclusivity and a sense of unity.⁷

Over generations, civic practices and democratic values have shaped Taiwanese identity, leading to its consolidation. The successful implementation of democracy also nurtures a profound sense of pride among the people of Taiwan and has also garnered increased support from like-minded partners, such as the United States and Japan. This entire process can be analogized to a cycle or an ecosystem, where each aspect reinforces the other.

6 Alex C. H. Chang and Chi Huang, "Party Competition and the Connection between the Taiwanese Ethnic Identity and National Identity [政黨競爭與台灣族群認同與 國家認同間的聯結]," *The Taiwanese Political Science Review* 15, no. 1 (June 2006): 3-71.

7 Ming-Sho Ho, "Desinicizing Taiwan: The Making of a Democratic National Identity," *Current History* (September 2022): 211-217.

International Aspect

External pressure from the PRC over Taiwan, aimed at preventing the state from expanding its international space, is the third factor that influences changes in national identity. During the Cold War, both the PRC and the ROC insisted on the One-China principle (*yi zhong yuan ze*, 一中原則) and claimed to be the only legitimate government of China. Consequently, each side made persistent efforts to exclude their adversary from entering international organizations, with the most intense battleground being within the membership-based units of the United Nations. This ongoing struggle for international recognition and legitimacy was a defining characteristic of Cold War-era politics in the region.

As the international environment changed, Beijing's power increased. It replaced Taipei by occupying the seat on the United Nations Security Council in 1971. Since then, Taiwan has rapidly lost not only its membership in most international organizations but also its diplomatic relations with other countries. As of August 2023, the ROC maintains formal relations with only 13 states.

Moreover, the PRC still insists on being recognized as the only legitimate representative of China on the international stage. It overtly denies Taiwan's sovereign status and vows to unify the island, even stating that force would be employed if necessary. China also exerts considerable effort to prohibit the appearance of symbols that may imply Taiwan's statehood in any international occasions. As China continues to grow its global influence and capabilities, it has increasingly utilized its power to coerce foreign countries from strengthening their ties with Taiwan. In response, many governments have adopted a more conservative or constrained approach towards Taipei due to concerns about the potential negative impact on their relations with Beijing. The ongoing zero-sum dynamic between China and Taiwan in the international arena has made it difficult for Taiwan to expand its international presence or build meaningful relationships with other countries. As a result, despite its economic and technological prominence on the world stage, Taiwan's level of engagement and its opportunities to interact with the global community have been significantly constrained.

To overcome the obstacles, the Taiwanese government has assessed the circumstances and made necessary adjustments. Recently, Taiwan's foreign minister Joseph Wu has proposed the possibility of potentially accepting dual recognition, which would allow Taiwan to establish formal diplomatic relations with countries that also have formal diplomatic relations with China.⁸ Moreover, in the face of repeated threats and coercion, many Taiwanese have not only rejected a Chinese identity but also deepened their sense of Taiwanese national identity, perceiving themselves as part of a political community aligned with the territorial boundaries of the state. Perhaps paradoxically, rather than stifling Taiwanese identity, the PRC's coercion has played a role in helping to shape the emergence of Taiwanese identity.

The evolution of Taiwanese national identity

Since 1992, the Election Study Center at NCCU has been publishing an annual report that examines the spectrum of identities among the Taiwanese people.⁹ These surveys not only document how the interviewees identify themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both, but also provide valuable records of the upward trend in Taiwanese identity over the past three decades.

To be more precise, Figure 4.1 demonstrates that exclusive Taiwanese national identity experienced a significant growth from a comparatively small number in 1992, with only 17.6 percent of the population identifying as only Taiwanese. Three years later, exclusive Taiwanese identity surpassed exclusive Chinese identity for the first time in 1995. Exclusive Taiwanese identity exceeded the combined Taiwanese and Chinese identity in 2005 and has consistently maintained its lead ever since. In general, Taiwanese identity has exhibited a steady growth, reaching a ratio of approximately 60.8 percent in 2022. This trend suggests that Taiwanese identity is expected to continue rising in the future.


8 Lu Yi-hsuan, "Taiwan could recognize dual relations with China," *Taipei Times*, March 28, 2023, <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/03/28/2003796857>.

9 Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, <https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageFront>.

By adopting an inclusive definition of Taiwanese identity, it can be observed that more than 90 percent of respondents have identified themselves as Taiwanese since 2008. In a recent survey conducted after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian War, this ratio climbed to 93.7 percent in 2022.

On the other hand, the proportion of individuals identifying themselves exclusively as Chinese has steadily fallen since 1994, and only about 3.6 percent of respondents still identify solely as Chinese. Given this shift in development, it indicates a significant transformation in Taiwanese national identity, with an ever-growing number of individuals recognizing Taiwan as a separate entity from China.

Figure 4.1: Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity (1992-2022)



Source: Election Study Centre, NCCU, Taiwan

To address the question of why Taiwanese identity became notable since 2008, a news report suggested two possible reasons.¹⁰ First, when

10 Zhong guo ren hu o taiwan ren? ni wo du zeng yu dao de shen fen ren tong wen ti [中國人或台灣人？你我

Ma Ying-jeou took office, cross-Strait interactions experienced a significant increase. This resulted in a substantial influx of tourists, students, and businesspeople visiting Taiwan for the first time, many of whom were taken aback by the noticeable differences between China and Taiwan. In fact, many Taiwanese shared a similar sentiment. Consequently, while interpersonal interactions increased, these communications did not lead to integration, but instead fostered a growing sense of alienation. Second, the rise of China is considered another significant factor. As the PRC's global influence expanded, it emerged as the dominant representative of China. Taiwanese people know that they do not belong to the PRC. This has prompted many Taiwanese embrace their Taiwanese heritage and re-examine their Taiwanese identity.

Meanwhile, it is important to note that Taiwanese attitudes towards the future relationship with China, specifically regarding the choice between independence and unification, are a significant factor where national identity plays a crucial role. Figure 2 shows that most Taiwanese people prefer the status quo, and the number supporting independence has been growing in recent years. Scholars have argued that economic interests and Beijing's Taiwan policy are factors that influence this choice, and this helps to explain why there is a gap between Taiwanese national identity and attitudes towards future relations with China.¹¹ In other words, Taiwanese identity is one factor, while concerns about the Chinese market and avoiding antagonizing the Communist leadership are another. While there is no consensus on the future relationship between Taiwan and China, a clear decreasing trend in support for unification can be observed.


Since 2016, under the leadership of Xi, China has tightened its stance on Taiwan, particularly after the DPP won the presidential election in the same year and was re-elected in 2020. China's aggressive military activities surrounding the island and threatening rhetoric, have escalated regional tensions and deepened the sense of alienation among the Taiwanese to

都曾遇到的身分認同難題], *The Reporter*, January 29, 2016, <https://www.twreporter.org/a/identity-twstory>.

11 Taiwan min zhong tong du li chang de chi xu yu bian qian [台灣民眾統獨立場的持續與變遷], *chong xin jian shi zheng bian zhong de liang an guan xi li lun* (Taipei: Wunan, 2009), 163-194.

China. The occurrence of the 2022 war in Ukraine, in which China is believed to have a role and may consider it as a potential model, has further captured the attention of the Taiwanese. This following section will analyze the influence of the war in Ukraine.

Figure 4.2: Changes in the Unification and Independence of the Taiwanese (1994-2022)



Source: Election Study Centre, NCCU, Taiwan

Russian-Ukrainian War of 2022 and Taiwanese identity

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military invasion of Ukraine, which he termed a “special military operation,” was launched on February 24, 2022. The war has not only reshaped the global order, but it has also altered the strategic landscape in Taiwan. Geopolitically speaking, the war has intensified a semi-Cold War confrontation between authoritarian regimes and democratic countries. In the process, it has brought Russia and China closer, forging a stronger partnership or even a potential military alliance. Three weeks prior to the war, Putin visited Xi in Beijing, where the two leaders openly supported each other’s demands, opposing the expansion

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and any form of Taiwan independence. Their joint statement declared that the friendship between the two states has no limits and that there are no “forbidden” areas of cooperation.¹²

While Beijing subsequently claimed to maintain a neutral stance regarding Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and called for a peaceful resolution to the dispute, the international community never underestimated the role of China. Observers noted that both regimes significantly increased their collaboration in economic domains, as well as in the areas of war narratives and propaganda.¹³ In addition, there are a number of cases that demonstrate that Beijing seized the opportunity to wage cognitive warfare against Taiwan. The widespread dissemination of the slogan “Today Ukraine, Tomorrow Taiwan” in Taiwanese social media before and after the war broke is a clear case of manipulation by Beijing.¹⁴

Meanwhile, many Taiwanese have expressed their sympathy for the tragedy unfolding in Europe and are concerned about the possibility that Xi would follow Putin’s example and invade Taiwan to assert China’s sovereign claim over the island. In this context, Taiwan has drawn the attention of the international community. Given its strategic significance in geopolitics, its democratic values, and its role in the global supply chain, it is clear that if China were to attack Taiwan, the damage to the world would be immense. Furthermore, the people of Taiwan deeply empathize with the pain of war and the sense of uncertainty that Ukrainians are experiencing. As relatively small democracies facing threats from authoritarian giants, they share a common bond that has fostered a sense of solidarity between the people of Taiwan and Ukraine. Since the outbreak of the war, the Taiwanese government and many civilians have provided

12 Tony Munroe, Andrew Osborn, and Humeyra Pamuk, “China, Russia partner up against West at Olympics summit,” *Reuters*, February 5, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-china-tell-nato-stop-expansion-moscow-backs-beijing-taiwan-2022-02-04/>.

13 Paul Mozur, Steven Lee Myers and John Liu, “China’s Echoes of Russia’s Alternate Reality Intensify Around the World,” *The New York Times*, April 12, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/11/technology/china-russia-propaganda.html>

14 Tsung-han Wu, “China’s Role in the Russia-Ukraine War and Its Cognitive Warfare Operations,” *Prospects & Perspectives*, April 11, 2022, <https://www.pf.org.tw/en/pfen/33-8257.html>.

assistance to Ukraine, including financial aid and volunteers who have joined the International Legion of Territorial Defence of Ukraine.

In fact, this empathy has further heightened the sense of self-defense in Taiwan. Witnessing the strong will and resistance of the Ukrainian people against the invaders, many Taiwanese have learned valuable lessons and been motivated to participate in military training programs. Taiwanese national identity has also been on the rise, possibly due to an increasing sense of insecurity. The results of several polls conducted after the Ukraine War show that these sentiments are reflected in the Taiwanese people. Presented below is a selection of investigations conducted by Taiwanese academic and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation


After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF), an active NGO that conducts public opinion polls, conducted a survey on Taiwanese attitudes towards independence versus unification with mainland China following the Ukrainian war. In summary, the poll shows that support for the pro-independence camp has increased, while support for the pro-unification camp has declined. These results suggest that the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has influenced the political identity of Taiwanese people, potentially leading to a stronger emphasis on their Taiwanese identity.¹⁵

Previously, the TPOF conducted a poll in December 2021, which found that 19.3 percent of respondents insisted on Taiwan independence, 33.4 percent supported Taiwan independence but did not insist on it, 16.9 percent expressed a desire to maintain the status quo, 13.5 percent supported cross-Strait unification but did not insist on it, and 2.5 percent insisted on unification. However, another poll in April 2022 revealed some compelling shifts: 26.8 percent of respondents insisted on Taiwan independence, 26 percent supported Taiwan independence but did not insist on it, 22.4 percent expressed a desire to maintain the status quo, 9

15 Taiwan ren de tong du qing xiang [台灣人的統獨傾向], *Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation*, April 26, 2022, <https://shorturl.at/aHQW7>.

percent supported cross-Strait unification but did not insist on it, and 2 percent insisted on unification. (See Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: Taiwanese Attitude Towards Independence and Unification (2021/12 vs. 2022/4)



Source: TPOF

Two key points stand out in comparison. First, while the total number of supporters for Taiwan independence remained relatively consistent between 2021 and 2022, with a small increase of 0.1 percent (from 52.7 percent to 52.8 percent), the status quo camp expanded by 5.5 percent (from 16.9 percent to 22.4 percent) and the pro-unification camp decreased by 5 percent (from 16 percent to 11 percent), accounting for one-third of its base. Second, the transition highlighted a “pro-independence-leaning” trend, wherein the firmly pro-Taiwan independence camp gained about 7 percent support, while the moderately pro-Taiwan independence camp decreased by 7.4 percent. The status quo camp gained more than 5 percent followers, while the pro-unification camp collectively lost the same number. Arguably, one camp’s gain came at the expense of another. Analyzing the changes from a political spectrum perspective, it is highly likely that people became more steadfast in their positions separating Taiwan from China during those months. These changes in timeline could

be attributed to the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.¹⁶

A similar shift in tendency can also be seen in an investigation on Taiwanese political identity, which was also released in April 2022. According to the report, in February 2022, 78 percent of the respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese, and this percentage increased to 80.1 percent in April. Additionally, the investigation showed that the proportion of people claiming a dual identity as both Chinese and Taiwanese decreased, as did the proportion of those identifying solely as Chinese, following the war.¹⁷

Undoubtedly, the ongoing war in Europe has cast a shadow over Taiwanese society, leading to a noticeable increase in the sense of threat. Consequently, people are contemplating countermeasures. Prior to the war, more than 62.7 percent of Taiwanese believed that China would not launch a military attack on Taiwan. However, given the escalation of tension, this belief decreased by 10 percent two months later, and the percentage of respondents who considered a military attack possible increased by approximately 11.5 percent (from 19.5 percent to 31 percent).¹⁸ In July 2022, when asked about their perception of the Chinese threat following the Ukrainian war, 61.8 percent of Taiwanese respondents expressed that they felt a heightened military threat from China. This investigation establishes a connection between cross-Strait relations and the Ukrainian war. One year later, a poll revealed that over half of Taiwanese feared becoming another Ukraine.¹⁹

Compared to the previous investigation, there appears to be a 10 percent decrease in concerns about a potential invasion by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). However, this gap could be credited to the

16 Ibid.

17 Taiwan ren de min zu ren tong [台灣人的民族認同], *Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation*, April 26, 2022, <https://shorturl.at/CDRV5>.

18 E wu yi dan kai zhan zhong gong shi fou hui chen ji wu li fan tai [俄烏一但開戰，中共是否會趁機武力犯台?], *Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation*, April 26, 2022, <https://shorturl.at/bjIW3>.

19 E wu zhan zheng hou guo ren dui liang an jun shi wei ji de ren zhi [俄烏戰爭後，國人對兩岸軍事危機的認知], *Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation*, July 19, 2022, <https://shorturl.at/htBS1>; Taiwan ren shi fou dan xin cheng wei wu ke lan di er [台灣人是否擔心成為烏克蘭第二?], *Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation*, February 21, 2023, <https://shorturl.at/jkzWY>.

Ukrainian experience, where they successfully resisted a comprehensive invasion by Russia and received ongoing assistance from the international community. In other words, having witnessed a possible precedent, many Taiwanese, although still concerned, are now less panicked.

Based on these polls, it is evident that the Taiwanese people have developed or strengthened their determination to pursue Taiwan's independence or maintain a separate political entity from China. Moreover, the polls may also reflect their willingness to defend themselves in the event of a war in the Taiwan Strait, influenced by the Ukrainian conflict. This paper will delve deeper into this latter point when analyzing other investigations regarding Taiwanese defense preparations.

Institute of National Defense and Security Research

Institute of National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), a think tank funded by Taiwan's Ministry of Defense, has conducted research and analysis on various issues related to national defense. One of its primary focuses is understanding public opinion regarding military defense, which they have investigated through a series of surveys conducted between 2021 and 2023.²⁰ While its surveys are often cited as supporting the Tsai Ing-wen administration's military reforms, including the extension of conscription from four months to one year, this article argues that, by examining the surveys on attitudes and determination of the people towards self-defense, we can gain a deeper insight into Taiwanese identity. It aims to explore how the Taiwanese people perceive themselves and their future within the national security landscape.

In research published in April, the willingness of Taiwanese individuals to engage in self-defense was examined over the period between September 2021 and March 2022. The research took into account variables such as the perceived commitment of the United States to defend Taiwan and the Taiwanese population's perception of their national army.²¹

20 Guo fang an quan min yi diao cha [國防安全民意調查], Institute for National Defense and Security Research, <https://indsr.org.tw/safetyInvestigation?uid=45>.

21 Kuan-chen Lee, E wu zhan zheng xia taiwan min zhong "zi wo fang wei" yi shi de chi xu yu bian qian [俄烏戰爭下台灣民眾「自我防衛」意識的持續與變遷], Guo fang an quan shuang zhou bao,

It revealed a consistent trend of active self-defense among Taiwanese individuals, even after the Ukrainian War. In both 2021 and 2022, over 70 percent of respondents expressed their willingness to fight. Moreover, when considering scenarios where the United States would defend Taiwan and respondents had confidence in the capabilities of the national armed forces, a surge in the number of individuals who expressed a positive attitude towards engaging in battle was observed, with the percentage rising from 92.2 percent to 95.6 percent. Under the conditions where the United States would not defend Taiwan, but respondents had confidence in the national armed forces, 85.8 percent of respondents in 2021 and 89.8 percent in 2022 indicated their willingness to choose the same option.²²

Furthermore, the surveys underlined a transition in which the factor of Taiwanese confidence in their national army became more influential than the United States factor. Specifically, in the 2022 survey, it was found that when individuals held a more positive perception of the national armed forces, they displayed greater willingness to actively combat the enemy. Previously, the United States factor played a more significant role in shaping the Taiwanese population's determination to defend.²³

Analyzing this phenomenon, INDSR argues that the Ukrainian War played a significant role in prompting Taiwanese individuals to consider the situation in Taiwan given a potential invasion by Beijing. In light of this, the issue of whether the United States would provide military assistance to Taiwan becomes crucial, but the Taiwanese people must take on a more significant role in the defense of their own country.²⁴ During a session of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, Taiwan's defense minister Chiu Kuo-cheng expressed a similar standpoint, emphasizing the need to "save our country by ourselves."²⁵

Vol. 52 (April 22, 2022): 9-16.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Qiu bu zhang: guo jun lu li zhan xun zi ji guo jia zi ji jiu [邱部長：國軍戮力戰訓 自己國家自己救], *Youth Daily News*, September 24, 2022, <https://www.ydn.com.tw/news/newsInsidePage?chapterID=1534929&type=immediate>.

Undoubtedly, the war in Ukraine has served as a wake-up call to the Taiwanese people and force them to face the prospect of armed conflict. In association with this, the Taiwanese government has initiated various reforms and preparations to strengthen their defense capabilities and readiness, ranging from raising the military budget, expanding the acquisition of military equipment, and building native warplanes and warships.²⁶

In another investigation published in April 2023, focusing on the extension of mandatory military service from four months to one year, INDSR revealed that over 85 percent of respondents expressed support for this policy. This result aligns with previous investigations and carries a pivotal implication. As China persists in its aggressive activities towards the island and strengthens its presence, many Taiwanese perceive an escalating threat and prioritize the need to enhance their military capabilities as a defensive reaction.²⁷

The investigation also aimed to explore the differences in attitudes towards the policy based on age and political ideologies. It revealed that the 18-29 age group displayed a slightly higher level of reluctance towards the policy compared to other age groups, with 20 percent of interviewees expressing opposition. This tendency can be attributed to the fact that these young individuals would be the first to be affected by the policy once implemented. However, it is worth noting that approximately 80 percent of young respondents still expressed their support for the policy. Additionally, supporters of the pan-Green camp exhibited a more positive outlook compared to supporters of the pan-Blue camp, with a ratio of 90 percent versus 80 percent. This result aligns with the divergent strategies adopted by the two camps, with the majority of pan-Blue camp

26 E wu zhan zheng xia taiwan min zhong "zi wo fang wei yi shi" de chi xu [俄烏戰爭下台灣民眾「自我防衛」意識的持續], *guo fang an quan shuang zhou bao*, Vol. 52 (April 22, 2022), <https://indsr.org.tw/respublicationcon?uid=12&resid=1885&pid=1944&typeid=3>; "President touts military reforms during her term," *Taipei Times*, June 7, 2023, <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2023/06/07/2003801140>.

27 Zhe-yu Wu, *guo fang yuan zui xin min tiao 8 cheng 5 min zhong zhi chi yi wu yi qi yan chang zhi yi nian* [國防院最新民調 8成5民眾支持義務役役期延長至一年], *Liberty Times Net*, April 19, 2023, <https://def.ltn.com.tw/article/breakingnews/4274833>.

members favoring negotiation with China rather than adopting a more confrontational approach. In summary, there is a consensus among the majority in favor of extending the duration of mandatory military service.

Others

In recent two years, there has been a number of polls, workshops, seminars, reports, and academic discussions examining the impact of the Ukrainian war on cross-Strait relations.²⁸ These investigations have employed various research methods, but most of them have centered on the crucial question of how to prepare for a potential conflict in Taiwan. Indeed, different strategies and approaches have been proposed and explored, but behind these discussions, it is implied that Taiwan is recognized as a distinct entity. From this perspective, the question of Taiwan's identity may no longer be a subject of debate.

Examining the Taiwanese polls mentioned earlier, we can observe a confirmed increase in national identity and a strong inclination towards self-defense. These two elements appear to be closely intertwined. Furthermore, it is evident that the Ukrainian war has significantly amplified concerns about national security among Taiwanese citizens, thereby accentuating this trend.

28 See for example, "Wu ke lan dui taiwan an quan zhi ying xiang yu qi shi"chao ye dui hua ban li qing xing [「烏克蘭對台灣安全之影響與啟示」朝野對話辦理情形], Institute for National Policy Research, March 21, 2022, <http://inpr.org.tw/m/404-1728-22698.php?Lang=zh-tw>; taiwan wang lu jiang tang: wu e chong tu xia de quan qiu wang lu zhi li gui ze gai bian? hui hou bao dao [台灣網路講堂：烏俄衝突下的全球網路治理規則改變？會後報導], Taiwan Network Information Center, April 27, 2022, <https://blog.twinc.tw/2022/04/27/22981/>; Qi-zhen Fu, "quan guo zhan lue yan jiu she qun guo ji xue shu yan tao hui" pou xi guo ji an quan qing shi hou zhi yan jiu neng liang [【全國戰略研究社群國際學術研討會】剖析國際安全情勢 厚植研究能量], October 28, 2022, <https://www.ydn.com.tw/news/newsInsidePage?chapterID=1542273>; 2022 *Report on the Security Landscape of the Indo-Pacific Region*, Institute for National Defense and Security Research, June 7, 2022, <https://indsr.org.tw/en/respubcationmenu?uid=16&resid=1891>; "E wu zhan zheng zhou nian: liang an yu guo ji da bian ju" zuo tan hui ban li qing xing [「俄烏戰爭週年：兩岸與國際大變局」座談會辦理情形], Institute for National Policy Research, February 24, 2023, <http://inpr.org.tw/m/405-1728-27289,c107.php?Lang=zh-tw>.

Conclusion: Taiwanese national identity – suppressed by the “Old China,” triggered by the “New China”

The concept of Taiwanese national identity has undergone a transformative process, shaped by historical events and political dynamics. During the Cold War, the ROC government, referred to as “Old China” by the PRC, imposed a Chinese identity on Taiwanese society, reminiscent of the colonial Japanese government’s influence during the colonial period. However, as Taiwan transitioned towards democracy in the 1990s, there has been a growing emphasis on cultivating a distinct Taiwanese national identity that sets itself apart from China. This evolution of national identity reflects the evolving historical context and aspirations of the Taiwanese people.

While Taiwanese people previously identified themselves as Taiwanese during the martial law period, it was primarily viewed as a local identity rather than a national one. However, driven by both global and local factors, the Taiwanese national identity has flourished and become a prevailing consciousness. Concurrently, this development has been propelled by the PRC, which asserts itself as the “New China” and continues to assert its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, refusing to rule out the use of force to achieve reunification.

Between March 2022 and April 2023, the PLA conducted two large-scale military exercises near Taiwan. These exercises were perceived as warnings in response to former U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and the meeting between Tsai and U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy in the United States. Alongside these exercises, there have been ongoing instances of gray-zone harassment in Taiwan’s neighboring sea and air areas. The PLA has been increasing its presence and activities in the region, regularly breaching Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and crossing the Taiwan Strait Median Line. These actions have been referred to as the “New Normal” by the PLA, and analysts believe they are aimed at pressuring the Tsai Administration and influencing public opinion in Taiwan, demonstrating China’s military capabilities.

The persistent tensions and escalations have raised concerns about the potential for military conflict. However, Beijing’s long-term strategy

of employing verbal intimidation and saber-rattling has shown limited effectiveness in swaying public opinion and has even backfired in previous elections. Relying on this “New Normal” approach is likely to be counterproductive and only exacerbate tensions further. Beijing’s coercive tactics are more likely to breed resentment and push Taiwan further away.

To summarize, while there are differences in Taiwanese identity among various political affiliations, the majority of Taiwanese people identify themselves as a distinct political entity separate from China. This sense of identity has grown stronger in recent years, especially in light of the Russian-Ukrainian War. Ukraine has provided Taiwan with a crucial lesson in the significance of willpower to withstand invaders and the necessity for robust defense capabilities. Based on these findings, we can confidently state that a lasting Taiwanese national identity has firmly taken root, and the political discourse surrounding Taiwanese identity is unlikely to fade away.

