

Political Role of Religious Communities in Pakistan

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Editors

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Islamabad, October 29-30, 2007

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The editors express their gratitude to the honourable scholars who accepted the invitation to participate in the seminar. Almost all of them have been closely associated, in one capacity or the other with the issues related to the dynamics of political role of religious communities in Pakistan. Our thanks are also due to members of the audience for their positive contributions and evincing interest and actively participating in the question and answer sessions.

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Finally, our thanks are due to all those whom it would not be possible to thank individually for making important contribution to ensure the success of the seminar. The failings however, needless to say, are our own.

INTRODUCTION

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Brig (retd) Muneer Mahmud

Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) and Institute of Security and Development Policy (ISDP), Stockholm, Sweden jointly organized a two-day National Seminar on *The Political Roles of Religious Communities in Pakistan* in IPRI conference room on 29-30 October 2007. The seminar was a part of an overall project on religion and security politics in South Asia. The purpose of the project was to explore the role of religious communities and their relation to state apparatus, status in law, and how the local, national and regional levels are interrelated. This volume contains the papers presented in the seminar comprising of five sessions during which ten presentations were made by different scholars.

Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, President IPRI, welcomed the distinguished participants and guests and opened the floor for deliberations. Ambassador (retd) Ingolf Kiesow, heading the ISDP delegation, in his opening remarks, gave a brief introduction and programmes being pursued, especially on security issues by the ISDP. He opined that the topic of the seminar is getting new salience in world politics and the outside world, is unfortunately, not as well informed about developments and thinking in Asia. He further said that political acts in the name of religion have an impact on the entire Eurasian continent. He added that the ISDP is financing similar seminars in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and India.

Prof. Ishtiaq Ahmed, University of Stockholm, presented a paper on "A European View on the Historical Perspective". He provided an analysis of the role of religion in Europe. He expressed disappointment about Pakistan's less tolerant image in the world but appreciated that, while the majority of people are moderate and tolerant, the problem lies in a small minority that does not represent the interests of the country. He highlighted the fact that pre-modern Islam worked in a better way than the West. He said that the laws promulgated during General Zia's regime militated against the charter of the UN. He termed South Asia as a fascinating region in the world due to emergence of Islam. An IPRI scholar during the discussion argued that the blasphemy laws of Zia regime do not violate the UN Charter: the question whether the blasphemy laws are good or bad is a different proposition altogether, he stated.

Dr. Noor ul Haq, Research Fellow IPRI, presented his paper on "Configuration of Religious Communities in Pakistan – A Historical Perspective." He shed light on the composition and role of religious

communities in Pakistan. He said that the *Madaris* have increased supporting orthodoxy and religious sectarianism in the country. Since Pakistan was conceived as an Islamic democratic state and not as a theocracy, the clergy soon felt isolated after independence of the country. They attempted to establish their leadership by championing the cause of religion and instigated sectarianism, extremism and violence. Contrary to the founding father, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah's vision of pluralism and enlightenment, the religious orthodox got stronger and stronger with the passage of time. The constitution of Pakistan fully safeguards the religious and political right of minorities. During the late General Zia's era, sectarianism and fanaticism gained momentum. In addition under Zia, there were separate electorates for the Muslims and non-Muslims, thus restricting political integration. Z. A. Bhutto, though secular, also had to concede to the demands of religious ulemas in face of political expediences. However since 1999, the policy of the government under General Pervez Musharraf tried some what in bringing minorities back into national mainstream and they started gaining some confidence as equal citizens of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Nevertheless, the government's control over private/religious institutions remained weak.

Prof. Mujeeb Ahmad, International Islamic University Islamabad, presented his paper on "Political Role of Sunnis and their Factions in Pakistan." He focused mainly on the composition and religious philosophy of Barelvis in Pakistan. Barelvis consist of those Ulemas who are deeply rooted in medieval traditionalism. In Pakistan, their influence is mostly confined to rural areas where they have considerable strength and play the role of custodian of public opinion. Since 1988, the Barelvis have been facing a serious leadership crisis. Their main political party, Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) has been divided into four rival groups and their performance in the elections of 1988, 1990 and 2003 was dismal. In an observation, Mujeeb said that Islam is intrinsically a tolerant religion and does not advocate terrorism of any kind.

Syed Hussain Arif Naqvi presented his paper on "Political Significance of Shiites." He said that the Shiite political point of view is very simple. He added that the movement for establishing Pakistan as a democratic Muslim country come about out of division of India which at that time gained massive support from Shiite Muslims. The Shias lived peacefully in Pakistan and the only occasion when they intervened was to stop the declaration of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a Sunni State by General Zia ul Haq. The Shias continued to face creeping moves towards discrimination against them, and, currently the most active regions of Shia-Sunni conflict are in the NWFP and Tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. He deplored the fact hat not even one percent of lecturers and professors in educational institutions are Shias, especially in Islamic and Arabic studies departments. And, there is no Shia officer in Islamic Ideology Council, except an odd clerk or peon. Even in the religious books, Shias are declared as *Kafirs*. i.e (non-believers). In Pakistan,

thousands of Shias have been killed, particularly during Ayub, Zia and Musharraf regimes. So, practically it means that Shias are non-Muslims. In reply to a question asked by Dr. P. I. Cheema that which books were declaring Shias as *Kafirs*, Mr. Naqvi replied that it was in some general and some textbooks. Almost all participants negated the views expressed by Mr. Naqvi about the highly marginalized status accorded to the Shias in Pakistan.

Prof. Abdul Samad Pirzada, Postgraduate College Rawalpindi, presented his paper on “MMA World View: 2002 – 2007”. He shed light on how *Mutabida Majlis-I-Amal* (MMA) views the world. He said that during the election campaign the MMA made a strong plea against interference of the US in Pakistan, given its global vested interests. The MMA took its victory as a proof of people’s rejection for the US and Pakistan’s anti-US policies. The MMA and the US were not on a common ground on the so-called War on Terror (WoT). The MMA Chief, Maulana Noorani, condemned inhuman massacre of Iraqi Muslims by America. And due to the pressure from MMA, Pakistan did not send its army in Iraq. The MMA termed the Wana operation in South Waziristan as a Zionist Conspiracy against Islam. The MMA views the world through a prism where the West, especially the USA, is targeting only the Muslims. Pirzada said that no solution, except a political one, might work for the Wana crisis. Further, he observed that America cannot occupy Afghanistan for long due to independent nature of Afghans and the hostile terrain of the country. America has attacked Afghanistan to encircle China but the situation has gone otherwise, as China’s economy is improving while that of America is declining. Inequality at the global level is a major hurdle in the way of inter-faith harmony, according to him.

Colonel (retd) S.K Tressler SI (M) presented his paper on “Roles and Significance of other Religious Minorities”. His focus was mainly on the Christian community in Pakistan. He remarked that the vision of Quaid-e-Azam clearly showed that he never wanted Pakistan to be divided on religion, caste, class or creed. No Christian has ever been disloyal to the country; rather they have served the nation in all walks of life. Z.A. Bhutto’s policies dealt a blow to the services of minorities, especially Christians when he nationalized all Christian educational institutions in 1973. The Blasphemy Law enacted by General Zia has done more harm than good and no government can dare to do away with it due to the present wave of religious fanaticism in Pakistan. The biggest damage to interfaith harmony has been done by the teachings of lower class textbooks, where it is written that Pakistan is created for the Muslims. Despite provisions in the Constitution of Pakistan, there are sporadic incidents of protests against construction of churches. He also opined that the majority of Pakistanis are moderate and tolerant by nature and tradition. In reply to a question by Mr. Mujeeb that some Christians were trying to have an independent state within Pakistan, *Maryamabad* and *Maseebistan* under the flag of Christian Liberation Front (CLF), Mr. Tressler

responded that he was personally against the idea of a separate state and CLF is meant only for protection of the Christian rights. Corroborating this, Prof. Ishtiaq Ahmad stated that the idea of a Christian independent state is just a non-serious talk.

Mr. Ahmed Bilal Soofi talked about “Pakistan Religious Communities – Status in Law.” He observed that the issue of religious communities is well recognized as there are provisions in the Constitution where emphasis has been laid on protection of minorities. E.g., there are more than 7,000 laws in Pakistan and the laws made by the state that are not in contradiction with the laws of God. There is a vacuum in understanding and, so the religious communities need to understand the law of the land. To a question posed by Mr. Mujeeb that why under the law of the land no one can become a President or Prime Minister from the minorities he replied that flaws in the laws can only be removed by political parties who come into power and then attain a political consensus. (*Paper not submitted*).

Haji Hanif Tayyab talked about “Governance Issues and Religious Affinities – Problems of Practical Politics”. He opined that the role of religion has remained fundamental in the political history of Pakistan. Starting from the ideology of Pakistan to the Objectives Resolution and from constitutional developments to practical politics, religion has remained the prime guiding force for governance. Religious affinities could have a very positive impact on governance and Islam could serve as a uniting force. Unfortunately, leaders in the garb of religion preached sectarianism and were responsible for division of the society into various groups. All religious militant organizations were either given: approval or connived at by the previous governments. The question arises are we capable to take these religious leaders into and discuss with them the solution of problems faced in matter of governance. But the fact is that we have never been serious in getting advice from them and neither the government has ever given them due respect. More than 90 percent recommendations of the Islamic Ideology Council are lying dormant and hate material spewed by some religious parties despite being forwarded to the government no official action has been taken. So, under this situation, how could one expect good governance in the country.

Dr. Riaz Ahmad talked about “Political Role of Religious Parties in Pakistan – Review and Reflections”. He criticized the role of extremist parties and urged the moderate and educated religious scholars to come forward to enter into a dialogue with religious extremist groups.

Mr. Vakil Ahmad Khan, Secretary Ministry of Religious Affairs could not attend the seminar; however, his paper was read by Brigadier (retd) Muneer Mahmud on “Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in Inter-Religious and Intra-Religious Communities”. The post-September 11, 2001 world is seized with the dangers of religious extremism and conflict between religious communities, particularly between two or more of the Abrahamic

faiths: Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Today, the threat of religious extremism is real and well documented. When communal identities, particularly the religious identities act as key casual factors in violent conflicts, traditional diplomacy is of little value in seeking conflict management or peace. The government of Pakistan calls for interfaith dialogue and sectarian harmony as a part of its program of promoting enlightened moderation'. In Pakistan, intra-religious conflicts mostly occur between Shias and Sunnis, and this sectarian nature of terrorism is part of the undeclared ongoing conflict. Though the sectarian violence had declined after the establishment of the religious opposition group of MMA in the Musharraf government that included Shias and Sunnis, the sectarian violence has flared up again after the gory incidents in Quetta and Parachinar.

All in all, the seminar proved a success and provided some new insights into the subject which is very topical and of prime national and international importance.

CHAPTER I

RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
PAKISTAN: HISTORICAL COMPARISONS

Ishtiaq Ahmed

*T*his study presents a puzzle: Whereas the treatment of religious minorities was historically more benign in South Asia than in Western Europe, in the contemporary period that situation has reversed in Pakistan (which connects to the Islamic legacy of South Asia) and the member states of the European Union (which originally included the old nation-states of Western Europe but now include new members from eastern Europe such as Bulgaria and Romania). Why? There can be a number of factors that shed light on this problem: levels of economic development, political modernization and secularization, cultural heritage, security concerns, and so on. However, the crucial factor is the construction of the nation as an idea and the measures undertaken to consolidate it.

Economic development, political modernization and overall secularization of society, and polity in the EU are far ahead of Pakistan with the exception of some of the poorer eastern European members. This surely helps the EU to adopt more liberal and progressive policy on religious minorities. On the other hand, with regard to security concerns, the proportion of the non-Christian population in Europe is roughly the same as in Pakistan. It is estimated that in a total population of over 495 million of the EU, some 16 million are Muslims— including both immigrants and natives (European Union, Wikipedia. 2008). One million Jews and probably one million Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, together with 16 million Muslims make up a non-Christian population of 18 million, which is slightly more than three per cent of its total population. Of Pakistan's estimated total population of 165 million, non-Muslims constitute only some 5 million. That too makes up some three per cent of the population. Of these the main minorities are Christians and Hindus: both some 1.5 per cent of Pakistan's total population. Thus, both the EU and Pakistan have roughly the same percentage of religious minorities. Now, whereas terrorism has been associated with some Muslims in the EU the same can not be said about Pakistan's religious minorities. Therefore, the security argument could not possibly explain the reason why the EU follows a more liberal policy on religious minorities than Pakistan.

The argument set forth in this essay is that the position and rights of religious minorities at least in formal terms are determined by the idea of nation or nation construction and nation-building. All official nationalisms can be classified as either derivative of the civic model deriving from the French Revolution or the cultural model deriving from German Romanticism. The idea of a nation-state based on fixed territorial boundaries over which it enjoys sovereignty is part of the modern era. Therefore, the rights of individuals within those territories are dependent on the national construct adopted by the state.

On the other hand, nation-states even when they enjoy sovereignty are nevertheless bound by international law. The member states of the European Union as well as Pakistan are members of the United Nations and therefore, bound to its charter that requires that all discrimination of individuals in law and in constitutional provisions should be removed. Therefore, the global trend is towards elimination of discriminatory laws and practices.

Religious Minorities in Western Europe

Religious wars bled Europe white for more than 150 years but the period 1616 to 1648 was the most intense and gory. The minorities such as Jews and Roma people but also minority sects within Christendom were subjected to severe persecution. However, the religious wars were fought mainly between rival Catholic and Protestant Powers. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 brought to an end such bloodshed. It gave formal recognition to territorial sovereignty of the various rulers of Europe, thus establishing proto-nations within specific territorial boundaries. The European princes could patronize a church of their liking, while minorities could at most enjoy religious freedom privately (Ahmed 2005, 13). In the 18th and 19th centuries, the nation-states of Europe were consolidated through the spread of public education and schools. A national language and an affiliation with a Christian sect distinguished the mainstream nation from linguistic, ethnic, and religious minorities living within the nation-states.

While the rights of citizens had been gradually evolving and expanding in England, it was the French Revolution, which in a dramatic manner, ushered in an era of modern citizenship. In the new dispensation a rights-bearing citizen supplanted the obligations-bound subject at the base of the political order. The civic model of nationalism became the centrepieces of the free French nation, although the state used various coercive methods to assimilate the German-speaking minority into the French nation (Smith 1986: 133-4).

In reaction to the French Revolution and the expansionism of Napoleon Bonaparte, German nationalism deriving from Romantic roots, cropped up. Culture (language and ethnicity) was emphasized as the basis of

loyalty and nationalism and not residence in the same territory (Smith 1983: 181-2). Later, rightwing nationalist movements in Germany gave birth to racist ideologies such as Nazism. On the whole, the Germanic model stood for exclusion of individuals from the nation on grounds of culture, ethnicity and religion.

Majoritarian Nationalism and Minority Rights

The creation of the so-called nation-states in Western Europe was primarily a triumph of the majoritarian principle whether of French or German leaning. However, some vague commitment to the freedom of religion of ethnic, religious, and sectarian minorities were made by West European states but in practice, discrimination and restrictions were prevalent, especially in relation to their right to take part in politics. In Sweden, for example, till the end of the Second World War even to become a school teacher, one had to belong to the Lutheran Church (Hjarpe 2005: 62).

Ironically, the recognition of the principle of sovereign nation-states in Europe did not prevent European powers from pursuing the most concerted lawless colonial expansion in Asia and Africa. The infamous scramble for Africa, agreed by the European powers in 1884-85 at the Conference of Berlin, gave free reign to expansionism in that continent within agreed spheres of influence. The First World War was a manifestation of competing ambitions to global empires of Western Nations. The treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations gave recognition to the right of self-determination of peoples and nations advocated by W. Wilson and V.I. Lenin, albeit with difference of emphasis: while Wilson confined such a right to people, living in the defeated German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires Lenin wanted such a right to be granted even to the colonized people of Asia and Africa (Ahmed 2005: 13).

In the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, only the subject people in Europe were given the right of self-determination and the borders were re-drawn to create new sovereign states. The people of Asia and Africa were denied such a right. However, the reorganization of boundaries and the appearance of new states still left ethnic and religious minorities in exposed situations. The Second World War wreaked havoc upon all notions of communal harmony and peaceful co-existence of nations and peoples.

The Individualistic Post-War Perspective on Human Rights

The catastrophic consequences of the Second World War were a watershed in the evolution of the post-war perspective on human rights norms, rules and treaties. The new standpoint took a clearly individual-based approach, although the most appalling aspect of that war was the systematic annihilation of demonized and dehumanized minorities such as Jews and Gypsies and civilian populations. The main reason was the abuse of the doctrine of

minority rights by Hitler. He justified the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland in the name of defending the German minorities allegedly persecuted in those states.

The United Nations, founded in 1945, raised the doctrine of state sovereignty to a higher, universal level. Thus, Article 2:7 of the UN Charter legally puts all states, big and small, at a par and declared interference in their domestic sphere illegal under international law. Exceptions were situations threatening world peace and massive human rights violations such as genocide. In most other matters, the states were assured sovereign power over their territory. However, article 1-3 and 55 obliged all member-states to respect human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) recognized freedom of conscience and religion as an inalienable right of all human beings.

The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms also recognized religious freedom. Article 9:1 stated: 'Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes the right to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance'. Simultaneously, in all human rights instruments adopted by the UN and the European Union the right of all bona fide citizens to vote and contest public office is clearly recognized.

Religious Minorities in the EU

As noted already the total non-Christian minorities in the EU are estimated at 18 million in a total population of over 495 million. Liberalization of immigration laws after the Second World War enabled the non-Muslims from Asia and Africa to enter West European states in large numbers. They were entering Europe which began to abolish progressively its restrictive laws on citizenship, and gradually from the 1970 onwards many such immigrants could acquire the citizenship of the countries they had settled in. Those who did not do so, were able to carry on their businesses and jobs, mostly small scale and low paid, by acquiring work permits. West Germany did not adopt liberal citizenship laws until 1999, although it followed a generous policy on the question of political refugees.

The non-Christians requested the host governments to grant permission to establish their places of worship, cultural centers, separate burial grounds, and so on. Demands for school children to eat food in accordance with their religious requirements were also added to that list. Other such pleas were also submitted. In most cases, they were considered sympathetically (Ahmed 1994). No particular Muslim problem existed until the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9, when Muslim religious activism and cultural separatism became politically significant. Thereafter, Muslim fundamentalism was to emerge as a major political trend in the Muslim world and inevitably affected

the Muslims in Europe too. Signs of Muslim self-assertion began to receive a strong political emphasis as some Muslim leaders in Europe, floated political ideas sure to excite apprehensions of the majority host society.

Thus, the idea of establishing a 'Muslim Parliament' was put forth in England in the summer of 1990 by Kalim Siddiqui, a Pakistani Sunni Muslim, supported by the Iranian Shia state (Karlsson, I. 1994: 160-61). Also, calls to permit dogmatic Islamic law, the Sharia, to the personal matters of the Muslim community were given. To such separatist demands were added grievances over the bad treatment of Palestinians by Israel, the Salman Rushdie Affair, followed by that of Taslima Nasrin who was given refuge in Sweden. The net result was that the fundamentalists began to promote their radical anti-Westernism as a cumulative reaction.

In such circumstances, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States of America (USA) and later in Spain and the United Kingdom (UK) by extremist Muslims and the great commotion that followed worldwide after cartoons of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) were published in Denmark in 2006, raised many doubts about Western multiculturalism. Rightwing nationalists and racists in Europe began to argue more loudly that Western and Islamic cultures were inconsonant; therefore, Muslim immigrants should be transported back to places from where they came (Ahmed 2006). Other non-Muslim immigrants, such as Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists do not seem to be seen in the same light. For the EU, committed to human rights and democracy, to adopt openly discriminatory laws against Muslims is not possible, however. However, given the pressure of public opinion and the need to win votes it is possible that further immigration of Muslims may be restricted in the future.

Religious Minorities in South Asia during Muslim Rule

The Muslim presence in South Asia dates from the 7th century. Between early 13th century and 1857, Muslim dynasties dominated the northern parts of the Indian subcontinent. They brought with them the idea of religious pluralism, known as the dhimmi system. Under it Christians and Jews were recognized as legitimate minorities in an Islamic state. They were to be accorded communal autonomy, but political and military power was to remain in Muslim hands. In lieu of such protection, they were required from paying a special tax, jizya. Some Muslim theologians and jurists in India interpreted Islamic law liberally to include Hindus among believers in the one true God and thus created scope for a proto-pluralist society (Naqvi 1995: 46). Others advocated harsher methods against them because of their idolatrous beliefs. Although the institution of slavery accompanied Muslim rule, it seems to have been a rather loosely organized system. Generally conversions to Islam won freedom to slaves and several Muslim dynasties (of foreign origin) founded by former slaves ruled in India.

In general, the main components of the Muslim social order were the so-called “ashraf” and the local converts known as “aam log”. The ashraf traced their descent to Turkish, Afghan, Persian or Arab ancestors and below them were the large bulk of local converts. Upper caste Hindus who became Muslims were accorded respectable status and in due course assimilated into the ashraf. Islamic theology did not recognize untouchability. Therefore, the social esteem of the local converts belonging to the lower castes and the various agricultural and nomadic tribes improved significantly but the ashraf kept their social distance from them. Sectarian differences between Sunnis and Shias were the basis of recurrent court intrigues and other divisive practices, but in the peculiar cultural diversity of India, by and large, the two groups could live in relative peace. At the time of the annual Ashura processions to mark the death of Imam Hussain Sunni-Shia clashes did take place (Ahmed 2005: 191).

The State in Pre-colonial Times

The pre-colonial Muslim states had an autocratic ruler at the apex of a segmentary power structure within which a descending power hierarchy constituted by lesser princes, chiefs, caste leaders and tribal headmen presided over the mass of peasants, craftsmen, artisans, menials and others the medieval period (Ahmed 1987:67-8). On the whole, the popular fiction that the ruler was a guardian of all his subjects and an impartial judge of conflicting individual and communal conflicts given currency to words such as *insaaf* (Arabic-Urdu) and *nyaya* (Sanskrit-Hindi), which mean justice, and associated them with good government. Moreover, words such as *haqq* (Arabic-Urdu) and *adhikara*, (Sanskrit-Hindi) meaning a right or entitlement were part of everyday parlance as well as legal vocabulary (Anderson and Guha 1998: 5-6). Within a strictly hierarchical order these terms suggested in a broad sense: to each, his due.

British Colonial Rule and Idea of Modern Rights

Although the British had since at least 1757 been expanding their hold over various regions of the subcontinent, it was only after 1857 that India was directly annexed by the Crown. From 1858 onwards the British government assumed direct control over many parts of India. The British were not particularly keen on fostering active citizenship among the natives and the Indian people remained mere subjects of the Crown, but reforms fashioned on liberal constitutional theory and English Common Law, nevertheless, resulted in the modern-educated classes, among whom a large number were lawyers trained in British schools and universities, acquiring a sense of citizenship and rights under the law. Such ideas gained wider currency as education spread and political activity acquired a more popular character.

In legal terms, except for personal matters, religious law was supplanted with modified versions of Common Law. Consequently the Islamic Sharia was confined to the private sphere and covered personal matters such as worship, marriage and divorce. In the political sphere, representative institutions were gradually introduced although suffrage remained narrow and subject to property and educational qualifications.

Pakistan

It is important to point out that although the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, made religious differences between Hindus and Muslims the main argument to justify the claim to a separate Muslim state for the Muslim nation, he tried to prevent such a state becoming an exclusive, confessional polity. In an address to the members of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947 he said:

You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State.... We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State... I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in due course Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State (Speeches of Mr Jinnah, Vol. 2, 1976: 403-4)

His early death on 11 September 1948, closed the chapter on secularism, and universal citizenship. On 7 March 1949, Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan moved an Objectives Resolution in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly. It declared God as the sovereign in Pakistan, not its people or elected representatives. Democracy was going to be observed within limits prescribed by Islam. Similarly, Muslims and non-Muslims were to enjoy fundamental rights compatible with Islam (Constituent Assembly Debates 1949: 1-2). The first constitution of 1956 declared Pakistan an Islamic Republic; its president could only be a Muslim. The second constitution from 1962 made similar provisions. The third constitution adopted in 1973 went further by requiring not only the president to be a Muslim but also the prime minister. On the whole, only symbolic discrimination against non-Muslims was given constitutional recognition. In 1974, however, the Pakistan National Assembly declared the Ahmadiyya community non-Muslims, thereby taking a patently dogmatic position on the relationship between the state, society and individuals.

Under General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88), the so-called Islamization programme was enforced on Pakistan. It heralded in an unambiguous commitment to the pre-modern type of communal state based on dhimmi principles though universal adult franchise was also accepted. In 1979, the government announced the imposition of the Hudud Ordinance, i.e. punishments believed to be laid down in the Quran was adopted. These punishments applied to all Pakistanis and did not discriminate among them on the basis of religion. However, they were part of an overall process aiming at creating a true Islamic nation. Supplementary edicts such as separate electorates were re-introduced in Pakistan in 1985 (the system had been abolished in 1956). It was followed by the adoption of the Blasphemy law in 1986. Thus, Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code reads as follows:

Use of derogatory remarks etc. in respect of the Holy Prophet: Whether by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, or by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) shall be punishable with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall be liable to fine.

The blasphemy law also did not, in principle apply only to non-Muslims but in practice it was mainly non-Muslims who have been tried under it.

Discrimination and Persecution of non-Muslims and Deviant Sects

In the wake of the hudud ordinance, introduction of separate electorates and the blasphemy law discrimination and persecution of non-Muslims increased dramatically. The annual reports of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan provide ample evidence of this assertion. The blasphemy law has been applied mainly against Christians and Ahmadis and lower courts have passed the death sentence on many of the alleged offenders. At the higher courts, however, the death sentence has been reduced. In October 1997, retired Lahore High Court judge, Arif Iqbal Bhatti, was shot down by unidentified assailants. In its annual report of 1998 Amnesty International observed: 'His death was believed to be linked to his role in the acquittal in 1995 of Salamat Masih and Rehman Masih (Christians, author's note) who had been sentenced to death for blasphemy by a lower court (Ahmed 2002).

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) reported that during 1998, 106 cases were registered under various religious laws against the Ahmadis (or Ahmadiyya, the sect declared non-Muslim in 1974, despite their claims to be Muslims). The editors, printers and publishers of Ahmadi publications faced 191 similar charges. At least five Ahmadis were murdered just for being Ahmadis. A Hindu, Chetan Das, complained that his daughter

had been abducted and forcibly married to a Muslim. The police took no action. A Christian Ayub Masih was sentenced to death by a session court on the charge that he had blasphemed. On 6 May 1998, Bishop John Joseph burnt himself to death to draw attention to the victimization of Christians under the Blasphemy law. Cases were also reported of forcible occupation of church land, the dismantling of a Christian locality and an explosion inside a historic church (State of Human Rights in 1998: 7-8).

There were demonstrations immediately in many parts of Pakistan. Human Rights Organisations and Christian Organizations led the campaign. In Lahore the police viciously attacked the protesters. As a result, many were hospitalized and hundreds arrested (Ahmed 2005: 206).

As regards the minor religious minorities such as the Parsees, Sikhs and Buddhists, they have also been adversely affected by the increasing Islamic radicalization of Pakistan. In the Gilgit and Chitral regions are to be found Ithna Ashari Shias, Ismaili Shias and Sunnis. Here the competition between Iran, the Ismaili mission headed by Prince Karim Agha Khan (based in Europe), and the Zia government backed by the Saudis, to win converts, led to several clashes in the 1980s. The tiny community of some 4,000 of the Kalash Kafirs of the Chitral Valley were in particular subjected to aggressive conversion onslaughts during the Zia regime. Some Ulema demand that all non-Muslims should be declared dhimmis and made to pay jizya. Such a drastic demand has not received serious attention from the state thus far (Ahmed 1998: 181). At any rate, in October 2000, leaders of the minority religious communities from all the four provinces of Pakistan attended an all Pakistan Minorities Conference in Lahore, where they unanimously demanded that joint electorates should be re-instituted in Pakistan (Ahmed 2005: 208).

The Shia minority had in large numbers supported the demand for Pakistan, but until the 1940s, significant sections of Shias were opposed it. It was feared that Pakistan might become a Sunni state. However, Jinnah (who was a Shia) and other Muslim League leaders assured the Shias that Pakistan would not become a sectarian state. This is clearly stated in a reply to Syed Ali Zaheer from (Allana 1977: 375-9). This policy was retained by the state in so far as the position of the Shias was concerned, until Islamization during the Zia regime began to carry Sunni overtones. This problem came to the fore when the state began to collect the alms tax zakat from all Muslims. The Shias refused to pay zakat to what they perceived was a Sunni state. It resulted in angry protests by the Shias. The government gave in after trying unsuccessfully for some time to disperse the Shia agitators.

These difficulties were compounded further when in the late 1980s powerful external actors began to cultivate their lobbies in Pakistan. Thus, Saudi Arabia and Iran were believed to be sending large sums of money, books, leaflets, audio and video cassette-tapes and other means to propagate

their point in Pakistan. Such propaganda offensives were backed by the inflow of firearms and other weapons. Sunni and Shia militias began to menace and terrorize society through attacks on each other during much of the 1990s. Consequently, assassinations of several rival Sunni and Shia Ulema and regular gun battles and bomb explosions have been taking place in Pakistan in recent years (Ahmed 1998: 176-8).

Incidents of violent attacks on non-Muslims, forced conversion of Hindu girls and women, burning of churches and temples continued into the 21st century. However, growing pressure from the United States in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the threat of a military conflict with India after some terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001, General Pervez Musharraf came under great pressure to dissociate his government with the radicals. In an address to the nation on 12 January 2002 he referred to the 11 August 1947 speech of Jinnah and said that Pakistan will be a moderate Muslim state and not a fundamentalist state. More significantly, the system of separate electorates was abolished but the status of Ahmadis as non-Muslims was retained.

Conclusion

A comparison of the constitutional and legal position of religious minorities in the European Union and Pakistan shows that whereas the European nations increasingly liberalized citizenship and expanded universal democracy, notwithstanding a long tradition of minority oppression, Pakistan in increasing measure introduced constitutional and legal provisions to discriminate non-Muslim minorities and even deviant sects despite the fact that the Islamic practice in South Asia on religion and religious groups has been more pluralistic and tolerant. In this study, the models of nation-building and national construction underpinning the treatment of minorities has been examined to find clues to the contrasting approaches to religious minorities in the two contexts.

However, positions on religious minorities as on nationalism are always subject to change and adjustment. The founder of Pakistan wanted to establish an inclusive and non-discriminatory citizenship so that all Pakistanis, irrespective of their religious affiliations could enjoy the same rights. His successors deviated from that path and chose, instead, a differentiated citizenship, which in practical terms resulted in discriminatory constitutional provisions and laws. There is nothing to suggest that the legacy of the founder of Pakistan cannot be revived although states founded on religious nationalism do discriminate between the primary nation and others, but this is a tendency and not a law of politics. Similarly, when societies feel threatened by atypical members of the population, they can take measures to restrict in some way the activities of such people. In the European Union, currently there is some

concern about the inflow of radical Islam and extremist Muslims. Restricting inflow of such people is one way to handle the problem of atypical members of the population.

In the longer run, however, discrimination and persecution of individuals by states will not be tenable because already as members of the United Nations, they are committed to eliminate all discriminatory law. As the world globalizes and interconnects, the need for universal standards of interaction among people of different cultures will become even more irresistible but we are a long off from it. ■

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CONFIGURATION OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN PAKISTAN *A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE*

Dr Noor ul Haq

Pakistan was established in 1947 on territorial basis through a democratic process as a dominant Muslim state. Contrary to the pluralistic vision of the father of the nation, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the forces of religious orthodoxy gradually gained importance. The Madaris (religious schools), financed by local and foreign sources, have increased supporting orthodoxy and religious sectarianism. Sectarian strife, besides poverty, low literacy, and extremism, is one of the challenges, faced by Pakistan.

Religious Configuration in British India

Pakistan had emerged on territorial-cum-religious basis. In British India, as per the Census of 1941, Hindus were 66.45 percent as against Muslims, who were 23.99 percent of the total population as under:

Religious Configuration in British India

Community	Total	Percentage
Muslims	92,058,096	23.99
Hindus	254,930,506	66.45
Christians	3,293,671	0.86
Others	2,228,536	0.58
Total	383,643,745	100.00

Source: Census of India 1941, Command Paper No. 6479

In spite of being a minority, Muslims formed a majority in five out of a total of 11 provinces in the undivided India. Three of the Muslim majority provinces, i.e., North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Punjab and Sindh, as well as Balochistan were in the northwest and the remaining two, i.e., Assam and Bengal, were in the northeast of the subcontinent. In the united subcontinent, Muslims would have remained a permanent minority, always to be ruled by a permanent Hindu majority. Muslims, fearing permanent domination by the majority community, decided to have an independent homeland in the vast contiguous areas in the northeast and northwest, where they were having a clear majority. After the establishment of Pakistan, the two geographically separated wings of the country, which were 1000 miles apart, became independent of each other during 1971. The eastern wing is

Bangladesh and the western wing continues to retain its original name, i.e., Pakistan. In Pakistan, there are about 97 percent Muslims. According to the first Census of Pakistan in 1951 and the last Census in 1998, the breakdown of religious communities is as follows:

Religious Configuration in Pakistan

Community	Total (in million) 1951	Percentage 1951	Total (in million) 1998	Percentage 1998
Total Population	33.730	-	145.5	-
Muslims	32.732	97.12	139.91	96.16
Qadianis	-	-	.509	0.35
Hindus	.531	1.58	1.40	2.037
Scheduled Caste	-	-	.48	0.33
Christians	.433	1.28	2.458	1.69
Others	.007	0.02	0.87	0.06

Source: Census of Pakistan 1951; Population Association of Pakistan Statistics, Table 1.4: Percentage Population by Religion, ... 1998, <http://www.pap.org.pk/statistics/population.htm>

Percentage Religious Population Province-wise

	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	FATA	Baloch	Isl.
Muslims	97.2	91.3	99.4	99.6	98.8	95.5
Qadiani	2.3	1	0.2	0.2	0.4	4.1
Hindus	0.1	6.5	-	-	0.5	-
Sh. Caste	-	0.1	-	-	0.1	-
Christians	2.3	1	0.2	0.1	0.4	4.1
Others	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

Source: 1998 Census: Hand Book of Population and Housing Census Pakistan (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organization Statistics Division, 2002), p. 50.

About minorities, the Constitution of Pakistan guarantees them “freely to profess and practise their religions and develop their culture”; specifically safeguards their “legitimate interests”; and guarantees “fundamental rights, including equality of status, of opportunity and before law political, economic and social justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality.

Earlier, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the father of the nation, while inaugurating the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, on 11 August 1947, said

... no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State [Pakistan] with equal rights, privileges and obligations ... You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State. ... we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.”¹

After the demise of Quaid-i-Azam, the Muslim leadership of Pakistan came to be divided into two opposing groups. One group wanted to have Pakistan as a liberal, secular state while the other was for the introduction of Nizam-i-Mustafa according to the Quran and Sunnah (i.e. a form of government similar to the one practiced by Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in Madina during (622-32 A.D.) Some of the vernacular print media² and the clergy³, were mostly propagating against liberalism and working against the efforts of liberal leaders. Thus, contrary to the vision of Quaid-i-Azam, there have been occurrences of religious discrimination and hostilities.

Since Pakistan was conceived as a modern democratic state and not as a theocracy, the clergy felt isolated. They attempted to establish their leadership by championing the cause of the religion. They were partly inspired by their faith and partly by economic motives. They promoted sectarianism, extremism, and violence. The first example of their efforts can be seen in the anti-Ahmadiyya movement, which led to the imposition of Martial Law in

¹ *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah - Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan 1947-48* (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), pp. 8-9.

² For instance, the popular Urdu daily *Nama-i-Waqt* of Lahore.

³ For instance, Maulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani and Maulana Zafar Ali Khan were promoting religious orthodoxy.

1953 in Lahore. Ahmadiyya community is the follower of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908), who claimed revealed knowledge. They consider themselves as Muslims. The mainstream Muslim Ulama demanded that Ahmadiyya community should be declared a non-Muslim minority. The liberal opinion criticized the Ulama for “launching a politically inspired agitation”.⁴ But 25 years later in 1978, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto conceded the demand of the Ulama and the community was categorized as a non-Muslim minority.

Following the success of the Ulama in getting their demand accepted, General Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan (1978-88), who succeeded Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-78), declared that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam. He promulgated certain disputed and discriminatory laws, such as chopping of hands, flogging, etc. The “institutional roots” of Islamic extremism were laid when General Zia provided government funds for the establishment of mosques and madrasahs. This helped “militant religious organizations” to find a “ready-made platform” for achieving their objectives. Thus, Zia’s regime encouraged the rise of religious groups on sectarian lines⁵. The emergence of many Sunni and Shi’ah groups strengthened the sectarian divide in the country.⁶ Interested foreign countries came to their help. For instance, after 1979 revolution in Iran, the Iranian government supported Shi’ah community in Pakistan. Saudi Arabia and General supported Sunni groups. The United States supported Zia regime in encouraging and arming religious militants to fight against Soviets in Afghanistan. During Zia’s regime the number of religious schools increased manifold from 900 to 8000, besides innumerable unregistered schools. Madrasah culture was promoted and developed especially in the camps of Afghan refugees, who had migrated to Pakistan from Afghanistan.⁷ After Zia’s death in 1988, during the next decade of democratic rule, according some assessment, “Pakistan went through periods of worst sectarian killings” and attacks on mosques, Imam Bargahs, and even churches and the Christian community.”⁸

In addition, under Zia there were separate electorates for Muslims and non-Muslims, thus restricting political integration. The minorities had

⁴ Craig Baxter and others, *Government and Politics in South Asia* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), Third Edition, p. 179.

⁵ Sipah-i-Sahaba; Lashkar-i-Jhangvi; Jaish-i-Muhammad.

⁶ Sadia Nasir, *IPRI Paper 7: Religious Extremism in South Asia* (Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2004), p. 33, cited A.Z. Hilali, “The Costs and Benefits of the Afghan War for Pakistan”, *Contemporary South Asia* (Oxford), Vol. 11, No. 3 (November 2002), p. 301.

⁷ Hussain Haqqani, “Islam’s medieval Outposts”, *Foreign Policy* (Washington), November/December 2002, p. 63, cited by Sadia Nasir, op. cit., p.35.

⁸ Zafar Abbas, “The Backlash”, *BBC*, 17 October 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2337675.stm

complaints that their schools were nationalized by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's administration (1972-78) and later, some discriminatory laws promulgated by President Zia-ul-Haq. However, since 1999, the policy of the present government under General Pervez Musharraf is bringing minorities back into national mainstream by introducing joint electoral system, restoring and allowing private schools. Religious minorities are, therefore, gaining confidence as equal citizens of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Sectarian Configuration

Since 97 percent population of Pakistan is Muslim, the sectarianism amongst Muslims assumes greater importance. Although the Muslims have the same God, the same prophet, the same book, i.e. Quran, there is diversity as well as both rigidity and flexibility in the interpretation of Quran and Sunnah (i.e. the sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad). This accounts for the creation of sects within Islam. Muslims are mainly divided into two branches, i.e., Sunnis and Shi'as. The exact proportion of these two major sects is not known, but a rough estimate indicated that nearly 80 percent are Sunni and 20 percent Shi'ah Muslims.⁹ Sunnis are further divided mainly amongst Barelvis, Deobandis, and Ahl-i-Hadith (Wahabis). Their exact number cannot be ascertained and is not available. Roughly, the bulk of the Muslim masses belong to Barelvi school of thought and they seem to be in majority in the provinces of Sind and the Punjab. The second largest are Deobandis, who have greater number of Madaris and have greater influence in the North West Frontier Province and Balochistan. The number of their respective religious schools is available. These schools are affiliated with one of the five Wafaq (Religious Education Boards).

Affiliation, Number and Percentage of Deeni Madaris (2000 AD)

Affiliation	Number	Percentage
Wafaq-ul-Madaris al- Arabia ¹⁰	1947	28.80
Tanzim-ul-Madaris Ahle Sunnat ¹¹ (Hanafi, Barelvi)	1363	20.16
Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Salfia ¹² (Ahle Hadith, Wahabi)	310	4.585

⁹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dmographics_of_Islam Since no authentic statistics are available, the exact percentage of Shi'ah population can not be ascertained. However, it is likely that they may be less but not more than 20 percent.

¹⁰ The board links itself with Dar-ul-Ulum Deoband founded by Maulana Qasim Nanautavi in northern India in 1866.

¹¹ These institutions are called Barelvi after the Madrassa founded by Maulana Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921) in Bareilly, India.

Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Shi'ah¹³	297	4.40
Rabita-al-Madaris al-Islamia¹⁴ (Mansoorah)	191	2.825
Madaris (unaffiliated)	6761	39.24
Total	10,869	100.00

Salim Mansoor Khalid, *Deeni Madaris Mein Taleem* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies), p.176.

There is a strong opposition, international as well as national, against Madaris. Although they have mutual differences, they have united into a common organization, known as Ittehad-e-Tanzimat Madaris-e-Diniah (United Organisation of Religious Institutions), as a measure of self-defence.

The number of Madaris has increased to about 13000 as per the latest data¹⁵ provided by National Education Census (NEC) carried out in 2005-06. The data also reveals the exact number of students and Madaris.

Country Percentage of Students in Deeni Madaris

Number of deeni madaris	12,979
Total enrolment in deeni madaris	1,549,242
Total enrolment in educational institutions	54.638 million
Percentage of students in deeni madaris	2.835

Government of Pakistan, National Education Census Highlights (Islamabad: Federal Bureau of Statistics) 2006.

There are generally four types of Sunni Madaris. The bulk of Madaris belongs to Deobandi school of thought. They follow Darul-Ulum at Deoband (India) founded in 1866. Deoband school accepts the validity of the four Sunni schools (Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki, Hanbali), follow dars-e-nizami but lay emphasis on fiqh Hanafi and recommend ijtehad. The Deobandis are also organized into a political party, Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, whose President was the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly of Pakistan before he resigned in October last.

Some Sunni Madaris are run by Rabitat al-Madaris Islamiya (League of Islamic Schools). These schools were established in 1983 by Jama't-e-Islami (a

¹² Belongs to Ahle Hadith school of puritan Sunni Islam inspired by Maulana Abdul Wahab (b. 1703), whose most of the followers are in Saudi Arabia.

¹³ Belongs to Shi'ah sect of Islam.

¹⁴ Belongs to the Jama'at-e-Islami, a politico-religious party of Pakistan.

¹⁵ Government of Pakistan, *National Education Census Highlights* (Islamabad: Federal Bureau of Statistics) 2006.

politico-religious party) with the purpose “to combat ‘popular’ Islam and purify the faith”. They were the followers of the revivalist Abul Ala al-Mawdoudi (1903-79).

Another group of Sunni Madaris belongs to Ahl-e-Hadith. They are inspired by the teachings of Sh. Abd al-Wahab (1703-1787), the creed followed in Saudi Arabia. They reject Sufism as un-Islamic and all schools of fiqh as being developed much after the death of the Prophet (PBUH). Like Jamaat-i-Islami, they are also committed to fighting ‘popular’ Islam. Their followers were a threat to British rule in the NWFP and West Punjab till 1871.¹⁶

The fourth group of Sunni Islam is the follower Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921). He is the founder of Barelvi school. He believes in Sufism and considers both Deobandis and Ahl-e-Hadith as heretics. The cult of Sufism is popular with bulk of Muslims and thus Barelvis are in a majority in Pakistan. Their Madaris are nearer to Sufism and are not associated with Jihadi groups. The Barelvi Ulama are politically organized into Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam and Sunni Tehrik.

The group of Shi’ah Madaris are distinct from all categories of Sunnis’ schools. They teach their own fiqh-i-Jafriah. Their political wing is represented by Tehrik-e-Islami and Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Jafaria. Thus, there are deep rooted schisms among different Muslim sects and their Madaris play an important role in perpetuating them.

Government control over private/religious institutions is weak. This has led the country in acquiescing the “growing influence of political Islamic movements in both private and public educational institutions.”¹⁷ The main reason for the lukewarm government control is mainly due to paucity of funds. Pakistan’s expenditure on education, during the first three decades, was about one percent of GDP and, during the last two decades, has increased to about two percent of GDP,¹⁸ which is much less as compared to other countries, which is normally four percent of GDP.

Madarsa Education

Two potentially misleading if not erroneous misconceptions have evolved recently concerning the Islamic institution of the traditional Madrasah ... The first revolves around the idea of a Madrasah as a kind of “jihad factory” whose sole aim is the indoctrination of young Muslim minds with the radical

¹⁶ Kh. Jamil Ahmad, *Hundred Great Muslims* (Karachi: Ferozsons Ltd., 1984), p. 306.

¹⁷ Mamoun Fany, “Enriched Islam: The Muslim Crisis of Education”, *Survival* (The IISS Quarterly), Vol. 49, Number 2, Summer 2007, pp. 88-89.

¹⁸ For instance, during first eight years (1947-55) of Pakistan’s existence, the total expenditure on education was Rs.199,800,000 which comes to about .919 percent of GDP, whereas during 2005-06, the expenses incurred were Rs. 163.392 billion which were 2.1 percent of GDP.

mystique of terrorism and martyrdom. The second misconception involves the idea that the traditional Madrasah represents an archaic form of learning that merely involves learning and memorization that does nothing to create a climate of mind and encourages critical and creative thinking.¹⁹

There are varying perceptions about Madaris. A perception about them as the breeding ground of extremism and militancy is persisting in the international community. It is necessary to know that during Afghans' struggle against Soviet occupation (1978-88) of their country, the students (Taliban) of certain Madaris (religious schools), located in Afghanistan and in the North Western Province of Pakistan, received military training and participated in the war of liberation for their country. They were eulogized as *mujahideen* and were joined by thousands of fighters mainly from the Arab world, sponsored by the United States, Pakistan and other countries. Osama bin Laden, who hailed from Saudi Arabia, was one of them. He and his organization al Qaeda found a favourable environment in Afghanistan to establish themselves. However, al Qaeda and Taliban are different entities. Whereas the former have a global agenda, the latter are concerned with the conditions in their own country. Some Madaris, where military training was imparted, mainly belong to Deobandi sect or school of thought. These are mostly located in territories adjacent to Afghanistan.

Apart from militancy, they are perpetuating sectarianism. They are persisting with archaic learning, which may be traced back to the days of Muslim supremacy, when a Madrassa-i-Nizamiyah Baghdad was established early in 11th century (1065-70). The curriculum and system of education has continued more or less on the same lines. In India, one Mulla Nizam-ud-Din of Sihali, who was contemporary of Shah Wali-ullah (1703-62) and Sheikh Abd alWahab, devised a curriculum for Madaris in the subcontinent. Most of the Madaris in Pakistan follow the structure of dars-i-nizami,²⁰ of course making changes from time to time.²¹ In addition to religious subject, the syllabus was tilted in favour of secular and rational sciences, such as logic, philosophy and mathematics. Only two books of Quranic commentary and two books of Hadith have been included. The curriculum resembles more or less with the one forming the syllabi of the Universities of Europe during the mediaeval ages.²² It was designed to prepare a student to get a job in the service of the

¹⁹ John Herlihy, "Inside the Madrasah: Traditional Disciplines for Young Minds", *Muslim Education Quarterly*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2002, p. 17.

²⁰ It is an outdated syllabus and teaches books prescribed in past centuries. It includes both secular and religious subjects: Arabic grammar, composition, logic, wisdom, quality expression, jurisprudence, principles of jurisprudence, literary conversation, commentary on Quran and sayings and practices of Holy Prophet.

²¹ Khalid, Deeni Madaris, op. cit., p. 43.

²² F. E. Keay, *Indian Education in Ancient and Later Times: An inquiry into its origin, development and ideals* (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 130-35.

government as Qadhis (judges) and muftis (helper of judges in exposition of law), besides producing Ulama. The syllabus is quite old and does not meet the requirement of modern times. It generally ignores the development taking place in various disciplines and almost neglects the faculty of physical sciences. Their education hardly equips them with the capability to perform functions required in the modern era.

Most of them impart basic benign religious education and have restricted themselves to producing religious teachers and prayer leaders in mosques. The government and Wifaq-ul-Madaris both have taken cognizance of their deficiency and desire to improve the curriculum to meet the requirements of modern days.

However, the Madaris are doing a good job in some respects. One of the positive features about them is that, besides imparting education, they are a great welfare non-governmental organization. They provide free boarding, lodging, textbooks and teachers. They are popular with the poor segment of the population. They are financed by charities, donations, and *zakat* (an obligation on Muslims to pay a certain percentage of their wealth to poor people and organization, looking after poor people and their needs including education).

They are also contributing to literacy in Pakistan. As for overall education standard in Pakistan, the UNESCO Institute for Statistics has calculated that there was no schooling for about 47 percent population in Pakistan during 2005-06.²³ The overall progress of literacy province-wise is as under:²⁴

Province-wise Literacy in Pakistan

Year	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Balochistan	Overall
1951 ²⁵	7.3	6.1 ²⁶	5.2	5.2	²⁷
1961	16.1	21.0	13.8	9.8	16.7
1972	20.7	30.2	14.5	10.1	10.1
1981	27.4	31.4	16.7	10.3	26.2
1998 ²⁸	46.6	47.3	35.4	24.8	43.9

²³ UNESCO Institute of Statistics, Statistics on Population by Highest Level of Education (Educational Attainment) in Pakistan 2005-06.

²⁴ Government of Pakistan, Economic Surveys; Census of Pakistan 1951 and 1998.

²⁵ Government of Pakistan, *Census of Pakistan 1951, Vol. 1*, (Karachi: Census Publications) n.d., p. 77.

²⁶ The figures do not include Karachi. The percentage for federal area Karachi was 18.4. See *Census of Pakistan 1951*, op. cit., p. 77.

²⁷ The literacy rate of West Pakistan is not shown, but the literacy rate of Muslim population of East Pakistan is shown as 13.4 percent. *Census of Pakistan, ibid.*

2004	55	56	45	37	53
2005-06	-	-	-	-	54.5 ²⁹

Madaris are contributing towards literacy. Those educated in Madaris are counted among literates.

Since independence, the policy of the government has been to bring religious education in Madaris in line with the general education system prevalent in the country. Several Commissions were constituted by the government. They were required, among other factors, to recommend measures for updating and modernizing the Madrasah education system. Although no substantial change was brought about in the system, improving is taking place in religious institutions. Some Madaris have well equipped language lab, computer lab, and are inclined to introduce modern subjects. Some of them are supporting even English medium instructions, which they had considered a taboo in the past.

In a survey carried out under the auspices of Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), it is revealed that there is more or less identity of views among students of Madaris and government institutions on most issues. For instance, sects deserve no role in the educational system; regardless of the magnitude of difference amongst different schools of thought, they should cooperate with each other; steps should be taken to improve the role and effectiveness of Madaris; mainstream disciplines should be introduced in Madaris; if the religious leaders are exposed to main stream knowledge, they could play their role more effectively; consensus that there are trends in universities and colleges about immorality; to extend help to oppressed people irrespective of their faith/religion; condemning killing innocent Muslims or non-Muslims; and optimism about the bright future of Pakistan.³⁰

Madarsa cannot be isolated from the overall education system of the country. It is popular with poor segment of population. It preserves the old and original textbooks of Islamic learning and prepares teachers of Islamic education and jurisprudence. It is in fact an adjunct to the main stream on several issues. Most policies of the government of Pakistan have more or less the same response from Madrasah students as from other students in the general education. However there are strong differences when it comes to social behaviour in the society, i.e., they are generally against liberalism,

²⁸ Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organization, Demographic Indicators – 1998 Census. The figures do not include FATA with 17.4 and Islamabad with 72.4 percent literacy.

²⁹ Ministry of Education, Academy of Education Planning and Management, Literacy rate by age group 10+, 2005-06.

³⁰ Khalid Rahman, Nadim Salim, Muttaqeen Ur Rahman, “Religious Educational Institutions: Perceptions about Contemporary Issues” (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies and Insights Research Consultants, 2007), unpublished report..

supporting war against terror or western sponsored NGOs operating in the country.³¹This helps extremism and terrorism.

Religious Extremism and Violence

“Zia’s Islamisation policy “injected the poison of sectarianism, fanaticism and bigotry, pitting sect against sect”.³² The sectarian rivalry resulted in the emergence of militant Shi’ah/Sunni sectarian organizations.³³The members of the opposite sect including worshippers in mosques were targeted. The number of sectarian killings during 1987-89 was 22. It increased from 22 to 166 during 1993-95. It led to the formation of militant sectarian organizations, such as Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi amongst Sunnis and Sipah-e-Muhammad and Tehrik-e-Jafariya-e-Pakistan amongst Shi’ahs.

Shi’ahs and Sunnis Killed in Sectarian Violence (1990-March 2002)

Year	Total Dead	Shi’ah	Sunni	Others
1990	32	13	14	5
1991	53	29	23	1
1992	48	22	16	7
1993	39	17	11	1
1994	69	39	23	7
1995	59	36	22	1
1996	90	56	34	
1997	200	105	90	5
1998	132	109	23	
1999	104	68	36	
2000	37	4	26	7
2001	154	80	64	10
2002	21	15	6	
Total	1025	593	388	44

Source: Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, translated by Saba Ansari (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004), p. 586-7.

³¹ For statistics see Khalid Rahman, Nadim Salim, Muttaqeen Ur Rahman, “Religious Educational Institutions: Perceptions about Contemporary Issues” (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies and Insights Research Consultants, August 2007, unpublished paper).

³² Hilali, “The Costs and Benefits”, p. 34m cited by Sadia Nasir, op. cit., p.35.

³³ Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, “Terrorism, Development and Democracy: The Case of Pakistan”, Khatri and Kueck (ed.), *Terrorism in South Asia*, p. 127, cited in Sadia Nasir, op. cit., p. 33.

Sectarian Violence Province-wise

	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Islamabad
Population	55.6%	2.3%	15.8%	5%	0.6%
1990	159	39	23	3	1
1991	110	35	12	1	
1992	39	42	19		
1993	34	21	19	4	1
1994	88	39	17		
1995	34	18	5	2	
1996	23	12	7	1	
1997	23	14	-	2	-
1998	47	10	18	-	5
1999	21	16	8	-	-
2000	11	10	3	-	-
2001	18	10	5	3	-
2002 (till March)	3	-	7	-	-

Source: Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, translated by Saba Ansari (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004) p.587.

Conclusion and Recommendation

Religious and sectarian extremism, when it turns violent becomes terrorism. However, in Pakistan, there is a conflict between liberalism and religious extremism and thus sectarian conflicts remain subdued for the time being. But there is a need to look into the causes of religious sectarianism and violence. We must eradicate poverty, deprivation, frustration and inequality. There is a need to ensure mutual understanding and tolerance. There should be no perception of political, economic and social hegemony. The political differences and conflicts need to be managed and if possible resolved. Lastly, there should be universal education, with free boarding and lodging for the poor. Madrasah education should be brought in line with main stream education. The emphasis should be on teaching disciplines - humanities, social and physical sciences - and not on old outdated books, as is emphasized in dars-e-nizami. This would bring students to develop a broader outlook. ■

POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SUNNIS (BARELWIS) AND THEIR FACTIONS IN PAKISTAN

Mujeeb Ahmad

The Ahl-i-Sunnat wa Jama'at (Barelwis) emerged as a distinct movement in late 19th century and its intellectual leader was Mawlana Shah Muhammad Ahmad Raza Khan Barelwi (1856-1921). The Barelwis did operate, as a popularly supported leadership, offering social and religious guidance to their community. They used their legal scholarship to justify the 'custom-laden' Islam. Barelwis consisted mainly of those Ulama who were deeply rooted in medieval traditionalism, as they re-phrased the interpretation of the works of the medieval theologians. So, they opposed the reformist Indian as well as Arabian Movements. They were against the early 19th century renewal movement, *Tariqab-i-Muhammadiyah* due to Arabian Wahhabis' influence. Likewise, they also opposed the Deobandis, the Ahl-i-Hadith, the Nadwat al-Ulama (1894) and the Aligarh Movement for the same reasons.¹

In Pakistan, Barelwis' influence has been regarded as largely rural, mainly due to their affiliation with the different Sufi orders. However, they do have a considerable number of devoted followers in urban areas. As they are representatives of the majority, so, they have to play their role of custodian of public opinion.

The Barelwis fully participated in the Freedom Movement of the British India and played an important role in the last and final phase of the Pakistan Movement, under the banner of the All-India Sunni Conference, formed in March 1925 at Moradabad, India. Their support to the Demand for Pakistan was purely on religious basis, as they hoped that the new state would have an Islamic character. However, after the establishment of Pakistan (August 1947), the Barelwis felt that the leadership of the All-India Muslim League (AIML)-(December 1906) was not sincere in fulfilling its promises, to make Pakistan an Islamic welfare state. They also felt intrigued by the close relationship between the Pakistan Muslim League (PML)-(December 1947) and their opponent sects. These developments persuaded them to think seriously about their socio-political as well as religious status in Pakistan. In this background, they decided to form Markazi Jam'iyat ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan

¹ Usha Sanyal, *Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi: In the Path of the Prophet* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006), pp.103-107.

(MJUP) in March 1948, at Multan, the first-ever religio-political party formed after the creation of Pakistan.²

After 1947, the Barelwis did not pay much heed to the electoral and parliamentary politics as they lacked any effective and disciplined countrywide MJUP's organization. However, they considered it as their duty to struggle for the enactment of Islamic Constitution and government in Pakistan. In doing so, they became first religious community of Pakistan who, on 22 September 1947, demanded the enforcement of Islamic Constitution and in this connection, more than three drafts were prepared by them which were presented to the Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) the then Governor General of Pakistan and the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) at different occasions.³

In Pakistan, besides other socio-political issues, the controversy in constitution-making mainly centred on the Islamic character of the constitutions. Although, the Barelwis, till 1972 had no representation in the CAPs, but they indirectly influenced the constitution-making process, especially its Islamic character. So, in this struggle, they even set aside their theological differences with their rival religious groups and cooperated with the united efforts of the Ulama for the enforcement of Islamic Constitution during 1948-56. So, out of thirty-one Ulama and *Masha'ikh* belonging to different religio-political parties and organizations, who, in January 1951, formulated twenty-two fundamental principles of an Islamic Constitution, five were Barelwis.⁴

The Barelwis were also putting pressure on the authorities for the enforcement of Islamic Constitution according to their own perceptions. In this connection, an All Pakistan Sunni Conference (December 1955) was held at Lahore, where the Islamic Constitution based on the *Fiqh-i-Hanafi* was demanded.⁵ However, they welcomed the enactment of the 1956

² Sayyid Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri, ed., *Ru'dad-i-Markazi Jam'iyat ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan, Labor* (Lahore: Amrit Electric Press, n.d.), pp.8-9.

³ *Azim Muballigh-i-Islam* (Karachi: Khawatin Islami Mission, 2003), p.168; Sayyid Ghulam Mu'inuddin Na'imi, ed., *Hayat-i-Sadrul Afadil* (Lahore: Idarah Na'imiyah Ridwiyyah, Swad-i-A'zam, n.d.), pp.193-196; Muhammad Salim Qadiri, *Muballigh-i-A'zam-i-Islam aur Ruhani Peshwa* (Faisalabad: Markazi Majlis-i-Kanzul Iman Pakistan, 1989), p.24 and *Jam'iyat-i-Ulama-i-Sindh*, Karachi, ed., *Islami Dastur Ka Khakab* (Karachi: Zahurul Hassan Dars, n.d.), pp.2-8.

⁴ Pakistan kay 31 Ulama ka Muttafiqah Faisalah: Islami Hakumat kay Buniyyadi Ausul (Lahore: Shu'bah Nashr-o-Isha'at Jama'at-i-Islami Pakistan, n.d.), pp.6-7.

⁵ Ghulam Mu'inuddin Na'imi, Markazi Jam'iyat ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan ki Salanah Tablighi wa Tanzimi All Pakistan Sunni Kanfarans Lahor ki Mufassil Report (Lahore: Maqbul-i-'am Press, n.d.), pp.36-37.

Constitution, in spite of the fact, that they considered it not Islamic in totality.⁶

After the adoption of the 1956 Constitution, the general elections were supposed to be held. The MJUP for the 'Islamic Revolution', decided to contest these elections for the first time, as an independent political party. In its election manifesto, the party vowed that the ruling elites in the last ten years, deeply disappointed the nation, as they had completely failed to make Pakistan a welfare state.⁷ The Barelwis were so critical towards the ruling elites, that they even welcomed the Martial Law of October 1958 and declared it as a 'Revolution'.⁸ However, very soon the majority of them changed their opinion.

After the imposition of Martial Law, the Barelwis reiterated their demand of having a constitution on the bases of Quran and *Sunnah*. While answering a questionnaire, circulated by the Constitution Commission, the Barelwi Ulama, in May 1960, along with other ten prominent Ulama of all schools of thought, for all constitutional, political and administrative issues, unanimously suggested acting upon according to the relevant provisions of the 1956 Constitution.⁹

The mosques and *khanqah*-s are the main source of socio-political as well as economic status of the Barelwis. So, they vehemently opposed the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance of 1961, on the ground that it violated the mandate of the *Shari'at*. They also blamed that by this, the Government had laid down the foundation-stone of the Socialism and declared it as a conspiracy to 'nationalize' Islam.¹⁰ However, some of them had passive stand to the *Anwaf* Department, as their endowments got some official patronage and the *Imam*-s of mosques became government employees, getting reasonable salaries for performing their religious duties, along with donations from the public.

The Martial Law authorities faced a more bitter criticism by the Barelwis regarding the issuance of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, in March 1961. More than two hundred prominent Ulama, including Barelwis issued three different joint statements and opposed the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, particularly the idea of restricting polygamy, fixing-age limit for marriage and laws concerning inheritance. They demanded that the clauses of the Ordinance that run counter to the Quran, *Sunnah* and *Fiqh-i-Hanafī* must

⁶ Ghulam Mu'innuddin Na'imi, ed., *Dastur-i-Islami aur Jamhuriyyah-i-Islamiyyah Pakistan kay Silsilah main Markazi Jam'iyat ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan ki Jidd-o-Juhad* (Lahore: Maqbul-i-'am Press, n.d.), pp. 21-24.

⁷ Markazi Jam'iyat ul-Ulama-i-Pakiatan ka Intakhabi Manshur (Lahore: Ghulam Qadir, n.d.), pp.4-7.

⁸ *Jam'iyat* (Lahore), 24 October 1958, pp.3, 5; 31 October 1958, p.3 and *al-Sa'id* (Multan), October 1960, pp.3-4.

⁹ Answers to Questionnaire of the Constitution Commission by Prominent Ulama (Lahore: n. pub., n. d.), pp. 28-29.

¹⁰ *Zia-e-Haram* (Lahore), November 1970, pp.30-32.

be deleted or be brought in line with the *Shari'at*.¹¹ Same was the case when, in November 2006, the Parliament of Pakistan passed 'Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Bill, 2006', as the Barelwis opposed the Act, but they were unable to stop its adoption and implementation.¹²

After the enactment of the Political Parties Act in July 1962, the MJUP was revived on 5 August and after that, it fully concentrated on its re-organization. However, the MJUP's matters did not run smoothly even after its revival.

Back in January 1958, there emerged a dissenting group of Lahore-based Barelwi Ulama and they organised their parallel organisation under the name of Jamhur Ahl-i-Sunnat Pakistan.¹³ Again in May 1963, some Lahore-based Barelwi Ulama announced to form another political organisation, Jam'iyatul Muslimin Pakistan (JMusl.P) and decided to contest the forthcoming elections on the tickets of the JMusl.P in order to get elected Barelwi representatives in the Assemblies.¹⁴ In Lahore, a section of the Barelwi Ulama who were against the moribund and dormant status of the MJUP, established Jam'iyat ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan, Lahor in July 1968.¹⁵

The 1965 Presidential Election also badly affected the organizational structure of the MJUP. The personality clashes of some Ulama and *Masha'ikh* aggravated during this Election. The Election, held in January 1965 enhanced the disunity and rift in the Barelwi Ulama and the MJUP. A majority of them were against the candidature of Miss Fatima Jinnah (1893-1967) younger sister of the Quaid-i-Azam, on the *Shari'* basis. But there were also some other Barelwi Ulama and *Masha'ikh* who were opposing Miss Jinnah and supporting Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan (1907-74) for their own vested interests.

Pir Muhammad Abdul Majid Ahmad Qadiri of Dewal Sharif (1922-95) organized his Markazi Jam'iyat ul-Masha'ikh Pakistan and claimed that Ayub Khan was his *murid*.¹⁶ A dissenting group, headed by Sahibzada Sayyid Mahmud Shah Gujrati (1920-87) vice-president of the West Pakistan Jam'iyat ul-Ulama-i-Pakistan openly supported Miss Jinnah.¹⁷

After the 'victory' of Ayub Khan, Barelwis reiterated their demand for legislation in accordance with the Quran and *Sunnah*, amendments in the

¹¹ Mian Tufail Muhammad, trans. and ed., Statement of 209 Ulama of Pakistan on Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (Evaluating its Religious & Social Aspects), (Lahore: Maktaba-e-Mansoorah, 1987), pp. 15-34.

¹² Muhammad Munibur Rahman, *Haquq-i-Niswan Aikt* (Lahore: Kownsil Af Jara'id-i-Ahl-i-Sunnat Pakistan, n.d.), pp. 3-16.

¹³ *'Arafat* (Lahore), January 1958, p.12.

¹⁴ *Snad-i-A'zam* (Lahore), 31 May 1963, p.1.

¹⁵ *Mashriq* (Lahore), 5 July 1968.

¹⁶ Personal Interview with Pir of Dewal Sharif, 29 May 1990, Faizabad, Rawalpindi.

¹⁷ *The Khyber Mail* (Peshawar), 1 January 1965.

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance and annulment of all other un-Islamic laws as promised by Ayub Khan before the Election. However, he was still promising to fulfil these demands. The controversy over sighting of the *'idul Fitr* moon (January 1967), malpractices, corruption and alleged anti-Sunni activities of the *Anqaf* Department and other casual and innovatory steps taken by him for religious reforms were also main reasons for a group of Barelwis to join the last phase of the anti-Ayub Movement in 1968-69.

The imposition of Martial Law in March 1969 again banned political activities which were resumed on 1 January 1970. The Martial Law authorities also announced to hold general elections in October 1970. However, the elections were held in December. The Barelwis, divided into number of groups, tried to forge unity in their ranks before the elections.

Several unsuccessful attempts were made to form a new, active and well-disciplined party of the Barelwis. However, on 4 April 1970, in a meeting held at Lahore, a successful attempt was made to forge unity among various groups of the Barelwis. All the groups, except that of Mahmud Shah Gujrati, attended this meeting and announced to cease the functioning of their groups. In this meeting, which was presided over by Mawlana Shah Ahmad Nurani Siddiqi (1926-2003), a twenty-five member 'Sunni Board', under the name of *Majlis-i-'Amal* of the Jam'iyat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan (JUP) was constituted. Allamah Sayyid Mahmud Ahmad Rizwi (1925-99) was appointed as a convener of the *Majlis*. The meeting pledged to work against Socialism, Communism, Capitalism, Feudalism and all other un-Islamic 'isms'.¹⁸ The Mahmud Shah Gujrati faction stayed away from the activities of the majority and sided with the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP)-(November 1967) and other leftist forces during and after the Elections.

The Barelwis commenced their election campaign by holding a public meeting at Multan on 19 April 1970. After that, they arranged number of public meetings under the name of Sunni Conferences for mobilizing public opinion, particularly Sunni public in their favour. They also gave their electoral manifesto, pledging to work for the establishment of a social welfare state; to uproot Socialism and Capitalism and to safeguard the rights of the Sunnis.

The most effective and strong power show by them was made on 13-14 June 1970 at Toba Tek Singh, where they arranged a largely attended Sunni Conference. This Conference was considered as a milestone in the political history of the Barelwis, as it injected new life and spirit in them. It transformed the JUP into an important religio-political party.

The JUP contested the elections for the National Assembly only from the North- West Frontier Province, Punjab and Sind and for the Provincial Assemblies of Punjab and Sind. It put up fifty candidates for the National Assembly. For the Punjab and Sind Assemblies, it had seventy-three and

¹⁸ *Ridwan* (Lahore), April-March 1970, pp.4-5.

fifteen candidates respectively. According to the election results, seven JUP candidates won National Assembly seats: four from Punjab and three from Sind. JUP stood seventh in all Pakistan level and third among other religious parties for the National Assembly seats. Four of its candidates for the Punjab Assembly won seats. JUP was fifth in the Punjab and first among other religious parties and in the Sind Assembly, seven of its candidates were elected¹⁹ JUP stood fourth in Sind and first among other religious parties. For that reason, Shah Faridul Haq, a JUP's elected member of the Sind Assembly from Karachi was chosen as the leader of the opposition in the Assembly.

The JUP, claiming to represent the Sunni majority of Pakistan, participated in electoral politics as an independent party for the first time in 1970. Its leadership had repeatedly asserted that the Sunnis constituted 80 percent of the population of Pakistan and they claimed to be their sole representative. During the elections, JUP was fully supported by the vast majority of the Sunni Ulama and *Masha'ikh*. The party did not join any electoral alliance and also exploited the sectarian differences with other religious parties. Even then, its performance in the election was quite poor, however, it emerged as a new political force.

The Barelwis fully participated in the post-election political and constitutional developments and pledged to work for the uplift of Islam, strong Centre and the integrity of Pakistan. They also played their due role in the East Pakistan crisis and tried their utmost to avert the debacle of East Pakistan.

In 1972, the Barelwis, for the first time, experienced parliamentary politics. However, it was mainly due to their struggle and demand that Islam was declared official religion of Pakistan, the definition of a Muslim was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution and Qadianis/Lahoris/Ahmedis were declared non-Muslim. In 1977, there started a protest against the alleged rigging in the 1977 Elections, which later on, transformed into a religious movement, *Tehrik-i-Nizam-i-Mustafa*, mainly due to efforts of the JUP. However, the movement terminated with the imposition of Martial Law in July 1977. By holding grand Sunni Conference at Multan in October 1978 and *Milad-i-Mustafa* Conference at Raiwind in March 1979, the Barelwis successfully managed to organize their community.

After October 1979, there occurred a division in the Barelwis. One group sided with the Martial Law authorities, while the other was against it. In the meantime, Jama'at-i-Ahl-i-Sunnat Pakistan (1956), in July 1987 announced to participate in the national politics of Pakistan.²⁰ The Jama'at contested the

¹⁹ Election Commission, *Report On General Elections: Pakistan 1970-71*, Vol. II, (Islamabad: The Manager of Publications, n.d.), pp.68-69, 257, 263.

²⁰ Jama'at-i-Ahl-i-Sunnat Pakistan ka Tarikhi Faisalah aur aus ka pasmanzar (Lahore: Markazi Jama'at-i-Ahl-i-Sunnat Pakistan, n.d.), p. 2.

1988 and 1990 Elections but could not manage to win any seat. Furthermore, Idarah-i-Minhaj ul-Quran was founded in October 1980, which later in May 1989, gave birth to Pakistan Awami Tehrik (PAT), a broad-based party having a moderate and non-sectarian approach. Where as, Istahkam-i-Pakistan Council and Sunni Tehrik (ST) were also organized in April 1981 and April 1990, respectively. ST vowed for the safeguard of the Sunnis' religio-political rights. In May 2001, Muhammad Salim Qadiri (1960-2001), leader of the ST was assassinated in Karachi, the first-ever leader of any Barelwi party who had been killed so far. The tragic incident of Nishter Park, Karachi (11 April 2006), was also a great setback for the ST, where its almost all frontline leadership was killed in a bomb blast. ST contested national and provincial elections of 2002 and election for the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly held in 2006 for the first time, but was unable to perform well.²¹ Although these organizations were formed by the Barelwi Ulama, but these were presented as alternative platforms to the already established Barelwi parties, particularly the JUP. This state of affairs badly affected the JUP's influence and strength in the Pakistan polity.

General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1924-88) in search of any legitimacy for his desire to rule for indefinite period called Islam for his help and announced to Islamise the laws and society. Some Barelwi Ulama, again in the noble hope of Islamisation under Zia regime, joined the *Majlis-i-Shura*, nominated in December 1981 and accepted some senior posts in the government departments like Council of the Islamic Ideology (1973), *Ruet-i-Hilal* Committee, Federal Shariat Court (May 1980) and Shariat Appellate Benches. For the 1985 Elections, there emerged a Nizam-i-Mustafa Group (NMG) consisting dissenting group of some Barelwi Ulama and former JUP's workers, mainly from Karachi and Hyderabad, the strong hold of the JUP, who sided with the Martial Law authorities. The NMG did well in the Elections and managed to win six seats in the National and three in the Sind Assemblies²² and so, inducted in the Federal and Sind Cabinets. After the dismissal of Muhammad Khan Junejo's (1932-93) Government in May 1988, the NMG transformed itself into a full-fledged political party with the name of Nizam-i-Mustafa Party (NMP). In August 2003, the NMP reactivated itself. In July 2007, there emerged another political party with the name of Nizam-i-Mustafa League. Both of them stand for the enforcement of the *Nizam-i-Mustafa*.

In the national politics, JUP had to join hands with other religio-political and even with secular parties for the fulfilment of its religious and

²¹ Personal Interview with Muhammad Shahid Ghuri, 17 March 2007, Markaz-i-Ahl-i-Sunnat, Karachi.

²² *Report On The General Elections 1985*, vol. III (Islamabad: Election Commission Of Pakistan, n. d.), pp. 58-60, 189, 204, 207.

political agenda. According to the JUP, unity with other sects had been forged only for the sake of restoration of democracy and civil liberties in Pakistan. For this, in March 1973, JUP joined the United Democratic Front and again in January 1977, Pakistan National Alliance against the PPP Government. However, it did not join the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in March 1981, but it opposed the Zia Regime. The majority of the Barelwis were against the Referendum, held in December 1984 and the JUP boycotted the non-party Elections, held in February 1985.

After the withdrawal of Martial Law in December 1985, the JUP reactivated itself and started its mass contact movement. Due to the dismissal of Junejo Government and the accidental death of General Ziaul Haq in August 1988, elections were held in November 1988 on party bases. For these elections, the JUP formed Pakistan Awami Ittihad with the Tehrik-i-Istaqlal (TI)-(March 1970) in October 1988. The JUP won 3 seats in the National Assembly. In the 1990 Elections, JUP (Nurani Group) contested independently, whereas JUP (Niazi Group) made an electoral alliance with the Islami Jamhuri Ittihad-(IJI)-(1988) and contested the Elections on the tickets and electoral symbol of the IJI. Furthermore, NMG and the Jam'iyat ul-Masha'ikh Pakistan (JMP) were also component parties of the IJI. In these Elections, JUP (Nurani Group) won 3 seats in the National Assembly. The JUP (Nurani Group) contested the elections of 1993 having alliance with the Jam'iyat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (Fazlur Rahman Group) a Deobandi party, under the name of Islami Jamhuri Mahadh (1992), whereas JUP (Niazi Group), NMG and the JMP contested the Elections under the umbrella of the IJI. The JUP (Nurani Group) boycotted the 1997 Elections whereas the JUP (Niazi Group) contested the Elections on the tickets and symbol of the PML (Nawaz Sharif Group). The JMP also contested the Elections. In March 1997, Mawlana Muhammad Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi (1915-2001) was elected as Senator. The JUP contested the 2002 Elections, through the platform of the Mutahiddah Majlis-i-'Amal (MMA)-(June 2001).²³ The MMA won 53 seats in the National Assembly and out of these, only one seat was of the JUP. However, Mawlana Shah Ahmad Nurani president of the JUP and the MMA was elected Senator in February 2003 and later, became unofficial leader of the opposition in the Senate. The NMP and the JUP (Nifadh-i- Shari'at Group) also contested the Elections, but in vain.

Since 1988, the Barelwis has been facing some serious crisis, especially leadership crisis. Their main political party, JUP has been divided into four rival groups and thus its performance in the Elections of 1988, 1990, 1993,

²³ Mujeeb Ahmad, "Translocal Muslim Networks and Religious Mobilization in South Asia-A Case Study of Barelwis Ahl-i-Sunnat wa Jama'at ", paper presented at The 19th European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies, Leiden, The Netherlands, 27-30. June 2006, p. 13.

1997 and 2002 was very poor. Although, the PAT, in January 1990 formed an alliance with the TI and the Tehrik-i-Nifadh-i-Fiqh-i-Jafariah (April 1979)- (now Islami Tehrik Pakistan) however, it did so poor in 1990 Elections that eventually it decided not to contest the next elections and in 1993, decided to quit active politics. However, it contested the 2002 Elections and was able to win only one seat for the National Assembly from Lahore.

Since April 1970, the JUP functioned mainly as a united party and a sole spokesman of the Sunnis. However, in February 1990, it divided into two factions; namely Nurani and Niazi Groups, due to severe differences over the issue of contesting or not the by-election from Lahore in February 1990.²⁴ After that, JUP (Niazi Group) became an allied party of the PML (Nawaz Sharif Group) mainly for the implementation of *Shari'at*. Although the Niazi Group got federal and provincial ministries, however, the Group was unable to persuade Nawaz Sharif Government for the implementation of *Shari'at*. So, in June 1997, there emerged Markazi Jam'iyat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan and later in May 1999, JUP (Nifadh-i-Shari'at Group) from the Niazi Group. The NMP merged itself into the MJUP. In October 1995, due to the efforts of some Barelwi Ulama, the JUP Nurani and Niazi Groups decided to merge their respective groups and to form a single party. However, this patch up did not live long and they again splitted. However, again in October 2000 both of them decided to work jointly under the supervision of a Supreme Council, headed by Mawlana Nurani.²⁵ After the death of Mawlana Abdus Sattar Niazi in May 2001, Pir Sayyid Anis Haider Shah revived the Niazi Group. Now, in the national politics of Pakistan there are four groups working on the name of the JUP. They are; JUP headed by Sahibzada Muhammad Shah Anas Nurani, JUP (Nifadh-i-Shari'at Group) headed by Engineer Salimullah Khan, JUP (Niazi Group) headed by Pir Anis Haider Shah and MJUP headed by Sahibzada Muhammad Fazl-i-Karim.

After the historical account of the Barelwis' role in the national politics of Pakistan, it is clear that, although they claimed that they are in majority, but the electoral history of Pakistan did not support their claim. However, it will be incorrect to ignore and underestimate their socio-political importance and influence in the national politics. As it is said that the majority of the Pakistanis are Sunnis (Barelwis), so, most of the Pakistani politicians, working in other political parties are by birth Barelwi. Like the 1945-46 elections, when the Ulama, *Masha'ikh* and Sunni people voted for the AIML, now they also supports and votes for the other parties, in spite of the fact, that there are Barelwi religio- political parties in the field. This attitude can be

²⁴ Qari Abdul Hamid Qadiri, ed., *Jam'iyat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan Apni Tarikh kay Aham Mur Par* (Lahore: Markazi Jam'iyat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan, n.d.), pp. 5-8.

²⁵ Rashid Ahmad Ridwi, *Jam'iyat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan* (Lahore: Shu'bah Nashr-o-Isha'at Jam'iyat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan, Panjab, n.d.), p.16.

rationalized by saying that the majority of the Sunni people are 'secular'. However, it will be again incorrect to conclude that the Ulama and *Masha'ikh* are irrelevant and unimportant in the national politics of Pakistan, as they have religious authority and sanction to lead the Sunni people in the different spheres of life and the people do response to their leadership. In this connection, one example of 19 May 2000 can be sited, when on the call of Mawlana Nurani and other *ulama* belonging to different schools of thought, gave a call of strike as a protest against the proposed amendments in the Blasphemy Act, the whole country responded so positively that the then Chief Executive General Perwaiz Musarraf had to denied any such proposal, publicly. Moreover, the Barelwis have a well connected network of numerous *dini madaris*, religious and social *anjuman*-s, students, lawyers, teachers, women wings and strong interaction with other members of the civil society. So, they have considerable importance in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan. ■

**POLITICAL FAMILY TREE OF THE BARELWIS IN PAKISTAN:
1948-2007**

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SHIITES

Hussain Arif Naqvi

Shiite Islamic political point of view is very simple. Accordingly, Imam is designated by 'Nus'. The Muslim should accept it through their own 'resolve'. Those who do not accept are free to follow their own motivation. However, it is the right of the Imam and the followers to practice Islam according to what is true in their belief. If forced to do the opposite, they struggle back.

In India, during Kingdoms, Shiite Muslims were regarded to be the antagonists of the Kingdom- as they sought guidance from the Imams and not from the Kings. The Governments required favour of those essentially opposed to Shiite thoughts. It was time and again considered necessary to propagate adversely against the so called opponents, the Shiites, to declare them as decoits, Qaramatis, and sometimes Kafirs. To get rid of these alleged opponents, many of the kings would endeavour to exterminate the Shiite Muslims or would get groups of people aroused against them.

However, the Shiite point of view on prevailing over an increased number of people and over a period of time it was possible for the Shiites to establish their own governments (though Kingdoms) in different areas of the world including those in undivided India.

Movement for establishing Pakistan as a democratic Muslim country out of division of India gained massive support of Shiite Muslims. Nevertheless, in the late stages of the movement, some statements by the leaders of the Movement created questions in the minds of the Shiites about the position of the Shiites in the new country. However, to a suggestion of Jamiat-e-Ulamai-Hind to hold a conference of All-Muslim parties to evolve a common basis for the unity of Indian Muslims, the Quaid-e-Azam said that it was not a moment for raising any issues concerning domestic differences/problems when the external danger is facing the Muslims.

Similarly, in reply to All-India Shia Political Conference's concerns about future of Shias in the new country-Pakistan Quaid-e-Azam said that the Muslim League stands for justice and fair play and that there is no need for the Shias to think that they will not be justly treated by the All India Muslim League. In his letter to the Quaid-e-Azam, the leader of the Shia Political Conference, admitting that he was not final authority on behalf of the Shias,

said they wanted to ensure that the Shias should be guaranteed sufficient number of seats in the Ministries. The Quaid-e-Azam said that the relevant points raised by the Conference are matters for the Musalmans themselves to deal with internally.

Whether such assurance is still there? Do Shias have sufficient participation in political matters and religious walks of life? Although it can be seen that there are areas in Pakistan where majority of the people are Shiites and in other areas the majority is Sunnis, some parties attempt in the direction that Shia candidates should be rejected in politics and other religious affairs only because of their being Shiites. Consequently, Shias have mostly abstained from voting in favour of the religious parties even to the Shia religious parties.

The Shiites, form a large portion of the Pakistani society, comprise more than 25% of its entire population. The Shias lived peacefully in Pakistan and as a community have always respected the teachings of Islamic Brotherhood and have kept themselves away from injustices, prejudices, and rivalries while they themselves become the target of injustice by the governments and other groups during the past several decades.

The only occasion where Shias have intervened in Pakistan was to stop the declaration of Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a Sunni State by General Zia ul Haq in the 1980s. Large number of Shias demonstrated in capital (Islamabad) in 1980 in an attempt to send a strong message of the Shiite anger and disagreement to the military ruler for ignoring Shiites. The Shiite groups even occupied the central secretariat for few days and only withdrew and dispersed from Islamabad after their demands were accepted by the government. The military dictatorship was shaken and it realized its mistakes and without any delay it immediately submitted to Shiite demands in the first meeting held with Shiite leadership after the first demonstration in Islamabad. The Shiite crowds dispersed peacefully and happily from Islamabad and a threat of occupation of cities by Shiites across Pakistan was over.

The successful Shiite agitation of the 1980 in Islamabad and the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran led to the beginning of creeping moves against the Shiites in international and national levels. Several Anti-Shiite organizations were born and several old were strengthened with hidden support from the government institutions and foreign elements. The invasion of Northern Areas by mobs or Lashkar, the wars in tribal areas of North West Frontier Province (NWFP), bomb blasts and the targeted killings of Shiite senior citizens, and technocrats across Pakistan were all part of that conspiracy.

In this threatening situation the Shiites in Pakistan looked towards the Majas of Iran and Iraq who only advised the Shiites in Pakistan to respect Islamic values of Muslim Brotherhood in all conditions. This decision by the Marjas of Iran and Iraq actually saved Pakistan from major crisis and complete

collapse. The Shiites in Pakistan respected these advices of their Marjas and boldly and patiently continued to face all sufferings.

In 1985 one attempt was made by the Shiites to form a strong political party. One convention titled "Quran o Sunnat Conference" was arranged in Lahore at Minar-e-Pakistan and was attended by tens of thousands of Shiites from across Pakistan. The "Tehrik e Nifaz e Fiqh Jafaria" was declared as a political party on this occasion. This move by the Shiites was not welcomed by some national and foreign elements and the Shiites leadership of the Tehrik Syed Arif Hussain al Hussaini was martyred in Peshawar. The Shiites put the blame of the martyrdom of their Leader on the military ruler and the Governor of the NWFP General Fazale Haq. The person who commanded the killing of Syed Arif Hussain al Hussaini is believed to be Major Majid Reza Gilani who was an elite member of the Presidential Guards. Major Majid Reza Gilani was held innocent by the Supreme Court but was later killed by the unknown men.

The martyrdom of Hujjatul Islam Syed Arif Hussain al Hussaini proved that the move by the Shiites to appear on a political scenario of Pakistan could not work as the foreign elements are not ready to give Shiites their due and right share. In the mean time the Shiites sufferings continued with the killings of hundreds of innocent Shiites across Pakistan.

Although some Shiites continued their association with the Tehrik Jafria that got some seats in National Assembly, Senate, and even a Ministerial seat in a caretaker setup.

Another attempt by the Shiites was the creation of Sipah e Muhammad. Tens of Thousands of Shiites gathered at Minar e Pakistan, Lahore and the formation of Sipah e Muhammad was announced. Interestingly it was declared that it was not a political party but a defensive force that will be strengthened in the future. This formation brought pleasant change for Shias in Pakistan within few years and the establishment was forced to review its relations with elements which were against Shiites while those elements had already failed to achieve the desired results.

Later both Sipah e Muhammad, Tehrik e Jafria and anti Shiite organizations like Sipah e Sahaba and Lashkar e Jhangvi were banned by the Present military ruler General Pervaiz Musharraf.

The Shiites continued to face creeping moves against them and currently the most active region where Shiites are still facing tough challenges is the NWFP province and Tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. The situations are even worse in Dera Ismail Khan and Tank districts where Shias still are being targeted and even some portions of the community are relocating to other safer areas.

In fact the unsuccessful movements targeting Shiites in Pakistan have proved to be more harmful for Sunnis than Shiites as it has created more

groupings among Sunnis and virtually the most honoured and senior Sunni Ulemas have no control over the mobs being led by junior or local leaders.

Due to the changing International political conditions and with the emergence of Islamic Iran as a major power and player in the region, the position of Shiites has generally improved in Pakistan. Shiites remain the potent and decisive force in Pakistan that continue to regard and respect Islamic values in all conditions and are always ready to respect the rights of other brethren.■

**PAKISTAN: *MUTTAHIDA MAJLIS-E- AMAL*
(COMBINED ACTION COMMITTEE) WORLD VIEW: 2002-2007**

Dr. Sayyid A. S. Pirzada

The 2002 national elections in Pakistan were significant from the viewpoint of unity of all religious parties. In January 2002 Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Fazalul Rehman, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Samiul Haq, Jamaat Islami Pakistan, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Tahrike Islami Pakistan, and Jamiat Ahle Hadith Pakistan coalesced to setup Muttahida Majlis-e- Amal – Combined Action Committee popularly referred to as the MMA or *Majlis-e-Amal* to contest the polls. The MMA was a continuity of the theme of the Islamic State in Pakistan.¹

In their manifesto, the MMA promised to recognize supremacy of the Quran and Sunnah, improving the lot of women in accordance with the dictates of Islam, and following an independent foreign policy. The manifesto specifically provided for guarantee to the rights of minorities and protection of their social and religious institutions². While electioneering was on, the United States (US) decided to attack the Taliban regime in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001 for alleged involvement in 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US. For using the Pakistan air space and land route, President Bush of the USA in a telephonic conversation on 13 September 2001, threatened General Musharraf to become America’s ally in “war against terrorism or that of terrorists and be ready to be turned into Stone Age.” General Musharraf responded instantly and expressed his readiness to assist him in mounting attack on neighbouring Muslim country, Afghanistan. General Musharraf convened a meeting of national leaders on September 16, 2001 and according to Qazi Husain Ahmad informed them of having surrendered the national independence and freedom before the Americans.³

In his *In the Line of Fire* (2006), General Musharraf writes that US Secretary of State Collin Powel rang him to convey a blatant ultimatum “You are either with us or against us.” The Deputy Secretary of the State Richard

¹ Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Berkley, 1963. Sayyid A.S. Pirzada, *The Politic of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam Pakistan: 1971- 1977*, Oxford, 2000. Syed M.H.Shah, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan 1972-88*, Islamabad, 1996. I. H. Qureshi, *Pakistan an Islamic Democracy*, Lahore. 1981.

² *Jang*, Rawalpindi, and 15 May 2002. *Nation*, Islamabad, 18 May 2002. *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 18 May 2002.

³ Monthly *Tarjumanul Quran*, July 2002, Lahore, 3-4.

Armitage went still farther and told the Director General of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) General Mahmud (then) in Washington “not only that we had to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but if we chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to Stone Age.”⁴ Powel, he says was very balanced, clear headed and able person and my friend.⁵ Armitage’s language was un-diplomatic. His tenor frustrated me but I found him “a good friend of Pakistan.”⁶ Soon after on September 13, 2001 US Ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlain brought me seven demands, the crux of which was to facilitate an all-out attack on Afghanistan by using all necessary facilities through land, air and sea.⁷ Of those, two were slightly reshaped. The rest were accepted. Musharrf continues, I met a cross section of society between September 18 and October 3, 2001 – intellectuals, editors, columnists, academics, tribal chiefs, students and leaders of labour unions, soldiers, ministers, corps commanders (and political leaders which he did not mention) to communicate them the offer he made to the Americans.⁸ My decision to satisfy American agenda “was based on the well-being of my people and the best interests of my country – Pakistan always comes first.”⁹ The above version is also referred to by Nazish Brohi, a sympathiser of the US and the West, in his *The MMA Offensive - Three Years in Power: 2003-2005* (2006).

Massive American bombings and use of dirty bombs causing hundreds of thousands of casualties including women, elderly and children, and hunt of the associates of alleged mastermind of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, Usama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network in the tribal area of Pakistan adjoining Afghanistan through Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) agents, therefore, engaged the attention of the MMA election campaign. Merciless killing of Afghans continues today (2007) even after the occupation of that country by the US and installation of the US-backed regime of Hamid Karzai.

In the election campaign the MMA made a strong plea against the interference of the US in Pakistan and its vested interests. The MMA President, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani emphasised at Karachi the dire need of the enforcement of Prophetic order in the country and breaking the shackles of American slavery.¹⁰ Those opposing the MMA, the first ever religious alliance of all religious parties, were American agents who have facilitated the presence of the Americans and the Jews at our airfields.¹¹ The

⁴ Parvaez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*, London, 2006, 201.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 289.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 204.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 204-205.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 206.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 201.

¹⁰ *Jang*, 1 July 2002.

¹¹ *Ansaf*, 26 July 2002.

central leaders of the MMA components told workers convention at Rawalpindi that the polls would be a contest between the US backed secular forces and Islamic forces in the country.¹² To bring masses round their viewpoint the MMA leaders decided to launch a train march from Rawalpindi to the down country till Karachi. The MMA stalwart, Maulana Fazalul Rehman pointed out that the Ulemas were waging a war for protecting the country against American and Western designs.¹³ Today, our airports, seaports and land have been handed over to the American forces. How can we say we are an independent nation?¹⁴ He warned, if the masses did not support the MMA, the country will pass on to the Americans and become their colony. He clarified that the MMA will give the minorities their due rights and even offered the Christian leader J. Salik to join their ranks.¹⁵ The October 10, 2002 polls returned MMA with 67 seats, out of total 342 seats as third major party in the National Assembly (NA). In the provincial assemblies, the MMA won strong majority in the NWFP with 46 out of 97, 14 out of 48 seats in Balochistan and 7 and 10 seats respectively in the Punjab and Sind.

The MMA took its victory as a proof of people's hatred for the US and Pakistan's pro-US policies.¹⁶ Daily Dawn linked MMA's achievement with feelings against America's high handed tactics in Afghanistan.¹⁷ However Daily *The News* warned MMA 'to remember the fate, that met Erbakan, the Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey, and his Refax Patry, when he bade farewell to diplomacy and came into direct clash with the establishment as a result of his blunt statements and actions.¹⁸ The US State Department called upon the MMA to fulfil their responsibility against terrorism 'under their aegis'.¹⁹ The Britain and European Union expressed dismay over the expected king maker role of the MMA.²⁰

The MMA and the US were not on a common ground in the so called "war of terrorism". Maulana Fazlul Rahman decried "war of terrorism as mere illusion."²¹ Taking into cognizance, the feelings of Western countries, the Pakistan Foreign Office (FO) 'strongly dispelled the impression that the MMA parties are extremist religious parties'.²² The MMA itself arranged a briefing by Qazi Husain Ahmed and Maulana Fazalul Rahman for ambassadors, high

¹² *Nation*, 26 July 2002.

¹³ *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 29 August 2002.

¹⁴ *News*, Rawalpindi, 29 Aug 2002.

¹⁵ *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 13 September 2002. *News*, 21 September 2002.

¹⁶ *Ausaf*, 15 Oct 2002.

¹⁷ *Dawn*, 18 October 2002.

¹⁸ *News*, 18 October 2002.

¹⁹ *Pakistan*, 18 October 2002.

²⁰ *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 20 October 2002.

²¹ *Jang*, 7 August 2007.

²² *Pakistan Observer*, 22 October 2002.

commissioners and senior diplomats of the Western, and other nations at Islamabad. They, MMA—the stalwarts, clarified that the alliance would not compromise on its basic ideology and principles for the rule of law in the light of the Quran and Sunnah.²³ The alliance condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and promised not to allow any one to use Pakistan's soil for this purpose. We know what terrorism is and what is not? There was no *internationally*²⁴ agreed definition of terrorism. *Jihad* was a Quranic teaching to fight against oppression. They exhorted the diplomats that the world community should evolve a strategy to stop the use of force by powerful nations in getting control over resources belonging to weaker nations. Any foreign intervention in the internal affairs of any nation in violation of latter's law, should not at all be approved in the garb of international community.²⁵ We are opposed to terrorism, may it be by individuals or state.²⁶ After inauguration of National Assembly, MMA's Maulana Fazlul Rahman took over as the Leader of the Opposition.²⁷ The plight of Iraq gained his attention which had become a victim of the US attack for the second time.

In March 2003, the US mounted attack on Iraq on the pretext that the President, Saddam Hussain was preparing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The MMA had spearheaded the move against the US and organised Million March protests all over the country like elsewhere in the world to condemn American aggression against that country. A countrywide strike was also observed on March 21, 2003. The Million Marches were addressed by leaders of other parties as well. The MMA Chief, Maulana Noorani condemned inhuman massacre of Iraqi Muslims by Americans and desecration of the Holy Places of Islam and appealed for an economic boycott of the aggressors – the US and Britain.²⁸ Maulana demanded an immediate halt of attack and ouster of American forces from Iraq. Maulana Samiul Haq condemned American aggression in Iraq and asked for severing all types of diplomatic relations with it. He also demanded stopping supply of oil to the US, opening of frontiers by all Muslim countries to enable the volunteers join hands with Iraqi brothers to combat aggression and to boycott American products.²⁹ Professor Sajid Mir, severely criticised the logic 'Pakistan First' on state media sponsored by the military government and 'regarded the American war against Iraq as a war against Islam'.³⁰ Maulana Fazalul Rahman condemned

²³ *News*, 24 October 2002.

²⁴ For emphasis.

²⁵ *News*, 24 October 2002.

²⁶ *Jang*, 24 Oct 2002.

²⁷ *Pakistan Political Perspective*, Islamabad, June 2004.

²⁸ *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 31 March 2003.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

the American attack against Iraq and decried General Musharraf's alliance with aggressor America against Muslims. He said the people of Pakistan have rejected his foreign policy in the elections. The people of Pakistani are with the aggressed, with humanity, with Iraq, and with Afghanistan. The people of Pakistan are not with American *pithus*- hirelings.³¹

Despite negotiating with the Musharraf government on constitutional matters, the MMA adopted a tougher stance against him and organised 'Go Musharraf Go' and 'No to military dictatorship' protest for³² collaborating with President Bush against vital national interests,³³ venturing for recognition of Jewish state of Israel against the popular sentiment³⁴, and promoting a secular outlook of life against popular Islamic teachings. They threatened to react severely, if he sent Pakistan Army to Iraq to help the Americans.³⁵ The MMA did not retreat from the above stance, despite a challenge of the eligibility of sixty five of their elected members in the Supreme Court (SC) which they viewed as glaring example of pressure against the Opposition.³⁶

The pressure by the MMA succeeded and the idea to send Pakistan Army to Iraq was dropped despite persistent US pressure. The MMA-government détente (to the extent of adoption of The Constitutional 17th Amendment Act, 2004) though added to the stature of Musharraf but degraded MMA as 'B Team of military bureaucracy'³⁷, (Musharraf 's) 'friendly and obedient Opposition'³⁸ and 'His Majesty's Loyal Opposition'³⁹ and the MMA as 'Mulla - Musharraf Alliance'.⁴⁰ Therefore, there was no truth whatsoever in the analysis of *New York Times* that having entered into an agreement with the MMA, Musharraf regime became a prey of the Mullahs and as a result, they will be reluctant in undertaking action against militants.⁴¹

Meanwhile, in early 2004 'debriefing', 'humiliation' and character assassination of Dr. A. Q. Khan, father of Pakistan's nuclear programme and other nuclear scientists, by Musharraf government under the US pressure, attracted the attention of the MMA. The nuclear scientists were undisputed national heroes. They were accused of transfer of technology. The nation was in a state of shock said Qazi Husain Ahmed at humiliating those who spent their lifetime in protecting the country.⁴² To protest against this attitude of the

³¹ Ibid.

³² *Pakistan Observer*, 13 June 2003.

³³ *Al-Akbar*, 13 June 2003.

³⁴ *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 19 June 2003. *Nation*, 20 June 2003.

³⁵ *Ausaf*, 22 August 2003.

³⁶ *News*, 14 June 2003.

³⁷ *Nation*, 7 Aug 2003.

³⁸ *Nation*, 14 June 2003.

³⁹ Pakistan Political Perspective, February 2004, 48-9.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, June 2004, 49.

⁴¹ *Ausaf*, 31 December 2003.

⁴² Pakistan Political Perspective, March 2004, 47.

government a countrywide strike was observed on February 6, 2004 wherein other parties also took part. He condemned that 'our army is fighting against its own people in South Waziristan at the direction of American troops and the FBI agents.'⁴³ He slated non-NATO ally of US status for Pakistan, and questioned after the elimination of NATO's foe, the former USSR, why he allied with Washington against Muslim movements.⁴⁴ The MMA termed the Wana operation in South Waziristan as a 'Zionist conspiracy' against Islam and a joke with the people of Pakistan. The government on the behest of the US is killing innocent citizens in the name of so-called terrorism.⁴⁵ The MMA feelings were shared by the Federal Education Minister General Qazi Javid Ashraf, who dubbed the Jews as "worst terrorists."⁴⁶

Maulana Fazalul Rahman questioned the moderate and civilized West and asked what degree of civilization and moderation would the US rate itself having undertaken nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki where millions of innocent civilians were eliminated in minutes, and unjustified attack on Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq and inhuman treatment of detainees at Shiberghan, Abu Gharib and Guantanamo prisons.⁴⁷ As Musharraf declined to accept MMA's demands, the MMA observed a Black Day on January, 1 2005 for humiliating the national heroes, the nuclear scientists, undertaking Army action against its own people in South Waziristan and activities of the FBI, besides major shift in the Kashmir policy seeking a solution on options other than the United Nations (UN) Resolutions.

Startling revelations were made by an MMA leader Senator Khurshid Ahmad about the real agenda of the US Secretary of State, Dr. Condoleezza Rice's visits to India and Pakistan. He said America was not interested about supporting our vital concern about Kashmir. In an interview with a private channel, she demanded 'joint interrogation of Dr. A. Q. Khan by the US and Pakistan'. He questioned that the country which has piled up over six thousand nuclear warheads and has refused to ratify Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and which is flagrantly violating Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) by new experiments for developing mini-nuclear bombs, has no right to poke its nose in the affairs of any other country. And that the vital question about Israel's arsenal and the threat it poses to the entire Arab and Islamic world is no concern for American and its allies.⁴⁸

The large scale campaign of the MMA finally exposed "American Imperialism" and the aggressor's own house started feeling the pangs of war at the hands of resistance movements in Afghanistan and Iraq. Dilating on

⁴³ *Ibid.*, April 2004, 55.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, June 2004, 53.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, November 2004, 47.

⁴⁶ *Khabrain*, 20 August 2005.

⁴⁷ Pakistan Political Perspective, January 2005, 44-5.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* April 2005, 50.

“terrorism”, Michael Moor – a film-maker, director and author of bestseller *Stupid Whitemen* (2001) disclosed that in 1997, the US Vice President Dick Cheney’s Helle Burton held negotiations with (“terrorist”) Taliban at Texas.⁴⁹ French authors Jean Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie in their book *Forbidden Truth* (2001), stated that till August 2001 the US looked at Taliban as such a via media that could ensure peace and stability in Central Asia to make conducive conditions for the laying of their 1300 Kilometer Turkmenistan-Pakistan pipeline through Central Asia to exploit Caspian oil reserves. They continue that the Taliban delegation instead wanted to give the contract to an Argentinian Company which infuriated Dick Cheney (present US Vice President), the Chief Executive of Helle Burton. The Bush administration continued negotiations with Taliban till August 2001, when the tougher stance of Taliban forced Dick Cheney to inform them at Berlin “Either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs”.⁵⁰ Professor David Ray Griffin, in his thoroughly researched book *Debunking* writes that the only evidence of involvement of Saudi national Osama bin Laden in 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre (WTC) was a doubtful video cassette, which has been termed as “bogus” by Bruce Lawrence, American expert on Osama bin Laden. The American scientists and researchers have advanced evidence that 11 September attacks on the US “involving melting of even steel in their structure was not possible without planting of dynamite in them. Similarly, the destruction of WTC 7 without collision of any aircraft was not possible without the collaboration of American government and agencies.”⁵¹ Professor Ward Churchill of University of Colorado says 11 September 2001 attacks represented return of bloodshed abroad by Americans.⁵² According to Chalmers Johnson, President of Japan Policy Research Institute, it (11 September attack) did not “attack America” but “attacked American foreign policy” in the “Blowback” terminology of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).⁵³

Alan Greenspan, the former Chief of the US Central Bank, says in his memoirs *The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World* (2007) that “the Iraq war is largely about oil”.⁵⁴ The Australian Defence Minister, Brendan Nelson shares his views that “the real motive for invading Iraq was oil”.⁵⁵ A 1500-page report prepared by the CIA Special Advisor, Charles Duelfer submitted to the Congress admitted that Saddam “did not pose a serious threat to the United States and he did not possess or have plans to develop weapons of

⁴⁹ *Khabrain*, 18 December 2004.

⁵⁰ Asmai, *Jang*, 9 October 2007.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Dawn*, 13 February 2005.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Dawn*, 18 Sep 2007.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 24 September 2007.

mass destruction". However, despite that the White House supported military action.⁵⁶ Having stated the defecto facet of US supremacy at the hands of indigenous freedom struggle in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US leadership now stands with a changed approach ranging from holding negotiations to withdrawal with Iraqi resisters and the Taliban. A major impetus to this reverse stance was death of 3000 US soldiers in Iraq alone.⁵⁷ It was this spirit that the publication of the news about "body bags" infuriated the Pentagon.⁵⁸

Panic of the US is evident from a statement of (Ruling) Republican Senator, Chuck Hagel of Nebraska. Writing in the Washington Post, he says "The future of Iraq was always going to be determined by the Iraqis – not the Americans. We have misunderstood, misread, misplanned, and mismanaged our honourable intentions in Iraq with an arrogant self delusion reminiscent of Vietnam. Honourable intentions are not policies and plans. Iraq belongs to the 25 million Iraqis who live there. They will decide their fate and form of government...we are destroying our force structure, which took 30 years to build. We have been funding this war dishonestly..."⁵⁹ The US Ambassador to Iraq, Crocker told Senators' panel in Washington, "There will be no single moment at which we can claim victory". Senator Jed Bidden told the meeting "The one thing virtually everyone now agrees on is that there is no purely military solution in Iraq". Senator John Kerry (the defeated presidential candidate) said, "We should not be asking any more American troops to sacrifice their lives and limbs."⁶⁰ In Iraq itself the US Commander- in- Chief, General David proposed a plan for withdrawal of 30,000 soldiers⁶¹ and handed over NAJAF to the Iraqi forces.⁶² A former commander of the US forces in Iraq, Lt. General Ricardo said in Washington that the US Army can kill Iraqis but cannot win the war.⁶³ British Premier Gordon Brown said in Basra that one thousand British troops would leave Iraq by Christmas.⁶⁴

The analysts opposed American nuclear hegemony. A report of Tahlif Deen entitled "New US Plan for Nukes Hypocritical" criticised Bush administration for war against Iraq and "hypocrisy" of criticising other countries for nuclear proliferation, while it continues to develop weapons of its own".⁶⁵ Taking cognizance of above criticism of the "war of terror", the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad condemned Bush and

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 7 October 2004.

⁵⁷ Weekly *Ghazwa*, 30 December 2005.

⁵⁸ *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 23, 24 April 2004.

⁵⁹ *Washington Post/Dawn* 28 November 2006.

⁶⁰ *Dawn*, 12 September 2007.

⁶¹ *Jang*, 12 September 2007.

⁶² *Dawn*, 21 December 2006.

⁶³ *Jang*, 4 November 2006.

⁶⁴ *Dawn*, 3 October 2007.

⁶⁵ *Dawn / IPN*, 13 February 2004.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair as “child killers” and “war criminals”.⁶⁶ Bolivian President Eva Morales declared Bush as “the greatest terrorist of the world”.⁶⁷ Facing large scale opposition, the incessant West decided to take revenge of their humiliation by making the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) as their target. In September 2005 the Danish daily, the *Tyllands-Posten* published the caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) which were reproduced in Western and American papers drawing a sharp reaction and massive protests from Pakistan and elsewhere in the Muslim world. The fury of injuring the respect of the Prophet (PBUH) was hardly over, that Republican Presidential candidate of the US, Tom Taint made a stupid statement “If the terrorist attack Americans Mecca and Medina should be attacked”, which invited large-scale condemnation from Pakistan.⁶⁸

With massive record of bloodshed – plotting the toppling of twenty five governments, (*Khabrain*, 1 April 2005), bombing several countries and horrible torture of the inmates of Guantanamo, Abu Gharib and Shiberghan prisons decried even by the UN,⁶⁹ killing millions of innocent people the world over including using nuclear bomb against Japan, the US could hardly be morally justified to regard Iran as a “brutal regime”,⁷⁰ with whom the MMA extended all Muslim solidarity against American threats of destroying its nuclear programme.

Conclusion

Failure of imposing US supremacy on the world, the helplessness of occupying forces coupled with their demoralisation at the hands of Taliban and resistance movement in Iraq, and besides realisation in the US itself that only Iraqis are master of their country support the universal perception of respect for the national rights of all people. This is the essence of the MMA worldview. The present modus-operandi of the Western democracy led by the Americans and fertilised by hate mongering scholars like Huntington, was not only viewed as double standard today but was also held as such by the renowned Muslim philosopher Dr. Muhammad Iqbal. He said:

These democratic Institutions of the West
Are but the old wine in bottles new;
There are edifying dissertations on the Rights
Of Men; impassioned speeches from the Forum
On the sacred Duties of citizenship; and stormy
Debates in the Houses. But all these are no more

⁶⁶ *Dawn*, 6 February 2007.

⁶⁷ *Ghazwah*, 6-19 January 2006.

⁶⁸ *Jang*, 3 August 2007.

⁶⁹ *Dawn*, 17 February 2006.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 26 September 2007.

Than so many subterfuges to get hold of the world's wealth
Just a series of gigantic frauds, worked by old adepts
At the game, who privately agree among themselves?
To the share of each in the common spoils."⁷¹■

⁷¹ Mazheruddin Siddiqui, *The Image of the West in Iqbal*, Lahore, 1956, 36.

CHAPTER III

ROLE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF OTHER MINORITIES

Col (R) S.K. Tressler

Struggle and Creation of Pakistan

The struggle for independence and freedom from the British rulers started with the uprising of 1857, which they successfully crushed but its seed could not be uprooted. They continued on their policy of “Divide and Rule”, which was fairly successful due to the native selfish individuals. The two major partners, the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority, continued to struggle together but the Muslim leadership soon found out the designs of the Hindu majority Congress and decided for the separate homeland.

The Muslim League was established in 1906 at Dhaka under the chairmanship of Nawab Waqar-ul-Mulk and Sir. Aga Khan was its first President and Nawab Waqar ul Mulk as its Secretary General. Mohammad Ali Jinnah as a member of Congress tried his best to bring an understanding between the Hindus and Muslims. Lukhnow Declaration in 1916 accepted separate electorates, 30% seats in the Centre, Punjab 50% and Bengal 40%. In provinces where the Muslims were in minority, their representation was doubled. Mohammad Ali Jinnah joined the Muslim League, after it was accepted as the party representing the Muslims of India.

The struggle continued with a lot of pitfalls and intrigues by the majority and their agents among the Muslims. So much so that at one stage Mohammad Ali Jinnah left for England disappointed with the party bickering. It was his patriotism and the sincerity of people like Mullana Mohammad Ali Johar and others that he decided to be their leader and contributed in various Round Table Conferences, which, in addition to the Hindus and Muslims had representatives from other minority communities like Christians, Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, Parsies, and Burmies. Mohammad Ali Jinnah tried his best to maintain harmony between the Hindus and the Muslims for the struggle of independence but he was every time disappointed by the Congress leadership, including Ghandi Ji’s behaviour backed by the British Government leadership at that time. Therefore, he decided to have one point agenda for a separate home land for the Muslims.

The 1940 historic Pakistan Resolution was adopted in Lahore which was presided over by Mohanimad All Jinnah. A number of prominent Christians were present on this historic occasion. Ch. Chandu Lal, who had later become the deputy speaker of Punjab Assembly and was a member of the Punjab Muslim League Council, demanded that the full rights of the minorities be embodied in the Constitution of the new State. The Quaid-e-Azam and other Muslim League leaders gave endorsement to this principal.

All India Christian Association had consistently supported Quaid-e-Azam rejecting the British offer of a separate homeland for the Christians-- a ploy to separate the Christians from supporting the Muslim cause. A lot of Muslim activists and religious parties opposed the Quaid-e-Azam. The Quaid-e-Azam commended the support from the Christians when he was given a reception by the Christians parliamentary members of the Punjab Assembly at Lahore on November 20, 1942. Miss Fatima Jinnah, Sir. Sikandar Hayat Khan, Chief. Minister Punjab, Sir Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot, President Punjab Muslim League and other prominent dignitaries including leaders of untouchables, Hindus, Sikhs, etc were present.

On 21st June 1947 Quaid-e-Azam, Miss Fatima Jinnah and Nawab of Mamdot had a special meeting with the Christian leaders at the Lahore residence of Diwan Bahadur S.P. Singha, Speaker of the Punjab Provincial Assembly of India. Diwan Bahadur S.P. Singha assured the Quaid-e-Azam that they would vote for the inclusion of West Punjab in Pakistan. On June 23rd when voting took place the Congress supported the ruling Unionist Party- an Alliance of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs landlords. This gave them 88 votes equal to Muslim League who were supported by two Christian members. The speaker came down from his chair and cast his vote for Muslim League which carried the Motion in favour of Pakistan. On this, we must remember the threat by Master. Tara Singh to the Christian members "JO MANGE GAA PAKISTAN USAY MILAY GAA KABRISTAN", meaning whoever wants Pakistan will get the grave yard. In reply Dewan Bahadur said "SENAY PER GOOLI KHAIN GAAY PAKISTAN BANAIN GAAY" (We will face the bullet on our chest and make Pakistan).

The very next day speaker S.P. Singha vetoed the proposal to form one National Assembly of Pakistan and India in the Punjab. This further infuriated the Hindus and Sikhs and their supporters.

On 19th July 1947, the Quaid-e-Azam nominated the first interim cabinet which included one untouchable Mr. Jogindar Nath Mandal as the Minister of Law, Education, Art and Labour. The others were Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, Mr. Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar, Sardar. Abdur Rab Nishtar and Raja. Ghanzanfar Ali Khan. They were the same who had also been nominated by the Quaid-e-Azam for the interim cabinet of Government of India.

On 25th July 47, the Christian leadership under Dewan Bahadur S.P.

Singha, appeared before the Punjab Boundary Commission, headed by Sir. Cyril Radcliff and asked him to count the Christians and other minorities of Punjab with the Muslims to decide on the areas to be given to Pakistan. Mr. Joginder Nath Mandal did the same before Bangal Boundary Commission for counting of schedule cast. This is how East Pakistan came into being. On 10th August 47 the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan met in Karachi, where the Quaid-e-Milat nominated Mr. Joginder Nath Mandal, to preside which was seconded by Khawaja Nazim uddin and he took the presiding chair. After the Inauguration and paying tributes, Mr. Mandal proposed that Quaid-e-Azam should preside over the Assembly and he was elected the following day.

Quaid-e-Azam's Vision of Pakistan

Alama Iqbal's poetry and his thoughts and philosophy of a Muslim Nationhood greatly influence Quaid-e-Azam's struggle for a separate homeland.

The struggle for Pakistan and the importance given to all communities by the Quaid-e-Azam clearly showed that it going to be a Theocratic State. In his first presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, he clearly and unmistakably claimed that:

“You can change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter what community he belongs to, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first second and last a citizen of this State, with equal rights, privileges and obligations. There will be no end to the progress you will make.

I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in the course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community, because even as regards Muslim, you have. Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vishnus, Kshatras, also Begalis, Madrasis and so on, will vanish.

“You are free. You are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the State.

“We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed or another. We are starting with this fundamental principal, that we are all citizens and equal members of one State.

“Now, I think that we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in the course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.”

The same day the National flag of Pakistan was approved, presenting the design to the Assembly Quaid-e-Milat told members,

“This flag is not only for the minorities currently in the country, but will also represent those who eventually will be in Pakistan. This is not the flag of any political party or sect. It is the flag of all Pakistan.”

The following day, this Assembly conferred on the Honourable Mr. Mohammed Ali Jinnah the title “Quaid-e-Azam” (Great Leader). From then onwards, he was addressed by this title, which appeared in all government documents.

The Quaid-e-Azam took oath as governor general with allegiance to King George VI, his heirs and successor, oath was given by Sir. Abdur Rasheed, Chief Justice of Lahore High Court. He appointed his cabinet including Mr. Joginder Nath Mandal as Minister of Law and Labour. He also appointed seven British Christians as Governor and chief commissioner of four provinces and chiefs of Army, Air force, and Navy.

The above vision of Quaid-e-Azam clearly showed that he never wanted division of the Pakistanis on religion, caste, class or creed. That was the reason that all Pakistanis especially Christians held a thanks giving service on 17th August 47 at Holy Trinity Church, Karachi. The Quaid-e-Azam, Mohtrama Fatima Jinnah and prominent Government and Civil dignitaries attended the service. After the service, the Quaid-e-Azani again declared his determination that would be there no discrimination between Muslims and Christians in Pakistan.

Quaid-e-Azam along with Mohtrama Fatima Jinnah attended the Christmas celebrations in a Church on 25th December 47. Where his 71st birthday was also celebrated and prayers were offered for the prosperity, unity and security of Pakistan. The Quaid-e-Azam continued to preach religious harmony, which is evident from the slogan he gave to the Pakistanis of “Unity, Faith and Discipline”. It was unfortunate that he left us after thirteen months of independence and his opponents and extremists got a chance to bring Pakistan to a stage where things are absolutely against the Quaid-e-Azam’s vision.

Religious Minorities in Pakistan

They comprise about 4% of the population, but the census can never be accurate. They comprise Hindus, Christians, schedule caste, Sikhs, Ahmadies (Who were part of Muslims till late 70’s) Bahais, Parsis, Buddhists and Kalash in Chitral (Presumably descendants of the lost legions of Alexander, the great).

The Quaid-e-Azam had visualized Pakistan to be a welfare State where everybody would be treated as equal citizen. However, after his death, efforts were made to make it an Islamic State. The start was with the Objective Resolution, drafted by Maullana Shabir Ahmad Usmani which was presented to the Assembly by the Quaid-e-Milat, who dismissed any apprehension that it

implied a Theocratic State by declaring:

“The people are the real recipient of power. This naturally eliminates any danger of the establishment of a theocracy.... I cannot over-emphasize the fact that such an idea is absolutely foreign to Islam... and therefore the question of a theocracy simply does not arise in Islam.”

On 23rd March 1956, the first Constitution of Pakistan, was enacted and after nine years of Independence, Pakistan was declared an “Islamic Republic”.

1962 Constitution enacted on 1st March 62, reverted to Republic of Pakistan. However due to pressure from fundamentalists it was declared an Islamic Republic in 1963.

Role of Non-Muslim Pakistanis

Religious hate frenzy was stirred up by interested parties before partition and millions lost their lives and the best migrated to India/Pakistan. These were the people who suffered on account of revenge that had stirred up riots in places which were so far peaceful. Hindus and Muslims had the choice but other minorities, living in either country being sons and daughters of the soil, decided to stay put and help in building the new nations. The major players were the Christian who had devoted themselves to education, healthcare and other social work.

They were the first to come to the help of the refugees as part of their religious duty of service to humanity.

They continued to serve the country all along as they are directed in the Holy Book, “Let every person be subject to the governing authorities for there is no authority except from God and those authorities that exist have been instituted by God” (St. Paul’s Letter to Romans, Chapter 13 Verse 1). No Christian especially and other members of the minority have ever been disloyal to the country. They have been serving in all spheres of national life, and in education and health they have left the others behind. Other communities like Parsis have also contributed in education and other fields but at a lesser scale in Karachi where they have the concentration. They were business community and wanted to migrate after the riots but stayed back on assurance by the Quaid-e-Azam. Some Hindu philanthropists had established hospitals, before partition which are now being run by the government.

For 25 years after independence of Pakistan, the minorities especially Christians served at important posts. In 1960, President F.M Ayub Khan appointed Justice A.R Cornelious as the chief Justice of Pakistan. He served several times as the Acting President of Pakistan. He retired in 1968 and was appointed Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs in 1969, by General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. He was asked to supervise the 1970 elections and also prepared a draft of a New Pakistan constitution which was appreciated by Jamat-e-Islami chief Maullana Mian Mohammad Tufail, who

declared it to be an Islamic Constitution. Justice Cornelious was a great supporter of certain Islamic Laws and was not afraid to project the same in the International Conferences of Judges. However, when Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came up he declared that he would never accept an Islamic Constitution by a Zimmi (Subjugated Citizen and less than equal). That was the start of problems for the minorities especially Christians.

Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto delivered another blow to the services of the minorities especially Christians when he nationalized all educational Institutions in 1973, as head of the Government. The entire leadership of Pakistan, even in office today have been trained and educated by these Christians/Missionary Institutions. They were the only ones functioning at the time of partition and for the first quarter of a century in the life of Pakistan. Allama Iqbal also got his initial school and college education in Missionary Institution which laid stress on producing good human beings.

Provisions in the Constitutions of Pakistan

The Constitution of Pakistan provides safeguards for the minorities in Pakistan as under:

Special Discrimination and Religious Intolerance

Persons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights, including those set forth in the present declaration, individually as well as in conformity with other members of their group, without any discrimination. Article 3 (1)

Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities

No one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair his freedom to have religion or belief of his choice.

No one shall be subject to discrimination by any state, institution, group of persons or person on the grounds of religion or other beliefs. Article 1 (2) and 2 (1)

Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief

Parochial and other Similar Prejudices to be Discouraged

The state shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their due representation in the Federal and Provincial services. (Article 33, Constitution of Pakistan)

Protection of Minorities

The state shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their due representation in the Federal and Provincial services.

(Article 36, Constitution of Pakistan)

All governments, whether civilian or military, made promises and high claims of building religious tolerance and working towards non-discrimination in Pakistan. However, regimes changed and decades passed but this goal remained an illusive dream. It was so because they failed to qualify their claims with concrete steps.

No amount of legislature within the country and International Human Rights Rules can have any effect unless the majority community does not change its thinking accordingly. There is no sense in talking about safeguards, unless they are implemented. One thing must be understood by the majority community of Pakistan that all Christians and Muslims and other minorities are the sons and daughters of this soil. Especially the Christians and Muslims in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent are converts from old inhabitants. There are very few direct descendants of invading Muslim Armies. The Christians have ancestors belonging to Hindu, Muslims and Sikh communities. My family had ancestors from all three above religions. So our ancestors may be common. The Christians of Pakistan have no blood relations with any outsiders. As against this, the Muslims, living in western countries, especially the UK, the USA and Europe, are all aliens. Over the last few years, some locals are converting to Islam, but their percentage as compared to outsiders is still negligible.

There is a big misunderstanding that the Western countries are Christian. There is a majority of Christians in these countries, but no country is named as such, so much so that the United Kingdom whose Monarch was known as “Protector of Christian Faith” is no more that. Prince Charles has declared that he is protector of all faiths. They all followed the teachings of Islam which encompasses the Torah, Psalms, and Bible and practice them. Thousands of people especially Muslims are living on social security in the UK and other countries. They practice Haqook-ul-Abaad – Rights of people, whereas we in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, do not practise it to that extent. Many Pakistanis living on social grant in the UK, buy properties in Pakistan from their grants. They have all the rights guaranteed in the UN charters, including freedom of worship and they are having worship places of their own. Even some Churches have been handed over to be used as Mosques and Temples.

Successive Governments and leaders in Pakistan, placate the religious parties to prolong their rule. As a fall over of this, the fanatics have enacted laws which have created discrimination and hatred amongst various sects/religions in Pakistan. They have become tools to settle personal differences, grab properties and thus denigrate both the Muslims and the Non-Muslim Pakistanis.

Major Problems and their Solutions

There was complete harmony and understanding between people belonging to various religions and sects before partition and immediately after partition as well. People used to live together and attend each others religious functions. Every one was judged as a human being and was treated as a respectable member of society. However, Partition saw hatred developing to such an extent that millions were massacred in the name of religion. In this holocaust, however, there were many examples of Hindus protecting their Muslim neighbours and vice versa. The Christians were spared and had the chance to serve humanity by looking after the wounded and the destitute on either side. Intolerance and religious fanaticism have been rising over the last three decades, especially after the Afghan War, where the West used the Muslims to wage a Holy war (Jehad) against the Russians. They provided every support to the Jihadis; of course the Muslim countries did not lag behind. However, this Jihad is still going on, but is causing adverse effect on the Pakistani nation.

We need to correctly educate the masses on the concept of Jehad in Pakistan.

Blasphemy Law

Late General Zia-ul-Haq enacted the Blasphemy Law to discourage any derogatory remarks against the Prophet of Islam (PBUH) and the Holy Quran. We, in this part of the world, hold our elders in great esteem and no body can dare to be rude or disrespectful to their elders - how can one dare to be disrespectful to the Prophet (PBUH) and the Holy Quran if he is in proper senses. But the law was enforced and the Shariat bench increased the punishment to death sentence. The result was that our illiterate and ignorant and fanatic people started using it to settle personal grievances. Today, there are more cases against Muslims than Non-Muslim Pakistanis. Lot of innocent people have been killed by the mob frenzy; so far no body has been executed by court sentences. Therefore, this law is doing more harm than good. No Government can dare to do away with it, due to the present religious fanaticism. Therefore, following suggestions are offered.

- a. A competent authority should be delegated powers to hear and decide on the merit of each complaint, before registration of a case.
- b. In case of the murder of the accused during this period, the complainant and his accomplices should be charged with homicide.
- c. In case of a false case the complainant should also be liable for maximum sentence given in the law for the death of the accused.
- d. The masses should be educated to be broad minded and not indulge in mud slinging on the basis of religion.

Education

The biggest damage to interfaith harmony has been done by the teachings, especially in the lower class text books, where it is written that:

- a. Pakistan was only made for Muslims (Negation of Quaid-e-Azam's Vision)
- b. All Non-Muslims are Kafirs (Infidels).
- c. There are a few verses in the Holy Quran where Muslims are cautioned not to share their secrets with Jews and Christians. These verses were meant for that specific period of time and environment. We emphasis on this, but forget to appreciate that whenever in doubt about any thing in the religious teachings of Islam, we should seek guidance from holders of Holy Books, especially the Holy Bible.
- d. We forget to mention that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) had offered to the delegation of Christians that they could offer their prayers in the Holy Mosque, as it was also the House of God. The Christian delegation was thinking of going out after the meeting to offer prayers.
- e. Similar education plus wrong concepts of Jihad and suicide bombers, is being taught in some Madrasah and backward areas which is detrimental to the spirit of Islam.

The Government must ensure that such lessons are taken out of the text books and Ulama are given a guideline for their sermons, as is being done in Saudi Arabia. This is very important to offset religious / sectarian hatred.

All left over Nationalized Educational Institutions, must be handed back at the earliest.

The present Government has already taken bold steps in this regard.

Religious Freedom

In spite of provisions in the Constitution of Pakistan, there are sporadic incidents of protests against construction of churches. In spite of Government's sanction, St' Thomas Church, Islamabad was constructed at the third site, due to opposition from fanatics. Similar is the fate of another church in Islamabad which is not yet allowed to be constructed even after the Capital Development Authority's (CDA) sanction and prolonged legal battle in F-7 Sector, Islamabad.

The attacks on churches, Christian Educational Institutions and Hospitals where more than 80% of Muslims benefit are noticed in retaliation to any action by the West and the U.S.A against Muslims. We fail to recognize the religious freedom to Muslims in those countries. Hence, this back lashes in Pakistan.

It must be understood and can be cross checked that no Christian /

other minority religious teacher, during their prayer and sermons ever criticizes other sect or religion. They have to confine their religious talks / sermons to the Holy Books, teaching us as to how we should lead our lives in the service of humanity to please the Creator.

A lot of Muslim scholars waste their energies on trying to find fault especially in the Christian faith because they consider other religions as idol worshippers. They mainly try to dwell over the following aspects.

- a. The Bible has been changed but where is the original one, no body can produce.
- b. The Christians worship three Gods (Trinity). When the Muslims consider ISAA RTJH ALLAH (Christ the spirit of God) that is Trinity and similar other things. How does it effect the Muslim faith is not understood.
- c. Some T.V Channels are going all out to provide chance to such intellectuals to spread religious hatred.

Late General Zia-ul-Haq, who is being blamed for all the fanaticism today, used to say that we should not leave our faith and must not touch other man's faith (APNI MASLAK KO CHORO MAAT AUR DOSRAY KE MASLAK KO CHERO MAAT). This has to be adopted in today's world for religious harmony.

Hadood and other ordinances have further deprived women, who already have the weightage of half witness. They have to produce four male Muslim witnesses to prove a rape case. How on earth four respectable men can allow a rape in front of their eyes to sense as witnesses later on.

Change of Religion to Islam

The Non-Muslim Pakistani women are target of kidnapping and forcible marriage on the excuse that they have embraced Islam. The police also connives at it. Some non-Muslim Pakistanis also misuse this excuse. They leave their wives / husbands elope with another one of the same religion and convert to Islam and get married with immunity at the hands of a Mullah. I am not prepared to believe that Islam condones such immorality but our law and police, do not act on a report. The solution to these problems lies in:

- a. Interference in other people's faith should be banned by law. Islam should not be forced on others as has been happening recently in the Frontier where Hindus and Christians have been receiving threatening letters to convert or face the consequences.
- b. All kidnapping and elopement cases should be recovered even if they have converted or marriages performed and placed in a solitary neutral custody for at least 7-10 days. Then they should be interviewed by an unbiased dignitary to find the facts and decide

accordingly. If force is identified, the culprits should be dealt with sternly according to the law.

- c. The common man especially the young generation at the grass root level should be given the correct religious education and not left at the mercy of illiterate religious teachers. Efforts should be made to make them good human beings first.
- d. No body should be allowed to interfere in the construction of worship places of the non-Muslim Pakistanis.
- e. The Evacuee Property Trust Board which controlled the Hindu property and temples should be asked to handover all existing temples to the members of the Hindu community along with attached property. Hindus and other minority persons should be employed on the staff of E.P.T.B for dedicated supervision. Initially, we can start with 25% quota on all seats.

The present Government is doing a great service by providing security at all place of worship and is also providing funds for their upkeep and maintenance.

Political Scenario

There have been many changes in procedures during the last 60 years depriving the minorities to take part in mainstream politics. The present Government has given them the joint electorate and reserved seats in Assemblies. The problem is that the minorities coming on proportionate representation are not the real representatives of the community. They represent the parties and have to follow their dictates. Some of them even do not take part in officially organized religious functions as they belong to the opposition parties. At the grass roots local bodies' elections, they do represent their communities and have double votes. There are no seats for the minorities in the Senate. It is, therefore, strongly recommended that:

- a. Minorities should be given right of double vote as is given to the Kashmiris, one to elect the local majority members and second to elect their own representatives.
- b. For this, the seats should be increased proportionately and constituencies ear-marked on population basis. In the first instance, 50% increased in the present seats be given at national and provincial level.
- c. Minorities must be given at least 3 seats in the Senate, one permanent seat each for Hindus and Christians and one for other smaller communities.
- d. Minority women should also be given appropriate share in the women seats.

Conclusion

The Non-Muslim Pakistanis are very patriotic and loyal to the nation. They are playing their role in all fields at national level. They are serving with dedication with a spirit of service to humanity. They are ready to share the difficulties of the common Pakistanis deprived of basic amenities of life, knowing that might is right in our country. The rich strong and the well-linking people exploit the weak and our history is full of such oddities. But they, like all other patriotic Pakistanis, hope and pray for a better times to come. We can not allow a handful of fanatics and dacoits to make the entire nation hostage. Majority of the Pakistanis are well meaning and enlightened people, but we all must put our efforts together to eliminate the small number of undesirable elements. ■

CHAPTER IV

GOVERNANCE ISSUES AND RELIGIOUS AFFINITIES –
PROBLEM OF PRACTICAL POLITICS

Haji Muhammad Hanif Tayyab

*T*he role of religion has remained fundamental in political history of Pakistan. The religious affinities have played a very crucial role in Pakistan's movement and its constitutional development. It is an unchallengeable fact that during the movement for creation of Pakistan, the All India Muslim League faced unimaginable difficulties, the most prominent amongst these was that in the beginning, response of the Muslim masses was very poor and dormant which compelled the All India Muslim League to summon its central Executive Committee meeting to review this problem. Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah chaired the session. It was resolved that a high level delegation, led by Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan, should meet prominent religious and spiritual leaders. As a result, delegation of All India Muslim League, met Allama Shah Abdul Aleem Siddique, Allama Abudul Hamid Badayuni and other scholars and asked for their support. Allama Badayuni himself narrated the details of that meeting, when I met him with a delegation of Anjuman Talba-e-Islam (Pakistan) in late 1960s. It was this moral, practical, dynamic, well-knit, and influential support of Ulamas and Mashaikh that helped the creation of Pakistan. General masses had great faith in these religious and spiritual leaders. Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah felt the importance of this support, up to the extent that he went to the very remote part of sub-continent i.e. MANKI SHAREEF to ensure the support for Pakistan Movement. When I visited Manki Shareef with Mr. Muhammad Khan Junejo, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, I had the chance to see the written pledge given by Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah assuring Ulema and Mashaikh that Islamic Shariat will be enforced in Pakistan. Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah awarded the title of "FATEHAY SARHAD" to Allama A. Hamid Badaymi in recognition of his services for the creation of Pakistan. Religion has always been a major factor in the formulation of our foreign policy. To be brief, importance of religion in governance issues of Pakistan has remained of prime importance. Starting from Ideology of Pakistan to Objective Resolution and from constitutional development to practical politics, religion has remained the prime guiding force for governance.

Religious affinities can have a very positive impact on governance. Islam can serve the purpose of a uniting force. Unfortunately, those who, in the garb of religion preached sectarianism, are responsible for the division of society into various groups. Basic question is this that are we capable enough to take these religions affinities in confidence, share views with them, listen to their ideas and advice, and discuss with them solution of problems being faced in the matter of governance. My personal but well calculated observation is that we have never been serious in getting advice from them Governments too have not given them due respect. We only pay respect to them when we are in the midst of crisis. For formulation of policies, such as population welfare, health, economy, and social development including elimination of social evil, religious affinities can play a major role. It is a fact undeniable that Bangladesh government and specially their Health Department has been able to eradicate Polio and TB from the country after consulting Ulemas & Mashaikh by using the platform of Juma (Friday) prayers.

We are facing governance issues since long but we are not ready to study in detail the society that was illiterate and ferocious, also, we do not know, how the Holy Prophet (PBUH) had created civic sense amongst them and how he had mustered mutual respect among them. The society that had never respected parents and elders suddenly became an exemplary society by the teaching of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). After facing very huge problems, we must try to see why Michael Heart has rated Muhammad (PBUH) as the best person in the human history, who has solved problems faced by human beings. ■

CHAPTER V

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING IN INTER
RELIGIOUS AND INTRA RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

Vakil Ahmad Khan

*I*t is a matter of great honour for me to have an opportunity to deliver a lecture on such a serious topic before this gathering of distinguished scholars and religious personalities.

In the first instance, I would like to explain how the world is going through a turmoil of clash and conflict. The post-September 11 World is seized with the dangers of religious extremism and conflict between religious communities, particularly between two or more of the Abrahamic faiths: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. The threat of religious extremism is real and well organised. The connection between religion and conflict is in the process of being thoroughly explored, to the extent that hyperbole and exaggeration are commonplace. In the popular parlance discussing religion in the context of international affairs, automatically raises the spectre of religious-based conflict.

The contribution that religion can make to peacemaking-the flip side of religious conflict-is only beginning to be explored and explicated. All three of the Abrahamic faiths contain strong warrants for peacemaking. There are past cases of mediation and peacemaking by religious leaders and institutions. For example, the World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of Churches mediated the short-lived 1972 peace agreement in Sudan. In South Africa, various churches were at the vanguard of the struggle against apartheid and the peaceful transition. The most dramatic and most frequently cited case, is the successful mediation the Rome-based community of Sant'Egidio achieved to help end the civil war in Mozambique in 1992.

Repeatedly citing these cases, as the main points of reference, distorts the reality of religious peacemaking. Most of the cases of religious or faith-based peacemaking are less dramatic in their outcome. Also, religious peacemaking is becoming much more common, and the number of cases cited is growing at an increasing pace.

When communal identities, particularly the religious identities are key causal factors in violent conflicts, traditional diplomacy may be of little value in seeking peace or conflict management. Douglas Johnston, President of the

International Center on Religion and Diplomacy, has identified conditions in several conflict situations, that lend themselves to faith-based intervention:

- religion is a significant factor in the identity of one or both parts to the Conflict;
- religious leaders on both sides of the dispute can be mobilized to facilitate peace;
- protracted struggles between two major religious traditions transcend national borders, as has been the case over time with Islam and Christianity; and/or Islam and Judaism.

Johnston also identifies the attributes that religious leaders and institutions can offer in promoting peace and reconciliation, including:

- credibility as a trusted institution;
- a respected set of values;
- moral warrants for opposing injustice on the part of governments;
- unique leverage for promoting reconciliation among conflicting parties... including an ability to rehumanize situations that have been dehumanized over the course of protracted conflict;
- a capability to mobilize community, nation, and international support for a peace process;
- an ability to follow through locally in the wake of a political settlement and
- a sense of calling that often inspires perseverance in the face of major, otherwise debilitating, obstacles.

By way of example, African peacemaker, Hizkias Assefa, emphasizes the commendable role of religious leaders as an asset in peacemaking. Such religious leaders are particularly effective in working together for peace when they are from different faith communities. When the faiths explore and practice common values, such as justice and compassion, in public life, religious leaders can be a source of inspiration to others.

Religious resources are contained in the four main elements, of which religions consist. Haar identifies these elements as: religious ideas (content of belief), religious practices (ritual behavior), social organization (religious community), and religious--or spiritual--experiences. These dimensions can all be used in the service of peacemaking. Two critical elements in religious life that are centrally important to peacemaking are empathy and compassion, and the value of tapping into these attributes is readily apparent in effective religious peacemaking.

Religion in many parts of the world is perceived to be contributing to violent conflicts, although this statement is exaggerated in many cases. This is well documented and broadly accepted. Usually disregarded, however, are

opportunities to employ the assets of religious leaders and religious institutions to promote peace. Traditional diplomacy has been particularly remiss in its neglect of the religious approach to peacemaking.

Status of Religious Freedom

The constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 establishes Islam as the state religion. It also states that adequate provisions shall be made for minorities to profess and practice their religions freely. Under the Constitution, religious communities are generally free to observe their religious obligations. However, religious minorities are, in some places, legally restricted from public display of certain religious images.

Freedom of speech is subject to “reasonable” restrictions in the interests of the glory of Islam — the religion professed by the over-whelming majority. The consequences for contravening the country’s “blasphemy laws, are the death penalty for defiling Islam or its prophets; life imprisonment for defiling, damaging, or desecrating the Qur’an; and ten years’ imprisonment for insulting another’s religious feelings”. To end the filing of frivolous charges, the Government enacted a law in January 2005 that requires senior police officials to investigate any blasphemy charges before a complaint is filed. In addition, any speech or conduct that injures another’s religious feelings, including those of minority religious groups, is prohibited and punishable by imprisonment. Under the Anti-Terrorist Act, any action, including speech, intended to stir up religious hatred is punishable by up to seven years of rigorous imprisonment. Under the act, bail is not to be granted if the judge has reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is guilty; however, the law is applied selectively. The Constitution provides for the “freedom to manage religious institutions.” In principle, the Government does not restrict organized religious groups from establishing places of worship and training members of the clergy.

The constitution safeguards “educational institutions with respect to religions”. No student can be forced to receive religious instruction or to participate in religious worship other than his or her own. The denial of religious instructions for students of any religious community or denomination is also prohibited. ‘Islamiyyat’ (Islamic studies) is compulsory for all Muslim students in state-run schools, whereas students of other faiths legally are not required to study Islam. The constitution specifically prohibits discriminatory admission to any governmental educational institution, solely on the basis of religion.

Interfaith Dialogue- Inter-Religious Conflict Prevention

The Government at its most senior levels, calls for interfaith dialogue and sectarian harmony as part of its programme to promote enlightened

moderation. It was instrumental in organizing the inaugural meeting of the World Council of Religions, an interfaith body of Ulema and religious scholars devoted to interfaith dialogue. Clergy members from all Islamic schools of thought and minority faith communities, with the exception of the Ahmadis, who were not invited, joined the Council. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Council of Islamic Ideology, a constitutionally mandated government body, continue to sponsor interfaith and inter-sectarian workshops and meetings. The Religious Affairs Ministry plays an active role in negotiating the inter—sectarian injunction against sectarian violence and the killing of non-Muslims in the country.

The necessity of responding to the processes of globalisation and the threats of ecological disaster has brought about a fast growing realisation that religions only have relevance to the extent that they can work together for humanity and put aside the contentions of the past. Globalisation and migration mean that no community can any longer live in isolation from others: even in countries where there is only one religion, religious pluralism enters through migration, travel, trade, the media, and the Internet. It is in reaction to such processes, that movements for inter-religious dialogue have gained growing support.

How can the task of dialogue make headway, so that religions can become effective forces for peace, which so many of their adherents proclaim to be. The task has to be achieved along two parallel interactive tracks with one overriding goal, namely that of (a) taking religion as a cause of conflict out of political and communal relations and (b) reinserting it as a factor for reconciliation and communal development. Both tracks must be pursued simultaneously at all levels, from the street to the palace, so to speak with universities, religious institutions and the media, having particular roles to play along that spectrum.

The first track has to do with the urgency of defusing current and potential community conflicts. Here a number of different projects take place and can be multiplied and developed. In some countries, local interfaith groups are making a noticeable contribution, while in others, inter-religious involvement in development have shown the potential for success. Political action against discrimination in employment, access to education, health and social welfare, etc., is another route by which people of different religious commitments have come together around a shared sense of justice.

In the universities, there are also tasks for social and political scientists, especially and probably also for psychologists although that is an explosively sensitive area. In Europe and North America, especially, the social and political sciences have until recently tended to ignore religion as a dying ember of the past: there were the secular sciences par excellence. As a result, the political and social scientists were often taken completely by surprise when religion suddenly returned to the forefront politics. They have thus had great

difficulty in coming to terms with; for example, the political resurgence of Islam, but the situation is not changing.

The second track is a long-term vision. Among the faiths, for example, between Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam, we have accumulated centuries of baggage, where we tend to remember the hard times and use them as ammunition against each other in subsequent conflicts. In good times, this negative baggage is stored away, but it does not take much to recall it, so that a battle in 1389 in the Balkans again becomes a live landmine in modern Yugoslavia, or one in Ireland in 1689 becomes the central symbol of conflicting communal identities three centuries later. All similar past events which refuse to remain safely in the history books, may be identified. The long-term project must be to change that baggage. We cannot discard it, and the human need for a sense of identity rooted in shared history, symbols and experiences needs baggage, but we can make conscious efforts to change it, or rather to change its meanings, just as they in the past been changed.

Here one might also draw special attention to the impact of the training of the religious professionals, priests, imams, religious teachers, etc., a particularly sensitive field because few states relish the risk involved in trying to interfere on this point. Clearly this is an arena where patient persuasion and dialogue is required, where an overlap between universities and religious training conducted in seminaries creates a direct link which can have more chances of success.

On both of these two tracks - the short-term and the long-term — the dialogue is the end but it is also the means. The dialogue must extend to the theological task by which scholars and thinkers from various religions work together not only on their mutually agreed views but also involving the outsider in their own internal theological rethinking. Only by thus internalizing the other, can a religion firmly and permanently become a full actor in a culture for peace.

Intra-Religion Conflict Prevention

In Pakistan, the intra-religion conflict mostly occurs between the Shias and Sunnis. The Shia community is a large community in Pakistan and that there are many differences between one Shia group and the other. This is why, it is important that dialogue between Sunnis and Shias becomes a movement and a process throughout society instead of everyone waiting for one high powered dialogue to yield some results at the leadership level.

Shia-Sunni sectarian terrorism is a part of the undeclared conflict, Pakistan is currently going through. The sectarian violence declined after the establishment of a religious opposition group Mutahida Majlis e Amal (MMA) that included Shias along with Sunnis, but the violence has recently restarted

after the terrible incidents in Quetta and Parachinar. If a dialogue was in place, that terrorism would have failed to restart sectarian violence.

This mutual recognition gives us hope that a dialogue can bear fruit of peace and harmony between both the communities.

Welfare of Minorities

For peace building measures amongst followers of different religions other than Muslims, the Government of Pakistan is committed to the welfare of the non-Muslims and has taken various steps towards their welfare. These include:

- (1) Creation of a full fledged Division for welfare of minorities.
- (2) Restoration of Joint Electorate System for Minorities.
- (3) Representation in Local Bodies.
- (4) Establishment of National Commission for Minorities.
- (5) Creation of a special Fund for the Welfare and uplift of Minorities.
- (6) Award of scholarships for Minorities students.
- (7) Establishment of National Cultural Award for Minorities.
- (8) Grant of financial assistance to non-Muslim affectees of natural calamities.
- (9) Promulgation of Ordinance, protecting the communal properties of minority communities in 2002.
- (10) Return of Educational Institutions of Christians, nationalized in 1972.

All the above steps have resulted in trust by Minorities in the Government as well as in the Muslims of Pakistan and there is no significant conflict among the Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan. ■

POLITICAL ROLE OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN PAKISTAN — REVIEW AND REFLECTIONS

Prof. Dr. Riaz Ahmad

According to the Constitution of 1973 Pakistan is termed as an Islamic State by which the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) are declared as supreme law of the land which implies that no law repugnant to Islam can be promulgated in Pakistan. This conforms to be the will of the people whose 95% of 160 million people are the Muslims. The minorities professing different faiths of Hinduism, Sikhism, Christian and other are less than 5% of the total population. Despite the fact that majority of the population is Muslim the Muslim community is divided into various sects — Sunnis and Shias, being the two major sects. The Sunnis who form the majority of about 75% are further divided into sub-sects of Brelvi, Diobandi, Wahabi, etc. The Shia whose population is less than 20% of the total population are also divided into various sub-sects—Asna Ashriyas, Ismailis, Agha Khanis, Bohras, Nur Bakshis, etc. But in terms of law all Shias belong to one school of fiqh — i.e. Jafari school of thought. Against this the Sunnis stick to two schools of fiqahs — Hanafis and Malikis. Those who profess Hanafi school of thought are the Brelvis and Deobandis. The Brelvis are, however, in majority, say about 65% of the population but their religious conception of Islam is significantly different from those of the Deobandis. While the Brelvis cherish Mashaikhs, Pirs, tombs and Mazars, the Deobandis are against these manifestations. While Brelvis consider the Holy Prophet, Sufis, Mashaikhs, Pirs, Tombs and Mazars as a strong link between man and the God, the Deobandis consider these as heresies. They think that in order to establish link between God and the man there is no need of any intermediary. Man should establish direct link with God without the support or help of any intermediary. The perception of Shia community is also very near to the Brelvis. Thus in the interpretation of laws of Islam there is a great difference of opinions between different communities.

This has created a lot of problems for the State. Despite the fact that the constitution of Pakistan professes to be Islamic, there are a number of religious groups especially belonging to the Deobandi and Wahabi school of thought who believe that Islamic Shariat should be promulgated. Various political parties like those of Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam are vocally demanding that Islamic Shariat should be promulgated in Pakistan. The Taliban and Al-Qaida movement in Afghanistan and tribal areas of Pakistan conform to this ideology, whereas the other groups think that as the

Constitution of 1973 has declared the Holy Quran and Sunnah as the supreme law of the land there is no need for implementation of separate shariat. The other difference between Deobandi and Wahabi school of thought on the one hand is that they want to establish Islamic shariat by force, while the Brelvis and Shias consider that adoption of Islamic laws should be left on the voluntary will of the people. The attitude of these two groups towards the minorities is also different. While the Deobandis and Wahabis consider that the non-Muslims should be declared as *Zimmis* — protected citizens, the Brelvis and Shias consider that the non-Muslim should also be considered as equal citizens as declared by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah in his speech of 11 August 1947. The Constitution of Pakistan also makes the same declaration.

If we go by these standards there are not more than 10 to 15% of the people of Pakistan who belong to the extremist section. Majority of the population of Pakistan is liberal minded. That is the main reason that liberalism prevails in majority of the areas of Pakistan. Thus there is only a small minority who want to force their brand of Islam on the whole people of Pakistan. The activities of this group increased as a result of 9/11 2001 incident in USA. It was because of the majority people's version of liberal traditions of Islam in Pakistan that government of Gen. Pervez Musharraf has taken stand in support of war against terror. But the extremist elements in Pakistan are resisting Pervez Musharraf in this endeavour.

The constitution of Pakistan has tried to resolve this issue of Islamization in a good spirit of accommodation and toleration without sticking to any brand of Islam or *fiqah*. The criminal laws are equally applicable to all the citizens of Pakistan without any discrimination of race, colour, ethnicity, region, *fiqah*, sect or religion. As far as the private law is concerned it has been left on the individual or the group or sect or religion to which a person belongs. It is in this way that Constitution of Pakistan has tried to resolve this problem. It is, however, pointed out that this is not a new thing but the British Government in India also did the same thing. The British in turn inherited the same pattern from the Mughal rulers of India who were also very liberal in the application of private law of the people or the group to which they belonged.

Let us examine various Islamic provisions in this regard. The objectives resolutions passed by the first legislature of Pakistan in March 1949 which has been made part of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 being its preamble, declared that the "principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed".¹ Article two of the Constitution declares that Islam shall be the state religion of

¹ M. Rafiq Butt, *The Constitution of Pakistan 1973 with Commentary* Lahore, Mansoor Book House, 2004, p. 47.

Pakistan”.² This does not mean that non-Muslims are not equal citizen like others. As a matter of fact all citizens without any reference to their creed, colour, caste, region, religion or sect, are to be treated as equal citizens of Pakistan. That is why under article 20 of the Constitution “every citizen” has been allowed to “have the right to profess, practise and propagate his religion.”³ At the same “every religious denomination and every sect” has been allowed “to establish, maintain and manage its religious institution”⁴ Equality of citizens without any kind of discrimination, has been ensured by article 25 of the Constitution by which “all citizens” are not only “equal before law” but at the same they are “entitled to equal protection of law”.⁵ In this article it has also been mentioned that “there shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone”⁶ At the same it has been made clear in the same article that if the State want to make any “special provision for the protection of women and children” nothing will prevent it to do so.⁷

Under article 31 of the Constitution it has been made incumbent on the State to take “steps” for the purpose of enabling the Muslims of Pakistan “individually and collectively” to order their lines in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the meaning of life according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah”.⁸ Regarding the “steps” to be taken by the State there is a difference of opinion before the two segments of the society. The extremist group belonging to Deobandi and Wahabi school of this kind are of the view that the State should implement Islamic laws by force, but the liberal minded people belonging to the Brelvi and Shia school of thought think that by taking “steps” it does not mean that State should force its people, rather, it should allow congenial atmosphere by which the individuals are free to understand the tenets of Islam on volunteer basis. It should be left on the free choice of the people as to what extent they want to adopt principles of Islam. They are also free to adopt any sectarian pattern they would like to adopt. The State has no right to impose any particular brand of Islam on the people of Pakistan. People should be given free choice. Explaining this concept further for the Section 2 of article 31 of the Constitution stipulate that the State shall endeavour to make “the teaching of Holy Quaran and Islamiat compulsory” for the Muslims. It will also endeavour “to promote unity” amongst various sects of the Muslims.⁹ By article 33 of the Constitution it has also been

² *Ibid.*, p. 51.

³ *Ibid.*, p.79.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.79.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p.84.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

stipulated that the State shall discharge its responsibility to “discourage parochial, social, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices amongst its citizens”¹⁰■

¹⁰ *Ibid.*,

Remarks by Mr. Nicklas Norling

Overall, the participants emphasised on the main point: the growing radicalization within Pakistan and the increasing divide between moderate and extremist forces. This divide between peoples and religious communities was traced to the birth of Pakistan as a nation but got widened with time. Two groups were especially identified: one, the pluralistic community associated with the Quaid-i-Azam Ali Jinnah and the other the strictly Muslim idealists embodied in the Ulema and the legacy of General Zia-ul Haq. It was conceived that the main destabilizing force in Pakistan today is found in some of the Madrassas associated with the latter group. Around 2.8% of total Pakistani students are enrolled in Madrassas and it was argued by most of the participants that the negative effects of these overshadow the positive so far. The negative effects are primarily manifested in indoctrination, perpetuation of sectarianism and archaic methods of learning which, in turn, discourage critical and creative thinking.

The paradox is that these groups of people and radicalist forces there is a tendency to perceive themselves as Pakistan's "frontline warriors" and main defenders of ideology and nation. As one participant put it: "...since the people of the tribal area are the ones most loyal to Pakistan, how have they come to be now Pakistan's enemy?" Misperceptions about the intentions of both Pakistani state towards these groups and the poor education are likely to further this sense disillusionment. The same sense of betrayal is also evident in the handling of the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapon, Dr. A. Q. Khan. To many Pakistani citizens, putting Dr. A. Q. Khan under house arrest is shameful and an act of treason.

In a sense, the Pakistani government's fight against "their own people" together with Khan's imprisonment have created a feeling among some that Pakistan has sold out its national pride for the US interests in the global war on terror. Some participants also considered this to be the main external driver for the formation of the religiously inspired Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and harmonization of interests within this parliamentary coalition.

The basic context of how the local, national, and regional levels interrelate, and who are the main contending forces within served as the focus. The specifics of religious communities were discussed in detail in the seminar. According to Pakistani Constitution, the state has an obligation to ensure plurality and uphold the rights of all citizens. Even here, however, one can discern the contending forces of Pakistani politics with, on the one hand, those advocating the ideals of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and "rights for all" or, on the other, the less popular forces which seek to establish nation wide *Sharia* and lay the foundation for a true Islamic state. It was argued that a majority of

Pakistan's population are unfavorable to the imposition of *Sharia*. It was also argued that the problem in Waziristan and radical Islamic beliefs has demoralized the public, especially the Sufi-oriented Muslims, while simultaneously encouraging extremist elements.

As such, the major societal strains in Pakistan should not be seen as those occurring between non-Muslims or Muslims, perhaps not even between Shiites and Sunnis, but within the Sunni community itself. The differences between the Deobandi movement and Wahabism are one example of this. Another example of how the current situation in Pakistan disconfirms the "clash of civilizations" thesis is the fact that the blasphemy law is primarily used against Muslims.

There were, of course, concerns expressed on discrimination among some of the minority groups represented in the seminar. These include the role of Shiites, Nur Bakshis, and Ismailists in primarily Baltistan, Gilgit, and Karman. There was a general debate here among the participants whether these groups have been subject to discriminatory practices in their professional lives and education and the way the school-textbooks have described these groups.

An interesting point raised during the seminar concerning minorities was how they get adapted into parliamentary practices and party politics. It was observed that "many parties avoid appointments of minorities, and when they do, these minorities stop representing their ethnic constituency but uphold the party constituency." From the perspective of democratization, the finding is very interesting since it would be the first step towards a more democratic political system in which politics rather than religious or ethnic affiliation define relations to constituencies. A pre-condition for that however is that such groups are not discriminated against when entering politics in the first place. ■

*T*hank you, it has been most interesting to listen to you. It is of great help in trying to understand the situation. I would like to summarize what I have found most relevant and remarkable in what you have said during the debates.

Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed in his speech stressed that apart from rights for individuals, we should create rights for disadvantaged people to become full members of society. He furthermore made a forceful argument for taking away the blasphemy law in Pakistan.

Dr. Noor ul Haq said that tolerance in this country decreased after the foundation of the state of Pakistan. He gave us some interesting figures about the distribution of religious affiliation in different parts of the country. He also quoted a statement by the father of the nation, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who said that "first, second and last, you are a citizen of Pakistan." To the

Christians he said: “You are free to go to our mosque to pray to God.” The meaning of his quotation was later debated a great deal during the seminar.

Professor Mujeeb Ahmad illustrated how Barelwis had divided and merged again, showing the difficulty to maintain a broad unity on religious political matters.

Mr. Sayed Hussein Arif Naqvi stated that in some areas with Shia domination, discrimination against them takes place. In textbooks used in Pakistani schools, Shias are even called “non-Islamic”, a statement that sparked animated discussion at the table. He also said that incidents in connection with this discrimination are often white-washed.

Professor Abdul Samad Pirzada told us that there is a tendency among MMA leaders to see the US war on terror as a war against Islam and quoted some leaders, who have used Samuel Huntington’s theory about the clash of civilizations as support for their argument. He also told us that MMA opposes the extradition of the nuclear scientist Dr. A. Q. Khan.

Professor Pirzada argued that the experiences from US failures in Afghanistan and Iraq shall be fully utilized here in Pakistan in order to avoid a similar failure in Waziristan. “Political, not military solutions have to be found to this problem.”

During the debate after his intervention, it was said that “Interfaith communication means a need to give the same right to respect to the other side as you request on your own behalf.”

Colonel (retd) S.K. Tressler’s in his speech made the following points.

- The Government must ensure that such lessons are taken out of the text books and Ulema given a guideline for their sermon as is being done in Saudi Arabia. This is very important to reduce religious/sectarian hatred.
- Interference in other people’s faith should be banned by law.
- The common man, especially the young generation at the grass root level should be given the correct religious education and not left at the mercy of illiterate religious teachers. Efforts should be made to make them good human beings first.

Mr. Vakil Ahmad Khan talked about Conflict Prevention and Peace Building and in his speech he made the following observations.

- The government, at its most senior levels, calls for interfaith dialogue and sectarian harmony as part of its program to promote enlightened moderation.

- Even in countries where there is only one religion, religious pluralism enters through migration, trade, the media and the Internet.
- The task has to be achieved along two parallel interactive tracks with one overriding goal, namely that of (a) taking religion as a cause of conflict out of political and communal relations and (b) reinserting it as a factor for reconciliation and communal development.
- Political action against discrimination in employment, access to education, health and social welfare, etc, is another route by which people of different religious commitments have come together around a shared sense of justice.
- Here, one might also draw special attention to the impact of the training of the religious professionals, priests, imams, religious teachers, etc., as a particularly sensitive field in which few states risk getting involved.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Amb (retd) Ingolf Kiesow

Mr. Ingolf Kiesow made the concluding remarks at the end of the seminar which can be summarized as follows:

- Firstly, the religious minorities in the narrow sense of the word are not a problem in Pakistan, given the fact that non-Muslims are only about 4% of the population— yet the problem of principle still remains. How do you deal in a fair way with small disadvantaged groups?
- Even if problems between groups with different religions do not represent any serious problem for the security of the state of Pakistan, the relations between the different schools of Islam seem to represent a considerable problem, especially along the borders with Afghanistan.
- “Religious communities” is not a terminology that covers only members of different religions but also means members of different sects of the same religion.
- The discussions have been very relevant and quite revealing as most of the Nordic and European societies are not very familiar with the inner dynamics of Islamic forces and movements. What has been said is not only of importance within the borders of Pakistan but also for the entire region.

- In the end, Mr. Ingolf thanked Professor Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, President IPRI, the participants and audience for their valuable contributions. He hoped that these deliberations could be carried forward at a suitable time later — if and when possible.